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Abstract 
 
This thesis achieves a deconstructive interrogation of American national identity by 
analysing its representation in contemporary independent cinema. Drawing upon the post-
structuralist work of Jacques Derrida (and limited applications of his thought to film 
scholarship), this project theorises a rigorous (but non-programmatic) model for conducting 
deconstructive readings of cinematic texts. Engaging with a corpus of ostensibly 
independent films, case-study analyses of American identity narratives are used to theorise 
and enact a fruitful process of Derridean cinematic and cultural interpretation. In 
undertaking this broad theoretical objective, I intervene within a range of specific filmic and 
socio-political debates. Analysing texts drawn from within prevailing independent film 
definitions, this project undertakes a deconstructive re-inscription of this prominent 
cinematic category. Destabilising its conventional designation as Hollywood’s antonymic 
“other,” the ontological solidity of independent film is fatally compromised, opening up its 
constituent texts to a greater range of interpretative gestures. Furthermore, in addressing 
textual representations of national identity, I elucidate a discursive area largely unexplored 
in existing independent film scholarship. Characterising case-study analyses as overtly 
deconstructive, this thesis also destabilises structural orthodoxies that orient American 
identity discourses around dichotomous concepts of character and place. Thus, studying 
representations of prominent cultural narratives (individualism, the nuclear family, the 
small-town, and the wilderness), this thesis uncovers and then dismantles their restrictive 
metaphysical foundations. Specifically, drawing attention to discursive slippages and 
paradoxes that inhabit these forms of cultural narration, textual readings problematize their 
self-coherence and ontological closure. Relating these cultural analyses to popular and 
academic discourses of national identity, this thesis also expands the reach of Derridean 
theory into a range of other disciplines, such as American studies. Ultimately, this thesis’ 
multifaceted research objectives open up American identity discourses to an unfixed 
freeplay of différance, laying the foundations for a liberatory intervention into oppositional 
American cultural debates. 
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Introduction - Deconstruction, Film Theory, and National 
Identity 
 
Introduction 
 
 This thesis provides a deconstructive reading of American national identity by 
interrogating its representation in contemporary independent cinema. This overarching 
research objective is constituted at the intersection of several methodological, thematic, and 
discursive aims. To begin, this project offers a vital theoretical contribution to film studies, 
augmenting limited scholarship that has explicitly utilised Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive 
elucidations to intervene within cinematic discourses. Specifically, I theorise a rigorous (but 
non-programmatic) model for applying Derridean reading strategies to film texts, redressing 
a dearth of sustained academic work in this area; in doing so, this project builds upon 
scholarship that relocates cinema within post-structuralist discourses of textuality.1 These 
theoretical gestures will be explored in this introduction, following a brief elucidation of 
Derridean theory. 
 This thesis also provides a series of more specific interventions into a range of 
cinematic and cultural discourses. To begin, I engage with a particular textual corpus, 
comprised of films positioned within prevailing definitions of contemporary American 
independent cinema. Therefore, one of this thesis’ central research objectives is to undertake 
a deconstructive re-inscription of independent film itself; engaging directly within these 
ontological debates, my project highlights, overturns, and displaces the reductive binary 
logic with which it is constructed as a totalised cinematic category. In doing so, I challenge a 
conceptual orthodoxy that coercively restricts the readings one can draw from related texts; 
by disturbing independent film’s definitional certainty, myriad films are opened up to a 
greater range of interpretative gestures. This aspect of my thesis is elucidated in chapter one.  
 Thus, this thesis’ deconstructive engagement with independent cinema operates as a 
pre-cursor to a series of Derridean textual readings, marrying the project’s broad theoretical 
objectives with more specific interventions into film and cultural studies. Namely, a range of 
independent films will be approached as reflexive critiques of American national identity, 
evoking but then dismantling a prominent series of collective cultural narratives 
(individualism, the nuclear family, the small-town, and the wilderness). Drawing attention to 
discursive slippages and paradoxes that inhabit these forms of cultural narration,2 these 
                                                          
1
 For a key example of such approaches, see Peter Brunette and David Wills, Screen/Play: Derrida 
and Film Theory (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1989), 62. 
2
 This approach draws upon Derridean cultural theory; see Homi K. Bhabha, “Introduction: Narrating 
the Nation,” in Nation and Narration, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (London: Routledge, 1990), 1; Geoffrey 
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textual readings fatally compromise their self-coherence and ontological closure. By using 
national identity as a focus for this project’s reading strategies, I also intervene in a series of 
representational discourses that have received little critical attention in existing independent 
film scholarship. Furthermore, by relating case-study analyses to popular and academic 
discussions of national identity, this thesis also provides an expansion of Derridean theory 
into a range of other disciplines, such as American studies; these interventions are outlined 
at the end of this introduction. Finally, this thesis’ multifaceted research objectives open up 
American identity discourses to an unfixed freeplay of différance, laying the foundations for 
a liberatory intervention into restrictive American “culture wars” debates.3 This significant 
impact outside of academia is detailed in this thesis’ conclusion. 
  
Derrida and Metaphysics 
 
 Before outlining this thesis’ deconstructive intervention into film studies, one must 
briefly establish the underlying tenets of Derridean theory. However, any attempt at 
coherently outlining deconstructive thought is haunted by the spectre of self-contradiction. 
As Derrida’s theoretical project offers a sustained critique of metaphysical truth,4 any fixed 
definition of deconstruction is inevitably sustained by the very structural forces it sets out to 
destabilise; as Robert Smith notes, attempts to programmatically describe deconstruction are 
wholly “essentialist,” a theoretical approach that Derrida’s work “diverges from” and 
“challenges indefatigably.”5 Yet, for the sake of legibility, this introduction tentatively 
summarises a number of general principles that animate Derridean reading; this objective is 
qualified by a heightened awareness of the reductive assumptions embedded within the 
explicative act, a caveat that extends to every definitional gesture that follows.  
 To begin, Derridean theory can be productively conceptualised as a sustained 
dismantling of Western metaphysics. In treating Derrida’s diverse works as complementary 
“critiques”6 of this pervasive thought-system, deconstruction has been approached as “a 
questioning stance taken towards the most basic aspects of the production of knowledge.”7 
                                                          
Bennington, “Postal Politics and the Institution of the Nation,” in Nation and Narration, ed. Homi K. 
Bhabha (London: Routledge, 1990), 121. 
3
 This theoretical gesture draws upon Bhabha’s Derridean reading of nationhood and cultural 
difference; see Homi K. Bhabha, “DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern 
Nation,” in Nation and Narration, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (London: Routledge, 1990), 292. 
4
 See Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chavravorty Spivak, Corr. ed. (London: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 12. 
5
 Robert Smith, “Deconstruction and Film,” in Deconstructions. A User’s Guide, ed. Nicholas Royle 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 120. 
6
 The term “critique” has itself has been placed under deconstructive scrutiny; see Jacques Derrida, 
Positions, trans. Alan Bass (London: Athlone Press, 1987), 46.  
7
 Peter Brunette, “Post-Structuralism and Deconstruction,” in The Oxford Guide to Film Studies, eds. 
John Hill and Pamela Church-Gibson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 91. 
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This perspective hinges upon Derrida’s identification of a purportedly consistent and stable 
origin, centre, or telos that orients Western philosophical enquiry; this is the theorisation of 
being as presence.8 For Derrida, the metaphysics of presence idealises an ontological model 
that renders a being’s essence or meaning immediately perceptible; put simply, metaphysical 
philosophy is based upon the assumption that objects or texts communicate a fixed, self-
coherent meaning or truth (logos). In metaphysics, presence takes on a number of 
complementary significances, each supporting the generalised principle of the “self-identity, 
self-continuity, or self-sufficiency of a being.”9 In summarising this multifaceted presence, 
Derrida discerns a foundationalist logic that he refers to as “logocentrism,” itself based upon 
the following “subdeterminations” of presence: 
 
Presence of the thing to the sight as eidos, presence as substance/essence/existence 
[ousia], temporal presence as point [stigmè] of the now or of the moment [nun],… 
the co-presence of the other and of the self, intersubjectivity as the intentional 
phenomenon of the ego, and so forth.… Logocentrism would thus support the 
determination of the being of the entity as presence.10 
 
Therefore, logocentrism encapsulates the visual presence of a being or object, the presence 
of that object’s essential meaning, the static nature of that structure as temporal presence, 
and the self-presence of the thinking subject that perceives it.11 Derrida’s project can be read 
as an attempt to unsettle these metaphysical assumptions, uncovering and strategically 
exploiting textual and discursive excesses that undermine presence in all its guises. 
Importantly, Derrida does not treat the metaphysics of presence as merely one philosophical 
school amongst others, but rather as the basis for all Western thought; its operation is not 
limited to theoretical discourses, but rather extends into the “everyday language” that 
structures all human experience:12 metaphysics “governs culture, philosophy, and science.”13 
As a result, Derridean theory offers a means of critically intervening into a plethora of 
cultural discourses, of which philosophical discussions are but one manifestation. It is this 
observation that underlines my thesis’ central research objectives; in allowing independent 
film and national identity to be approached as explicitly metaphysical structures, they can be 
subjected to deconstructive textual interrogation.     
                                                          
8
 See Simon Morgan Wortham, The Derrida Dictionary (London: Continuum, 2010), 103. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 12. 
11
 Also see Wortham, The Derrida Dictionary, 103; David Norman Rodowick, The Crisis of Political 
Modernism: Criticism and Ideology in Contemporary Film Theory (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1988), 18-19. 
12
 Derrida, Positions, 19. 
13
 Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, ed. Alan Bass (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982), 18. 
13 
 
In positing a wholesale critique of metaphysical knowledge, Derridean thought 
inevitably engages with the field of semiotics; as Peter Brunette and David Wills argue: 
 
A potentially fruitful way of approaching deconstruction is as a radicalization of 
Saussure’s insights into the nature of language, and specifically into the nature of the 
sign itself and the relation between signifier and signified.14 
 
To begin, Derrida firmly places the structuralist model of the sign (a fixed relation between 
signifier and signified) within metaphysical discourse. On one level, the distinction between 
signifier and signified institutes a spatio-temporal rupture in the presence of an object or 
meaning, a division at the heart of the metaphysical sign.15 In Of Grammatology, this 
difference is epitomised by the logocentric division between speech and writing, an 
opposition that Derrida discerns as a consistent model for all metaphysical signification. 
Whilst speech is treated as an immediate presentation of thought and the self-presence of the 
metaphysical subject, writing is cast as a derivative, second-order representation, a signifier 
that merely points towards an absent presence or meaning.16 Thus, the signifier operates as 
an exterior, derivative, representational instrument, a non-presence; conversely, the signified 
is associated directly with metaphysics’ idealised telos of absolute presence, a value 
embodied both within the immediate manifestation of a specific meaning and the signified’s 
own formal structure: “the formal essence of the signified is presence, and the privilege of 
its proximity to the logos as phonè is the privilege of presence.”17 The metaphysical sign is 
rendered a divided structure of presence and non-presence, a vital constitutive binary 
opposition exploited throughout deconstructive theory. 
 However, whilst the signifier/signified division challenges the self-presence of the 
sign, it also establishes its logocentric function, insofar that the signified is positioned within 
a fixed, direct relationship with a corresponding signifier. Indeed, Derrida notes that 
structuralist readings of the sign neutralise the division between signifier and signified by 
arguing that the two distinct halves of the sign form a fixed totality: “the notion of the sign 
always implies within itself the distinction between signifier and signified, even if, as 
Saussure argues, they are distinguished simply as the two faces of one and the same leaf.”18 
Thus, metaphysics disavows the ontological rupture that the division of signifier and 
signified opens up: “the sign must be the unity of a heterogeneity, since the signified (sense 
                                                          
14
 Brunette and Wills, Screen/Play, 6. 
15
 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 11-14. 
16
 Ibid., 11. 
17
 Ibid., 18. 
18
 Ibid., 11. Emphasis added. 
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or thing, noeme or reality) is not in itself a signifier.”19 By evoking meanings that are 
“capable of being present,”20 the direct correspondence between signifier and signified is 
established as metaphysical;21 the signified is again associated with presence, an a priori 
unity that the secondary signifier points towards in its temporary absence: “the sign 
represents the present in its absence…when the present cannot be presented, we signify, we 
go through the detour of the sign.”22 Thus, whilst the sign does not achieve self-presence it is 
implicated in its metaphysical idealisation, compensating for a lack of immediate, essential 
meaning.  
 In intractably associating the signified with a telos of presence, Derrida describes a 
metaphysics that venerates a holistic, eternal meaning that halts (and stands outside) 
signification; it “would place a reassuring end to the reference from sign to sign.”23 Derrida 
explores this metaphysical master-concept at length, arguing that the signifier/signified 
model precipitates the possibility of such a “transcendental signified,” “a concept signified 
in and of itself, a concept simply present for thought, independent of a relationship to…a 
system of signifiers.”24 As the apotheosis of self-presence, the transcendental signified is 
established as an “eternal verity,”25 a universal truth that governs all discourse from a 
position of totalized authority. Thus, as Brunette and Wills suggest, Derridean 
deconstruction amounts to a critique of the fundamental ontological grounds that anchor 
Western culture:  
  
Also called into question is the attendant logocentrism of this metaphysics, which is 
that system of concepts such as ‘truth,’ ‘good,’ ‘nature,’ and so on, which are 
regarded, throughout the entire history of Western thought, as being whole, 
internally coherent, consistent and originary.26 
 
Derridean thought elaborates the impossibility of fixing any such absolute, self-coherent 
signification. Importantly, this notion of the transcendental signified is again vital to this 
project, as the varied American cultural narratives that my case-study readings interrogate 
are conceptualised as national equivalents of these fixed structures of cultural meaning.  
 
 
                                                          
19
 Ibid., 18. 
20
 Brunette and Wills, Screen/Play, 6. 
21
 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 13. 
22
 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 9. 
23
 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 49. 
24
 Derrida, Positions, 19-20. Emphasis in original; Derrida, Of Grammatology, 13. 
25
 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 15. 
26
 Brunette and Wills, Screen/Play, 6-7. 
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Metaphysics and Binary Oppositions  
 
In initiating his critique of metaphysics with a commentary on Saussurean 
linguistics, Derrida observes that logocentric discourse orders presence through the 
construction of binary oppositions, two of which (speech/writing and signifier/signified) 
have been explored above.27 Within Ferdinand de Saussure’s structuralist paradigm, it is the 
oppositional difference between signs that allows meaning to be legible; as Derrida notes, 
“the play of difference…is the condition for the possibility and functioning of every sign.”28 
Unpacking this idea, Brunette and Wills note that “nothing in language is meaningful in and 
of itself, but only as it differs from other elements within the system.”29 Hence, the apparent 
presence of a term relies upon its structural differentiation from others; this observation lays 
the foundations for a critique of metaphysical self-identity. 
Importantly, logocentric binaries should not be approached as neutral antinomies, 
conceptual oppositions between two equal presences. Rather, Derrida notes that there is an 
inevitable hierarchical relationship between the two sides of any structural dichotomy: “in a 
classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence of a vis-
à-vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms governs the other 
(axiologically, logically, etc.), or has the upper hand.”30 Outlining a series of logocentric 
governing concepts that are constructed as being “whole, internally coherent, consistent, and 
originary,” Brunette and Wills note that their oppositional antitheses are denied similar 
positive values of plenitude and coherence: “invariably these concepts are seen to have 
opposites (‘falsehood,’ ‘evil,’ ‘culture’) that are always presented as in some way harmful, 
deficient, deformed, or secondary, in short as a falling away from the fullness and self-
sufficiency of the primary term.”31 Thus, the metaphysical opposition plays out an 
underlying antinomy of presence and absence, solidifying the plenitude, identity, and 
eminence of one term by denying that status to another. Furthermore, Simon Morgan 
Wortham notes that this logic extends beyond theoretical discourse, as it governs “cultural 
relations and practices more broadly.”32 These observations illustrate the ideological 
ramifications of metaphysical binarism. Extending into the realm of cultural politics, the 
dichotomous structure of presence/absence engenders a discrepancy in power and authority, 
favouring certain structures by homogenising and marginalizing their multifarious “others.” 
                                                          
27
 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 27-73. Also see Wortham, The Derrida Dictionary, 103; Brunette, 
“Post-Structuralism and Deconstruction,” 92. 
28
 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 5. 
29
 Brunette and Wills, Screen/Play, 6-7. 
30
 Derrida, Positions, 41. 
31
 Brunette and Wills, Screen/Play, 7. 
32
 Wortham, The Derrida Dictionary, 103-104. 
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Thus, the play of difference is regulated as an oppositional relationship between two static 
entities, a closed antinomy that ensures the plenitude, wholeness, and presence of the 
superior term. Indeed, this study contends that prominent American cultural narratives 
operate precisely in this way, producing universal structures that disavow a greater 
multiplicity of cultural identities or experiences.  
 
Différance 
 
Whilst the differential play of the binary opposition is treated as the structural basis 
of metaphysical meaning, it also provides the tools for Derrida’s critique of the sign, and 
ultimately, presence itself. In noting that a sign relies upon a differential “other” for its 
existence, Derrida argues that all metaphysical structures inevitably surrender the presence 
they appear to embody; the absence of those terms that a sign excludes is paradoxically re-
inscribed within the sign itself as a “trace,” constituents of its (illusory) plenitude. Brunette 
and Wills argue that this observation radicalises the oppositional difference Saussure 
postulates between signs as the structure of all language, as any 
 
thing, idea, or event cannot ever be whole, self-contained, and uncontaminated by an 
‘outside,’ because it depends for its very existence on that which it is not. Every 
concept, in other words, has its opposite somehow inscribed within it, in the form of 
what Derrida calls a ‘trace,’ which…is paradoxically there and, as a sign of an 
absence, not there at the same time.33 
 
Importantly, this paradoxical economy problematizes presence at the very moment of its 
constitution. The trace is rendered as the force or possibility that both allows signification 
and denies the presence it purportedly signifies:  
 
The trace, where the relationship with the other is marked, articulates its possibility 
in the entire field of the entity [étant], which metaphysics has defined as the being-
present starting from the occulted movement of the trace. The trace must be thought 
before the entity. But the movement of the trace is necessarily occulted, it produces 
itself as self-occultation.34  
 
                                                          
33
 Brunette and Wills, Screen/Play, 7. 
34
 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 47. 
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Rather than externally marking difference upon a pre-existing presence, the trace is 
established as a “non-signifying difference that is ‘originarily’ at play in all signification.”35  
Consequently, the metaphysical opposition can be approached as a means of expunging (and 
thus mastering) the “otherness” that the trace instils at the heart of all meaning;36 as Peter 
Brunette (paraphrasing Barbara Johnson) notes, “in the Western tradition, differences within 
are inevitably recast as differences between.”37 The (externalised) opposition of binary 
difference is re-marked within the sign itself, an originary “supplement”38 that metaphysics 
exorcises in its unerring quest for transcendental presence. As a result, the trace disturbs the 
very division between presence and absence, the foundation of metaphysics itself; as 
Wortham suggests:  
 
Since every sign in its manifestation or apparent ‘presence’ always includes traces of 
others which are supposedly ‘absent’, the trace can be reduced to neither side of the 
presence-absence opposition so prized by the metaphysical tradition…The trace 
names that non-systematizable reserve which is at once constitutive and 
unrepresentable within such a field.39 
 
Thus, in evading any fixed or self-coherent ontology, the trace unsettles the presence of the 
sign at the same time that it makes signification possible. 
It is through the trace that Derrida elucidates différance, a vital term within 
deconstructive thought. As explored above, Derrida notes that the sign’s presence is divided 
by its location within a differential signifying economy, carrying within it traces of excluded 
meanings. However, presence is not simply divided by a static trace of an internalised binary 
opposite. Rather, Derrida argues that meaning is deferred by a hypothetically boundless 
chain of references and substitutions: “the trace proclaims as much as it recalls: differance 
defers-differs [diffère].”40 Exceeding the “regulated play” of the binary opposition, meaning-
making is cast as a dynamic process that institutes a “freeplay” of difference; traces of 
absent signifieds in turn evoke traces of other absent signifieds, instituting an open-ended 
and inexhaustible referential chain.41 In his 1968 essay on “Différance,” Derrida describes 
how this semiotic reconceptualization directly challenges a metaphysics orientated towards a 
telos of static, totalized meaning: 
                                                          
35
 Wortham, The Derrida Dictionary, 229. 
36
 See Derrida, Of Grammatology, 62. 
37
 Peter Brunette, “Toward a Deconstructive Theory of Film,” Studies in the Literary Imagination 19, 
no. 2 (1986): 62. 
38
 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 7. 
39
 Wortham, The Derrida Dictionary, 230. 
40
 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 66. 
41
 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 11. 
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The signified concept is never present in and of itself, in a sufficient presence that 
would refer only to itself. Essentially and lawfully, every concept is inscribed in a 
chain or in a system within which it refers to the other, to other concepts, by means 
of the systematic play of differences. Such a play, différance, is thus no longer 
simply a concept, but rather the possibility of conceptuality.42  
 
Thus, the signified does not mark the eternal fixing of self-coherent meaning; indeed, 
Derrida notes that différance describes “the absence of the transcendental signified as 
limitlessness of play, that is to say the destruction of ontotheology and the metaphysics of 
presence.”43 Each signified in turn acts as a signifier, referring to other terms that are evoked 
as differential traces within the signified’s illusory presence: “‘Signifier of the signifier’ 
describes…the movement of language…the signified always already functions as a 
signifier.... There is not a single signified that escapes, even if recaptured, the play of 
signifying references that constitute language.”44 Destabilising the difference between 
signifier and signified, différance describes a process by which all signifieds unceasingly 
refer to other terms or meanings, which in turn do the same, denying metaphysical properties 
of fixity, self-coherence, and, ultimately, presence; as Derrida notes, “nothing, neither 
among the elements nor within the system, is anywhere ever simply present or absent. There 
are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces.”45 In precipitating the play of 
différance, the trace becomes the motor for a sustained challenge to the presence/absence 
opposition that underlies metaphysical discourse;46 the trace’s status as a “presence-absence” 
mirrors Derrida’s theorisation of différance as “the nonpresence of the other inscribed within 
the sense of the present.”47 Importantly for this project, this aspect of différance closely 
mirrors Derrida’s brief discussions of the cinematic image, which he establishes as a 
“hauntological”48 form that renders spectral figures that resist any fixed being, neither 
present nor absent.49  
However, différance is not a thesis on the impossibility of meaning, or an attempt to 
theorise a new significatory model beyond metaphysics. Indeed, Derrida argues specifically 
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that the movement of différance underlies the generation of all meaning: “what defers 
presence, on the contrary, is the very basis on which presence is announced or desired in 
what represents it, its sign, its trace.”50 Rather than simplistically disavowing the binary 
oppositions that structure metaphysical language, différance is treated as their precondition: 
“the movement of différance, as that which produces different things, that which 
differentiates, is the common root of all the oppositional concepts that mark our language.”51 
Thus, différance generates differences that can be cast in binary terms, a pre-requisite for 
metaphysical signification; yet, différance simultaneously renders these discrete oppositions 
arbitrary, transient, and irrelevant, as there will always be a trace of one term within the 
other (and vice-versa): “at the point at which the concept of différance…intervenes, all the 
conceptual oppositions of metaphysics (signifier/signified; sensible/intelligible; 
writing/speech; passivity/activity; etc.) – to the extent that they ultimately refer to the 
presence of something present… - become nonpertinent.”52 As Derrida summarises, 
“Differance produces what it forbids, making possible the very thing that it makes 
impossible.”53 Here, différance exceeds the metaphysical “principle of non-contradiction,”54 
insofar that it both underlies and critiques all forms of signification as presence. 
 Therefore, perhaps it is best to consider any signified (or associated binary structure) 
as a “micro-stabilization” of an “unstable and chaotic” economy,55  a “regulated play” of 
differences that temporarily halts the originary chain of signifiers that différance initiates.56 
In arresting a pre-existing differential play (and simultaneously extolling their own timeless 
inherence), binary oppositions entail “a subordination of the movement of différance in 
favor of the presence of a value or a meaning supposedly antecedent to différance, more 
original than it, exceeding and governing it in the last analysis.”57 Indeed, Derrida suggests 
that this process of reduction is the foundational purpose of metaphysical philosophy: 
 
All dualisms…are the unique theme of a metaphysics whose entire history was 
compelled to strive towards the reduction of the trace. The subordination of the trace 
to full presence summed up in the logos...such are the gestures required by an onto-
theology determining the archaeological and eschatological meaning of being as 
presence, as parousia, as life without differance.58 
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Thus, Derrida discerns within logocentrism a “desire to restrict play” that is “irresistible”;59 
metaphysical meaning’s stabilization of chaotic différance inaugurates an act of semiotic 
violence, forcefully assembling a closed, oppositional economy of ontological stasis.60  
In contrast, différance posits a radical play left unstructured by metaphysical forces; 
it inaugurates a heterogeneous textual field that produces a multiplicity of potential 
significations in place of rigid binary frames. In evading spatial integrity and temporal fixity, 
différance “marks an irreducible and generative multiplicity”;61 in noting this fundamental 
challenge to logocentric structuration, Derrida revels in the diverse semiotic possibilities that 
différance actively engenders: 
 
Turned towards the lost or impossible presence of the absent origin, this structuralist 
thematic of broken immediacy is therefore the saddened, negative, nostalgic, guilty, 
Rousseauistic side of the thinking of play whose other side would be the 
Nietzschean affirmation, that is the joyous affirmation of the play of the world and 
of the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, 
without truth, and without origin which is offered to an active interpretation.62 
 
Thus, différance eludes metaphysical presence, binary codification and a logocentrism that 
posits truth as a fixed ontological telos; in their place, Derrida diagnoses a generalised 
textuality that abets the exhilarating possibility of heterogeneous, unrestricted, inexhaustible 
signification. 
 
Deconstruction 
 
As argued above, Western metaphysics both relies upon and disavows différance as 
the basis of all signification. Feeding off (but then arresting) spatio-temporal freeplay, 
logocentric structures regulate difference within binary oppositions, expunging the sign’s 
internal divisions and recasting them as (hierarchical) antinomies between self-identical 
presences. Deconstruction can be thought of as the process by which this metaphysical 
operation is uncovered, reversed, and displaced. The purported unity of any text is 
undermined by focusing upon its “margins,”63 an “untranslatable remainder” or 
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“supplement” that inhabits all meaning, yet is disavowed by metaphysical discourse.64 In 
doing so, deconstruction uncovers and exploits moments of “undecidability,”65 textual self-
contradictions and ellipses that operate beyond (and between) the presences and oppositions 
that govern a specific discursive field.  As a process, it demonstrates how metaphysical 
forms are always already inhabited by différance, providing the conditions of possibility for 
meaning whilst simultaneously exceeding the structural logic that such significatory systems 
impose. Demonstrating that no structure can exhaust the play of differences and deferrals 
from which it is assembled, deconstruction locates moments of self-contradiction inside 
metaphysical discourse; in transgressing the structural laws that govern the text within which 
they reside, semiotic slippages undermine the totalizing, essentializing pretensions of 
logocentric concepts and dualisms.  
However, as previously discussed, attempts to describe deconstruction are complicit 
in the metaphysical logic it ostensibly aims to displace; as Derrida explicitly states, it 
necessarily eludes definition: “deconstruction doesn’t consist in a set of theorems, axioms, 
tools, rules, techniques, methods.”66 Furthermore, attempting a systematized elucidation of 
deconstruction is also methodologically problematic, insofar that developing a fixed 
procedure undermines its logic as a critique of metaphysics from within. For Derridean 
scholars, every metaphysical form inevitably carries within itself the possibility of its own 
disruption. Utilising this reflexive potential, deconstruction strategically mobilises 
logocentric structures to compromise their illusory presence and plenitude. Thus, Derrida 
explicitly argues that attempts to unsettle metaphysical constructions of being cannot 
dispense with a philosophical heritage orientated towards ontological presence. Rather, 
deconstruction takes the form of a close reading of this metaphysical economy, forever 
explicating and disrupting its logocentric assumptions and foundations as they become 
apparent.67 Thus, the positioning of deconstruction within metaphysical discourses is 
deemed a theoretical necessity and a discursive inevitability; the act redirects one’s 
inevitable (and inescapable) positioning within metaphysics to a critical end: 
 
The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures from the outside. They 
are not possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by inhabiting 
those structures. Inhabiting them in a certain way, because one always inhabits, and 
all the more when one doesn’t suspect it. Operating necessarily from the inside, 
borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of subversion from the old 
                                                          
64
 Wortham, The Derrida Dictionary, 31-32. 
65
 Derrida, Positions, 42-43. 
66
 Jacques Derrida, “As if I were Dead: An Interview with Jacques Derrida,” in Applying: To Derrida, 
eds. John Brannigan, Ruth Robbins and Julian Wolfreys (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 218. 
67
 See Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 22-23. 
22 
 
structure, borrowing them structurally, that is to say without being able to isolate 
their elements and atoms, the enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way 
falls prey to its own work.68 
 
As demonstrated above, deconstructive readings operate on a “double register,”69 
simultaneously mobilising and critiquing metaphysical discourse; as Derrida notes, “one can 
say a priori that in every proposition or in every system of semiotic research…metaphysical 
presuppositions coexist with critical motifs.”70 In these interrelated observations, Derrida 
outlines an unavoidable complicity that simultaneously provides the conditions of possibility 
for presence and its critique. Deconstruction occupies an undecidable position at the margins 
of metaphysics, inhabiting textual elements that contradict (and thus betray) the structural 
oppositions and ontological purities of logocentric discourse.71   
In denying deconstruction any totalized definition, Derridean theory demonstrates 
that each of its critical gestures is fundamentally singular;72 the precise form of any 
deconstructive act is dictated by the particular logocentric forms upon which it operates: 
“what is called or calls itself ‘deconstruction’ also contains, lodged in some moment of its 
process, an auto-interpretative figure which will always be difficult to subsume under a 
meta-discourse or general narrative.”73 As a result, deconstruction takes on a gestural 
character. Eluding any a priori ontological presence, it is constituted in the very moment of 
its application;74 as David Wills argues, “it is important to reinforce the revolutionary 
potential of deconstruction as a shifting set of strategies that should by definition disturb the 
status quo.”75 
 The methodological commentary provided above problematizes any attempt to 
construct a fixed deconstructive method that encompasses a finite number of discrete textual 
practices. Nevertheless, one is able to summarise a number of principles that orient a 
heterogeneous galaxy of singular deconstructive gestures; importantly, this allows 
deconstruction to be grasped as a distinct (yet structurally amorphous) theoretical project. 
Indeed, Derrida attempts such an undertaking in “Positions,” in part to protect the term from 
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metaphysical domestication; he calls for a “general strategy of deconstruction,”76  
differentiating between textual readings that reinforce logocentric principles, and those that 
disrupt foundational metaphysical dualisms. In this regard, any gesture that embodies a 
“strategic and adventurous”77 discursive intervention would be considered a part of this 
“general economy.”78 In forwarding this project, Derrida suggests that one cannot simply 
observe, outline, and erase a term’s presence, or the oppositional structures within which it is 
constituted; this would amount to “simply neutralizing the binary oppositions of 
metaphysics,” a temporary suspension of a dualistic economy that will inevitably reassert 
itself as its basic structure has been ignored (and thus left intact).79 To do so would also 
neglect a sustained interrogation of the hierarchical relationship between the two sides of 
the opposition, a vital step in any challenge to the authority and presence of certain concepts 
within metaphysical discourse.  
Thus, Derrida carefully outlines a series of non-proscriptive stages that together 
constitute a rejection of logocentric presence and its hierarchical, antonymic foundations; 
this begins with a conceptual “overturning,” reversing the authority of the two concepts it 
regulates: 
 
On the one hand, we must traverse a phase of overturning…. To deconstruct the 
opposition, first of all, is to overturn the hierarchy at a given moment. To overlook 
this phase of overturning is to forget the conflictual and subordinating structure of 
opposition. Therefore one might proceed too quickly to a neutralization that in 
practice would leave the previous field untouched, leaving one no hold on the 
previous opposition, thereby preventing any means of intervening in the field 
effectively…The necessity of this phase is structural; it is the necessity of an 
interminable analysis: the hierarchy of dual oppositions always re-establishes 
itself.80  
 
Yet, focusing solely upon the reversal of the opposition’s hierarchical economy would be 
equally problematic: “to remain in this phase is still to operate on the terrain of and from 
within the deconstructed system.”81 Thus, one would simply switch the dominance of a 
specific concept to its formerly oppressed “other,” trading the eminence of one totalized 
presence for another; the antonymic structure of logocentric discourse would be necessarily 
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retained.  Accordingly, Derrida suggests that the overturning of any binary opposition must 
be accompanied by a complementary displacement of the difference between its bifurcated 
terms. In applying this strategy, deconstruction seeks out and exploits discursive moments 
that cannot be governed by existing discrete oppositional frames:  
 
By means of this double, and precisely stratified, dislodged and dislodging, writing, 
we must also mark the interval between inversion, which brings low what was high, 
and the irruptive emergence of a new ‘concept,’ a concept that can no longer be, and 
never could be, included in the previous regime.82 
 
Here, Derrida mobilises his notion of the “undecidable” to challenge metaphysical 
difference: 
 
Henceforth, in order better to mark this interval…it has been necessary to analyze, 
to set to work…certain marks, shall we say…that by analogy (I underline) I have 
called undecidables, that is, unities of simulacrum, ‘false’ verbal properties (nominal 
or semantic) that can no longer be included within philosophical (binary) opposition, 
but which, however, inhabit philosophical opposition, resisting and disorganizing 
it.83  
 
Therefore, deconstruction hinges on undecidable “moments of negation”84 that are 
perceptible within metaphysical oppositions yet disobey their bifurcated logic, resisting 
discrete categorization and delineation;85 as Derrida puts it, the mark embodies a new textual 
logic of “neither/nor, that is, simultaneously either or.”86 In this regard, deconstruction does 
not merely disrupt the binary division of metaphysical concepts, but also troubles the self-
identity of the terms themselves. As Johnson puts it: 
 
Instead of ‘A is opposed to B’ we have ‘B is both added to A and replaces A.’ A and 
B are no longer opposed, nor are they equivalent. Indeed, they are no longer even 
equivalent to themselves. They are their own differance from themselves.87     
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As a textual element that can be located within two seemingly paradoxical paradigms, the 
undecidable undermines the positioning of said concepts as polar opposites, pointing 
towards an excess that escapes rigid dichotomisation; in turn, the undecidable demonstrates 
that each term is necessarily inhabited by traces of paradoxical and absent significances.      
Thus, deconstruction troubles metaphysical closure, presence, and being through a 
complex process of supplementarity. In doing so, oppositional terms are re-positioned within 
the dynamic chain of mutually-constituting differences that institutes them whilst denying 
transcendental meaning: each concept is simultaneously its antonym, “different and 
deferred.”88 Deconstruction therefore liberates the heterogeneous play of différance that 
facilitates all signification; overturning and displacing temporary logocentric stabilizations, 
Derridean readings release a dynamic spatio-temporal freeplay from the coercive shackles of 
metaphysical structuration. Importantly, this underlying deconstructive objective 
encapsulates my thesis’ intervention into American national identity discourses. Specifically, 
I explore how recent films seek out moments of deconstructive undecidability in logocentric 
cultural narratives; in doing so, they open up American cultural discourses to a radical, 
heterogeneous field of différance. 
 
Derrida and Film Theory  
 
Having briefly outlined some general characteristics of Derrida’s critique of 
metaphysical ontology, it is important to consider the presence (or, conversely, absence) of 
deconstructive influences on contemporary film theory. Immediately, it is noticeable that the 
majority of existing Derridean film scholarship is reflexively self-justified as an attempt to 
address a theoretical aporia, a vital intervention into a sparse discursive terrain.89 
Nevertheless, scholars qualify such claims by noting that deconstruction has had an indirect 
bearing on the shaping of film theory. Thus, it has been argued (in fittingly Derridean terms) 
that the theorist “haunt(s)” the discipline;90 as Robert Lapsley and Michael Westlake 
suggest, “within film theory Derrida is perhaps best conceived of as a structuring absence,”91 
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a “spectral” status that eludes metaphysical categorisation.92 Nevertheless, other critics have 
noted a series of more explicit theoretical relays;93 theorists such as Libby Saxton and 
Brunette observe a recent encroachment of deconstruction into film theory via its influence 
on “feminist, queer and post-colonial theory,” particularly through the influential work of 
Homi K. Bhabha and Judith Butler.94 Thus, as Robert Stam, Robert Burgoyne, and Sandy 
Flitterman-Lewis summarise, deconstructive strategies “can now be assumed to form part of 
the received methodological wisdom of film theory and analysis.”95  
 As alluded to above, traces of Derridean thought in film studies can be discerned 
primarily in its influence on other theoretical models, a process that simultaneously 
integrates and excludes Derrida from the disciplinary canon. Indeed, this situation can be 
partly explained by the predominance of other post-structuralist philosophers in recent film 
theory, providing related paradigms that superficially reduce the need for an explicitly 
Derridean cinema discourse. As Brunette and Wills noted in the late-1980s, “most 
contemporary post-structuralist film criticism and theory continues, for better or worse, to be 
based on the strong re-reading of Freud initiated by Jacques Lacan.”96 In turn, this orthodoxy 
is commonly attributed to different theoretical (and figurative) foci. Brunette and Wills 
suggest that the pre-eminence of Lacanian psychoanalysis in film studies is attributable to 
“Lacan’s emphasis on the visual,” which may have “seemed particularly appropriate to the 
study of film.”97 In contrast, Saxton notes that Derrida’s (particularly early) work 
demonstrates “suspicions of the visual” and “appeared to prioritize language over vision and 
perception,” a possible explanation for his relative discursive occlusion.98 Finally, it is 
argued here that the recent primacy of Foucauldian, and more prominently, Deleuzian 
approaches in film studies (undoubtedly motivated by his voluminous writings on the 
subject) have provided another barrier to specifically Derridean engagements with cinema, a 
trend that this thesis intends to redress.99  
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For many, however, this academic aporia is simply attributable to the virtual 
absence of sustained discussions of cinema in Derrida’s own work. Thus, whilst Derrida 
occasionally discussed the medium in interviews, appeared on-screen in three films and a 
piece of “video-art,” and co-authored a commentary on one of these texts, references to 
cinema are almost non-existent in his more prominent writings.100  Noting a diversity of 
other art-forms that Derrida directly addressed (such as painting, architecture, and 
photography),101 Louise Burchill maintains that “there is no text by Derrida on cinema, 
rendering him in this respect an exception amongst other French thinkers of his generation 
or, more precisely, his ‘philosophical sequence.’”102 Discussed by scholars as a “blind 
spot,”103 Derrida’s neglect of cinema amounts to a noticeable discursive gap; the topic of 
cinema is rendered a constituting difference within deconstruction due to its apparent under-
theorisation. In turn, Derrida explains that his relative silence on cinema was largely self-
inflicted, dictated by a lack of disciplinary expertise: “I like cinema very much; I have seen 
many films, but in comparison with those who know the history of cinema and the theory of 
film, I am, and I say this without being coy, incompetent.”104 This thesis reads the above 
quote not as a dismissal of deconstruction’s relevance to film theory, but as an implicit 
challenge to those with a more sustained disciplinary grounding to assume this theoretical 
project. Indeed, scholars have noted “tremors of the cinematic” in Derrida’s work,105 an 
unexplored deconstructive potential that is further hinted at by his own assertion that cinema 
“exceeds philosophical discourse and questions philosophy.”106 Thus, such statements 
amount to a scholarly “invitation,” a gesture that Derrida established as the basis for all his 
intellectual acts.107 A limited number of theorists have attempted to fulfil this discursive 
demand, a task that this thesis productively contributes towards. 
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 In reflecting upon existing Derridean film theory, one may notice two distinct trends 
(a perception that undoubtedly imposes a binary logic upon a field of amorphous 
interpretative differences). Importantly, each approach draws upon complementary aspects 
of Derrida’s work to address prevailing assumptions within film theory, and, ultimately, to 
critique and re-inscribe cinematic ontology. The first of these re-positions film within 
Derrida’s expanded notion of “arche-writing,” laid out in Of Grammatology;108 
consequently, “film as writing”109 scholars deny cinema its common status as an indexical 
representation of a visual presence, transforming it into a heterogeneous Derridean text. 
Conversely, more recent work on Derrida and film theory has drawn heavily upon his later 
notion of “hauntology,” a concept outlined in his limited ruminations on cinema (principally 
his on-screen performance in Ken McMullan’s Ghostdance [1983] and commentaries on the 
film). In such approaches, theorists expand upon Derrida’s characterisation of film’s “logic 
of the spectral,”110 rendering it a ghostly medium that exceeds and resists foundational 
logocentric oppositions between presence and absence.111 Any clear delineation between 
such approaches is problematized by their clear conceptual affinities, and their arbitrary 
division erases differences within these methodologies. However, in discussing these 
theoretical trends separately, I can ultimately demonstrate that they achieve similar goals. 
Namely, they productively locate cinema within Derrida’s reading of textuality as a dynamic 
process of semiotic difference and deferral. Finally, I demonstrate how this discursive re-
appraisal underlies the deconstructive textual analyses that this thesis undertakes. Thus, 
whilst this project is not primarily an intervention into debates surrounding cinematic 
ontology, the following discussion elucidates how this study expands the influence of 
existing Derridean film theory into the realms of textual reading and interpretation.      
 
“Film as Writing” 
 
 Abstract ruminations that tentatively ally cinema with Derridean différance have 
been consolidated within a framework that reconsiders film within Derrida’s deconstructive 
expansion of writing. In Of Grammatology, Derrida outlines how the logocentric idealisation 
of being as presence has led to the hierarchical, “phonocentric” subjugation of writing to 
speech. For Derrida, this inequality is produced by the purportedly unmatched closeness of 
speech to thought: “the voice, producer of the first symbols, has a relationship of essential 
and immediate proximity with the mind…. It signifies ‘mental experiences’ which 
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themselves reflect or mirror things by natural resemblance…the voice is closest to the 
signified.”112 Thus, the expression of a self-coherent speaking subject orients an entire 
philosophical system around the possibility of immediate presence, essentialist being, and 
transcendental ontology. Conversely, Derrida demonstrates that metaphysical writing has 
conventionally fulfilled “a secondary and instrumental function: translator of a full speech 
that was fully present.”113 Thus, writing is devalued as an abject deformation of speech and 
its transcendental self-identity, evidenced by its reliance upon the division of signifier from 
signified.114  
 Having outlined the vital role of speech/writing oppositions in metaphysical 
knowledge, Derrida deconstructs this hierarchical couplet. Noting the pervasive hierarchical 
subjugation of writing to speech, this duality is initially overturned, as spoken language is 
re-cast as a derived form of writing. As Brunette and Wills eloquently summarise: “writing 
becomes the model for all linguistic operations, including speech, to the extent that they 
always involve a dependence on the difference, spacing, and rupture that the speech model 
occludes.”115 Derrida provides his own lucid description of this process, outlining his 
theorisation of “a new concept of writing” that “simultaneously provokes the overturning of 
the hierarchy speech/writing, and the entire system attached to it, and releases the 
dissonance of a writing within speech, thereby disorganizing the entire inherited order and 
invading the entire field.”116 Thus, Derrida repositions writing as a broader model for all 
linguistic utterances. In doing so, he theorises a “mutation” of writing, one that “enlarge(s) 
and radicalize(s)”117 the concept to the point that it undermines the entire metaphysical 
system within which it is positioned; this model grants the Derridean critic “the assured 
means of broaching the de-construction of the greatest totality – the concept of the epistémè 
and logocentric metaphysics.”118 In undertaking this gesture, Derrida uses the term “arche-
writing” to distinguish “vulgar” logocentric models of inscription from their deconstructive 
reconceptualizations;119 arche-writing re-introduces the textual excesses, supplements, and 
ruptures that constitute any system of signification, yet have been routinely repressed by 
metaphysics in its desire for absolute presence. Noting that arche-writing resides within 
metaphysics as both its possibility and critique, Derrida equates it directly with the 
differences and deferrals of freeplay: “the unnameable movement of difference-itself which I 
have strategically nicknamed trace, reserve, or differance, can be called writing only within 
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the historical enclosure, that is to say within the boundaries of metaphysics.”120 Writing is 
repositioned and reappraised, embodying the différance that initiates, inhabits, and exceeds 
all forms of language and signification.121  
The possibility of treating cinema as a manifestation of différance is enabled by its 
inclusion in Derrida’s expanded taxonomy; he lists “cinematography” as a non-scriptural 
form of writing, which now covers “all that gives rise to an inscription in general, whether it 
is literal or not and even if what it distributes in space is alien to the order of the voice.”122 
Thus, Derrida’s equation of cinematography and writing implicitly positions film within 
discourses of arche-writing, as it is subject to this broader transformation and radicalisation. 
Numerous theorists have unpacked these discursive links between Derridean writing and 
cinema. Foremost in this trend are Brunette and Wills, as they explicitly relate a re-
theorisation of “film as writing” with the destabilisation of reigning orthodoxies within film 
theory. To begin, they contend that cinema constitutes a “reproducible language”; thus, “to 
the extent that (film) is a language, it is to be considered as a type of writing.”123 In doing so, 
they outline how the technical specifications of film support this re-reading of the cinematic: 
 
Cinema can never be directly ‘spoken.’ We would merely add that this is because it 
is always written. Cinema, like all other forms of writing, leaves something behind, 
something involving material effects that cannot be hidden if the operation is to 
continue to function, like printed letters and words or reels of celluloid.124 
 
Indeed, several theorists have argued that cinema may be approached as an ideal model for 
Derridean writing. In her theorisation of “cinema-graphia,” Laura Oswald boldly claims that 
the medium’s ontological heterogeneity and temporal properties allows film to “outweigh 
literary discourse as a model for the kind of writing Derrida defines as ‘the becoming-space 
of time, the becoming-time of space.’”125 Conversely, Brunette and Wills reach similar 
                                                          
120
 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 93. Emphasis in original. As a result, Derrida’s notion of arche-writing 
inhabits (and problematizes) all metaphysical discourse from its beginnings; see Derrida, Of 
Grammatology, 56-57; Wortham, The Derrida Dictionary, 242-243. 
121
 This expansion of writing has also been elucidated in reference to Derridean “spacing”; see 
Derrida, Of Grammatology, 57, 68; Oswald, “Semiotics and/or Deconstruction,” 317; Johnson, 
“Translator’s Introduction,” xvi. 
122
 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 9.  
123
 Brunette and Wills, Screen/Play, 61. Also see Dana Polan, “‘Desire Shifts the Differance’: Figural 
Poetics and Figural Politics in the Film Theory of Marie-Claire Ropars,” Camera Obscura 12 (1984): 
67; David Norman Rodowick, “The Figure and the Text,” Diacritics 15, no. 1 (1985): 36. 
124
 Ibid. 
125
 Laura R. Oswald, “Cinema-Graphia: Eisenstein, Derrida, and the Sign of the Cinema,” in 
Deconstruction and the Visual Arts: Art, Media, Architecture, eds. Peter Brunette and David Wills 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 249, 257. Others have drawn direct links between 
written inscription and cinematic editing; see David Wills, “Derrida, Now and Then, Here and There,” 
Theory and Event 7, no. 2 (2004), https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v007/7.2wills.html: 
31 
 
conclusions but for seemingly divergent reasons; they argue that cinema superficially refutes 
its textual form, appearing as a mimetic, indexical reproduction of the real: 
 
In the case of cinema, its ‘writtenness’ simply seems less obvious because it is 
received as still more natural and direct than speech…. From this point of view, the 
visual occupies a position of primacy with respect to the verbal similar to that which 
speech occupies with respect to the written.126  
 
However, Brunette and Wills suggest that such assumptions actually reinforce cinema’s 
suitability to deconstructive theorisations of writing. Replicating many of metaphysics’ 
foundational assumptions, film theory provides an object of study that is particularly 
receptive to Derridean reading and, once deconstructed can “provide new insights into the 
ancient problematic of the relation between image and referent.”127  
These observations provide a useful bridge to a closer investigation of how cinema 
has been furnished with the deconstructive properties of arche-writing; it is recast as a 
medium that visualises semiotic ruptures and differential chains that undermine textual self-
presence and unity. One of the earliest exponents of this approach was Marie-Claire Ropars-
Wuilleumier, particularly in La text divisé (1981).128 In her theorisation of cinematic 
écriture, Ropars-Wuilleumier re-conceptualises the film image as a heterogeneous 
hieroglyph, incorporating diverse, “nonunifiable” signifying elements; in doing so, it breaks 
down absolute divisions between seemingly distinct semiotic registers, inscribing 
ontological difference within the very fabric of the image.129 In Of Grammatology, the 
ideogram or hieroglyph is endorsed as an exemplary limit-case for the metaphysical 
speech/writing opposition: it represents “the organized cohabitation, within the same graphic 
code, of figurative, symbolic, abstract, and phonetic elements.”130 Brunette and Wills 
conclude that this reading of the hieroglyph provides a suitable figurative model for film, as 
its “mixture of signifying systems makes it especially appropriate to the study of cinematic 
signification.”131 Importantly, Ropars-Wuilleumier argues that this re-inscription of cinema 
                                                          
8; Peggy Kamuf, To Follow: The Wake of Jacques Derrida (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2010), 110-111. 
126
 Brunette and Wills, Screen/Play, 61-62. 
127
 Ibid. 
128
 An English translation of this work has never been published. However, articles drawn from the 
monograph have been reprinted in English-language journals.  
129
 See Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier quoted in Oswald, “Semiotics and/or Deconstruction,” 316; 
Brunette and Wills, Screen/Play, 130-131; Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier, quoted in Ulmer, 
Applied Grammatology, 271. 
130
 Jacques Derrida, quoted in Brunette and Wills, Screen/Play, 129.  
131
 Brunette and Wills, Screen/Play, 118-119. For a similar readings of the cinematic see Derrida, 
“The Spatial Arts,” 13; Tom Conley, Film Hieroglyphs: Ruptures in Classical Cinema (Oxford: 
32 
 
entails a “radical dismantling of the sign,” evidenced in her specific analysis of the 
discordance between a film’s visual and aural registers. Focusing on the “montage of the 
signs and the staggered movement of the visual signals and the sound emissions,”132 Ropars-
Wuilleumier discerns ruptures in cinematic self-presence; isolating and exploiting 
“privileged fracture zones,”133 she argues that   
 
the supposed unity of signification explodes in the separation of meaning and sound; 
slipping beneath the signified, the signifier is reduced to fragments which can be 
released, available for other combinations, which inscribe in the sign the call for and 
the trace of other signs.134  
 
Thus, Ropars-Wuilleumier further locates cinematic textuality (“the endless filmic sliding of 
the signifieds”)135 within Derridean discourses of différance, dissemination, the trace. This 
discordant interplay of different discursive registers visualises a textual heterogeneity that 
undermines metaphysical self-identity, a process that “cinema is best able to show.”136 
Whilst the filmic hieroglyph challenges the unity of the metaphysical sign through 
its incorporation of divergent significatory systems, it also exemplifies différance as a 
process of ceaseless temporal deferral. As Oswald suggests, the Derridean ideogram 
embraces the movement of différance as the precondition for all linguistic utterances: 
 
Each ideogram taken in isolation has a meaning based on its iconic function.… This 
signified becomes a signifier in its turn in a chain which produces meaning by 
means of relations between different ideograms organized in time and space, thus 
deferring the presence of meaning and the unity of the subject of discourse.137 
 
This observation leads Oswald to conclude that “from the start, the process of signification 
in cinema is inscribed with division and threatened with erasure.”138 In typifying Derridean 
constructions of arche-writing as différance, this semiotic process has also provoked direct 
                                                          
University of Minnesota Press, 1991), viii, x, xxviii; Kamuf, To Follow, 110; Brunette, “Toward a 
Deconstructive Theory of Film,” 65. 
132
 Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier, “The Disembodied Voice: India Song,” Yale French Studies 60 
(1980): 254. 
133
 Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier, “The Graphic in Film Writing: A bout de Souffle, or the Erratic 
Alphabet,” Enclitic 506 (1982): 147. 
134
 Ropars-Wuilleumier, “The Disembodied Voice,” 261. 
135
 Ibid., 263. 
136
 Ibid., 267. Also see Ulmer, Applied Grammatology, 306. 
137
 Oswald, “Semiotics and/or Deconstruction,” 318 
138
 Oswald, “Cinema-Graphia,” 257, 259. 
33 
 
comparisons with Sergei Eisenstein’s theory and practice of cinematic montage;139 Ropars-
Wuilleumier explicitly cites Eisensteinian theory in locating the production of cinematic 
meaning in an unceasing process of “juxtaposition” and “conflict” between adjacent stills, a 
“play of signifiers.”140 Thus, theories of cinematic montage mirror those of film as 
hieroglyphic writing, insofar as they both posit a play of différance within and between 
textual elements; in turn, they also initiate a critique of metaphysical film theory and its 
reliance upon the medium’s conventional association with photographic self-presence or 
textual unity. To provide but one example, Derridean reconceptualizations of film have 
launched a sustained deconstructive attack on mimetic theories of cinematic ontology, 
typified in the work of Andre Bazin.141 
 
Spectrality and the Cinematic Image 
 
 As explored above, readings of cinema as arche-writing have relocated the medium 
within discourses of Derridean différance. In doing so, such accounts challenge pervasive 
theories of cinematic realism, which have utilised the purported indexicality of the 
photographic as a means of theorising cinema’s privileged proximity to an a priori material 
reality. However, following Derrida’s own (limited) discussions of cinema in the 1980s and 
1990s, deconstructive engagements with the medium shifted focus towards the 
conceptualisation of the audio-visual as a “spectral” or “hauntological” form. This should 
not be considered as a fundamental theoretical shift; indeed, it is argued here that such 
approaches reach similar conclusions to considerations of film as writing. However, in 
establishing a distinct vocabulary with which to critique metaphysical ontology, such 
approaches warrant further discussion. Although positing a precise origin for this theoretical 
trend would undoubtedly be compromised by metaphysical complicity, one can identify 
Derrida’s earliest engagements with cinema in Ghostdance, a film in which he plays a 
fictionalised version of himself. Asked to reflect upon the medium by a student (Pascale 
Ogier), Derrida elucidates his theorisation of cinematic spectrality, a deconstructive 
framework to which he would sporadically return: 
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To be haunted by a ghost is to remember what one has never lived in the present, to 
remember what, in essence, has never had the form of presence. Film is a 
‘phantomachia.’ Let the ghosts come back. Film plus psychoanalysis equals a 
science of ghosts. Modern technology, contrary to appearance, although it is 
scientific, increases tenfold the power of ghosts.142  
 
Importantly, these words take on their own spectral form, as Derrida refers to the phantasmic 
appearance of their cinematic utterance; when asked whether he “believes in ghosts,” 
Derrida responds: “that is a difficult question. Do you ask a ghost if he believes in ghosts? 
Here, the ghost is me.”143 Derrida clarifies this point in a later interview, arguing that 
spectrality is a property of the cinematic image; explaining that film entails a 
“disappearance…which promises and conceals in advance another magic ‘apparition,’ a 
ghostly ‘re-apparition,’” Derrida concludes that “we are spectralized by the shot, captured or 
possessed by spectrality in advance.”144 Thus, as Burchill notes, Derrida’s meditations on the 
subject amount to a “phantasmic mise-en-abyme,” as his spectral theoretical insights are 
simultaneously spectralized by their cinematic rendering.145    
In “Artifactualities,” Derrida outlines a broader “law of the spectral”: “the phantom 
or ghost [le revenant] is neither present nor absent, it neither is nor is not, nor can it be 
dialecticized.”146 Derrida expands upon this subversion of metaphysical being and binarism, 
arguing that the spectral cannot be accommodated within totalized categories or oppositions: 
“it regularly exceeds all the oppositions between visible and invisible, sensible and 
insensible. A specter is both visible and invisible, both phenomenal and nonphenomenal: a 
trace that marks the present with its absence in advance.”147 Thus, the spectral represents a 
point of undecidability in the hierarchical separation of presence and absence, the underlying 
structure of Western metaphysics.148 Importantly, Derrida’s reading of spectral cinema does 
not entail the transformation of an a priori presence into a ghostly image, a second-order 
representation of a pre-existing material referent. Rather, he argues that the spectral 
embodies a supplementarity that always already inhabits the image as a pre-condition of its 
possible filmic representation: 
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Because we know that, once it has been taken, captured, this image will be 
reproducible in our absence, because we know this already, we are already haunted 
by this future, which brings our death. Our disappearance is already here.149   
 
As Burchill notes, this theorisation explains Derrida’s assertion in Ghostdance that “here, 
the ghost is me”; even as he is being recorded, Derrida is “aware of the images’ vocation to 
be reproduced in (his) absence, (he) is haunted in advance by (his) future death.”150 Cinema 
is thus imbued with an iterative potential; seemingly singular images can be repeated (and 
hence transformed) by their possible reproduction in new, unpredictable contexts.151 The 
spectral is not the product of the ghostly conversion of an absolute being that pre-existed the 
acts of filming and projection, but rather haunts (and therefore fractures) all presence.152   
Finally, the cinematic medium’s hauntological character can also be discerned in the 
temporal properties of the moving image. This aspect of cinematic spectrality is explored by 
Louis-Georges Schwartz in his interrogation of the filmic “possibility of preserving a living 
image of the dead.”153 Discussing early cinema, Schwartz argues that the moving image’s 
apparent ability to foster an “absolute illusion” of life was directly related to “the concept of 
action, the movement of the living image.”154 Schwartz proceeds to note that the medium 
was perceived as a machine that can (as Derrida puts it) “let the ghosts come back”; “a film 
of someone who has died brings the person back to life.”155 However, he then demonstrates 
that this reading of cinema reifies the difference between life and death, and is thus plainly 
logocentric. Conversely, Schwartz argues that Derridean spectrality allows for a more 
radical reading of cinematic time that dislocates the medium’s normalised ontological 
frames. The present (and presence) are thrown into temporal crisis, producing “a living 
present always already fissured, heterogeneous and out of joint from the inside.”156 
Mirroring Schwartz’s discussion, Derrida notes that specific temporal properties of the 
moving image undermine any absolute visual presence: “film is a very particular case:…this 
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effect of presence is complicated by the fact of movement, of mobility, of sequentiality, of 
temporality.”157 This phenomenon, in which temporal linearity both relies upon and 
destabilizes presence, is furnished with a spectral character by Roger Luckhurst:  
 
The absent presence of the spectre fractures the self-identity of the present, installs 
an anachronistic, differential temporality which is not divorced from, but renders 
both possible and impossible, the ‘unfolding’ of time understood as a succession of 
self-present moments.158  
 
Thus, film’s spectral destabilisation of presence and absence both relies upon and challenges 
pervasive models of cinematic temporality and linearity. The ghostliness of motion pictures 
relies upon spatio-temporal reproducibility and succession, an impression of life afforded to 
the moving image. Yet, such a project is exposed as ultimately illusory; the very properties 
that allow the perception of cinema as a “living presence” also lay bare temporal ruptures 
that undermine the conceptual plenitude they institute.159 
 To conclude, in treating cinema as a play of absence and presence, hauntological 
readings embody a radical ontological gesture; Derrida unequivocally states that “the 
spectral logic is de facto a deconstructive logic.”160 In arguing that the spectral “exceeds all 
the oppositions”161 of metaphysics, Derrida positions the cinematic image as a 
heterogeneous text that cannot be enclosed within logocentric antinomies. However, it must 
be remembered that the foundational metaphysical dualism of presence and absence is 
organised hierarchically, treating presence as an idealized state of conceptual plenitude. The 
spectral first overturns this opposition, placing greater emphasis on the absent “other” that 
inhabits cinematic presence: Derrida notes that “our relation to another origin of the world or 
to another gaze, to the gaze of the other, implies a kind of spectrality. Respect for the alterity 
of the other dictates respect for the ghost.”162 Burchill clarifies that this inversion and 
effacement of oppositional difference is achieved by equating the spectral with 
undecidability; it is “at once, both and neither: visible and/nor invisible…sensible and/nor 
insensible, living and/nor dead, perceptual and/nor hallucinatory.” Thus, “spectrality would 
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ultimately scramble philosophy’s determination of being as presence”;163 as Luckhurst 
confirms, “the spectre makes tremble a Western metaphysics, an ontology that would 
exorcise the impurity of a ghost hovering between.”164 This effacement of binary structures 
into “between” states of “both and neither” again furnishes cinema with a deconstructive 
character, providing another conceptual underpinning for the close readings undertaken in 
this thesis. 
 
Film as “Text” 
 
 Whilst providing distinct terminologies with which to challenge metaphysical 
readings of cinema, one can discern clear parallels between cinematic spectrality and film 
arche-writing. Both theoretical approaches perform a “strategically important” task: they 
“(inscribe) film…within the domain of the textual.”165 However, it is important to note that a 
Derridean reading of text extends beyond its common definition as a “signifying practice.”166 
Arguing that all art-forms are inhabited by a deconstructive “spacing,” Derrida mobilises a 
vital analogue for arche-writing: “there is text because there is always a little discourse 
somewhere in the visual arts, and also because even if there is no discourse, the effect of 
spacing already implies a textualization.” Thus, in any attempt to apply deconstruction to the 
visual arts, “the expansion of the concept of text is strategically decisive.”167 In this manner, 
the text initiates and challenges logocentric discourse, allowing signification whilst 
preventing its transcendental fixing and closure. This textual function is elucidated by 
Derrida, who asserts that deconstruction 
 
cannot be the work of a discourse entirely regulated by essence, meaning, truth, 
consciousness, ideality, etc. What I call text is also that which ‘practically’ inscribes 
and overflows the limits of such a discourse. There is such a general text everywhere 
that (that is, everywhere) this discourse and its order (essence, sense, truth, meaning, 
consciousness, ideality, etc.) are overflowed, that is, everywhere that their authority 
is put back into the position of a mark in a chain that this authority intrinsically and 
illusorily believes it wishes to, and does in fact, govern.168 
 
                                                          
163
 Burchill, “Jacques Derrida,” 166. 
164
 Luckhurst, “(Touching on) Tele-Technology,” 172. Also see Schwartz, “Cinema and the Meaning 
of ‘Life,’” 24. 
165
 Brunette and Wills, Screen/Play, 62.  
166
 See Easthope, “Derrida and British Film Theory,” 192. 
167
 Derrida, “The Spatial Arts,” 15. 
168
 Derrida, Positions, 59-60. Emphasis in original. 
38 
 
The text signifies but then displaces a number of logocentric concepts, opening these up to a 
play of différance that disperses their illusory totality. Indeed, Derrida contends that it is the 
operation of a “network of differences and references” that grants any discourse “a textual 
structure.”169 In turn, Ropars-Wuilleumier notes that evaluating the cinematic image as a 
Derridean text re-introduces discordances and ruptures into purportedly self-coherent, 
significatory models: 
 
It is a question of crossing films and cinema from the point of view of the text, that 
is, in the sense used here, of the capacity of signifying systems, whatever their 
technico-sensorial status – to point to a weakness in linguistic theory based on the 
sign.170 
 
The text therefore establishes a dynamic, heterogeneous, differential field that disturbs many 
of the totalised anchors of metaphysical discourse. Importantly, it is this reading of textuality 
that facilitates a comparison between complementary Derridean readings of the cinematic. A 
dynamic freeplay of presence and absence constitutes textual différance, inaugurating an 
unbounded differential economy that underlies both Derrida’s re-inscription of writing and 
his discussions of ontological spectrality. Indeed, Derrida directly notes the mutual 
imbrication of writing and hauntology, describing the former as a “spectral response.”171  
Finally, in denying logocentric semiotic closure, Derrida calls into question the very 
possibility of distinguishing between distinct textual wholes. The differential play of 
signifiers cannot be confined within rigid discursive boundaries, as a diverse series of 
textual, contextual, and extra-textual factors are gathered up into the play of différance that 
precipitates and denies ontological coherence; this process is summarised by one of the most 
widely circulated maxims of Derridean thought: “There is nothing outside of the text [there 
is no outside-text; il n’ya a pas de hors-texte].”172 With regard to this thesis’ research 
objectives, Derrida’s reading of the “decentered text”173 provides a vital intervention into the 
relationship between film and close reading.174 Lapsley and Westlake briefly discuss this 
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theoretical problematic, arguing that an expanded notion of text nullifies attempts at fixing 
cinematic meaning: 
 
Just as no one person or institution can finally control the contexts in which a text 
will be situated, no one person or institution can specify the limits of meaning 
accruing to the text. Readers constantly relate any given text to others, so producing 
new meanings, new interpretations. The possibility of ‘the text overrun(ning) all the 
limits assigned to it’ entails that meaning is always potentially both different and 
deferred.175  
 
Brunette and Wills further suggest that a deconstructive model of film analysis endorses a 
move from interpreting films as totalities to a process of “reading in and out of the text, 
examining the other texts onto which it opens itself out or from which it closes itself off.”176 
Here, the authors motion towards a Derridean form of textual engagement, in which attempts 
to demarcate textual unity have been abandoned; rather, the chains of references and 
associations that constitute différance become a crucial focus in the analysis of cinematic 
meaning as a (unceasing) textual process. This reorientation of the text has a vital effect on 
reading strategies; it lays bare an unbounded structure of differences and substitutions that 
abet deconstructive re-readings of any film. This gesture lays the groundwork for a future 
practice of Derridean textual reading; it is within this critical area that this thesis 
productively intervenes.    
 
Deconstruction, Film, and Textual Reading  
 
 Having briefly outlined prominent manifestations of Derridean film theory, this 
project’s intervention into a broader critical landscape is more easily discernible. Namely, 
this thesis theorises and enacts a deconstructive form of cinematic textual analysis. As 
demonstrated already, the majority of Derridean interventions into this discipline have 
explored how a critique of Western metaphysics can undermine orthodox conceptualisations 
of the cinematic apparatus. In contrast, sustained Derridean film readings are sporadic and 
under-theorised; engagements with this topic usually involve short, standalone 
interpretations of single texts, in which one aspect (or a more generalised conception) of 
deconstructive theory is applied to specific films or film discourses.177 It is this state of 
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affairs that my project redresses. In adopting this methodological aim, I demonstrate that 
existing Derridean film scholarship provides a vital (but limited) precursor to my thesis, as 
my textual reading strategies are enabled specifically by their reconceptualization of cinema 
as a Derridean text.  
 As implicitly suggested in the discussion above, a deconstructive expansion of the 
text also precipitates a re-interpretation of textual analysis itself. Again, Brunette and Wills 
have explored deconstruction’s transformation of close reading in a cinematic context.178 
Specifically, the pair argue that prominent forms of film reading are guided by a “will to 
totality or integrality, the inevitable essentialization, categorization, and repression of 
elements that ‘don’t fit’.”179 Yet, they also demonstrate that deconstruction does not amount 
to the rejection of a consistent, attentive argumentative logic; indeed, they note that 
Derrida’s own analyses were constructed with an “obsessive rigour.”180 Paul Bowman 
usefully unpacks this understanding of deconstruction as a radicalisation of metaphysical 
models of textual engagement. Based upon the premise that “no interpretation is total,” 
deconstruction is tasked with “putting in question the established limits of the existing 
interpretations perpetuated by institutions and taken-for-granted readings.”181 Thus, 
Derridean interpretation provides both an amplification and critique of logocentric close 
reading, a reflexive re-orientation of textual analysis away from totalizing aims and towards 
a celebration of interpretative heterogeneity.182 
 Drawing upon these observations, it is possible to theorise a direct call for a 
deconstructive mode of textual analysis within existing film discourses, predicated upon the 
transformation of cinema into a Derridean text. For example, Brunette and Wills argue that 
“the greatest impact of a Derridean point of view on film studies – beyond the questions of 
film history, genre, and various theoretical models – may very well be in the area of 
interpretation itself.”183 This observation is reinforced in their suggestion that all forms of 
Derridean film theory ultimately feed into discussions of textual engagement: 
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It seems to us that any attempt to extend Derrida’s ideas concerning the image to the 
domain of the cinema will come back to the matter of how strategies for reading 
film might challenge, more radically than semiotics did or does, the institutions that 
determine and restrict such reading(s).184  
 
In turn, this observation is accompanied by a more explicit call for “reading practices that 
challenge the imposition of institutional forms” and “would seek a more adventurous 
marrying of theory to reading practice.”185 Importantly, this re-theorisation of close reading  
 
would see the gaps of a text not so much, or not only, as signs of elision but as 
aporias representing important points of articulation between its inside and outside. 
It would accept that although such aporias might be productive of further readings, 
there can be no simple way…in which one reading could ‘correct’ another – thus no 
way out of reading itself.186 
 
In postulating this re-orientation of both the object and aims of textual analysis, Brunette and 
Wills espouse a reflexive interpretative form that opens up (rather than closes down) other 
nascent textual readings. The analyses undertaken in this thesis directly build upon Brunette 
and Wills’ ruminations on the topic, answering a call discernible throughout their 
scholarship but never actualised in any sustained fashion.187 In doing so, my thesis 
constructively contributes to a growing Derridean film discourse; rather than providing an 
oppositional counter-argument to existing work within the limited field, this project enacts a 
form of close reading that relies upon more abstract re-theorisations of the medium that are 
already in process. 
 
National Identity and Cultural Narration 
 
In this introduction, I have briefly explored the Derridean principles that guide my 
thesis’ methodology, demonstrating how these productively expand the limited field of 
deconstructive film scholarship. Specifically, this project intervenes within critical debates 
regarding cinema and textual reading, allowing films to be critiqued as metaphysical forms 
and interpreted as deconstructive engagements with other logocentric discourses. In the final 
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section of this introduction, I demonstrate how my analyses enact this scholarly objective. 
Drawing upon the work of Bhabha188 and Geoffrey Bennington, my analyses of case-study 
texts and their socio-political representations are guided by a Derridean re-conceptualisation 
of nationhood. By treating American national identity as a form of cultural narration, it is 
explicitly established as a logocentric discourse; in turn, this discursive shift abets the 
dislocation of its totalising function, a gesture that constitutes this thesis’ central research 
aim. However, before exploring these scholarly precedents, this thesis must be 
contextualised within a broader academic discourse that has re-cast nationhood as a 
complex, ideologically-constituted form. Whilst an exhaustive survey of such approaches is 
impossible, one can perceive a general shift towards re-defining the nation as a 
“multidimensional concept,”189 assembled from a plethora of diverse cultural determinants; 
for example, Anthony D. Smith constructs a taxonomy of potential sources for national 
solidarity that includes shared ethnicity, myths, religion, and geography.190 In turn, acts of 
discursive complexification underline readings of nationhood as an arbitrary, intellectual 
construct. Drawing upon Benedict Anderson’s theorisation of the nation as an “imagined 
community,” countless national identity scholars have endorsed his premise that 
“nationality, or, as one might prefer to put it in view of that word’s multiple significations, 
nation-ness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artefacts of a particular kind.”191 In turn, 
studies of nationalism have furnished these “artefacts” with an explicitly ideological 
character.192 For example, Ernest Gellner reverses orthodox readings of nationalist rhetoric 
as the expression of a coherent, a priori national body; he argues instead that nationalist 
discourses construct and solidify national forms, rendering specific nations and their 
collective identities as “arbitrary historical inventions.”193 Thus, varied readings of national 
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identity ostensibly challenge its purported status as a concrete historical phenomenon; in 
turn, by treating the nation as a discursive structure, these interpretations problematize the 
furnishing of national forms with any inherent, essential meaning. However, these scholars 
stop short of a subversive critique of metaphysical national identity; instead, they propose a 
self-consciously arbitrary yet equally totalised model of national ontology.194  Nevertheless, 
in providing an (albeit compromised) critique of essentialist identities, engagements with the 
nation as an ideological construct lay the groundwork for a more radical disruption of its 
logocentric foundations.  
Overtly deconstructive engagements with this area of cultural discourse radicalise 
these insights in their treatment of national identity as a metaphysical narratology. In one of 
the most influential examples of this academic discourse, Bhabha systematically unpacks the 
theoretical strengths of treating the nation within discourses of Derridean textuality.195 To 
begin, he argues that the pre-eminence and timeless solidity of the Western nation stems 
from its literary and discursive narrativisation: 
 
Nations, like narratives, lose their origins in the myths of time and only fully realize 
their horizons in the mind’s eye. Such an image of the nation – or narration – might 
seem impossibly romantic and excessively metaphorical, but it is from those 
traditions of political thought and literary language that the nation emerges as a 
powerful historical idea in the west.196 
 
In complementary terms, Bennington focuses on the nation’s “origin,” again elucidating its 
status as a narrative construct:  
 
It is tempting to try to approach the question of nation directly, by aiming for its 
centre or its origin. And…we undoubtedly find narration at the centre of the nation: 
stories of national origins, myths of founding fathers, genealogies of heroes. At the 
origin of the nation, we find a story of the nation’s origin.197 
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Here, Bennington initiates a deconstructive study of nationhood by demonstrating how the 
narrativisation of national identity furnishes it with the fixity of the metaphysical centre;198 
in doing so, he also demonstrates how national meaning operates as a transcendental 
signified that effaces its own historical contingency. 
Due to its role in constituting metaphysical national identity, Bhabha interrogates 
cultural narration to challenge it with a counter-reading that stresses the nation’s structural 
ambivalence and “conceptual indeterminacy.”199 Expanding upon this general principle, 
Bennington explores how national narration necessitates the fixing and hierarchization of 
difference within discrete binary oppositions: “the idea of the nation is inseparable from its 
narration: that narration attempts, interminably, to constitute identity against difference, 
inside against outside, and in the assumed superiority of inside over outside, prepares against 
invasion and for ‘enlightened’ colonialism.”200 In uncovering this metaphysical function, 
deconstructive critics have explored a freeplay of cultural difference that inhabits (but is 
forcefully regulated) by the Western nation. For Bhabha, this is achieved by radicalising the 
nation’s narratological status, exploiting its relocation within discourses of textuality: 
 
To study the nation through its narrative address does not merely draw attention to 
its language and rhetoric; it also attempts to alter the conceptual object itself. If the 
problematic ‘closure’ of textuality questions the ‘totalization’ of national culture, 
then its positive value lies in displaying the wide dissemination through which we 
construct the field of meanings and symbols associated with national life.201  
 
By considering the nation as a textual object, Bhabha places national identity within 
discourses of arche-writing, a term explored earlier in relation to cinema. Indeed, Bhabha 
establishes this theoretical re-inscription as an underlying objective of his project, arguing 
that “poststructuralist theories of narrative knowledge – textuality, discourse, enunciation, 
écriture” can be utilised “to evoke the ambivalent margin of the nation-space.”202 Finally, 
John Brannigan’s Derridean reading of literary national identity again allies a deconstructive 
expansion of writing with the emergence of spatio-temporal difference within identity 
discourses; “writing” is established as “the very condition of national identity that opens it 
up to otherness, and that allows a certain play of differences within the discourses of 
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national identity.”203 As he concludes, “writing serves then to both determine the nation, and 
to testify to its indeterminability, its endless heterogeneity.”204   
In the citations provided above, critics call for a deconstructive re-inscription of 
national identity that this project constructively contributes towards. Firstly, I fundamentally 
challenge the illusory solidity of American cultural narratives, demonstrating the textual 
slippages that problematize national self-presence. In turn, this gesture opens up the 
possibility for a cinematic representation of American différance, a Derridean model of 
cultural undecidability. To achieve this goal, I exploit Derridean readings of national identity 
as an assemblage of narrative structures, locating and exploiting a deconstructive potential 
within cinematic renderings of prominent cultural texts. Whilst the selection of these specific 
forms must be placed under reflexive methodological scrutiny, the four narratives that my 
thesis explores are legible through a series of prominent discursive tags: individualism, the 
nuclear family, the small-town, and the wilderness. To clarify, the narratives explored here 
are not treated as a closed, exhaustive taxonomy of self-identical American cultural forms. 
Rather, they are merely presented as indicative case-studies that facilitate fruitful 
deconstructive engagements with American national identity. Specifically, they have been 
selected due to a shared scholarly and textual pervasiveness, pertaining to normative 
constructions of character and place; each narrative represents a common structure of 
national experience explored within American studies scholarship, as well as a frequent 
textual focus of contemporary independent film. However, this thesis acknowledges the 
metaphysical choices that underline the selection of its case-study themes; not only are there 
a plethora of other cultural forms that could have been chosen, but also an even greater 
number of ways of conceptualising the discursive objects that are being analysed. 
Furthermore, one can note a series of conceptual interdependencies between these thematic 
foci; to provide a couple of examples, individualism plays a vital role in scholarly 
discussions of wilderness, and the nuclear family is often treated by cultural critics as a 
microcosm of small-town community.  
Nevertheless, treating this thesis’ case-study themes as structurally distinct, 
metaphysical entities is a necessary pre-cursor to their deconstructive analysis. Bearing in 
mind Derrida’s contention that deconstruction resides within the discourses it subsequently 
disturbs, Philip Rosen notes that the (initial) retention of “more or less determinate 
categories” appears methodologically vital.205 Thus, attempts by deconstructive critics to 
transcend metaphysical discourse are both practically impossible and theoretically ill-
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advised.206  Instead, the critic must pay close attention to the source and extent of the 
logocentric assumptions that he or she mobilises, a reflexive attitude practiced in this thesis; 
not only are my uses of metaphysical structures constantly interrogated, but I also analyse 
the discursive context from which they have been drawn. In doing so, my project engages 
with a series of narratives whose ontological solidity have been reified in other scholarly 
works and fields; this gesture diminishes my own metaphysical complicity, whilst extending 
the deconstructive influence of my project into a greater range of disciplinary contexts, such 
as American studies.  
 
Deconstructing National Identity 
 
As alluded to throughout the preceding discussion, any attempt to deconstruct 
American national identity presupposes the overtly metaphysical character of its existing 
discursive construction. Indeed, the concept itself appears predicated on a range of 
logocentric assumptions; existing scholarly literature has frequently treated the nation as an 
essentialist structure with static conceptual (and geographical) borders, exhibiting (and 
engendering) properties of cultural homogeneity, fixity, and presence.207 For example, 
Smith’s definition of national identity is sustained by conceptual demarcation and 
ontological self-coherence:  
 
There is, for example, a straightforward understanding of the concept of ‘identity’ as 
‘sameness’. The members of a particular group are alike in just those respects in 
which they differ from non-members outside the group…. This pattern of similarity-
cum-dissimilarity is one meaning of national ‘identity’.208      
 
Thus, treated as a self-coherent whole constituted in binary difference from other totalised 
structures, national identity is theorised as an (ideally) self-identical form of cultural unity. 
Lee D. Baker neatly summarises this link between logocentric discourse and national 
belonging, asserting that “identity reifies notions of homogeneity, hierarchy, and 
essentialism.”209  
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Importantly, in terms of this thesis, numerous scholars have located totalising 
structural properties within specific manifestations of American nationhood. To begin, 
perceptions of the United States as a demarcated spatio-conceptual structure can be 
discerned in discussions of the nation’s geographical closure and its role in constituting 
homogeneous national meanings; Robert Burgoyne describes this as a foundational 
American myth, presuming “the existence of a single, homogeneous nation extending from 
‘sea to shining sea.’”210 Furthermore, scholars have argued that national identity actively 
engenders a monolithic collective uniformity through the disavowal of cultural difference;211 
such models appear particularly pertinent in an American context, discussed in terms of 
“Americanization” and the “assimilation” of heterogeneous groups into a collective “melting 
pot.”212 This interpretation of American national identity is exemplified by Sacvan 
Bercovitch, who argues that cultural uniformity is only legible through the uniting of 
diversity: “the rhetoric of American identity…derives authority from its power to unite 
disparities. It feeds on fragmentation, gathers strength from the variety of conflicts it can 
obviate or absorb.”213 Thus, demonstrating a paradoxical reliance upon and disavowal of 
heterogeneous forms of cultural contestation, American identity ameliorates ruptures that 
problematize national self-coherence; yet, as with all metaphysical structures, it also depends 
upon a matrix of multifarious differences as a precondition of its very existence. 
Importantly, Derridean theorists have noted the logocentric tenor of existing national 
identity scholarship; in doing so, they validate the applicability of deconstruction to studies 
of national self-coherence. Indeed, Derrida’s sporadic work in the area demonstrates that 
“the national” frequently connotes conceptual plenitude and homogeneity; he describes a 
nationalist perspective that reifies the concept’s essential wholeness and “obligatory 
solidarity,”214 outlining “a certain image of the quasi-biological hygiene of the inviolate 
national body.”215 In his more sustained ruminations on national identity, Bhabha endorses 
and expands upon the observations above, elucidating “the problematic unity of the 
nation.”216 Vitally, this observation alludes to both the metaphysical character of national 
identity and the inevitable textual contradictions that deny the nation absolute ontological 
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closure. Thus, Bhabha explicitly discusses existing socio-historical constructions of nations 
as “totalities” that represent themselves as “transcendent,” a view he subsequently 
challenges with his own heterogeneous conceptions of cultural hybridity and difference.217  
In “DissemiNation,” Bhabha further elaborates this critique through his theorisation 
of a multiplicitous “field of cultural difference,”218 a Derridean economy that problematizes 
the nation’s internal coherence and its antonymic opposition to other national structures. In 
doing so, Bhabha observes a “‘splitting of the national subject’” that is the product of a 
particular temporal paradox: 
 
Such a shift in perspective emerges from an acknowledgement of the nation’s 
interrupted address, articulated in the tension signifying the people as an a priori 
historical presence, a pedagogical object; and the people constructed in the 
performance of narrative, its enunciatory ‘present’ marked in the repetition and 
pulsation of the national sign.219  
 
Mobilising an explicitly Derridean reading of iteration, Bhabha treats this paradoxical 
dynamic as the basis for a challenge to the nation’s ontological solidity. In doing so, national 
belonging is treated as “a form of social and textual affiliation”: 
 
Such a pluralism of the national sign, where difference returns as the same, is 
contested by the signifier’s ‘loss of identity’ that inscribes the narrative of the people 
in the ambivalent, ‘double’ writing of the performative and the pedagogical. The 
iterative temporality that marks the movement of meaning between the masterful 
image of the people and the movement of its sign interrupts the succession of plurals 
that produce the sociological solidity of the national narrative. The nation’s totality 
is confronted with, and crossed by, a supplementary movement of writing.220  
 
Here, Bhabha directly relates the temporal complexities of national identity to Derridean 
supplementarity, a theoretical gesture that underlies Bhabha’s textual critique of 
metaphysical ontology. Indeed, he clarifies that the “act of cultural enunciation,” of re-
marking identity in the face of its purported pedagogical solidity, should be treated as a form 
of arche-writing, and is thus governed by différance. In doing so, he poses a fundamental 
challenge to national unity and the dichotomous economy within which it is constructed: 
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Cultures are never unitary in themselves, nor simply dualistic in relation of Self to 
Other.… The reason a cultural text or system of meaning cannot be sufficient unto 
itself is that the act of cultural enunciation – the place of utterance – is crossed by 
the différance of writing or écriture.221 
 
Noting the originary différance at work in the constitution of all cultural identities, Bhabha 
offers a Derridean critique to any normalised, a priori national coherence. This theoretical 
project is unpacked further in the remainder of this introduction, facilitating its application 
throughout this thesis’ resultant textual readings.  
 
Dislocating American Difference 
 
As mentioned briefly above, the metaphysical foundations of national identity are 
not merely demonstrated by its construction as a structural self-presence, but also by its 
constitution within a logocentric economy of binary opposition. Whilst numerous theorists 
suggest that any act of national definition entails a differentiation from externalised 
“others,”222 this form of oppositional rhetoric is particularly perceptible within discourses of 
American national identity. Specifically, the prominent maxim of “American 
exceptionalism” intractably ties constructions of a totalised national character to widespread 
assumptions that the United States is ontologically unique. For example, Seymour Martin 
Lipset begins his sociological analysis of “the American difference” by contending that 
popular and academic discourses construct America as “qualitatively different…an 
outlier.”223 In disseminating this narrative of cultural distinctiveness, exceptionalist rhetoric 
tacitly constructs the nation as a self-coherent entity to be juxtaposed with equally reified 
external “others.” Deborah L. Madsen demonstrates this logocentric dynamic in her 
suggestion that “the exceptionalist mythology of America” engenders “the idea that America 
has a coherent national identity and that a consensus concerning the nature of American 
national identity does reign.”224 Finally, the logocentric tenor of exceptionalist discourse is 
further demonstrated in its construction of American identity in hierarchical opposition with 
a specific “other”;225 prominent currents within popular and scholarly discourse approach 
America as a cultural (and religious) ideal to be contrasted with a debased or fallen “old 
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world,” represented by Europe.226 The thematic significance of oppositional difference to 
American national identity again renders it a suitable object for Derridean interrogation. 
Indeed, Anselm Haverkamp argues that it is America’s regulated difference from Europe 
that opens it up to deconstructive reading.227 In establishing this subversive potential, 
Haverkamp asserts that exceptionalist, oppositional difference effaces an originary, 
heterogeneous cultural freeplay that inhabits the very concept of America itself: 
  
In America’s multifaceted landscape of differences, the European tradition has 
turned into a mortgage of uncanny proportions. Quite against the grain of leaving it 
behind, the European difference returns as the repressed and reveals what had to 
remain repressed in its difference. That great design of America as a radically open 
space to newcomers meant more than just the erasure of these newcomers’ histories; 
it meant the retroactive idolization of one particular difference erasing all others.228  
 
Thus, Haverkamp explicitly casts the opposition between America and Europe as a 
dichotomous play that regulates an unbounded difference that challenges American identity 
from within.  
Returning to Bhabha, his application of writing and différance to the metaphysical 
nation further elucidates critiques of its regulated dissimilarity from other national forms. To 
begin, Bhabha argues that external binary oppositions between holistic nations are 
problematized by a “liminal” cultural difference that operates internally: “in place of the 
polarity of a prefigurative self-generating nation itself and extrinsic Other nations, the 
performative introduces a temporality of the ‘in-between’ through the ‘gap’ or ‘emptiness’ 
of the signifier that punctuates linguistic difference.”229 Consequently, the presumed discrete 
(and antagonistic) difference between nations is re-inscribed as an uncodified undecidability 
within the nation that “threatens binary division” and opens up “a space that is internally 
marked by cultural difference and the heterogeneous histories of contending peoples, 
antagonistic authorities, and tense cultural locations.”230 Thus, as Bhabha eloquently notes, 
“paranoid projections ‘outwards’ return to haunt and split the place from which they were 
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made.”231 This critique of regulated national difference amounts to a rejection of national 
coherence itself: 
 
Once the liminality of the nation-space is established, and its ‘difference’ is turned 
from the boundary ‘outside’ to its finitude ‘within’, the threat of cultural difference 
is no longer a problem of ‘other’ people. It becomes a question of the otherness of 
the people-as-one.232 
 
Bennington provides a similar challenge to any model that differentiates between nations as 
a priori cultural totalities; he argues that the act of structural differentiation complicates the 
internal solidity of the nations it produces: “the ‘origin’ of the nation is never simple, but 
dependent on a differentiation of nations which has always already begun. The story of (the 
institution of) the nation will be irremediably complicated by this situation.”233 In such a 
reading, the nation is rendered “imperfect” by traces of other nations against which it is 
delineated and defined. Thus, the nation is inhabited by (and forged from) a heterogeneous 
internal difference that is arbitrarily stabilised by the construction of coherent nationhood:  
   
We have to go further, and say that this complication is not an accident which 
befalls the state in its ideal purity, but that it is originary…national differentiation 
does not come along to trouble the state after its perfect constitution, but precedes 
the fiction of such a constitution as its condition of possibility.234   
 
Thus, Bennington’s critique is cast in explicitly Derridean terms, uncovering the différance 
that allows (but also problematizes) the presence and ontological closure of any 
metaphysical national identity.  
Importantly, this re-inscription of the nation as an ungrounded venue of cultural 
heterogeneity opens up the possibility of a potentially boundless play of identities. Utilising 
his notion of “cultural difference,” Bhabha re-marks the nation as an indeterminate realm of 
contradictory narrational forms:  
 
The nation is no longer the sign of modernity under which cultural differences are 
homogenized in the ‘horizontal’ view of society. The nation reveals, in its 
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ambivalent and vacillating representation, the ethnography of its own historicity and 
opens up the possibility of other narratives of the people and their difference.235 
 
Predicated upon an in-built “instability of cultural signification,”236 Bhabha’s model stresses 
the unique, transitory nature of identities that are always open to unpredictable 
transformations: “the aim of cultural difference is to re-articulate the sum of knowledge from 
the perspective of the signifying singularity of the ‘other’ that resists totalization.”237 Bhabha 
clarifies this reading by suggesting that the play of differences engenders emergent forms of 
cultural identity that can never be exhausted by any static ontology: “cultural difference 
marks the establishment of new forms of meaning, and strategies of identification, through 
processes of negotiation where no discursive authority can be established without revealing 
the difference of itself.”238 Thus, Bhabha’s thesis embodies Derridean différance, insofar that 
it suggests that cultural meanings are only constituted in an unceasing chain of spatio-
temporal referrals; identities are forged yet simultaneously evoke other forms from which 
they diverge, deferring any transcendental significance.239   
The close textual readings undertaken in this project facilitate a similarly 
heterogeneous model of cultural différance, drawing upon Derrida’s theorisation of the term 
and its application to national identity discourses by aforementioned deconstructive 
theorists. Facilitating a vital intervention into American socio-political debates, this aspect of 
my thesis can provide a tangible, political impact outside of a solely academic context. 
Specifically, it forwards a fluid re-conceptualization of American identity that destabilises 
and de-centres the coercive, homogenising function of normative cultural forms and 
discursive frameworks. Thus, this thesis is not merely presented as a critical contribution to 
relevant academic discourses (although this aspect will be outlined presently); rather, it also 
has the potential to directly intervene within popular socio-cultural debates. This disruptive 
intervention into broader cultural discourses will be returned to as the focus of this thesis’ 
conclusion. 
 
Scholarly Interventions 
 
In undertaking a deconstructive engagement with American national identity, this 
thesis provides a multifaceted intervention into a range of scholarly discourses. To begin, the 
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cultural narratives explored by this thesis’ textual analyses have been subject to extensive 
critical attention within the amorphous field of American studies. Thus, this project offers a 
Derridean contribution to the discipline, presaging each cinematic textual reading with a 
deconstructive interrogation of related scholarly discourses. Importantly, this intervention is 
predicated upon the post-structuralist assertion that American studies constitutes its own 
object of study. As will be explored in chapter one, deconstructive scholars demonstrate that 
any act of reading entails a process of re-writing; it necessarily contributes to the discourses 
that surround (and subsequently, infiltrate) the cultural, philosophical, or cinematic texts it 
interprets.240 Furthermore, certain American cultural scholars have noted that academic 
engagements within their field necessarily re-shape their texts. For example, Baker argues 
that social scientists frequently mobilise the same “reified, bounded, ahistorical, and static 
understandings of cultural practices and social groups” that they purportedly interrogate; in 
doing so, he ponders whether it is possible to interpret cultural identities without reinforcing 
their apparently metaphysical foundations.241 In more explicitly Derridean terms, Bhabha 
discusses cultural studies’ complicity in constituting its logocentric foci; in questioning the 
reductive opposition between “theoretical” and “activist” scholarship, Bhabha argues that 
“they are both forms of discourse and to that extent they produce rather than reflect their 
objects of study.”242 It is my contention that this observation applies to all forms of scholarly 
discourse, this thesis included. However, in explicitly noting that academic work never 
simply analyses a fixed, coherent cultural object, this project displays a heightened level of 
critical self-reflection, guarding against significant lapses into metaphysical methodological 
assumptions. Furthermore, this project’s re-evaluation of academic practice also provides an 
effective means with which to intervene into the discursive landscape of American identity. 
Thus, the strengths of this method are twofold: not only are close-readings of American 
studies debates vital in constituting a legible object of study, but the process also precipitates 
a deconstructive engagement with the self-same scholarly literature.  
 In focusing on how cinematic texts can challenge prominent American cultural 
narratives, this thesis also provides a vital intervention into scholarly debates concerning 
“national cinemas.” As has been noted by countless theorists in recent years, national cinema 
discourses frequently reify links between film texts and essentialist national identities. To 
cite a prominent example, Andrew Higson argues that the construction of a national cinema 
performs an inherently homogenising function: “to identify a national cinema is first of all to 
specify a coherence and a unity; it is to proclaim a unique identity and a stable set of 
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meanings.”243 Thus, Higson concludes that a national cinema is principally theorised “in 
terms of its relationship to an already existing national political, economic and cultural 
identity.”244 In similar terms, Rosen demonstrates how national cinemas presuppose a 
classificatory plenitude, implying an a priori national totality around which a unified film 
practice can solidify: “intertextual coherence is connected to a socio-political and/or socio-
cultural coherence implicitly or explicitly assigned to the nation.”245 Thus, by enacting 
metaphysical categorical imperatives, national cinemas imbue related structures of identity 
with similarly fixed ontologies.246 However, a growing number of critics have challenged the 
discourse’s logocentric foundations, with varying degrees of success and self-implication. 
Higson demonstrates that the constitution of a homogeneous national identity necessitates 
the erasure of a range of diverse subjectivities: “The search for a stable and coherent national 
identity can only be successful at the expense of repressing internal differences, tensions and 
contradictions – differences of class, race, gender, region, etc.”247 Thus, national cinemas are 
forever inhabited by self-paradox; they are expected to “pull together diverse and 
contradictory discourses, to articulate a contradictory unity, to play a part in the hegemonic 
process of achieving consensus, and containing difference and contradiction.”248 Here, 
Higson rejects reductive readings of national cinemas as the simple expression of “already 
fully formed and homogeneous national culture and identity”; rather, “it needs also to be 
seen as actively working to construct subjectivity.”249 Higson’s reading of national cinemas 
remains problematic insofar that he implies that they successfully repress the incoherencies 
that inhabit the nation of Western metaphysics. Yet, his observations simultaneously draw 
attention to the structural inadequacies of logocentric nationhood, laying the foundations for 
a radical deconstruction of cinematic and cultural narration. 
 Importantly for this thesis, similar deconstructive potentials can be discerned in the 
work of other national cinema theorists. Focusing on the evocation of metaphysical binarism 
in the constitution of coherent national cinemas, Stephen Crofts references Bhabha in his 
suggestion that “pristine” national identities must be challenged with a heterogeneous 
understanding of the “hybridity of national cultures.”250 He concludes by citing Trinh T. 
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Minh-ha, whose reading of identity entails a similar re-marking of traces of the “other” 
within purportedly pure national cultures.251 Rosen poses an equally explicit challenge to the 
“coherence(s)” of a national cinema by treating it as a “body of textuality.” In doing so, he 
disturbs the metaphysical closure of interrelated cinematic and cultural categories, initiating 
a play of signifiers that closely resembles Derridean différance: “a theory of intertextuality 
treats those gaps as openings onto other texts, but those gaps can, in opposed or 
complementary ways, also be treated as openings onto society or history.”252 Thus, Rosen 
ultimately calls for scholars to place the homogenising claims of national cinemas and 
identities under greater scrutiny, a desire that his textual approach arguably fulfils.253 Finally, 
in noting a common assumption that cinema constitutes a “national bounded cultural 
artefact,”254 Susan Hayward argues that such perspectives uncritically perpetuate the nation’s 
supposed structural fullness.255 Engaging with prominent scholarship from other national 
cinema theorists (principally Tom O’Regan), Hayward extols a self-interrogatory approach 
that probes the category’s role in constructing its own object of study: 
 
This approach…does more than expose the “masquerading” practices of the nation 
as a categorical concept…this approach also carves out spaces that allow us to 
revalue the concept of national cinema. It makes it possible to reterritorialise the 
nation…not as bounded, demarcated and distinctive but as one within which 
boundaries constantly criss-cross both haphazardly and unhaphazardly.256 
   
Thus, Hayward explicitly calls for national cinema scholarship that self-consciously avoids 
replicating the Western nation’s “masquerade of unity.” Additionally, she notes that this 
discursive re-orientation also constitutes a vital revaluation of film studies and its 
relationship to cultural representation, converting it into “a mise-en-scéne of scattered and 
dissembling identities as well as fractured subjectivities and fragmented hegemonies.”257As 
has already been outlined in this introduction, my thesis utilises an overtly deconstructive 
methodology to productively contribute towards these currents in national cinema 
scholarship, building upon the discursive shifts outlined above.  
This intervention into national cinema debates augments aforementioned 
contributions to Derridean film theory, providing a case-study that fruitfully utilises 
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deconstruction as a basis for close readings of cinematic texts. In exploring cinematic 
representations of national identity in an American context, this project also expands the 
scope of deconstructive scholarship itself. Indeed, on the specific topic of American cultural 
identity, scholars have noted another surprising discursive gap in Derrida’s work.258 James 
Ceaser even argues that on certain occasions Derrida actively avoided an opportunity (or 
“obligation”) to ruminate upon the nation.259 For example, he once gave a keynote address 
concerning the “Declaration of Independence,” a foundational document and event in the 
constitution of the United States as a national entity; however, his talk focused on 
authorship, the “signature,” and political authority, ignoring any discussion of American 
culture in its own right.260  
 The scarcity of direct references to America grants it a spectral status in Derrida’s 
work, akin to his treatment of cinema; traces of American culture imperceptibly inhabit 
many of his deconstructive engagements with broader socio-political discourses. This view 
is espoused by Peggy Kamuf, who claims that Derrida indirectly addressed American 
society throughout his discussion of certain political issues; importantly, this observation 
encompasses cultural tropes, forms, and values that will be explored in this thesis, including 
“the American public scene,” politics, movies, television, and violence.261 Indeed, Kamuf 
concludes that “Derrida has kept his promise to go on criticizing and deconstructing 
America from wherever he might be, whether within America or elsewhere.”262 Thus, 
America’s core institutions, themes, and values have arguably proved a fruitful object for his 
deconstructive analyses, providing a useful jumping-off point for this thesis’ wider 
interpretative aims. Finally, the purportedly exceptional relationship between America and 
Derridean thought explored above is solidified by the more concrete influence of his work 
on the American academic (and cultural) landscape.263 Indeed, Derrida notes that “it is 
commonplace to say that the United States has been very open to deconstruction, the main 
place for the legitimation of deconstruction is the United States.”264 François Cusset suggests 
that these intellectual inroads may stem from America’s position as an ideal logocentric 
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object for Derridean analysis; from this viewpoint, deconstruction is rendered “one of the 
keys to American culture.”265  
Contextual links between American culture, academia, and post-structuralist theory 
are drawn together in one of Derrida’s singular theoretical gestures, in which the nation is 
playfully evoked as a possible synonym for deconstruction itself. In “Mnemosyne,” Derrida 
“risks” the following statement: “America is deconstruction.” Unpacking this bold 
proposition, Derrida outlines its wider ontological significance: “America would be the 
proper name of deconstruction in progress, its family name, its toponymy, its language and 
its place, its principal residence.”266 However, Derrida ultimately rejects this assertion, 
demonstrating that such a metaphysical definitional gesture would betray deconstruction’s 
non-totalizing principles.267 Yet, Derrida’s abortive attempt to synonymise deconstruction 
and America demonstrates a multifaceted affinity between the two terms. Even in refusing 
their lexical co-presence, Derrida solidifies a number of less tangible discursive links 
between America and his theoretical enterprise; the United States is cast as  
 
that historical space which today, in all its dimensions and through all its power 
plays, reveals itself as being undeniably the most sensitive, receptive, or responsive 
space of all to the themes and effects of deconstruction…. In the war that rages over 
the subject of deconstruction, there is no front; there are no fronts. But if there were, 
they would all pass through the United States.268 
 
Thus, Derrida follows his rejection of “America is deconstruction” with a statement that 
reaffirms a pre-eminent link between the United States and deconstructive reading: “Let us 
say instead, deconstruction and America are two open sets which intersect partially 
according to an allegorico-metonymic figure.”269 The above statements render America as 
deconstruction’s constitutive force and the focus of its critique;270 this fittingly self-
contradictory framework reaffirms Derrida’s assertions that deconstruction must be 
practiced within the specific logocentric structures that it aims to disrupt. In this project, it is 
this complex and mutually-constitutive relationship between American culture and 
Derridean thought that will be explored in greater detail, ultimately demonstrating the 
exemplary applicability of deconstruction to a metaphysics of American national identity.  
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In extending the reach of deconstruction into numerous areas from which it has 
largely been excluded, this thesis displays its continuing worth and adaptability as a form of 
close textual reading. In making this claim, I explicitly support critics who have established 
deconstruction’s relevance outside of the philosophical and literary context within which 
Derrida most commonly intervened.271 When probed about deconstruction’s wider 
applicability, Derrida suggests that its most effective uses do not delimit its analytical 
potential; indeed, he argues that deconstruction cannot be contained as it is already at play in 
a wide range of cultural contexts: 
 
Beyond an institution…deconstruction is operating, whether we like it or know it or 
not, in fields that have nothing to do with what is specifically philosophical or 
discursive, whether it be politics, the army, the economy, or all the practices said to 
be artistic and which are, at least in appearance, nondiscursive and foreign to 
discourse.272  
 
Extending this argument further, Wills suggests that the sustained academic analysis of a 
broad range of cultural texts “would not have been possible without…the conceptions of 
textuality and re- or decontextualisation that have been developed by Derrida.”273 Following 
Wills, this thesis engages with an arena of cultural representation that falls clearly within the 
bounds of Western metaphysics, yet would be closed off to scholars without 
deconstruction’s prominent theoretical insights. 
This thesis’ academic worth extends beyond a simplistic demonstration of how 
deconstructive principles can be consistently applied to cinematic and cultural artefacts. 
Rather, the act of applying deconstructive approaches to new intellectual areas ensures its 
methodological and political vitality.274 As demonstrated earlier, the consistent 
deconstruction of American studies scholarship demonstrates this thesis’ radical discursive 
reach. Referring to extensions of deconstruction as “disseminations,”275 Derrida notes the 
subversive act of moving across disciplinary borders, subverting the taxonomic presences 
embedded within particular scholarly fields. Indeed, he has praised scholars who attempt to 
subvert traditional disciplinary delineations, describing such acts as “courageous” and 
“political.”276 Paul Bowman expands upon Derrida’s challenge to academic demarcations in 
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relation to the increasingly prominent discourse of cultural studies. Engaging directly with 
the concept of the disciplinary “field,” Bowman argues that these categories should not be 
treated as “homogeneous terrains,” as “the disciplinary ‘field’ is not itself a unity.”277 Noting 
Derrida’s attempts to initiate scholarly practices that cross disciplinary boundaries and avoid 
monolithic definition, Bowman demonstrates that several deconstructive scholars (including 
Derrida himself) have critiqued cultural studies as such a homogenising tag.278 However, for 
others, cultural studies embodies the Derridean project of dismantling pervading scholarly 
hierarchies, a view that solidifies this thesis’ intervention into this field. For example, 
Patrick McGee describes cultural studies as “the methodology of hope,”279 a perspective 
based upon the category’s heightened conceptual impurity and reflexivity; indeed, McGee 
argues that cultural studies “has made visible its own internal contradictions as the basis for 
its intervention in cultural politics.”280   
Whether one endorses or jettisons cultural studies as a useful term, it has been 
demonstrated that Derridean theory necessitates an approach that cuts across disciplinary 
borders and, in the process, scrutinises their ontological stability. In concluding his study, 
Bowman theorises such a radical scholarly discourse, a project to which this thesis will 
contribute. To begin, his aforementioned critique of disciplinary solidity lays bare the 
logocentric complicity of “interdisciplinarity,” as the term connotes a mixing of distinct, 
coherent subject-areas. Thus, as Bowman notes, a Derridean critique of disciplinary 
categories entails a remarking of the purported difference between fields as a heterogeneous 
difference within those fields: “This discipline is not one. That field is not one. The conflict 
of the faculties does not just consist in the differends between putatively distinct disciplines 
like these. It is also internal to and constitutive of disciplinary fields as such.”281 To achieve 
this goal, Bowman theorises a practice of “alterdisciplinarity,” a model that respects the play 
of différance that produces disciplinary categories but denies them fixed definitions.282 I 
contend that my project exemplifies this “deconstructive humanities to come”;283 engaging 
with varied academic disciplines, this thesis interrogates the metaphysical assumptions that 
construct these categories as structurally self-coherent.  
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The Structure of my Arguments 
 
 Having established this project’s thematic and methodological tenets, objectives and 
interventions, I conclude by summarising the structure of my arguments. Utilising Derrida’s 
work on genre as a starting-off point, the first chapter provides a sustained deconstructive 
engagement with pervasive definitions of American independent film. Specifically, I argue 
that the category is frequently constituted as a static, homogeneous totality, the lesser term in 
a metaphysical opposition with a normative Hollywood monolith; this tendency is 
perceptible even in scholarly work that attempts to problematize the boundaries between 
these two classifications or superficially jettisons independent cinema as a useful definitional 
structure. Thus, by exploiting conceptual contradictions present in independent film 
discourses, I directly challenge its ontological plenitude. In turn, I elucidate my own 
repositioning of independent film from a definitional rule to a deconstructive tool. Noting 
the heightened structural reflexivity imbedded in the notion of cinematic independence, a 
deconstructive engagement with the term fruitfully transforms it into a discursive limit-point 
that disrupts pervasive logocentric assumptions and oppositions. Finally, the chapter 
concludes by outlining my project’s intervention into identity politics debates that dominate 
studies of independent cinema’s socio-cultural representations. Principally, I explore how 
existing readings demonstrate their own logocentric tendencies by focusing on self-coherent 
minority identities; this problematic complicity is challenged by this thesis’ Derridean 
engagement with independent texts and their intervention into the largely disregarded 
discourse of national identity.  
 The following four chapters each address a specific cultural narrative and its 
deconstructive rendering in specific case-study films. Chapter two inaugurates this trend in 
its focus on an atomistic locus of American national identity, individualism. Principally, I 
identify structural affinities between individualism, goal-oriented cinematic narratives, and 
metaphysical models of linear history and causality. Subsequent textual readings position 
Wendy & Lucy (2008) and Sure Fire (1990) as complementary critiques of individualism’s 
implication in these logocentric discourses. Wendy & Lucy dislocates individualism’s 
dependence upon narrative linearity and a fixed origin, before problematizing the goal-
oriented form’s reliance on the discrete delineation of success and failure. In contrast, Sure 
Fire enacts Derrida’s call for a non-metaphysical model of history based on repetition and 
recurrence, before troubling the self-coherence of specific narrative events, structural unities 
that are vital to individualism’s causal fulfilment of personalised goals. I conclude by 
analysing the film’s contradictory narrative telos of violent death; this ending ruptures Sure 
Fire’s individualist premise whilst simultaneously epitomising an absolutist form of 
presence upon which it structurally relies. 
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In chapter three, my project enacts a scalar expansion, re-locating the American 
subject within the nuclear family. To begin, I demonstrate how scholarly, cinematic, and 
popular representations have frequently constructed the American family as an idealised 
metaphysical centre. In turn, I argue that recent challenges to this orthodox model have 
primarily taken the form of antonymic, negative portrayals; importantly, such readings 
mirror the metaphysical totalities they ostensibly critique, tacitly constructing their counter-
representations as the other side of a logocentric binary opposition. In the second half of the 
chapter, I conduct a detailed textual analysis of Happiness (1998), within which I read a co-
presence of purportedly contradictory familial images; ultimately, the nuclear family is re-
inscribed as a cultural undecidable, a simultaneously wholesome and abusive realm. Chapter 
four provides a further structural enlargement of this argument, engaging with the American 
small-town. Like the family, the small-town is frequently constructed by American studies 
scholars as a nexus of contestation in national identity debates; prominent representations 
oscillate between reductive, antonymic, value-laden poles. This analysis and deconstruction 
of the small-town’s scholarly appraisal is accompanied by a complementary textual reading 
of George Washington (2000). In this close analysis, the town is interpreted as a 
fragmentary, contradictory location; here, the small-town’s cinematic depiction enacts a 
structural decentering, marrying its conceptual dismantling with an accompanying visual, 
spatial, and architectural breakdown. 
 Finally, chapter five provides a deconstructive engagement with the American 
wilderness. To begin, I critically interrogate prominent scholarly readings that constitute 
wilderness in a discrete binary opposition with American civilisation. In doing so, it is 
demonstrated that the ontological separation of nature and culture has remained a 
fundamental structural antinomy of national identity, despite myriad shifts in their respective 
values and connotations. Intervening into ecocritical discourses, I then read a pair of case-
study texts as deconstructive disruptions of this bifurcated economy. Firstly, Dead Man 
(1995) utilises its common generic positioning within Western discourses to dismantle 
discrete wilderness/civilisation dualisms; the film systematically contaminates textual 
elements with co-present traces of contradictory meanings, complicating the essentialist 
ontologies of both terms. Gerry (2002) provides a more detailed Derridean engagement with 
wilderness landscape depiction. Rather than treating the film’s setting as either an acultural 
void or a repository of cultural meaning, my reading of Gerry identifies varied semiotic 
processes that motion toward (but ultimately defer) any intelligible reading of its natural 
environs; ultimately, the film constructs a radical landscape of différance. 
 Importantly, the layout of this thesis’ textual analyses provides a further 
deconstructive gesture, intervening in the aforementioned opposition between American 
character and place. To begin, the semiotic co-presence of these foundational concepts is 
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inaugurated by this thesis’ chapter order. Specifically, the structure of my argument 
engenders a gradual spatio-thematic opening-out; the thesis begins with a detailed analysis 
of the individualist subject, and ends by deconstructing vast expanses of wilderness. 
Between these apparent polar extremes, I have chapters dedicated to the family (a purported 
centre of American socialization) and the small-town, an iconic cultural location often 
described as a macrocosm of the nuclear unit. Thus, one can clearly discern a process of 
scalar expansion and assimilation, by which the American character is gradually integrated 
(and eventually subsumed) into American places and spaces. Furthermore, this process is 
augmented by the uncovering of traces of each narrative within the national identity 
structures explored in the other chapters, moments of cultural excess that are discussed as 
they arise. However, this does not amount to the theorisation of a logocentric continuum 
model, stretching out between discretely opposed conceptions of character and place. 
Rather, this structure steadily fosters a structural undecidability that builds throughout the 
piece, a process that progressively effaces their binary difference and ontological certainty. 
Thus, the final chapter (concerning the wilderness) renders explicit the deconstruction of this 
foundational American cultural division. Erasing any clear delineation between nature and 
culture, this concluding analysis foregrounds and effaces the antinomy between place and 
character perceptible throughout this thesis’ broader structure.  
Finally, my project concludes by arguing that a deconstructive engagement with 
national identity offers a mere starting-point for a heterogeneous re-conceptualisation of 
American cultural identity. In this manner, I suggest that this thesis facilitates a radically 
open and unfixed cultural discourse that can intervene into a range of popular socio-political 
debates. This is demonstrated by a deconstruction of restrictive, interrelated frameworks of 
American experience: these are discourses of multiculturalism and “culture wars.” I finish 
by reaffirming the generative powers of deconstructive criticism, arguing that this project 
facilitates further, affirmative explorations of cultural différance within both scholarly and 
non-academic realms.  
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Chapter One – Relocating American Independent Cinema: 
From Definitional Rule to Deconstructive Tool 
 
The Death of American Independent Cinema? 
 
 Although contemporary studies of “American independent film” conceptualise this 
disputed cinematic category in potentially discordant ways, many endorse a shared discourse 
regarding the current state of their object of study.1 Put simply, commentators have 
perceived a “crisis” in independent practice, a series of industrial and conceptual trends that 
threaten (or have precipitated) the “death” of independent cinema.  As Geoff King notes, 
such judgements pervade industry accounts of the American filmmaking landscape; articles 
in the trade press have treated the initial presence and resultant closure of studio-owned 
specialty divisions as paradoxical portents of an upcoming calamity in the “indie sector.”2 
This crisis rhetoric has largely stemmed from specific financial and infrastructural 
determinants: these include perceived downturns in box office receipts, the scarcity of public 
funding, and the effective closure of iconic independent distributors, studios, and specialty 
divisions.3 In contrast, prominent producers such as James Schamus and Ted Hope have 
located a crisis not only in the practical mechanics of the “independent film market,” but 
also in the potential co-optive threat of media conglomeration.4 Whilst Schamus lauds 
“untold benefits” resulting from “the successful integration of the independent film 
movement into the structures of global media and finance,” he warns against the 
transformative effects of commercialisation upon independent cinema, instituting the demise 
of a cinematic identity sustained by coherent socio-political principles: 
 
We might be worried not so much about ‘independent film’ as about independence 
itself, the preservation of some form of civic space in which freedom of expression 
                                                          
1
 From the outset, this project fundamentally questions the ontological solidity of “American 
independent film” and related concepts. Although the term will be used without qualification from 
this point onwards (for ease of reading), this rejection of essentialist definitions must be kept in mind; 
this caveat extends to other categories discussed in this thesis. 
2
 Geoff King, “Thriving or in Permanent Crisis? Discourses on the State of Indie Cinema,” in 
American Independent Cinema: Indie, Indiewood and Beyond, eds. Geoff King, Claire Molloy and 
Yannis Tzioumakis (New York: Routledge, 2013). 41-44; Geoff King, Indie 2.0: Change and 
Continuity in Contemporary American Indie Film (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 9. 
3
 Pat Brereton, Smart Cinema, DVD Add-Ons and New Audience Pleasures (Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 205; Sherry B. Ortner, Not Hollywood: Independent Film at the Twilight of the 
American Dream (London: Duke University Press, 2013), 264. 
4
 See James Schamus, “A Rant,” in The End of Cinema as we know it: American Film in the Nineties, 
ed. Jon Lewis (London: Pluto Press, 2002); King, Indie 2.0, 1.  
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is not simply a privilege purchased with the promise of an eventual profit, but the 
exercise of a fundamental right.5 
 
Thus, one can discern two contrasting models of independent expiration; the first assumes 
the industrial collapse of independent filmmaking, the second laments the erosion of its 
ontological distinctiveness. This apparent contradiction demonstrates the pervasiveness of 
crisis rhetoric within independent cinema discourse, as well as its implication within broader 
definitional debates. 
 These paradoxical deaths of independent film constitute the focus of recent 
academic texts, extending earlier discussions of the term’s discursive demise. In Indie 2.0, 
King analyses the current state of the sector, noting that aforementioned developments have 
been simultaneously cast as a holistic, industry-wide crisis and a precursor to the renewal of 
a more “authentic” form of independent filmmaking.6 Using 2007 as an exemplary case-
study date, Thomas Schatz also invokes crisis discourse, drawing a clear distinction between 
studio-owned “indie divisions” and “genuinely independent producer-distributors”; whilst 
noting the critical and commercial success of releases from major studio subsidiaries, Schatz 
contrasts this with the “worst year ever” for the “genuine” independent sector.7 Finally, 
Robert Sickels provocatively suggests that independent film “arguably, is either on its 
deathbed or buried deep underground, already snuggly ensconced in its coffin.”8 In doing so, 
he argues that the high-profile commercial success of certain independent films in the late-
1980s planted the “seeds of death” for the sector, encouraging increased studio infiltration 
into marginal film practices and a resultant saturation of the marketplace with “indie-style” 
films.9 Yet, whilst the rise of studio-owned specialty divisions is cast as a primary cause for 
the independent sector’s woes, they are also treated as victims of this slump, an apparent 
conflation of industrial and ontological crisis models; 2008 is chosen as the moment of 
“death” for independent film primarily due to the mass closure of these self-same studio 
subsidiaries.10 As a result, Sickels perceives “a return to a more accurate, or at least more 
reasonable, definition of ‘independent’ within the industry,” an essentialist, production-
based reading that precludes high-budget studio-funded texts.11        
 Many of the academic texts outlined above locate the crisis of independent cinema 
within a specific historical moment, relating it to a series of events and a broader socio-
                                                          
5
 Schamus, “A Rant,” 256, 259. 
6
 King, Indie 2.0, 12. A similar reading is present in Ortner, Not Hollywood, 264-265. 
7
 Thomas Schatz, “New Hollywood, New Millennium,” in Film Theory and Contemporary 
Hollywood Movies, ed. Warren Buckland (London: Routledge, 2009), 20-21. 
8
 Robert Sickels, American Film in the Digital Age (Santa Barbara, Calif: Praeger, 2011), 34. 
9
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 Ibid.,, 47. 
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economic context (the “world-wide financial crisis of 2008.”)12 This viewpoint is expressed 
by a number of prominent scholars in this area (Geoff King, Claire Molloy and Yannis 
Tzioumakis) as they ask whether the downsizing and eventual sale of Miramax by Disney in 
2010 “might suggest the end of the ‘Sundance-Miramax era,’” used here as a “convenient 
shorthand for the broader indie sector of its time.”13 However, it is important to note that 
diagnoses of crises in independent film are not solely an innovation of recent academic 
discourses; indeed, scholars such as Justin Wyatt and J.J. Murphy have located similar 
apocalyptic trends at significantly earlier dates.14 This seemingly continual evocation of 
crisis in scholarly work is astutely discussed by King, who argues that the perception of 
emerging catastrophe has been an essential element of independent film’s self-identity. As a 
result, King notes that recent discourses have been dominated by seemingly conflicting (but 
mutually implicated) judgements of an impending death and subsequent rebirth of a “‘true’ 
indie” practice.15 King elucidates this rhetoric by locating it as a vital precondition of 
definitions that construct independent cinema in binary opposition to a Hollywood “other”: 
 
Indie cinema often seems to have been viewed as existing in a state of close-to-
permanent crisis of one kind or another…. One way of understanding this is to 
suggest that, within the prevailing discourse, the indie sector almost needs to be seen 
as existing in a permanent state of crisis; that this is, in a sense, part of its 
definition.16   
 
King concludes his perceptive analysis by critiquing the ontological status of the “true indie” 
frequently mobilised (explicitly or implicitly) in normative definitions of American 
independent cinema;17 he contends that independent texts are rarely “void of any forms of 
institutionalisation,” an argument that undermines essentialist and oppositional readings of 
this cinematic category.18   
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 Sickels, American Film in the Digital Age, 47. 
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 Geoff King, Claire Molloy and Yannis Tzioumakis, “Introduction,” in American Independent 
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 King’s analysis neatly relates notions of “indie crisis” to broader definitional 
discourses that increasingly dominate academic writing on independent film. Furthermore, 
assertions of a widespread industrial calamity have been accompanied by an ontological 
crisis within academic discourses themselves, characterised by an increasing scepticism 
towards independent cinema as a useful analytical category. Indeed, several studies have 
displaced emphasis from debating the films, filmmakers, and institutions commonly used to 
construct independent cinema as a coherent film sector, replacing these with a growing, 
reflexive focus upon the terms and categories with which such discourses are signified. 
Importantly, accounts that challenge existing discussions of independent film crystallize 
around common perceptions that the term “confuses more than it clarifies.”19 For example, 
Yannis Tzioumakis has argued throughout his work that conglomeration and 
institutionalisation have rendered the “label ‘independent’…increasingly difficult to 
sustain”20 and “virtually meaningless,”21 leading to the adoption of more ambiguous terms 
(for example, “indie” and “indiewood”) that reference a growing symbiosis with major 
studios.22 However, he extends this argument further by questioning the usefulness of any 
such terms within the cultural and media contexts they are commonly applied. Thus, 
Tzioumakis outlines a trend in which “independence” was increasingly used as a marketing 
label, a development that led to a decline “in public and critical interest in questions of 
independence…. After so much appropriation, overuse and abuse, the label was inevitably 
rendered meaningless for critics and the cinema-going public alike.”23 Furthermore, this 
focus on the diminishing semiotic value of cinematic independence is repeated in further 
academic claims that it is “spent as a useful term”24 or has been “appropriated into 
insignificance.”25  
Importantly, in almost every instance cited above, the semiotic emptying of 
independent film is ultimately related to perceived contextual changes in the American 
cinematic landscape; for example, in noting increased charges of meaninglessness directed at 
independent film, Michael Z. Newman cites the following as possible causes: “the 
incorporation of the discourse of independence by the major media industries and their mini-
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majors’ dominance of the market for Oscar-worthy, upscale, artistically ambitious films.”26 
Such judgements appear to be predicated upon the assumption that independent cinema once 
constituted a distinct, self-coherent cinematic form, a conceptual totality that has been 
subsequently thrown into a recent crisis of being. Therefore, most scholarly work only 
superficially questions the current integrity of independent film as a unified cultural 
presence; contentions of the term’s meaninglessness rarely initiate more sustained attacks 
upon its purported ontological fixity. In contrast, a central argument of this thesis is that a 
crisis of meaning within independent cinema can be traced to the metaphysical structural 
foundations of the category itself, a series of arbitrary binary oppositions that underlie a 
superficial appearance of conceptual self-presence. It is my contention that the seeds of the 
category’s demise lie within its own conditions of possibility, a proposition demonstrated 
through a deconstructive analysis of its bifurcated logic and internal contradictions.  
Feeding upon this assertion, this chapter provides a general critical survey of 
existing independent cinema discourses, analysing prominent impressions of the topic 
through a deconstructive lens; indeed, it is demonstrated that even those approaches that 
ostensibly challenge the self-coherence of independent film are often implicated in its 
metaphysical logic. In turn, I conclude this literature review by arguing that several critics 
have utilised analogous definitional terms to side-step many of the complex debates that now 
circulate around the concept of cinematic independence. However, it is demonstrated again 
that these seemingly original modes of categorisation reify many of independent film’s 
structural assumptions, replicating the discursive simplifications that they attempt to evade. 
Following on from this, I engage in detail with one particular framework (“smart”) that has 
tentatively laid the foundations for an explicitly deconstructive intervention into independent 
cinema discourses. Teasing out the latent radical potential of this scholarly area, I 
systematically elaborate my thesis’ re-inscription of independent film, transforming it from a 
definitional category to a deconstructive limit-point within metaphysical discourse. Having 
established the theoretical and methodological bases of this Derridean gesture, I delineate 
the textual corpus of the thesis, demonstrating how this latent deconstructive potential can be 
directed at a specific discursive case-study, American national identity. Finally, this chapter 
concludes by demonstrating how this specific thematic emphasis differentiates my thesis 
from pre-existing readings of independent cinema and socio-cultural representation. In doing 
so, I shift focus from personal to national identities, an area largely unexplored in existing 
independent film scholarship. 
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Deconstructing Indie Dualisms: Independent Cinema as a Relational Term 
 
 As suggested above, existing accounts of independent film constitute a superficially 
diverse discourse of competing definitions. However, as few readings interrogate the act of 
definition itself, one can discern within them a series of shared ontological assumptions. To 
begin, any act of classification amounts to a totalising metaphysical gesture, ordaining the 
object of study with a legible and self-coherent structural form. Indeed, several scholars 
explicitly attempt to ascertain independent film’s precise meaning, a recuperative response 
to the increasingly amorphous appearance of contemporary cinematic categories; for 
example, John Berra rationalises his project as an attempt to “‘rescue’ the term from such 
lazily non-specific usage.”27 This idealisation of definitional plenitude is implicit in other 
scholarly and journalistic texts on the subject, even if it is regularly accompanied with 
caveats regarding the term’s increasing ambiguity; indeed, several accounts directly 
establish this problematic, only to apply their own rigid definitional practices.  Jim Hillier 
introduces his discussion of independent film by claiming that the term constitutes a “loose 
and slippery label.” However, these statements preface his contention that “American 
independent cinema has a relatively specific meaning.”28 Furthermore, whilst theorists like 
Newman largely reject existing essentialist definitions, their reconceptualizations of the field 
are again predicated upon the assumption that independent film constitutes a distinct, 
definable category, “a stable cluster of meanings.”29 
In attempting to map independent film’s purported ontological closure, many 
commentators have mobilised the aforementioned notion of “true” independence, a term that 
unproblematically implies the presence of an essential set of authentic indie criteria.30 
Tellingly, this rhetorical device has primarily been used to differentiate between texts judged 
as genuinely independent and those dismissed as Hollywood facsimiles. Such a distinction 
underlies Sickels’ aforementioned readings; discussing the takeover of Miramax and New 
Line by large media conglomerates, Sickels plainly suggests that “when you are owned by a 
major, you are by definition no longer independent.”31 Thus, such assertions implicitly 
construct essentialist, production-context definitions of independent cinema, ensuring that a 
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specific film’s claim for inclusion in this category is reductively policed by absolute 
discursive boundaries; to be considered independent, a text must be produced in total 
isolation from the infrastructure and resources associated with the Hollywood studio system. 
In Celluloid Mavericks, Greg Merritt makes explicit this interpretative orthodoxy, as he uses 
industrial criteria as the sole arbiter of independent status; he specifies an “independent film 
as any motion picture financed and produced completely autonomous of all studios, 
regardless of size.”32 In such approaches, independent cinema’s ontological solidity relies 
upon a regulated economy of difference, embodied by metaphysical dualism. José B. Capino 
provides a cogent summary of such assumptions, suggesting that independence is mobilised 
as a marker of industrial distinction, inaugurating “a discourse of difference based on an 
oppositional practice.”33 Thus, presented as a superficial totality, independent film is 
constructed (and solidified) by the necessary absence of another term; it can only exist by 
inscribing a rejection of its conceptual antonym, usually characterised as mainstream 
Hollywood film.   
 Returning to Merritt, he argues that his rigid interpretative stance abets an 
objectively-verifiable method of defining independent film. In doing so, he critiques other 
approaches that focus on a film’s textual attributes to identify a common “independent 
spirit”; Merritt dismisses such readings as highly subjective and “slippery.”34 Thus, if one 
subscribes to the definitional framework outlined above, the aesthetic, thematic, or formal 
properties of independent texts are rendered a consequence of their means of production. 
Exemplifying this logic, Schamus tentatively constructs a determinist link between industrial 
context and aesthetics; he notes that “we have heard that a film’s mode of production bears 
some relation to its mode of representation. Perhaps the many modes of financing 
independent films bear some relation to their meaning.”35Although King fundamentally 
rejects simplistic industrial definitions, he provides a cogent summary of how such 
perspectives reify essentialist correspondences between text and context: “a degree of 
distance, industrially, from the Hollywood studio system often appears to be a necessary 
condition for substantial formal or socio-political departure from the dominant norms.”36 
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Thus, whilst commentators analyse independent film’s purportedly distinct textual qualities, 
these are frequently approached as a secondary by-product of a more concrete contextual 
difference. 
As suggested in the preceding discussion, independent film scholars have theorised 
an amorphous “independent spirit,” signifying a series of aesthetic, formal, and 
representational commonalities. Whilst the critical accounts explored above treat a film’s 
aesthetics as a secondary definitional characteristic, others have used textual factors as a 
more central classificatory focus;37 indeed, such approaches are frequently conceptualised as 
a direct response to the perceived limitations of narrow industrial definitions.38 Although 
Tzioumakis notes that independent spirit is “a notoriously difficult to define concept,”39 he 
argues that absolutist industrial definitions have “failed to register the subtleties of 
independent film production historically as well as in the 1990s and 2000s.”40 This critique 
provides the foundation for definitions that focus more clearly upon textual properties: “As 
the industrial background of a film has become gradually an irrelevant factor in its claim to 
independence, questions of aesthetics have assumed an increasingly prominent position in 
the discourse of contemporary American independent cinema.”41 Therefore, such approaches 
allow for a far more inclusive construction of independent film, incorporating any number of 
“independently-spirited” texts that have relied (to some degree) upon Hollywood’s 
production, distribution, and exhibition networks. 
 However, a shift in focus from industrial to textual definitions does not 
fundamentally challenge the binary logic with which the former have been constructed; 
independent spirit still implies an oppositional rejection of homogenised constructions of 
mainstream Hollywood film, albeit with a complementary focus on textual rather than 
contextual norms. For example, Hillier treats these two approaches as different 
manifestations of a shared oppositional relationship with Hollywood film: “we may today 
identify American independent cinema against the dominant of Hollywood – both as a mode 
of production and as a set of stylistic norms.”42 Positioning Hollywood as an “implicit 
referent” against which independence is defined, E. Deidre Pribram also identifies discursive 
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fields that interact in producing independent film as a “discrete cultural site”; importantly, 
these entail both “representational discourses” and industrial factors.43 Finally, whilst Janet 
Staiger’s theorisation of “American indie cinema” as a neo-formalist film-practice 
reflexively addresses several limitations of discrete productive and textual definitions, she 
tacitly retains the dualistic, logocentric economy that they embody.44 Thus, whilst applying a 
multi-faceted model that factors in socio-historical, narrational, thematic, and spectatorial 
attributes, she ultimately groups these determinants within a totalised, cohesive alternative to 
Hollywood film: “American cinema might be described as having at least two lively film 
practices rather than being homogenized into the classical Hollywood mode.”45 Thus, whilst 
scholars like Pribram and Staiger note a plethora of ways of inscribing independent 
distinction, these are cast as structural equivalents, each reinforcing an oppositional 
difference from a normative Hollywood centre.  
Vitally, pervasive readings of independent film and Hollywood as ontological 
opposites usually engender (implicitly or explicitly) a hierarchically-uneven dualism, a 
structural inequality that allows this regulated economy to be considered as overtly 
metaphysical.46 The earliest sustained exploration of this logocentric system can be located 
in the work of Chuck Kleinhans, whose reading inaugurates dominant discursive trends 
within this scholarly area. In asserting that “we must first look at the dominant institution – 
Hollywood cinema – in order to understand the alternatives,”47 Kleinhans explicitly defines 
independent film as a reactive category that is meaningful only when considered in relation 
to another term that it responds to and rejects:  
 
The rest of filmmaking exists below, beyond, subordinate to Hollywood… 
‘Independent’, then, has to be understood as a relational term – independent in 
relation to the dominant system – rather than taken as indicating a practice that is 
totally free-standing and autonomous.48 
 
Importantly, Kleinhans’ discussion of independent film’s subordinate position constructs a 
hierarchical relationship between this category and Hollywood, preventing their constitution 
as two equal, complementary values. Similar conceptions of independent film as a fallen, 
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inferior term can be discerned in its occasional positioning as Hollywood’s “other.”49 
Indeed, Claire Molloy notes a pervasive scholarly tendency towards “spatially oriented 
descriptions” of the American cinematic landscape, arguing that they “give rise to an 
interesting geography of American film that has mainstream studio fare at its industrial 
centre with the outlying borders being home to an ‘othered’ independent cinema populated 
by ‘outsider’ filmmakers.”50 As has been noted in this thesis’ introduction, Jacques Derrida 
insists that there is always a power differential at play within any metaphysical binary 
opposition, as one term inevitably dominates the other: to reiterate, “we are not dealing with 
a peaceful coexistence of a vis-á-vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy.”51 In this regard, 
independent film’s constitution as an inferior, reactive “other” of Hollywood clearly locates 
the term within the closure of metaphysics. 
The brief critical literature review above demonstrates the pervasive retention of 
specific binary theorisations of independent film, dualistic structures that cement the 
metaphysical tenor of such definitions.52 Indeed, totalised readings of independent cinema 
and their reliance upon logocentric dichotomies have themselves become the subject of 
recent academic scrutiny. For example, a number of scholars note the difficulties faced in 
defining independent cinema as an object of study, an observation that alludes to both the 
arbitrariness of the term and its common constitution as a structure of ontological negation. 
Emanuel Levy uses such rhetoric in introducing his monograph, outlining a number of 
categories and attributes that are not constituents of independent film; tellingly, this is 
framed as a means of addressing the difficulty of establishing a positive definition.53 Most 
commonly, such negative definitions construct independent film in a specific relationship 
with a homogeneous Hollywood mainstream. Discussing “‘independent’ films” that employ 
“twisted narratives of various kinds,” Martin Barker asserts that “they have tended to be 
described by what they aren’t: they are ‘not mainstream,’ ‘off-beat.’”54 Finally, whilst 
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Newman ultimately rejects such definitions as “inadequate,” he characterises indie film as a 
deleterious discourse, sustained through the necessary negation of another form of cinematic 
identity: “its identity begins with a negative: these films are not of the Hollywood studios 
and the megaplexes where they screen.”55 Whilst not explicitly critiquing independent film 
discourses from a post-structuralist perspective, these observations allude to the internally-
divided structure of the metaphysical sign, explored at length in this project’s introduction. 
As a result, the concept of independent film embodies Derrida’s assertion that  
 
An interval must separate the present from what it is not in order for the present to 
be itself, but this interval that constitutes it as present must, by the same token, 
divide the present in and of itself, thereby also dividing, along with the present, 
everything that is thought on the basis of the present, that is, in our metaphysical 
language, every being.56  
 
Thus, whilst being treated as structurally self-identical, independent cinema carries within 
itself traces of those concepts against which it is negatively theorised; the very absence of 
Hollywood is itself rendered an internal constituent of independent film’s structural 
definition, a precondition of its very existence. This economy of ontological imbrication is 
touched upon by Pribram, as she suggests that the object of her discursive analysis should be 
seen as “codependent, rather than wholly independent, in the sense of always requiring, by 
definition, a dominant industry to define (itself) against.”57 Importantly, these readings lay 
the groundwork for the deconstructive engagement with the topic that follows. By 
characterising independent film as a product of a broader metaphysics of presence, the term 
is opened up to a radical structural dismantling, a move that erases the term’s definitional 
self-coherence. 
 In imposing a reductive, dualistic model of difference onto a potentially 
heterogeneous American cinematic landscape, various texts, forms, and practices have been 
grouped into arbitrary, discrete terms, undermining a more nuanced engagement with their 
own specificity and singularity. As a result, the multifaceted différance that necessarily 
inhabits independent film is expunged and regulated, cast as an oppositional difference with 
another, externalised presence. This totalising function can be further elucidated with 
reference to Derrida’s work on genre, a discursive area that has already been applied to 
cinematic categories by Peter Brunette and David Wills, and, in an example relevant to this 
study, by Claire Perkins in her work on “smart” film. In the “Law of Genre,” Derrida 
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establishes the concept’s implicit logocentric purity: “Genres are not to be mixed.”58 In 
doing so, he notes that any act of generic classification entails an act of structural enclosure, 
in which a set of pure, essential criteria (“taxonomic certainties”)59 are used to police generic 
membership (and difference): “as soon as the word ‘genre’ is sounded…a limit is drawn. 
And when a limit is established, norms and interdictions are not far behind.”60 Brunette and 
Wills demonstrate how genre’s metaphysical properties of “completion and closure” pervade 
the diverse scholarly terrain of film studies: “surveying the field, one quickly discovers that 
much serious writing about film is based upon a constant, enabling assumption concerning 
the possibility of accurately describing different kinds of totalities.”61 
Yet, Derrida asserts that any “law of genre” is only possible through the a priori 
acceptance of a “counter-law”, a “principle of contamination”;62 “every mark or trait” that 
could signify generic membership “will always already be divided and lacking the 
wholeness that could generate whole categories or genres.”63 This is in turn attributed to the 
iterative operation of genre, a form of classification based upon transformative re-citation; 
again using filmic examples, Brunette and Wills explain that “genre distinctions are usually 
seen as existing outside or drawing their definition from outside the individual film, but are 
actually always inside it at the same time through citation and reference and through each 
text’s individual semiotic functioning.”64 This problematization of textual boundaries is then 
focused upon the structure of genre itself. As Derrida notes, generic “re-marks” are required 
to arbitrate any legible generic membership. Yet, the re-mark is necessarily external to the 
generic category that it signifies, enacting “a taking part in without being part of”;65 as 
Perkins summarises, “genre-designations cannot be part of the corpus that they designate.”66 
As a result, generically-marked texts can never “belong” but rather “participate” in 
(multiple) open-ended genres, as they always refer to an external designation and, more 
broadly, “a system of difference outside any given genre.”67 The self-integrity of any genre 
(or generic trait) is thus fundamentally compromised; as Brunette and Wills summarise,  
 
a genre trait will be…divided between inside and outside, it will be différant and 
thus always constituted by its opposite. This division always allows a kind of 
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otherness, an indefinite openness or incompleteness, to exist at the very heart of the 
concept of genre.68 
 
It is precisely this originary impurity that this thesis positions “at the very heart” of 
independent film. Its totalised constitution in opposition to an equally homogeneous 
Hollywood designation is undermined, as this antonymic difference is re-cast as a structural 
incoherence that resides within the category itself. In levelling this attack upon independent 
film’s ontological self-coherence, this thesis disrupts the pervasive oppositional frames and 
totalising definitions that reinforce a normative mode of reading and categorising cinematic 
texts. This dominant structural equation discourages any engagement with the singular 
distinctiveness of the varied discursive elements subsumed within pre-existing conceptual 
categories; in positioning independent properties as deviations from Hollywood convention, 
they can only be read in one fashion, as departures from an external structural centre-point. 
As will be established later, it is this methodological orthodoxy that this thesis aims to re-
dress; in doing so, it opens up a varied matrix of emergent re-conceptualisations and 
interpretative gestures that can be applied to the study of contemporary American film.  
 
Independent Film as a Hybrid Category: Cinematic Continuums and Oppositions 
 
As explored in detail above, foundational scholarly discourses on independent film 
have repeatedly reasserted a relationship between discrete conceptual opposites. Independent 
cinema and Hollywood have often been treated as antithetical presences, superficial 
coherences that are themselves inhabited by traces of their absent antonymic double. 
However, in more recent academic work, several theorists have attempted to interrogate 
rigid, binary definitions. For some scholars, dichotomous frameworks represent simplistic, 
outmoded structures that must undergo urgent revision. Relating apocalyptic appraisals of 
the independent film sector to essentialist constructions of “true” or “originary” 
independence, King argues that any attempt to theorise an authentic definition is undermined 
by its position as an “institutionalized discursive conception.”69 King then extends this 
ontological critique to the oppositional, binary framework within which self-coherent 
independent and mainstream categories are constructed: “If the negative object in the purist 
account might be opened up to a more complex reading, the opposite pole is also a mythic 
notion.”70 In noting this critical shift, King, Molloy, and Tzioumakis characterise recent 
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independent film scholarship as a turn away from discrete oppositional models, even if the 
solidity of the term is eventually reaffirmed:  
 
Together, academic and other publications helped establish independent film as a 
concrete and distinct category of American cinema characterised by a number of 
specific traits, rather than as one simply defined negatively on the basis of existing 
outside the ‘mainstream’ represented by the output of the major studios.71 
 
Writing alone, Tzioumakis explores this trend in a pair of detailed survey articles that 
analyse this scholarly field. In the second of these (dealing with academic interventions 
“from the 1990s to date,”) Tzioumakis asserts that 
 
the 2000s saw a large number of studies that have made American independent 
cinema one of the most debated subjects in the field of film studies at a time when 
questions of definition of the term ‘independent’ were becoming progressively 
complex.72 
 
Accordingly, Tzioumakis notes the common application of “discursive” definitions and 
“hybrid” or “continuum” models in problematizing earlier essentialist readings. In such 
formulations, independent cinema has been approached as an ever-shifting discourse shaped 
by a greater range of contributing criteria and factors; in turn, it has also been located as a 
relative “centre-ground” in a complex spectrum of cinematic forms and categories, 
incorporating both marginal and mainstream influences.73 Such redefinitions ostensibly 
challenge independent film’s presumed fixity and self-identity, whilst also downplaying its 
rigid, oppositional separation from mainstream Hollywood; this is evidenced in 
characterisations of the category as “a notoriously slippery designation,”,74 a “kaleidoscope 
of modern film-making,”75 and a classification with “increasingly elastic”76 boundaries. 
However, it is my contention that such readings are implicated in the logocentric definitional 
logic they purport to subvert, even if their metaphysical complicity is less structurally 
explicit.     
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To address a prominent example, Tzioumakis’ influential study is predicated upon a 
conception of independent film as a dynamic, shifting structure that changes shape 
depending upon its specific historical and cultural context; it constitutes “a discourse that 
expands and contracts when socially authorised institutions (filmmakers, industry 
practitioners, trade publications, academics, film critics, and so on) contribute towards its 
definition at different periods in the history of American cinema.”77 In such a reading, this 
thesis’ object of study amounts to but one epoch in independent film’s dynamic definitional 
history, referred to within Tzioumakis’ text as “Contemporary American Independent 
Cinema.”78 Nevertheless, there are a number of methodological assumptions that ensure his 
argument clings to existing totalising categories and binary definitional frames. To begin, 
the study’s exploration of independent cinema in a series of specific socio-historical periods 
must be challenged from a post-structuralist perspective. As noted by Brunette and Wills, 
grounding textual analyses within self-coherent historical contexts is itself an act of 
metaphysical reduction, as one necessarily disavows a plethora of equally valid historical 
sub-divisions or alternative interpretative foci.79 Secondly, whilst Tzioumakis places the 
concept of independence under analytical scrutiny, terms such as “mainstream” and 
“alternative” are unproblematically reified; this is evidenced in his assertion that 
contemporary independents are “grounded” in “mainstream” conventions, and in his 
mobilisation of “co-dependent” and “hybrid” categories.80 Finally, whilst independent film is 
treated as a dynamic, changeable discourse, it must carry an intelligible, static form in any 
given historical moment to allow such changes to be observed and mapped; independent 
film’s continuing categorical solidity is evidenced in Tzioumakis’ assertion that “despite the 
continuing problems of definition, American independent cinema has finally established 
itself as a relatively distinct category of filmmaking both in the global entertainment industry 
and in public discourse.”81 Therefore, this approach constructs a corpus that is structurally 
dynamic but signifies a range of self-contained, historically-specific meanings.82 
 Whilst the range of studies explored above superficially disrupt independent film’s 
ontological fixity, a greater number have attempted to complexify its antonymic, regulated 
difference from an equally static Hollywood mainstream. In doing so, several recent texts 
have constructed independent film as a hybrid location on a broader continuum, assimilating 
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a range of influences from seemingly divergent cinematic sources. To begin, several 
scholars have posited a growing symbiosis between independent and Hollywood practices 
and aesthetics, a merging of two initially distinct categories within the specific context of 
recent American cinema. Indeed, such assumptions are commonplace in aforementioned 
industrial definitions, identifiable in the work of Richard Maltby, Merritt, Schatz, and 
Sickels.83 These scholars argue that in recent years a previously distinct independent sector 
with a coherent, oppositional identity has been co-opted, commercialised, and 
institutionalised into crisis or compromise; this process is evidenced by the purported rise of 
indiewood film, specialty divisions, and corporate takeovers of prominent indie studios. 
However, whilst this industrial narrative offers a vague indictment of recent industrial 
convergence and its creation of a “pseudo-independent” product,84 it has also been mobilised 
as a starting-off point for more rigorous reappraisals of recent independent films as hybrid 
textual configurations. 
 To begin, numerous critics have characterised a specific historical context (the 
1990s onwards) within which certain infrastructural developments and trends undermined 
strict oppositional definitions of independent and Hollywood film. For example, in noting a 
greater accommodation of “queer themes” within 1990s mainstream cinema, Michele Aaron 
contends that the decade “was a…period when the polarity of the Independent and 
Hollywood sectors was fraying”;85 Levy forwards a similar argument throughout his 
exhaustive study of “the rise of American independent film,” suggesting that “over the years, 
the definition has blurred as a result of the increasing consolidation of power among 
Hollywood’s majors and mini-majors.”86 Tzioumakis offers a detailed periodization of these 
cinematic trends in a recent article, locating a similar coming together of antonymic 
categories within a specific historical context. Thus, whilst arguing that “much of American 
Independent cinema has always operated at close range with the Hollywood majors,”87 
Tzioumakis outlines a series of “phases” that chart a changing relationship between 
independent cinema and Hollywood. Thus, “indie” (1989-c.1996) and “indiewood” (1996/8-
present)88 eras are characterised as different stages in a growing “convergence between 
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independent and Hollywood cinema,” a gradual phenomenon that involved “the lines 
between independent cinema and Hollywood” becoming increasingly “blurred.”89  
 Whilst the examples offered above posit an originary opposition between 
independent film and Hollywood that has been slowly eroded, a number of more complex 
academic engagements consider ontological hybridity as a structural pre-condition of 
independent cinema itself. King offers the most prominent, sophisticated example of this 
definitional argument. Despite endorsing readings of a historical convergence of 
independent and mainstream texts,90 he constructs a broader cinematic continuum sustained 
by varying points of structural hybridity, using this coherent interpretative framework to 
group and order (in relative terms) a plethora of texts associated with independent film. 
Thus, citing industrial, textual, and socio-political aspects as vital “points of orientation” for 
independent cinema, King cogently describes a range of discursive possibilities subsumed 
within this category: 
 
Some films customarily designated as “independent” operate at a distance from the 
mainstream…: they are produced in an ultra-low-budget world a million miles from 
that of the Hollywood blockbuster; they adopt formal strategies that disrupt or 
abandon the smoothly flowing conventions associated with the mainstream 
Hollywood style; and they offer challenging perspectives on social issues, a rarity in 
Hollywood. Others exist in a closer, sometimes symbiotic relationship with the 
Hollywood behemoth, offering a distinctive touch within more conventional 
frameworks.91  
 
In stressing independent film’s textual diversity, King furnishes this category with a hybrid 
structure, arguing that it is constituted by the interplay of a number of mainstream and 
alternative forms: 
 
Independent cinema exists in the overlapping territory between Hollywood and a 
number of alternatives: the experimental ‘avant-garde’, the more accessible ‘art’ or 
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‘quality’ cinema, the politically engaged, the low-budget exploitation film and the 
more generally offbeat or eccentric.92 
 
King directly acknowledges this structural hybridity in his study of Indiewood, a cinematic 
sub-category that exemplifies the purported assimilation of mainstream and marginal forms, 
practices, and themes. Describing indiewood as a “hybrid location,” King uses the term to 
describe “an area in which Hollywood and the independent sector merge or overlap.”93 
Indiewood is treated as a “combination of more and less mainstream ingredients,”94 a 
theorisation that clearly problematizes readings of independent film as totalised, self-
contained, and discretely opposed to a homogeneous Hollywood monolith. Indeed, in 
concluding his study, King directly positions his model as a challenge to essentialist 
definitions and fixed binary frames; his aim “is not to suggest the existence of an open field 
of forces but to move away from the notion that a simple binary opposition can be asserted 
between the commercial mainstream and all points of relative departure and difference.”95 
Whilst indiewood exemplifies King’s structural re-conceptualisation, this argument implies 
that a range of ontological hybrids can be discerned, myriad differential mixtures that 
replace one discrete, absolutist antinomy. Thus, as King summarises, “the lines between the 
independent sector and Hollywood are in many places blurred, the difference between one 
and the other being sometimes radical, sometimes far less clear-cut.”96 Importantly, King’s 
reading elucidates an increasingly visible structural tendency in recent independent 
discourses, where the category is cast as an “in-between space”97 that “exhibits all vigor of 
the hybrid”;98 such equations are perceptible in the aforementioned work of Tzioumakis and 
Pribram,99 as well as related categories of “semi-independent”100 and “major independent” 
film.101  
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As briefly mentioned earlier, King’s theorisation of a range of hybrid cinematic 
forms is mapped onto a bounded continuum that stretches out between hypothetical 
mainstream and marginal poles; a text or category’s precise location is dependent upon the 
extent to which they incorporate and merge seemingly antithetical influences: “at one end of 
the American cinematic spectrum is the globally dominant Hollywood blockbuster. At the 
other is the low-budget independent or ‘indie’ feature and, beyond that, various forms of 
avant-garde, experimental, no-budget or otherwise economically marginal production.”102 
Thus, whilst indiewood provides an increasingly prominent middle-ground for this linear 
framework, spectrum models accommodate and order a large variety of texts that have been 
discursively associated with American independent film. As King concludes, these 
multiplicitous textual possibilities stretch out between two antonymic poles: “many shades 
of difference…continue to exist…between the extremes constituted by Hollywood and 
Indiewood, at one end, and the underground and avant-garde, at the other.”103 Thus, King’s 
cinematic continuum superficially undermines a strict binary segregation of Hollywood and 
independent film, allowing for a complex mixing or merging of these terms into numerous 
singular variations. King’s spectrum of indie ontologies has been mirrored, mobilised, and 
revised in a number of further scholarly studies. Chris Holmlund inaugurates a similar model 
in her suggestion that “independent and mainstream feature films are linked together on a 
sliding scale. Neither ideologically nor economically are they purely antithetical.” This form 
of structural interconnection purportedly runs in both directions; whilst various “key sectors 
of independent film have indeed migrated towards the mainstream, from the margins,” this 
has in turn led “many contributors (to) choose to speak from the margins to the 
mainstream.”104 Yet, these seemingly opposed dynamics are rendered as manifestations of a 
single theoretical shift; for Holmlund, in the act of definition, “what’s at stake is a 
continuum, not an opposition.”105  
 As evidenced above, recent intellectual currents within independent film scholarship 
have encouraged works that seek to redefine their object of study; applying similar 
theoretical models, these works ostensibly critique the rigid oppositional definitions that 
characterise earlier popular, journalistic, and academic readings. Considering independent 
film as a hybrid site (or series of sites) mapped onto a broader cinematic spectrum, any 
attempt to theorise the category as a pure, polar opposite of Hollywood is fatally 
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undermined. Furthermore, in reading independent texts as an amalgam of mainstream and 
marginal determinants, this model superficially erases any clear division between these 
countervailing tendencies, as they are shown to co-exist (and intermingle) in the production 
of textual meaning. Finally, by reading independent cinema as a hybrid of varying cinematic 
traditions, dualistic frames are rejected in favour of a multifaceted integration of disparate 
influences; numerous theorists have considered independent film as a productive meeting of 
a plethora of filmic forms, including Hollywood, art cinema, avant-garde film, and 
exploitation. 
 However, whilst such models undoubtedly complexify reductive oppositional 
frameworks, they ultimately reify the metaphysical principles upon which earlier definitions 
are founded. For example, this section began by noting a scholarly consensus concerning the 
perceived convergence of independent and mainstream cinematic forms and practices, a 
process located directly within a specific socio-historical context. However, whilst such 
arguments superficially challenge discrete, oppositional independent definitions, they rely 
upon essentialist constructions of the categories whose boundaries they purport to blur or 
merge. Firstly, in positioning this trend as a recent textual phenomenon, such readings tacitly 
embrace a priori, originary constructions of “true independence”; for independent film and 
Hollywood to have recently merged, there must be an earlier context within which they were 
fundamentally separate. Thus, the dualistic antinomy between independent and Hollywood 
film is retained as one historically-specific manifestation of American cinematic reality.106  
Secondly, the application of this hybrid discursive form implies the mixture of two 
legibly discrete values, hypothetical opposites that are subsequently integrated. Such an 
observation is discernable in Mark Shiel’s astute interrogation of “cult cinema,” a 
definitional discourse that bears striking structural similarities to bifurcated independent film 
models. Shiel argues that similar hybridity discourses utilised by cult theorists like Joan 
Hawkins actually reify strict binary frames, dependent as they are on the “resurrection” of an 
“out-of-date opposition.”107 Furthermore, in his deconstructive interrogation of genre, 
Derrida notes that the superficial interspersing of textual forms does not entail a radical 
effacing of their a priori ontologies: “if it should happen that they do intermix, by accident 
or through transgression, by mistake or through a lapse, then this should confirm, since, after 
all, we are speaking of ‘mixing,’ the essential purity of their identity.”108 Thus, the act of 
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generic assimilation reinforces the necessary distinctness of the ontologies it brings together. 
It is the contention of this study that a similar theoretical critique can be applied to the work 
of figures such as King, Holmlund, and Wyatt, who construct independent cinema at the 
intersection of mainstream and marginal forms, aesthetics, and practices. In positioning 
independent film as a hybrid of antagonistic tendencies, mainstream and marginal must carry 
essential ontologies; without retaining metaphysical self-coherence, the integration of 
previously distinct entities would be rendered illegible. 
 This reading of independent film as an “eclectic mixture”109 of discrete elements is 
solidified by the terms with which this specific hybrid category is described. Importantly, the 
readings outlined above do not characterise it as a fluid textual zone within which previously 
distinct elements are transformed into undecidables through heterogeneous interactions; 
rather, independent texts are commonly described as an assemblage of oppositional 
components that retain their a priori meanings even as they are structurally interspersed. 
This set of structural assumptions is clear in King’s work on indiewood. Locating this 
category as “an area in which Hollywood and the independent sector merge or overlap,”110 
King’s detailed textual descriptions suggest that elements drawn from antonymic tendencies 
remain discretely discernible within case-study films. Thus, indiewood is established as a 
“combination of more and less mainstream ingredients,” ensuring that films within this 
category are the products of a process in which “elements of more and less 
distinctive/mainstream cinema are mixed in varying quantities.”111 Finally, this process is 
typified by King’s mobilisation of Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of “distinction” as it relates to 
prevailing taste cultures; he suggests that “each of the films analysed so far combines largely 
conventional cinematic structures or devices with some markers of difference or 
distinction.”112 In such a reading, countervailing properties remain clearly separate. 
In constructing indiewood as a mixture of opposed tendencies, King ameliorates the 
seemingly undecidable textual logic that inhabits the category. As noted in this thesis’ 
introduction, Derrida regularly evokes this concept to elucidate his deconstructive project; 
re-marking a point where previous categorical oppositions begin to unravel, the undecidable 
exceeds the dualisms of metaphysics as it simultaneously embodies seemingly paradoxical 
ontologies.113 Derrida then contrasts this theoretical gesture with Hegelian “speculative 
dialectics,” a form of criticism he deems complicit in searching for a telos of logocentric 
closure and conceptual self-unity; in such models, paradoxes are uncovered but then 
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defused, as pre-existing polar opposites are integrated into a new totalising concept that 
escapes the metaphysical dualism that produced it:  
 
Hegelian idealism consists precisely of a relève of the binary oppositions of classical 
idealism, a resolution of contradiction into a third term that comes in order to 
aufheben, to deny while raising up, while idealizing, while sublimating into an 
anamnesic interiority (Erinnerung), while interning difference in a self-presence.114 
 
Conversely, Derrida argues that deconstruction uncovers textual self-contradictions so that 
they can be exploited rather than resolved; instead of being comfortably accommodated into 
a new (and totalized) meaning, they are used to pull apart the oppositional foundations of 
metaphysical discourse. Thus, in contrast to a Hegelian method that “determines difference 
as contradiction only in order to resolve it…into the self-presence of an onto-theological or 
onto-teleological synthesis,” Derrida notes a “conflictuality of différance,” a model of 
textual self-contradiction that “can never be totally resolved.”115 Bearing this commentary in 
mind, a similar critique can be levelled at pervasive readings of indiewood. As demonstrated 
above, the category fulfils a role that mirrors the logocentric dialectics that Derrida attacks; 
outlining the co-presence of paradoxical textual and contextual discourses (independent film 
and Hollywood), these are resolved or synthesised within a third term (indiewood) that is 
then taxonomically defined, granting it absolute ontological closure. Thus, whilst indiewood 
draws attention to contradictions within American cinematic discourse, these are neutralised 
within a new structural self-presence, which is in turn granted its own legible, essential 
being. In contrast, this thesis, as a Derridean intervention into similar debates, utilises these 
textual paradoxes for deconstructive ends. 
Finally, the metaphysical complicity of aforementioned hybridity definitions is 
equally discernable in the continuum models from which they are drawn. Superficially, 
theorisations of cinematic “gradational scales”116 elude discrete, binary formulation; such a 
framework visualises a broad range of textual possibilities in place of monolithic absolutes, 
laying bare a conceptual diversity that is forcefully homogenised within independent film 
and Hollywood categories. However, for a continuum to operate, it must stretch between 
two polar opposites, theoretical essences between which a variety of figures or terms can be 
positioned. As a result, any such framework solidifies the integrity of these oppositional end-
points; even if they are posited as practically unobtainable extremes, their hypothetical 
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solidity is vital to the continuum’s operation. Furthermore, by locating the object of study 
between distinct poles, spectrum models again demonstrate the originary différance that 
inhabits the metaphysical sign; whilst being shown to differ relatively from two specific 
oppositional points, each text, category, or value is again defined in relation to an external 
(and absent) “other,” which can be recast as an internal differential constituent. By stressing 
the “shades of difference” that exist between two (externalised) “extremes,”117 such studies 
mobilise a logocentric framework themselves, rationalising and bounding a radical textual 
heterogeneity and a freeplay of cinematic différance. Yet, in doing so, hybridity and 
spectrum models also demonstrate their structural reliance upon this unbounded semiotic 
economy. 
 
Side-Stepping Independent Discourses: (New) Punk, Smart, and other Analogous 
Concepts 
 
 As demonstrated above, recent independent film discourses have reiterated a range 
of metaphysical structural assumptions, intractably tying the concept to a series of 
interrelated binary oppositions.  In turn, the weight of previous scholarship has made it 
increasingly difficult for contemporary studies to explore this textual area without being 
drawn into these well-trodden ontological debates; this often leads to the regurgitation of the 
same reductive definitional frameworks they set out to subvert. However, in recent years a 
tangential trend in indie scholarship has emerged, within which academics have begun to 
reject independent film as a useful conceptualisation of their object of study. Thus, original 
interpretative and cinematic categories (such as “[new] punk,” “post-pop,” “quirky,” 
“smart,” and “specialty film”)118 have been constituted in recent academic works, 
incorporating a plethora of films and filmmakers that had previously been located squarely 
within independent film discourses.  
Ostensibly, one could read these studies as attempts to side-step the myriad 
discursive impasses elucidated within this chapter. Indeed, several such works are explicitly 
justified by their superficial transcendence of this definitional area’s problematic structural 
assumptions; for example, Tzioumakis extols his re-christening of independent cinema as 
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“specialty film” because the new term “removes the ideological and political implications 
and meanings that have been attached by various institutions to the label ‘independent’ and 
its derivatives over the years.”119 Whilst these reconceptualizations may encourage original 
perspectives that complement orthodox studies, it is argued here that any attempt to side-step 
independent cinema discourses is deeply problematic. As evidenced in Derrida’s assertion 
that “there is nothing outside of the text,”120 the meaning(s) of any object of study are 
reciprocally constituted, augmented, and transformed by the act of analysis itself; 
accordingly, previous readings of independent film have actively re-shaped the category 
they have attempted to describe. If one rejects theorisations of independent film as a fixed 
entity that can be objectively defined, it can be re-appraised as an amorphous, dynamic 
cultural construct, a signified that is constantly open to an endless process of revision, flux, 
and iterative transformation.121 Furthermore, the various practices, texts, and filmmakers 
associated with the category are themselves ontologically modified by the popular, 
industrial, and academic accounts that have debated, analysed, and (ultimately) shaped their 
meanings. Thus, in ignoring a range of relevant discursive elements, meanings, and 
structures, such approaches deny a complex web of connotations that partly constitute their 
objects of study.  
Furthermore, a large number of these discursive innovations ultimately perpetuate 
the arbitrary totalities and metaphysical bifurcations that structure independent film 
ontologies. Indeed, the very act of initiating a new cinematic category encourages 
logocentric generalisations and reductions. Constructing and enforcing a series of discursive 
limits, these definitional texts shape and demarcate a broader textual heterogeneity; as 
Brunette and Wills note, “any analysis necessarily divides a domain in order to study it.”122 
In being granted this structural closure, many of the aforementioned terms are theorised 
within an explicitly oppositional economy; whilst evading the reified binary dualism 
between independent film and Hollywood, these new categories are often located on the 
margins of the American cinematic landscape, again establishing them in relation to a 
homogeneous mainstream. Furthermore, many examples of this trend also replicate the 
hybridity or spectrum discourses outlined above; often responding to or trying to refine the 
amorphous territory of indiewood film, new cinematic sub-categories are placed at the 
intersection of two or more seemingly divergent film traditions. Whilst there are numerous 
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potential examples of such methodological gestures, they are elucidated here in relation to 
one exemplary case-study: (new) punk cinema.      
  Nicholas Rombes, Stacy Thompson, and Bruce Isaacs’ explorations of (new) punk 
cinema encapsulate recent attempts to provide a more complex or variable definitional 
alternative to independent film. Indeed, (new) punk is explicitly introduced as a more 
nuanced, fluid conceptualisation than the existing independent discourse it superficially 
resembles. Rombes describes it as containing a “contested heart,”123 a view reinforced by 
Isaacs’ assertion that any theorisation of “a new punk tradition” must account for “textual 
heterogeneity”;124 extending this perspective even further, Thompson suggests that punk is 
often circumscribed by practitioners as “‘that which cannot be defined.’”125 This implicit 
critique of conceptual rigidity is rendered explicit by Rombes, as he directly discusses how 
the new concept destabilises dualistic definitions of American independent film: pointing out 
that his corpus of new punk texts are “not all ‘independent’” and are drawn from a variety of 
national contexts, Rombes argues that the latter term “has less value today when so many 
films are financed by complex and interrelated networks.”126 As a result, he contextualises 
new punk within a range of “new movements that seek to move beyond the worn-out 
‘mainstream vs independent cinema’ paradigm, a paradigm which…is trickier to sustain 
now that ‘indie’ cinema has become a multi billion dollar industry.”127 However, scholars 
like Thompson have also located the term as a categorical structure within independent 
discourse; at times the author refers to the object of study as a “sub-genre,”128 deferring to an 
industrial definitional framework that defines punk cinema as “independently produced.”129 
Thus, whilst Thompson does not theorise punk as an explicit indie analogue, the manner in 
which he positions punk within existing categories allows it to be discussed aside from the 
problematic structural assumptions that orient independent cinema as a broader, self-
coherent cinematic category.130   
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As alluded to above, attempts to transcend independent film discourses are often 
undermined by the mobilisation of a similar metaphysical logic within new cinematic 
categories. Returning to (new) punk cinema, it has been theorised as an explicit attack upon 
structural simplifications and oppositions mobilised in normative models of American 
cinema, typified by antonymic definitions of independent and Hollywood film. However, 
when considered closely, one can discern similar logocentric properties within (new) punk 
cinema itself, metaphysical gestures that undermine the term’s purported “openness” and 
“heterogeneity.”131 Specifically, (new) punk cinema frequently mobilises materialist and 
auteurist structures that are strikingly similar to those observable within dualistic 
independent film definitions. In Rombes’ introduction to the category, he constructs a series 
of historical, textual, and structural frames that closely resemble pervasive independent film 
taxonomies: “Beginning in the mid 1990s, a series of films from around the world began to 
emerge that challenged, or at least radically revised, many of the narrative and aesthetic 
codes that governed mainstream Hollywood fare.”132 Furthermore, several of the exemplary 
new punk texts he outlines are more commonly approached by critics and scholars as 
independent; these include Gummo (1997) and The Blair Witch Project (1999).133 Thus, 
whilst explicitly arguing that this category is not analogous with independent film, Rombes 
defines new punk with a timeframe and corpus that is roughly equitable with pervasive indie 
definitions; additionally, he places the category in a similar dualistic, antagonistic 
relationship with a monolithic mainstream Hollywood. For Thompson, punk is also 
characterised as a “resistant cinema,”134 an aesthetic attack upon a normalised Hollywood 
mainstream aesthetic: comparing the workings of punk film and music, Thompson argues 
that major record labels and Hollywood studios play identical “gatekeeping functions,” 
providing self-coherent, monolithic textual norms that punk products can oppose and 
subvert.135 Thus, noting the differences in pacing that characterise the oppositional aesthetics 
of punk music and film, Thompson demonstrates that punk narration is primarily defined by 
that which it excludes, namely the commercial imperatives of classical Hollywood 
convention: to abet the development of a “punk” aesthetic, “the Hollywood aesthetic – 
linear, teleological, and fast-paced – had to be diverted, rendered open-ended, and slowed 
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down. In punk cinema, scenes that do not advance the narrative signify a lack of concern 
with money and therefore with the commercial market.”136   
This purported textual subversion is underlined by an equally important industrial 
antinomy; for a text to be considered as punk, any formal or stylistic oppositionality must be 
accompanied by (and stem from) a marginal productive context. Thompson introduces this 
idea by providing a dualistic summary of punk discourse’s “two vectors,”137 arguing that 
different groups have chosen to define punk either as “a loosely construed aesthetic” or “in 
terms of its economics – its production and reproduction.”138 In contrast, by adopting a 
“materialist critique,”139 Thompson proposes a “more dialectical approach, one that grasps 
the aesthetic of punk cinema that has emerged from and been informed by ‘punk 
economics.’”140 Here, Thompson clearly replicates traditional independent film definitions 
that rely upon industrial oppositionality, as he presumes a direct causal relationship between 
productive and aesthetic attributes. Finally, there are also brief moments when (new) punk 
discourse evokes more complex (yet equally metaphysical) hybrid definitional models. In 
Rombes’ introductory text, his rejection of independent film as a useful category informs 
assertions that new punk films should be approached as a “brutal mixture of underground, 
avant-garde technique and mainstream, genre-based storytelling”141; this reading closely 
resembles recent theorisations of independent film forwarded by figures such as King and 
Holmlund.142 Thus, whilst (new) punk scholars explicitly reject independent film as a useful 
analytical category, they tacitly reinforce the relational or hybrid models that have 
dominated recent American film scholarship. 
This brief survey of (new) punk scholarship demonstrates the logocentric complicity 
of reductive attempts to side-step independent film discourses. However, there has been one 
trend within recent American film scholarship that provides a tentative basis for a more 
sustained deconstructive re-inscription of independent film; this is the gradual rise in work 
on smart cinema, evidenced by the work of Jeffrey Sconce, Pat Brereton, and Perkins. 
Undoubtedly, existing constructions of smart cinema replicate many of the problematic 
methodological assumptions discerned within other interpretative models, demonstrating an 
(albeit increasingly self-conscious) logocentric complicity. Firstly, this is evident in its 
discursive positioning as both a sub-category of and a cypher for independent film; in both 
formulations, smart’s heightened structural reflexivity is centred upon its own distinct being, 
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deflecting critical interrogation away from the broader discourse of 
“commercial/independent” filmmaking within which it is positioned.143 Secondly, smart has 
been theorised as a “nebulous tendency”144 or “loosely conceived”145 category “with a 
specific interest in confounding the discrete categories of art, independent and mainstream 
filmmaking.”146 Yet, in spite of these caveats, it has often been constructed with an (albeit 
self-conscious) taxonomic certainty; in Sconce’s inaugural definition of smart he outlines a 
number of smart texts, filmmakers, and shared textual elements, including a characteristic 
“‘blank’ style,” synchronous narrative structures, “a focus on the white middle-class family 
as a crucible of miscommunication and emotional dysfunction,” and a political interest in 
issues of “taste, consumerism and identity.”147 Finally, smart’s structural solidity has been 
underlined by its constitution either in opposition to mainstream cinema and culture, or as a 
hybrid of countervailing tendencies, structural models that closely replicate prominent 
independent film definitions; thus, smart has been imagined as both a “style defined in 
opposition to Hollywood”148 and a category “that survives…at the symbolic and material 
intersection of ‘Hollywood’, the ‘indie’ scene and the vestiges of what cinephiles used to 
call ‘art’ films.”149 However, in spite of these metaphysical implications and structural 
limitations, smart scholarship has achieved several reflexive theoretical breakthroughs; these 
are ultimately beneficial to my thesis’ re-inscription of independent film as an interpretative 
tool that embodies a radical deconstructive potential.  
 Specifically, it is argued here that smart’s purported characterisation as a nihilistic, 
postmodern, and self-reflexive category render it a useful starting point for the application of 
deconstructive reading strategies to American cinematic texts. The construction of smart as a 
sensibility within contemporary US film has crystallized around purported tonal 
commonalities within case-study texts, expressed repeatedly as being ironic in character.150 
Indeed, Sconce introduces smart as one manifestation of a broader cultural shift, manifesting 
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and expressing “a predilection for irony, black humour, fatalism, relativism and, yes, even 
nihilism.”151 Thus, arguing that the ironic tone of smart is applied “as a means of critiquing 
‘bourgeois’ taste and culture,” it is perceived not as a symptom of socio-cultural 
disengagement, but rather a shift in the political strategies of American film: 
 
American smart cinema has displaced the more activist emphasis on the ‘social 
politics’ of power, institutions, representation and subjectivity so central to 1960s 
and 1970s art cinema (especially in its ‘political’ wing), and replaced it by 
concentrating, often with ironic disdain, on the ‘personal politics’ of power, 
communication, emotional dysfunction and identity in white middle-class culture.152 
 
Thus, describing smart irony as a “semiotic chasm,”153 Sconce argues that case-study texts 
offer subversive challenges to overarching ethical and political frameworks: “from within 
the prism of irony…many of these films suggest the futility of pure politics or absolute 
morality.”154 In introducing her own study, Perkins comments upon Sconce’s observations at 
length, discussing how the perceived ironic tone of smart can be used to explore the cycle’s 
reflexive critiques of contemporary American society and prevailing cinematic 
conventions.155 Consequently, Perkins also frames smart as an attack on essentialist 
categories and absolute knowledge; citing smart’s reflexive approach to genre as a key 
example, she notes that it “has obvious resonance with the techniques of pastiche and 
quotation that are central to a postmodern aesthetic that distrusts ultimate positions of truth 
or reason.”156 In turn, smart’s construction as an ironic cultural form again places the 
category within broader discourses of the postmodern, a point reinforced by Brereton’s 
assertion that it constitutes “a dominant framing device for smart cinema.”157 Thus, smart is 
consistently defined as a critique of transcendental meaning, allying the category with 
broader currents within contemporary post-structuralist theory. Finally, references to smart 
as a potential critique of metaphysical presence are also discernible in pejorative evaluations 
of the category and associated texts; criticised by conservative commentators as part of a 
pervasive “new nihilism,” smart films have been located as “a particularly active 
battleground within a larger moral and artistic war.”158 For its disparagers, smart films are 
devoid of “rational moral judgement and politics,” embodying a perceived “nihilistic” 
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amorality that motivated comparisons with the cinemas of Stalinist Russia and Nazi 
Germany.159  
 Whether framing the category as politically progressive or fascistic, critical and 
scholarly engagements with smart texts have continually focused upon a pervasive ironic 
tone; this “ineffable”160 quality underlies contrasting readings that posit both a radical 
political potential and a reckless apathy. However, in this thesis, I consider smart’s supposed 
ironic qualities as neither a full-fledged conceptual critique nor a retreat into nihilist 
detachment; rather, they can also be considered as a nascent deconstructive potential.161 In 
meeting charges of nihilism and “blank disengagement” frequently levelled at smart, Sconce 
contends that its ironic disposition does not constitute a withdrawal from political or moral 
judgement;162 rather, he reads the sensibility as an emergent form of political engagement 
“conducted on a new terrain,” rooted in the bifurcated socio-political climate of late 20th 
century American culture wars: “frequently dismissed as apolitical or even amoral, the new 
smart cinema might be better seen as a transition rather than an abnegation of political 
cinema.”163 Indeed, Sconce proceeds to argue that “many of these films are extremely 
politicized and even rather moralistic.”164 Importantly, such a judgement is related to 
Sconce’s own observations regarding the potential political role of irony itself, as he refers 
to it as a “strategic gesture” or a “semiotic intervention within politics.”165 Thus, the 
subversive potential of smart is clear, as it is positioned directly within a “semiotic war of 
position” that uncovers and exploits cultural and cinematic contradictions.166 Interrogating 
prominent ontological frameworks, smart texts directly engage with specific textual and 
contextual structures; however, they are in turn subverted through the ironic character of 
their rendering, a gesture that amounts to a critical self-interrogation of their engrained 
logocentric properties. From such a perspective, smart does not inaugurate a new set of 
political or ontological truth claims; rather, it operates as a textual tool that evokes but then 
undermines conventional models of cinematic and cultural knowledge. 
Whilst smart is not elucidated within an explicitly deconstructive methodology, its 
ironic tone can be fruitfully reconceptualised within an overtly Derridean framework. 
Indeed, smart irony bears strong foundational resemblances with the more sustained 
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deconstructive method that will be applied in this project; the latter also relies upon the 
general principle of overturning and displacing metaphysical structures from within, through 
the uncovering and explication of their internal contradictions and textual slippages. In this 
manner, the “double-voicing”167 of irony provides a useful starting-off point for an explicitly 
deconstructive reading of American independent film and cultural politics. Indeed, this latent 
affinity between smart principles and Derridean theory is demonstrated in the language 
Sconce uses to describe the “ironic position-taking” undertaken by smart moviegoers; 
suggesting that viewers must adopt a spectatorial position that involves “reading ‘against the 
grain,’” he mobilises a term frequently associated with deconstructive textual analysis.168 
Furthermore, the aforementioned critical aims of smart (to demonstrate the “futility of pure 
politics or absolute morality”) closely resemble the objectives of the deconstructive critic, in 
his or her broader challenge to Western metaphysics and its idealised telos of absolute 
presence. In turn, the purportedly nihilistic rejection of all meaning in smart films can also 
be re-contextualised as an unravelling and deconstruction of specific metaphysical 
structures.  
Additionally, smart discourses briefly touch upon a subversive re-appraisal of 
American national identity, a vital pre-cursor to this project’s thematic aims. Brereton 
provides a limited commentary upon smart’s relationship with the national, arguing that its 
post-9/11 context locates it within a broader “re-polarization of cultures,” a position that 
allows it to critique “mythic expressions of national solidarity” and “triumphal national 
narrative(s).”169 However, such observations are limited specifically to “war films” and non-
linear narrative structures, and no deeper analysis of specific shared national identity 
structures is forthcoming.170 Furthermore, whilst Sconce theorises smart as an intervention 
into contemporary American socio-cultural discourses, such readings crystallize around a 
specific “interest in the politics of taste, consumerism and identity.”171 Finally, Perkins 
analyses smart’s socio-cultural representations within a similar thematic range, arguing that 
case-study texts focus “on the psychological state of middle-class America,” a rumination 
that is usually located within domestic settings.172 Thus, once again, smart is positioned as a 
critique of specific, essentialist cultural structures, an assault on prominent socio-cultural 
narratives that are developed and expanded upon in this project. 
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Finally, there are brief moments in smart scholarship that mobilise more overtly 
deconstructive gestures, further expressing its potential as a foundation for a sustained 
Derridean intervention into independent film discourses. For example, in Brereton’s 
discussion of smart as a postmodern phenomenon, he argues that such texts constitute a 
direct disruption of dualistic binary oppositions: “the postmodernist paradigm is said to 
promote a ‘both-and’ philosophy, which effectively copes with apparently contradictory 
discourses, often replacing the less inclusive (modernist) ‘either-or’ paradigm.”173 
Importantly, Brereton’s observation closely resembles Derrida’s aforementioned discussion 
of the undecidable, the destabilising force that resides within metaphysics and its regulated 
model of binary difference. Clearly, Brereton stops short of inaugurating a deconstructive 
method; the co-presence of contradictory discourses is presented as an ontological endpoint, 
halting the spatio-temporal différance that deconstruction aims to liberate. Furthermore, 
when considering the critical potential of smart, Brereton focuses most closely upon the 
disruption of textual values, evidenced in his detailed analysis of smart’s reflexive 
subversion of Hollywood narrative.174  
Brereton’s focusing of an anti-metaphysical potential onto artistic forms is even 
clearer in Perkins’ reading of smart as a “critical sensibility” that interrogates connected 
“historical and international intertexts.”175 In doing so, Perkins again establishes a series of 
“conflicted stance(s)” in smart’s interventions into cinematic culture, history and tradition. 
Prominent filmic structures (such as authorship and narrative) are initially embraced, only to 
be critiqued and transformed through their subsequent smart iteration, frequently cast as a 
negotiation of shifting, co-present textual registers of irony and sincerity.176 Furthermore, an 
increasingly radical deconstructive potential is discernable in Perkins’ general theorisation 
of smart as a category. As mentioned briefly before, Perkins directly cites Derrida when 
discussing smart’s structural self-reflexivity, approaching the classification as an indicative 
example of a deconstructionist critique of genre. In her reading, it is the two-fold 
“ineffability” of smart as an ironic sensibility that allies it with Derrida’s observations; for 
Perkins, by classifying smart texts through an intangible ironic tone, the category self-
consciously performs the act of genrification, in that texts are grouped by criteria that 
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“cannot be identified with itself.”177 Thus, smart’s purportedly self-reflexive attitude to 
cinematic discourses is attributed to a deeper textual engagement with its own unstable (and 
even paradoxical) generic status.178 
However, whilst a number of affinities have been charted between smart and overtly 
Derridean strategies, it must be reiterated that smart merely offers a burgeoning 
deconstructive potential. Although smart motions towards a fruitful form of Derridean 
textual interrogation, this is compromised by aforementioned metaphysical implication, 
itself a product of smart’s problematic discursive relationship with independent film. 
Furthermore, whilst theorists like Brereton and Perkins have noted that smart can explicitly 
challenge pervasive logocentric oppositions and totalised presences, these observations are 
not used to inform a sustained deconstructive method. Textual contradictions are uncovered 
but not exploited, stopping short of a radical dismantling of the metaphysical structures that 
smart films strategically engage. As a result, this thesis builds upon several of the useful 
properties associated with smart, extending these threads into an explicitly deconstructive 
methodology. In doing so, deconstructive reading strategies are applied here to a variety of 
themes that have been largely unexplored by smart scholars. As noted previously, the most 
sophisticated forms of smart criticism have been directed at cinematic categories themselves, 
evidenced in Perkins’ characterisation of smart as a Derridean reading of genre. Whilst this 
chapter undertakes a similar post-structuralist reconceptualization of a specific cinematic 
category (independent film), this forms a theoretical precursor to this thesis’ central research 
objective; to explore how recent cinematic texts can be approached as deconstructive 
critiques of American national identity. As a result, this project’s broader interrogation of 
American cultural narratives encompasses a wider variety of cultural meaning-structures 
than previously addressed in smart scholarship. Indeed, whilst one of this thesis’ cultural 
narrative foci (the nuclear family) remains a central concern of smart discourses, it is 
discussed in relation to personal rather than national identity;179 furthermore, themes of 
individualism, the small-town, and the wilderness have garnered little or no explicit attention 
in existing smart literature. 
Finally, in addressing a number of the limitations discerned within smart, this thesis 
eschews any attempt to construct new cinematic categories to frame its deconstructive 
textual engagements; as discussed earlier, smart approaches sidestep a broader discursive 
context surrounding many of its case-study films, whilst simultaneously reifying that 
discourse’s logocentric structural properties. Conversely, this study challenges independent 
film’s metaphysical contradictions and reductions head-on. In contrast to smart, this thesis 
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locates a deconstructive impulse directly within the pre-existing categorisation of 
independent film; indeed, as will be explored in the following section, the very act of 
deconstructing independent film provides the term with this radical interpretative potential. 
Thus, once shorn of any strict, definitional role, independent cinema provides a useful means 
of conceptualising a deconstructive method of reading cinematic texts; embodying a 
heightened structural self-consciousness, the term independent lays bare its own dualistic 
foundations as a precondition of its semiotic existence. It is to this act of conceptual 
relocation that we now turn. 
 
Reconceptualising Independent Cinema: From Definitional Rule to Deconstructive 
Tool 
 
 As outlined in the detailed literature review above, existing independent film 
scholarship has focused primarily upon definitional acts, and the complexities that 
accompany this process of cinematic classification. However, isolated readings have 
tentatively challenged the solidity of this discourse, either directly or through the location of 
a latent deconstructive potential within case-study texts. As explored in the previous section, 
scholarship surrounding smart cinema provides the most sustained example of this, allowing 
canonical independent texts to be approached as ironic, self-reflexive critiques of pervasive 
cultural and cinematic structures. At this point, it must also be noted that similar qualities are 
fleetingly discernable in scholarly texts that deal more overtly with independent film. 
However, as will be elucidated presently, these largely take the form of elusive 
deconstructive moments; whilst pointing towards potentially radical analyses, they are rarely 
(if ever) followed through by a radical dismantling of the categories’ metaphysical structural 
frames. Thus, whether observing an ironic or self-reflexive engagement with Hollywood 
form, genre, or broader cultural meanings, existing readings avoid framing these 
interventions as deconstructive.180 They operate as fissures and slippages in conventional 
independent film discourses, textual ruptures that this thesis aims to extend into a sustained 
deconstructive method. 
  Providing the most developed dissemination of deconstructive theory into 
independent film discourse, Pribram discerns a series of potentially post-structuralist 
impulses within the textual properties of numerous avant-gardes; in turn, these categories are 
treated as stimuli for future independent practitioners. Hypothetical deconstructive elements 
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are also located in Pribram’s later discussions of independent textuality, as traces of these 
specific discursive influences.181 David E. James’ study of “alternative cinemas” in 1960s 
America analyses similar avant-garde texts and practices, positioning them as repositories 
for a potentially deconstructive film aesthetics. In doing so, he articulates a reading of 
cinematic representation that bears clear Derridean influences: 
  
The interruption between signifier and signified that is the condition of signification 
separates signs, not only externally from their referents, but also internally from 
themselves. Constituted in difference, all images are thus inhabited by an otherness 
that erodes the affirmation of their apparent presence.182 
 
Nevertheless, any tangible post-structuralist influence on contemporary independent film is 
ultimately downplayed. For example, whilst potentially deconstructive elements are 
occasionally discernable within Pribram’s textual analyses, they are qualified by a greater 
emphasis on how independent texts perpetuate pervasive metaphysical structures. Thus, 
Pribram approaches independent film as a diluted inheritor of more radical cinematic forms: 
“many would argue that independent cinema is a watered-down version – some would say, 
compromised version – of the avant-gardes.”183 The possibility of a radically post-
structuralist approach within independent film discourses is thus downplayed, demonstrated 
in Pribram’s greater focus on the construction of alternative cultural representations over the 
deconstruction of existing semiotic structures. Thus, whilst certain theoretical works imply 
the operation of potentially deconstructive influences on independent cinema, they are 
(fittingly) located on the margins of this discursive area, in the tangential category of the 
avant-garde. In contrast, this study builds upon these theoretical observations, reintegrating a 
reflexive textual potential into American independent film’s very definitional core.   
As demonstrated throughout this chapter, any attempt to furnish independent cinema 
with specific ontological borders mobilises a number of essentialist metaphysical 
assumptions; as Derrida notes in his discussion of genre, any form of classification institutes 
a series of structural edicts that posit an identifiable set of criteria with which to arbitrate a 
text’s inclusion or exclusion.184 Whilst this section has outlined moments of deconstructive 
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potential within independent film scholarship, these are typically neutralised by their 
location within what is primarily a definitional discourse. Thus, it must be reiterated that this 
thesis does not intend to redefine independent film, as any such act presupposes a 
(hypothetically) identifiable essence or presence that animates the category in question. 
Nevertheless, neither does this thesis call for an outright rejection of independent film as a 
useful term, as argued for in some recent scholarship. Instead, aforementioned paradoxes 
and ruptures within existing discourses will be strategically exploited to re-mark 
independent film, transforming it from a definitional rule to a deconstructive tool; this aim 
has already been inaugurated by this chapter’s critical discussion of existing definitional 
models. Thus, the preceding discussion and forthcoming textual analyses amount to a 
reversal and displacement of independent film’s (oppositionally-constituted) presence. A 
fundamental rejection of relational definitions precipitates a shift in focus away from 
independent cinema’s perceived deviation from Hollywood norms; in turn, analytical 
attention is turned towards the singular textual configurations of case-study films on their 
own terms. In doing so, the hierarchical, oppositional difference between independent film 
and Hollywood is displaced, to be ultimately relocated within the former as an originary 
spatio-temporal différance.  
In effacing the rigid, antonymic framework within which the term is commonly 
defined, independent film’s claim to metaphysical definitional authority is fatally 
compromised; in turn, this allows it to be re-appraised as a reflexive interpretative device, a 
destabilising influence within contemporary cinematic discourses. Indeed, in the act of 
deconstruction, logocentric concepts are retained but then re-inscribed, placing them “under 
erasure” (sous rature). Represented typographically by an act of “crossing out,” this process 
amounts to a recognition of a term’s necessity to metaphysical discourse, whilst also 
denying its self-presence.185 Thus, rather than embodying a logocentric presence suspended 
within the regulated play of the binary opposition, the deconstructed term can be rethought 
as a critique of this pervasive thought-system; it represents an undecidable discursive limit-
point, a textual kernel that undermines the metaphysical structures within which it operates. 
As Derrida explains, deconstruction  
 
is not a question of junking these concepts, nor do we have the means to do so. 
Doubtless it is more necessary, from within semiology, to transform concepts, to 
displace them, to turn them against their presuppositions, to reinscribe them in other 
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chains, and little by little to modify the terrain of our work and thereby produce new 
configurations.186    
 
Such a process guides the deconstruction and re-location of independent cinema undertaken 
by this chapter. The term is deconstructed and re-inscribed, allowing it to be turned against 
the logocentric cultural discourses it engages. Thus, this thesis can be read as a sustained 
attempt to place independent cinema “under erasure” (independent cinema), a move abetted 
by the category’s heightened structural reflexivity. 
Whilst such a process may initially seem amorphous and abstract, my thesis 
solidifies this conceptual repositioning by using it as the theoretical basis for deconstructive 
textual engagements with a specific set of cultural themes and narratives; these have all been 
positioned (in existing popular and scholarly discourses) as constituents of American 
national identity. Furthermore, this method can only be built upon the ruins of independent 
film as a definitional category. As demonstrated at length, the metaphysical foundations of 
the term are evidenced by its constitution as the “other” of an equally discrete Hollywood 
mainstream. As a result, the purported presence of independent film is a direct product of 
this regulated binary structure; it can only be treated as a “discrete cultural site” by 
expunging its own internal differences and divisions, which are homogenised and recast 
externally as an absent antonym. However, unlike similar categories (art or cult cinema, for 
example), independent film self-consciously references its own underlying metaphysical 
logic. Such an observation has been touched upon by a handful of critics, but finds its 
clearest elucidation in the work of King; he perceptively notes that the category’s dualistic 
foundations are alluded to in its lexical signifier: “‘Independent cinema’ is itself a term that 
asserts a distinction from the Hollywood mainstream.”187 So, the concept of independence 
embodies a potentially heightened structural reflexivity, as it makes no attempt to cover the 
difference that establishes (but also undermines) its self-coherence and solidity; the term 
explicitly acknowledges that it is simultaneously defined in opposition to another term (that 
from which it is independent, usually Hollywood film). Accordingly, this indirectly 
foregrounds the metaphysical sign’s internal divisions, as traces of the absent “other” are 
rendered constituents of independent film’s own (purportedly) pure definition. Thus, 
encapsulating a critical method that relies upon the uncovering and dismantling of 
conceptual oppositions, independent film signifies the first steps required in any sustained 
act of deconstructive reading; it lays bare the dichotomous framework with which it was 
initially defined.  
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Furthermore, this project’s aim to subvert existing definitions from within 
necessitates the initial mobilisation of certain metaphysical structures and assumptions; as 
noted previously, a superficially coherent object of study must be signified before its 
integrity can be questioned through the exploration of its discursive slippages and fissures. 
This project’s corpus (as laid out briefly in the introduction) has been intentionally drawn 
from dominant independent definitions and periodizations. Thus, whilst the texts chosen for 
analysis have been selected primarily to meet this project’s (subjective) thematic and textual 
criteria (as films that abet a potentially deconstructive engagement with specific cultural 
narratives), they have also been selected due to their critical and scholarly location within 
independent cinema; all six case-studies have been consistently (and primarily) identified as 
independent texts by a variety of commentators. Furthermore, the aforementioned case-study 
texts have all been drawn from within a specific timeframe, the temporal borders of which 
are again motivated by a desire to destabilise existing independent film definitions. Thus, 
each text discussed falls within a socio-historical context that runs from 1989 until the 
present day, the earliest (Sure Fire) being released in 1990 and the latest (Wendy and Lucy) 
being released in 2008. Of course, these historical limit-points are (in many ways) arbitrary, 
and are symptomatic of the desire for definitional plenitude discernable in existing 
independent film scholarship. However, the strategic use of this framework is vital, as it is 
the most common periodization discernible within recent studies of contemporary 
independent practice. Whilst it would be impossible to list every account that utilises this 
model, it is coherently summarised by Newman as “the Sundance-Miramax era,” stretching 
from  
 
the 1989 Sundance Film Festival, where sex, lies and videotape launched itself 
improbably to commercial and cultural success, and Disney’s shuttering of 
Miramax, which had been so influential over more than two decades in defining and 
promoting independent cinema, in 2010.188    
 
Thus, whilst distancing himself from attempts at positing fixed indie origins, 1989 is used as 
a foundational cut-off point for his study. Newman is not alone in treating the premiere of 
sex, lies and videotape as a vital moment in independent film history; commentators 
including Hillier, Schatz, and Staiger approach this specific event as either a legible origin of 
or a transformative pre-cursor for a prominent independent film movement.189 Furthermore, 
even those studies that chose an earlier start-date stress the importance of 1989 in shaping 
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the character of independent film discourses; for example, Tzioumakis’ recent attempt at a 
more complex sub-periodization of this discursive area treats 1989 as the starting point for 
“the indie years.”190 Thus, in line with this project’s research objective to forward a 
deconstructive critique of independent film, this project will (initially) work within dominant 
periodizations.   
 Finally, in positing a conceptual relocation of independent cinema, a few words 
must be spent clarifying this complex methodological and theoretical gesture and its 
manifestation in this project’s close-textual readings. As suggested in the introduction, this 
thesis’ analyses do not (principally) constitute a deconstruction of case-study films (although 
they are guided by a constant process of methodological self-interrogation). Rather, they are 
read as deconstructive critiques of specific socio-cultural structures explored within those 
films; their representations of American culture are riddled with conceptual paradoxes that 
undermine a totalised metaphysics of national identity. It would be tempting to consider this 
deconstructive potential as a textual attribute, as this argument relies upon the construction 
of case-study films as carriers of a latent deconstructive potential. However, it must be 
emphasised that this attitude is not one that is held by the author of this thesis; to consider 
these texts as inherently deconstructive furnishes them with a single, unified, and privileged 
meaning, a significant lapse into the metaphysical logic this form of analysis ostensibly 
critiques.  
Rather, this thesis utilises post-structuralist reading strategies as a means of pulling 
apart existing structures of meaning, metaphysical cultural narratives that are (incompletely) 
evoked within cinematic case-study texts. Thus, whilst it is suggested here that independent 
texts are particularly fruitful for this form of reading (a result of the category’s common 
discursive positioning), this conceptual relocation merely abets specific interpretative 
methodologies. In doing so, this project builds upon certain observations made in the recent 
constitution of (new) punk cinema; in elucidating this area, Rombes suggests that cinematic 
categories and codes can be grasped as much as “way(s) of seeing” as they are (objective) 
groups of textual criteria, as they are (in part) constituted by “the expectations that we, as 
viewers, bring to the material.”191 Rombes’ arguments mirror overtly Derridean approaches 
to the act of readership, insofar that he troubles discrete divisions between text and context, 
film and viewer. Paul Bowman neatly summarises this perspective, demonstrating how post-
structuralist theory challenges reductive conceptualisations of reading as the subjective 
uncovering and interpretation of inherent textual meanings: “the connections we make and 
things we ‘discover in’ a text are actually being produced by the act of reading itself: as if 
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reading is inevitably a kind of rewriting.”192 Finally, such observations are given an 
explicitly Derridean bent in the work of Bernadette Guthrie and Dana Polan. In his 
discussion of Derrida and Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier, Polan notes a shared desire to 
“challenge any notion of textuality as fully constituted before the intervention of the critic 
and therefore of textuality as forcing the critic into a passive role as transcriber.”193 In 
similar terms, Guthrie clarifies that   
 
in Derrida’s theory of readership, the reader holds a complex and dangerous role 
within the texts he or she encounters…the text calls to the reader, it invites the 
reader inside itself…. The reader is always inside the text and implicated within the 
text.194 
 
This thesis does not approach the deconstructive potential of its case-study analyses as 
simply an internal textual property or an external interpretative framework. Rather, it is 
treated as a product of an active dialogue between text and critic; the act of reading 
necessarily re-writes the text being analysed, as it pro-offers an iterative re-marking of the 
critical discourses that contribute to the text’s constitution. 
Thus, this form of analysis will be considered as one way of engaging with (and thus 
re-writing) these texts; no attempts are made to treat these interpretations as canonical or 
static in a fruitless search for a single, transcendental signified. However, such readings are 
undertaken in a manner that opens up alternative textual engagements, as they are 
constructed as a direct challenge to metaphysics’ totalising gestures. Thus, in providing 
interpretations that stress a heterogeneity of potential cultural significations, this project’s 
case-study analyses reflexively acknowledge the possibility of limitless other textual 
perspectives and engagements. Indeed, in actively dismantling a number of restrictive 
American identity narratives, these readings aim to enable a more fluid freeplay of cultural 
différance; this unbounded semiotic economy abets the construction of diverse, unfixed, and 
non-proscriptive textual engagements. 
Yet, this methodological justification does not completely ameliorate the 
problematic project of utilising a deconstructive methodology to construct a coherent 
subjective reading of cinematic texts, even if one consistently highlights the arbitrary 
structural choices and assumptions at play. This methodological caveat equally applies to the 
cultural narratives that these films ostensibly critique. In treating this project’s case-study 
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themes as distinct textual objects that can be described, divided, and subsequently 
deconstructed, one is complicit in granting them an a priori metaphysical wholeness, a 
model of structural closure that I openly set out to problematize. Nevertheless, my 
mobilisation of coherent textual readings and distinct cultural narratives amounts to a 
structural necessity predicated by a number of contributing factors: the entrenched 
metaphysical character of all Western discourse, the need to construct a readable scholarly 
argument, and the specific principles that constitute deconstruction as a critical gesture. 
Firstly, Derrida continually noted the futility of attempts to escape metaphysical complicity, 
even for the critic who frames their project as an explicit attack on such discursive 
assumptions. To provide a clear example from myriad instances across his work,195 Derrida 
argues in Of Grammatology that it is impossible to simply dispense with metaphysical 
structures; as he states, “it is not a question of ‘rejecting’ these notions; they are necessary 
and, at least at present, nothing is conceivable for us without them.”196 Thus, logocentric 
assumptions are so deeply entrenched in Western thought, their (qualified) retention is 
required if one is to present a legible argument. Yet, Derrida proceeds to argue that the 
nature of this complicity, and the extent to which it undermines a critic’s work, is dependent 
on the degree to which one acknowledges and reflects upon this discursive paradox: 
 
There are several ways of being caught in this circle. They are all more or less naïve, 
more or less empirical, more or less systematic, more or less close to the formulation 
– that is, to the formalization – of this circle.197  
 
Above, Derrida demonstrates the inevitable coexistence of the critique and the critiqued, and 
the responsibility of the critic to constantly ruminate upon this ontological self-contradiction. 
In turn, the French theorist applies this principle to his own work, where he stresses the 
usefulness of certain binary structures if their mobilisation is accompanied by a thorough 
discussion of their reductive assumptions: “these oppositions remain very useful and even 
productive, but even as one uses them and puts them to work, one has to be aware of their 
limitations. Their pertinence is restricted.”198 Thus, the critic must not exempt his or her own 
work from deconstructive interrogation; they must produce a mode of scholarship that 
“constantly deconstructs its own conceptual oppositions…. For me, a reading is bearable 
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only when it does that work.”199 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak neatly summarises this 
dynamic, treating Derrida as an exemplary case of a critic who highlights and interrogates 
his moments of metaphysical implication; noting his tendency to deconstruct the work of 
those philosophers to which his deconstructive project would appear most indebted, Spivak 
contends that: 
 
Perhaps the entire argument hangs on who knew how much of what he was doing. 
The will to knowledge is not easy to discard. When Derrida claims for himself that 
he is within yet without the clôture of metaphysics, is the difference not precisely 
that he knows it at least?200   
 
Therefore, in a manner pioneered by Derrida himself, this project does not hide its moments 
of metaphysical complicity, or its reliance on logocentric structures as a condition of its 
possibility. Rather, I foreground and interrogate the structural assumptions and reductions 
that allow me to construct and communicate my textual readings and arguments, with this 
brief discussion being an indicative example of such a reflective process. 
 
Deconstructing Identity: From the Personal to the National 
 
Having outlined this project’s re-inscription of independent film, this chapter 
concludes by demonstrating its practical potential as the foundation for a deconstructive 
form of textual analysis within film studies. Specifically, this is achieved by shifting focus to 
a series of interrelated cultural themes and narratives that have been left largely untouched 
by previous critical work on independent cinema, all of which contribute to discourses of 
American national identity. As alluded to earlier, “identity politics”201 categories have been 
used as a dominant framing device for studies of independent film and socio-cultural 
representation. However, such readings largely avoid any direct interrogation of American 
national identity, arguing that independent cinema should be primarily defined by “the space 
it offers – potentially, at least – for the expression of alternative social, political and/or 
ideological perspectives.”202 Importantly, this potentially nebulous conception of “alternative 
visions” has frequently been divided into discrete sub-cultural identities, commonly linked 
to race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and clearly-defined political movements. In the 
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remainder of this chapter, I examine how these categories have been mobilised in existing 
independent film scholarship. Specifically, it is argued that while these accounts usefully 
elucidate certain models of subjective experience, their position as a prevailing critical 
orthodoxy restricts the range of cultural meanings that can be read from independent texts. 
Furthermore, whilst such readings implicitly critique constructions of an homogeneous 
national character, they do so by inaugurating yet another rigidly oppositional, metaphysical 
framework; a shared, monolithic American identity is contrasted with a series of (equally) 
self-coherent cultural “others,” a theoretical move that replicates the pervasive oppositions 
and ontological certainties such categories were initially constructed to challenge.203 Finally, 
this critique is used as a foundation to outline this project’s shift to a focus on American 
national identity; simultaneously, this gesture inaugurates a deconstructive method that 
problematizes the reductive truth claims that sustain both national and sub-national 
subjectivities.  
Before looking more closely at the mobilisation of specific identity categories in 
existing scholarship, it is prudent to consider how independent cinema has been more 
closely aligned (both in terms of industrial practices and textual themes) with individualist 
discourses of the personal than with collective models of the social or national. King 
cogently summarises this view, asserting that “independent cinema remains primarily an 
individual-centred cinema”; indeed, he argues that this property “limits its capacity to 
present radical alternatives to dominant American ideologies,” noting their mutual 
veneration of “the freedom of the individual.”204 In Newman’s study of indie as a distinct 
film culture, a focus on the personal is presented as a key point of differentiation from 
mainstream media practices: “‘Indie’ connotes small-scale, personal, artistic, and creative; 
‘mainstream’ implies a large-scale commercial media industry that values money more than 
art.”205 Finally, links between this textual category and the personal are reified by the 
assumption that independent texts reflect a singular perspective, vision, or worldview; this 
discursive link renders independent film as “the cinema of the ‘Other’ America,”206 a 
“cultural site” replete with “competing voices.”207 
Finally, contentions of an inherent focus on personal identity within independent 
cinema are also reflected in a number of commonly-recognised textual attributes. For 
example, independent narratives have been frequently approached as “character-driven,” a 
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property utilised as a marker of distinction from Hollywood’s purported “plot-driven” focus; 
this been attributed to both the influence of art cinema norms and budgetary restrictions on 
independent productions.208 Indeed, Newman locates a focus on character subjectivity at the 
core of the “rhetorical” strategies that constitute indie film culture. To begin, he superficially 
rejects bifurcated arguments that construct Hollywood and independent film as textual 
models with diametrically-opposed narrative foci: “a distinction between plot-driven 
blockbusters and character-driven indies is a somewhat misleading and unsophisticated 
simplification.”209 However, he then goes on to argue that this “rhetoric of difference” still 
plays an important function in indie discourse, and in particular informs a pervasive “indie 
realism,” which he establishes as both a discursive construct and an identifiable style of 
storytelling that deviates from “canonical, mainstream narrative practice.”210 In doing so, he 
concludes that independent texts “foreground and emphasize character,” embodying a 
storytelling style that “function(s)” to “orient attention…to topics or themes raised in indie 
films, and in particular to issues of social experience and identity.”211 
Newman’s focus on characterisation provides a useful bridge to the beginning of this 
discussion, where readings of independent film as a personal cinema were postulated as the 
foundation for more widespread critical evocations of identity politics categories in making 
sense of indie socio-cultural representations. Indeed, Newman argues that indie realist 
characters “stand as emblems for their social identities”; in clarifying the terms of this 
statement, he asserts that “social identities are those identities shared among significant and 
well-recognized groups of persons, such as sexual and gender identities; racial, ethnic, 
national, and regional identities; and identities of age or generation.”212 Whilst national 
identity is listed as one of the potential classes to be explored, it is the other minority 
categories that form the primary focus of academic studies of independent film; as Newman 
notes, “the value of indie cinema is often located in the ethnic/racial and gender/sexual 
identities of filmmakers and characters.”213 Newman’s comments exemplify a pervasive 
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trend in studies of independent film and cultural representation. Arguing that “Indie cinema 
is committed to cultural diversity,” Levy suggests that many independent filmmakers are 
themselves “outsiders,” figures “whose voices have been unheard or ignored in dominant 
culture”; importantly, these are principally delineated as “members of ethnic minorities, gays 
and lesbians, and women.”214 Embedding American cinema within broader socio-cultural 
debates surrounding multiculturalism, Brian Neve notes that a text’s intervention into 
identity politics debates has often been used to evaluate its worth and status within 
independent film: 
 
A template was formed early on that saw the independents as playing a political as 
well as an aesthetic role, broadening the range of representations of contemporary 
America, and in particular enfranchising those groups and minorities whose voices 
were largely unheard in mainstream film.215 
 
In turn, Neve tacitly downplays the potential for independent texts to engage with national 
identity: they express an emphasis on a “decentered multiplicity of localised struggles,” 
avoiding any direct interrogation of “large ideologies.”216 Finally, definitional texts have also 
used identity politics categories to structure discussions of independent film’s political 
functions. King’s exploration of “alternative visions” is abetted (and ordered) by these 
normalised cultural classifications: “the American indie sector has also provided an arena 
hospitable to a number of constituencies generally subjected to neglect or stereotypical 
representation in the mainstream, the most prominent cases in recent decades being black- 
and gay-oriented cinema.”217 These taxonomic accounts of specific minority cinemas share a 
common oppositional thrust; independent film is continually constructed as an arena of 
cinematic expression where specific identity groups can challenge pervasive stereotypes 
commonly located in mainstream media culture, signifying more “authentic” representations 
of their own members.218  
 Consequently, one can perceive an orthodox deployment of identity politics 
discourses in independent film scholarship, focused specifically upon personal experience 
and the theorisation of distinct minority subjectivities. However, by closely analysing how 
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such structures have been used to frame indie film’s representational strategies, a number of 
theoretical limitations become apparent. In fulfilling a purported pluralising function, 
independent texts have been read as a direct challenge to a broader socio-cultural 
homogeneity implied in constructions of a mainstream popular culture or national identity; 
embodying metaphysical properties of self-presence and structural fixity, homogeneous 
images of American socio-cultural life are challenged by a cinematic practice that values 
diversity and personal expression. However, as has already been demonstrated, such 
readings replicate a number of the logocentric principles they ostensibly aim to critique. In 
focusing upon a limited range of self-identical minority cinemas, existing scholarly literature 
necessarily relies upon their construction as conceptual monoliths; in doing so, they disavow 
any conception of identity as an (often self-contradictory) intersection of a greater number of 
attributes or classifications. Thus, whilst superficially disturbing American cultural self-
coherence, such approaches rely upon a series of equally discrete, oppositional categories, 
and as such mobilise their own metaphysical, totalising gestures. Finally, these 
classifications regulate and disavow a more radical freeplay of cultural différance, a model 
(outlined in this thesis’ introduction) that precipitates a potentially limitless multiplicity of 
complex, contradictory, and co-present modes of identification.      
As noted above, there has been limited critical self-reflection upon the use of these 
categories in independent discourse, and the few methodological self-interrogations that can 
be discerned attempt to qualify (rather than critique) their application. For example, Pribram 
warns against the disavowal of differences and divergent cultural experiences within identity 
categories themselves, challenging their frequent treatment as unified, homogeneous or 
essential. Indeed, Pribram suggests that the retention of these structural assumptions can 
perpetuate rather than challenge stereotypes, fixing representations upon one (often clichéd) 
aspect of minority identity.219 Nevertheless, this assessment merely provides a self-
interrogative caveat that precedes an analysis based entirely on gender, a fact that 
undermines the deconstructive potential of her otherwise astute theoretical observations. 
Furthermore, the construction of legible minority identities is often a pre-condition of their 
conceptual positioning within the broader American cinematic landscape. Located within a 
hierarchical, binary opposition with a cultural or cinematic mainstream, readings of 
independent film as a “Cinema of Outsiders” (to use Levy’s term)220 necessarily assembles 
and accommodates a broad range of singular texts; their complex differences are effaced in 
the act of defining them as a homogeneous, oppositional deviation from fixed American 
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socio-cultural norms. Thus, as Wyatt notes, a focus on specific identity categories “replicates 
and reinforces dominant notions of cultural difference.”221 
Additionally, as alluded to briefly by Pribram, the construction of self-coherent 
identity categories denies the more complex cultural experiences of subjects living in a 
“multiply identified” society.222 As a result, the application of such categories to independent 
film relies upon the reception of texts as expressions of one specific identity, to the 
exclusion of other cultural inputs. This process has been outlined effectively by Judith Butler 
in her post-structuralist critique of “woman” as a stable category within feminist discourse; 
Butler notes that essentialist theorisations of gender and sex disavow a reading of identity as 
a heterogeneous intersection of multiple, fluid attributes: 
 
The masculine/feminine binary constitutes not only the exclusive framework in 
which that specificity can be recognized, but in every other way the ‘specificity’ of 
the feminine is once again fully decontextualized and separated off analytically and 
politically from the constitution of class, race, ethnicity and other axes of power 
relations that both constitute ‘identity’ and make the singular notion of identity a 
misnomer.223 
  
The above quote eloquently summarises the problematic logic that this study also discerns 
within independent film discourses; even if minority cinematic categories have been 
theorised for “emancipatory purposes” (as Butler puts it), they necessarily posit a reductive 
conception of a stable subject that is coercive, exclusionary, and metaphysically complicit.224  
Although identity politics discourses provide a near-universal frame within which to 
consider independent film’s cultural politics, a limited number of studies have tentatively 
pointed towards fruitful discursive overlaps between this cinematic category and American 
national identity. Most prominently, Sherry B. Ortner contends that independent film 
constitutes a “critical cultural movement, an attempt to critique the dominant culture 
(represented by ‘Hollywood’) through their films.”225 In such a formulation, Ortner argues 
that the indie scene constructs itself in direct opposition to both Hollywood and the 
“hegemonic American culture” that it represents and perpetuates.226 Indeed, in identifying 
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indie texts as “counter-hegemonic,” Ortner argues that their aim and role is to 
“deconstruct”227 conventional cinematic and cultural narratives; in this reading, her model of 
“independent filmmaking” is focused on “‘talking back’ to the stories that are already out 
there in the public culture.”228 In doing so, Ortner contextualises her study within a specific 
socio-historical moment, which she describes as “the end of the grand narrative of American 
culture, the so-called American Dream.”229 
Thus, Ortner ostensibly provides a direct, critical engagement with American 
national identity, positioning independent film as a multifaceted critique of specific forms of 
cultural narration. However, the manner in which Ortner characterises this challenge 
diverges significantly from the deconstructive approach adopted by this thesis, ultimately 
reifying a number of reductive metaphysical principles. To begin, independent challenges to 
dominant cinematic and cultural forms are established in relation to shared (and interlinked) 
textual properties of “darkness” and “realism.” Ortner suggests that independent texts 
distinguish themselves as an authentic palliative to the distortive socio-cultural messages of 
Hollywood texts: “independent films perform cultural critique by way of embracing a kind 
of harsh realism, by making films that display the dark realities in contemporary life.”230 
Thus, Ortner notes a common perception that “independent films seek to tell the truth about 
contemporary society,” an assumption she partly internalises in her assertion that 
“independent films are explicitly meant to show the world ‘as it really is’”;231 this contrasts 
with constructions of Hollywood as a sector that is adept at “telling lies” and is reliant upon 
a pervasive “fantasy,” attributes that render such texts as “false pictures of the real world.”232 
Finally, Ortner again utilises specific identity politics approaches in characterising the 
source of independent film’s implicitly critical stance, treating the independent sector 
loosely as the cinema of Generation X.233 Therefore, although Ortner provides the most 
consistent engagement with independent texts and their representations of national identity, 
she does so by appealing to self-coherent constructions of identity and social verisimilitude. 
Conversely, it is precisely these structural and ontological assumptions that are directly 
questioned in the deconstructive textual readings that form the main body of this thesis. 
In contrast to Ortner’s approach, a greater number of accounts read prominent 
independent texts as elaborations and endorsements of national identity structures. For 
example, whilst Levy characterises independent film as a pluralist movement representing 
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marginalised cultural perspectives, he qualifies this reading by downplaying the possibility 
of an overtly subversive engagement with dominant American values in such texts. Levy 
continually reaffirms that indies tend to lack “radically political and avant-garde visions,” 
ensuring that such texts pose no “serious challenge to dominant culture.”234 Thus, Levy 
concludes be suggesting that independent films actually perpetuate hegemonic American 
structures of meaning: “most indies have functioned as soothing entertainment, reaffirming 
rather than questioning basic values.”235 Finally, several texts implicitly locate independent 
film within homogenising identity discourses by noting its potential position as an 
“alternative” American national cinema, a view that implicitly challenges aforementioned 
links between this area of cinematic practice and cultural pluralism. For example, Maltby 
notes that “Independent low-budget or ‘boutique’ productions” lack the international appeal 
of Hollywood blockbusters, instituting an industrial insularity that confers upon independent 
film “the status of an American national cinema.”236 Newman diagnoses a more complex 
and contradictory relationship between indie film and American socio-cultural narration. 
Positioning it as a “vanguard subculture,” Newman argues that indie cinema adopts a 
“critical stance toward the dominant culture” whilst simultaneously reproducing several of 
its structural effects, specifically through its elitist rejection of pop cultural forms. Indie is 
seen to fulfil “two contradictory missions of resisting and perpetuating the dominant 
ideology.”237 In justifying his limited focus upon texts produced within USA, Newman 
argues that “indie cinema in the United States has functioned as an alternative American 
national cinema,” a claim that he grounds in the prevalence of national institutions (festivals, 
print media, blogs, distributors, and exhibitors) within the infrastructure of the indie scene.238 
However, he is careful to note that this productive background does not promote a 
complementary textual focus on national identity: “All of this suggests that indie culture is 
to some significant extent a national culture, even if it is not essentially concerned with 
thematizing national identity.”239   
 
Conclusions 
 
It is the above contention that this thesis aims to fundamentally challenge, through a 
demonstration of how independent case-study texts can be fruitfully read as (deconstructive) 
meditations on American national identity. As elaborated upon earlier, this shift in focus is 
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abetted by the application of specific reading strategies and their role in re-inscribing 
cinematic meaning; therefore, this thesis challenges assertions that independent film’s 
cultural representations stem from a limited range of in-built textual attributes and thematic 
preoccupations. Indeed, a number of this project’s case-study texts have been analysed 
previously in relation to aforementioned identity politics categories; for example, Wendy and 
Lucy and Gerry have been approached as complex representations of gender and sexuality, 
Happiness as a meditation on personal politics, and George Washington has been read in 
relation to race, youth, and regional identity. In this sense, the shift in focus to national 
identity provides a conceptual framework that complements existing readings of 
independent texts, elucidating areas of cultural knowledge that have been left relatively 
unexplored in existing critical literature.  
Furthermore, in focusing specifically on national identity, this study 
reconceptualises numerous theoretical trends outlined in recent independent cinema 
discourses; rather than ignoring a range of thematic connotations that have built up around 
the concept of independent film, many of these are re-examined in relation to national 
(rather than personal) identity. In his largely industrial account of recent American film, 
Schatz describes a specific type of independent text that is useful in explicating this process; 
comparing “passion projects” with more “mainstream independents,” Schatz argues that the 
former are “films driven by character and a sense of place.”240 As has been demonstrated, 
character and place have been utilised by scholars as a means of anchoring indie cultural 
representations within personal or regional identity categories, drawing attention towards 
minority or sub-national cultural discourses. Conversely, these concepts are re-appropriated 
as a means of framing this thesis, demonstrating how they can equally be used to explicate a 
range of American national narratives; individualism, the nuclear family, the small-town and 
wilderness can be approached as complex, deconstructive meditations on American 
character and place, subject and object. However, the integrity of such oppositions is fatally 
compromised as the central argument of this study unfolds; these interpretative couplets are 
strategically used to construct specific textual analyses, cultural readings that ultimately 
precipitate their structural subversion. 
This shift in thematic focus also brings methodological and theoretical advantages, 
facilitating an overtly Derridean critique of American national coherence. Whilst identity 
politics approaches implicitly challenge homogeneous cultural narratives, they do so through 
the construction of their own monolithic categories, each carrying within itself a series of 
exclusionary definitions and essentialist truth claims. Conversely, through the overt 
visualisation of textual self-contradictions and conceptual fissures, the representations of 
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American national identity observed in case-study texts undermine any attempt to 
seamlessly rationalise a plethora of potential cultural significations. In doing so, this 
approach allows for a fluid, ungrounded freeplay of cultural différance; this non-proscriptive 
model facilitates myriad expressions of emergent, transformative cultural identities that 
exceed static, totalised sub-categorisations of American subjectivity. Thus, this 
deconstructive gesture subverts normative modes of cultural narration, without constructing 
or privileging a series of similarly totalised minority identities in the process.   
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Chapter Two - Ragged Individualism: Deconstructing the 
Goal-Oriented Protagonist 
 
American Individualism: Contradictions and Complexities   
 
Described in scholarly texts as a “quintessential American value,”1 an “American 
Ideology,”2 and a “symbol of national identification,”3 individualism has been consistently 
defined as a thematic and narrative locus of a shared national character. Addressed by 
figures as diverse as Herbert Hoover, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Alexis de Tocqueville,4 
individualism constitutes a key term within a plethora of socio-cultural and identity 
discourses. Indeed, Chuck Kleinhans argues that the analogous conception of “the success 
myth” (based upon a “prevailing ideology of individualism”) is “so pervasive in U.S. life 
that it needs little description.”5 In similar terms, Julie Levinson suggests that individualist 
narratives of success and the American Dream are often treated as a core constituent of 
American cultural meaning and national identity; for her, such stories “function allegorically 
to fulfil our belief in the promise of America, with the hero’s individual self-making and 
accomplishment standing in for national self-determination and exceptionalism: for the 
fundamental essence of America itself.”6 Nevertheless, other theorists suggest that the 
prominence of individualism in American culture can be explained through its association 
with a range of amorphous and potentially paradoxical meanings. This argument is clearly 
demonstrated by Yehoshua Arieli, whose post-civil war definition of American 
individualism encompasses various socio-political, religious, historical, and economic 
factors: 
 
The concept of individualism was closely related to the Jeffersonian ideas of self-
government, free society, and the rights of man…It endowed democracy with a 
philosophic dimension, closely related to religion and to the philosophy of History. 
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It was intimately connected with the theory of laissez faire and described as well the 
patterns of behaviour typical of the American way of life.7  
 
Rather than endorsing this passage as a coherent individualist definition, Arieli is quoted 
here to demonstrate the complexities inherent in any study of American individualism. 
Arieli’s use of the term does not simply connote a range of historically-specific values, 
charting the development of a single, cogent ideal. Rather, individualism is presented 
simultaneously as a philosophical premise, a political principle, a narrative of social 
behaviour, and an economic system.8 Thus, whilst cultural critics have constructed a number 
of discourse or discipline-specific individualist meanings,9 its use within an American 
context opens up a heterogeneous web of cultural connotations, associations, and references. 
 As a result, in approaching individualism as a narrative of national identity, it is vital 
to establish which discourses such a reading engages. This is not to suggest that 
individualism can be neatly divided into a number of discrete cultural formulations, 
elucidating different areas of cultural knowledge. Rather, it is suggested that scholarly 
readings employ the term to rationalise and regulate an amorphous network of socio-
political concepts in relation to a fixed centre, the figure of the individual American 
“agent.”10 This process is touched upon by James E. Block in his reading of America as A 
Nation of Agents: emphasising the importance of liberty and autonomy in the “American 
narrative,” Block asserts that discussions of American identity must be placed within an 
overarching “discourse on freedom.”11 Irene Taviss Thomson adopts a similar attitude as she 
positions individualism within contemporary “culture war” debates, a dichotomous 
discourse that will be returned to throughout this thesis; she contends that “in the American 
cultural lexicon, individualism is always good,” an assumption that explains the term’s 
appropriation by a variety of socio-ideological groups.12 Thus, whilst individualism appears 
to be predicated upon the continuing relevance of an autonomous, active American 
subjectivity, the manner in which this liberty is theorised varies greatly within critical texts. 
Yet, despite these observations, recent scholarly readings have drawn distinct dividing lines 
between particular manifestations of individualism. Therefore, even accounts that highlight 
the term’s potentially fluid, diverse connotations appear to constitute these meanings as self-
coherent presences. For example, Robert Bellah et al segregate American individualism into 
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numerous sub-categories, dependent on the context of the term’s utterance; “mythic” 
individualism is contrasted with “bureaucratic,” “conformist,” and “expressive” uses of the 
term.13 Thus, the conceptualisation of various discrete individualisms is reinforced by their 
prescription as viable, distinct objects of critical analysis. 
Consequently, this exploration of individualism necessarily entails a radical 
deconstruction of its previous uses, relocating the term within a Derridean economy of 
spatio-temporal différance. In turn, this strategy fuels this chapter’s primary theoretical 
objective; the exploration of how cinematic texts can challenge individualism as a self-
coherent metaphysical narrative form, drawing upon considerations of the term in 
contemporary film theory. In turn, I explore how this particular manifestation of 
individualism thematizes and enacts causal linearity, demonstrating that maxims of 
“success,”14 “upward mobility,”15 and the “self-made man”16 connote and embody forward 
narrative momentum to rationalise a disparate field of cultural experiences. Finally, these 
theoretical premises are explored in case-study readings of Wendy and Lucy (2008) and Sure 
Fire (1990). In these, it is argued that both films strategically evoke a number of 
individualist structural principles, but only as a means of demonstrating and dismantling the 
concept’s formal reductions and internal contradictions.    
 
Individualism, Cinema, and Cultural Narration 
 
 As alluded to above, this chapter observes within specific case-studies a focused, 
cinematic deconstruction of individualism as a form of cultural narration, a socio-cultural 
configuration that accommodates disparate experiences and identities into arbitrary, 
homogenised cultural schema. Therefore, this observation extends beyond a simplistic 
prescription of any fixed definitional content for American individualism; rather, the various 
manifestations of individualism mentioned above are considered as complementary narrative 
configurations that reinforce the logocentric repression of cultural différance. Whilst 
previous scholarly accounts have been largely concerned with reductive definitional 
gestures, a number of sociological studies allude to individualism’s role as a structure of 
cultural homogenisation and regulation. For example, Arieli briefly considers individualism 
as a narrative of American everyday experience:  
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Individualism supplied the nation with a rationalization of its characteristic attitudes, 
behaviour patterns and aspirations. It endowed the past, the present and the future 
with the perspective of unity and progress. It explained the peculiar social and 
political organisation of the nation-unity in spite of heterogeneity.17  
 
Thus, whilst Arieli makes this point as a pre-cursor to solidifying individualism as a fixed 
object of study, this process of harnessing cultural heterogeneity feeds into the reading of 
individualism utilised throughout this chapter.  
Approaching individualism as a form of cultural narration necessitates the rejection 
of any rigid ontology, as such a project would be implicated in the totalising logic that 
sustains previous discursive accounts. Nevertheless, in reading this chapter’s case-study 
texts as deconstructive interventions into this metaphysical economy, one must clearly 
establish which of the term’s connotations the films critique, drawing particular motifs and 
formal principles from previous scholarly and cultural discourses. Therefore, my analyses 
are concerned with a limited range of individualist significations, exploring a number of 
cultural and cinematic discourses relating individual agency with principles of personal 
progress and forward causal momentum. Specifically, it is argued that this particular aspect 
of individualism reflexively unveils its role as a narrative structure; themes of progress, 
upward mobility and the self-made man intractably tie individualism to the dynamic (linear) 
self-realization of a narrative protagonist. Structural affinities between individualism and 
causal narration can be further explicated in reference to Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive 
critique of historical linearism. In “Positions,” Derrida links the application of causal logic to 
metaphysical notions of presence, continuity and truth, asserting that “the word history 
doubtless has always been associated with the linear consecution of presence.”18 This 
critique appears equally applicable to aforementioned constructions of causal individualism; 
tying events or experiences into a forward-looking chain of succession, metaphysical 
readings of history reaffirm central principles of progress, linear motion, and the self-
determining narrative protagonist. 
Explicit references to logocentric linearity are legible in various scholarly 
constructions of individualism. In his broad thematic and geographical study, Steven Lukes 
exemplifies a reading of American individualism rooted in notions of wealth accumulation 
and personal success: Lukes establishes a number of cultural connotations, focusing clearly 
upon “the belief in free enterprise” and “the American Dream.”19 In similar fashion, theorists 
have drawn direct links between the individualist agent and certain patterns of socio-
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economic behaviour. For example, David Riesman defines a foundational American 
subjectivity as “inner-directed,” constituting self-reliant, task-based individuals whose social 
actions are primarily focused towards the fulfilment of narrow, personal objectives: “the 
inner-directed person is oriented early in childhood towards very clear goals in life – it may 
be money, fame, power, goodness or a blend of these.”20 In linking this character type to the 
completion of social tasks, Riesman suggests a primary self-interest in “their social mobility, 
their ambitions.”21 Finally, Levinson notes that individualist conceptions of the American 
character construct a national identity that draws upon a dynamic model of subjectivity: “at 
the heart of the American dream and at the center of classic success myth stories lies the 
promise of mobility and self-making…. We are active subjects rather than compliant objects 
of our personal destinies.”22  
Thus, this narrative of social mobility is encapsulated in writings on the “self-made 
man,” a concept consistently evoked in American identity discourses.23 Irvin G. Wyllie 
identifies the self-made man as a cultural archetype, symbolising ideals of equal opportunity 
and personal improvement: “the legendary hero of America is the self-made man.... He 
represents our most cherished conceptions of success, and particularly our belief that any 
man can achieve fortune through the practice of industry, frugality, and sobriety.”24 Here, the 
American subject is once again oriented towards the achievement of personal goals and 
material success. Furthermore, figurative evocations of narrative motion pervade countless 
readings of American individualism: to provide but one example, Nathan Glazer identifies 
an “age-old individualist thrust in American life, one that has given it so much of its 
distinctive quality.”25 Thus, individualism is not merely constructed as a cultural narrative, 
but one that collapses any clear distinction between form and content; in narrativising 
cultural events and experiences, it self-consciously alludes to the underlying structural 
principle of linear causal momentum.  
 This reflexive narratology of individualism forms a perceptible object of study in 
contemporary film theory. A number of critics have drawn parallels between individualism 
and “dominant” forms of cinematic narration, arguing that normative narrative structures 
directly reflect overarching “mythico-realistic” storylines.26 For example, Levinson 
acknowledges how individualist tropes of upward mobility and self-reliance engender 
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specific cultural (and cinematic) narrative structures: “the protagonist’s upward progress 
from one social and vocational level to another defines the basic plot movement of success 
myth stories.”27 As a result, “the narrative momentum of such movies…revolves around 
individualist yearnings for self-realization.”28 Furthermore, in his study of The American 
Dream and Contemporary Hollywood Cinema, J. Emmett Winn notes similar cinematic, 
thematic, and cultural correspondences that crystallize around the figure of the individualist 
protagonist; his study is predicated upon the assumption that “the pursuit of the American 
Dream is a common plotline in Hollywood films,” ensuring that a “simple rag-to-riches 
storyline is the basic plot for dozens of Hollywood films.”29 Finally, in their prominent study 
of classical Hollywood narration, David Bordwell, Kristen Thompson, and Janet Staiger 
note a unique affinity between filmic and cultural narratives:  
 
It is easy to see in the goal-oriented protagonist a reflection of an ideology of 
American individualism and enterprise, but it is the peculiar accomplishment of the 
classical cinema to translate this ideology into a rigorous chain of cause and effect.30     
 
David Bordwell relates this initial observation to classical cinema’s “pattern…of forward 
momentum,”31 another factor shared with previous constructions of individualism. 
Bordwell utilises this analysis as a basis for his formalist model in which motion 
pictures are delineated into a limited number of restrictive cinematic modes.32 Although he 
clearly approaches individualism as a socio-cultural construction, his tacit acceptance of 
essentialist cultural ontologies is demonstrated by its accommodation within reductive 
theoretical categorisations. Therefore, whilst Bordwell acknowledges the artificial codes that 
underlie specific narrative configurations, he proceeds to replicate their totalising logic, 
grounding a relatively stable set of aesthetic, formal, and spectatorial norms within fixed 
institutional and productive contexts. The metaphysical tenor of Bordwell’s observations is 
explored directly by Peter Brunette and David Wills in their sustained Derridean critique of 
formalist film theory; using Bordwell, Thompson, and Staiger’s study of classical 
Hollywood as an indicative example, they note that “‘Hollywood’ as a category is 
essentialized from the very beginning…recourse to the idea of a self-identical, coherent 
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system is frequent, along with a concomitant desire for totalization.”33 Bordwell’s 
homogenising tendencies are augmented by his suggestion that the (totalised) classical mode 
acts as the dominant term against which all other cinematic forms are defined. This 
metaphysical attitude is encapsulated in his exposition of the “canonic story”: Bordwell 
suggests that the classical mode conforms closely to a homogenised narrative structure 
“which story-comprehension researchers posit as normal for our culture.”34 As a result, this 
model reaffirms the perceived inherence of individualist cultural narratives, positing linear, 
goal-oriented structures as a universal norm.  
 This relationship between cultural narration and cinematic structure has also been 
explored by Gilles Deleuze, in his discussion of the “action-image.”35 In Cinema 1, Deleuze 
coins the action-image as a cinematic form, characterised by a dynamic protagonist who 
institutes narrative momentum through the creation and fulfilment of clear, personal goals:  
 
The milieu and its forces...act on the character, throw him a challenge, and constitute 
a situation in which he is caught. The character reacts in his turn…so as to respond 
to the situation, to modify the milieu, or his relation with the milieu, with the 
situation, with other characters.36  
 
Thus, in denoting a structure where characters react dynamically to their surroundings, 
modifying their milieu and instituting new situations, the action-image is founded upon a 
linear causal chain, a clear point of comparison with individualist narratives. In turn, 
Deleuze draws direct parallels between this narrative form and individualist structures, 
engaging with the euphemistic concept of the American Dream. In the Deleuzian action-
image, the cinematic protagonist symbolises “a man of this nation who knows how to 
respond to the challenges of the milieu as to the difficulties of a situation.”37 This 
relationship between individualism and the action-image is reaffirmed by David Martin-
Jones, who suggests that “the individualist ethos (is) exemplified by the action-image (in 
which the individual’s ability to alter his or her situation was beyond doubt.)”38 
                                                          
33
 Peter Brunette and David Wills, Screen/Play: Derrida and Film Theory (Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 1989), 41. 
34
 Ibid.,157. 
35
 Perkins engages with the action-image to read smart cinema as a reflexive critique of classical 
narrative structures. However, her approach diverges from mine through her Deleuzian focus, and her 
conclusions that smart case-studies intensify narrational norms; see Claire Perkins, American Smart 
Cinema (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 49-75.   
36
 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(London: Continuum, 2005), 146. 
37
 Ibid., 148. 
38
 David Martin-Jones, Deleuze, Cinema and National Identity: Narrative Time in National Contexts 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 22.  
121 
 
One could easily draw superficial parallels between Bordwell and Deleuze’s 
investigations of individualism and cinematic narration. Indeed, Martin-Jones notes several  
superficial similarities, suggesting that “to those unaware of his philosophical project, 
Deleuze’s work undoubtedly smacked of the reductive binary previously proposed by such 
works as David Bordwell’s ‘Art Cinema as a mode of Film Practice.’”39 However, rather 
than constituting a cohesive cinematic mode, the action-image appears as a potential quality 
signified from a plethora of interchangeable cinematic styles and aesthetic devices, shorn 
from their simplistic association with discrete movements or national cinemas.40 
Additionally, Deleuze does not appear to construct the action-image within a codified 
stylistic mode or productive infrastructure, treating it instead as an elaboration of 
metaphysical thought. This is demonstrated in Deleuze’s discussion of cinematic naturalism, 
in which he identifies the action-image as a “realist” form of presence: “When qualities and 
powers are apprehended as actualised in states of things, in milieu which are geographically 
and historically determinable, we enter into the realm of the action-image.”41 Thus, taken 
alongside aforementioned formal attributes, potential comparisons between individualism 
and the action-image are reaffirmed; akin to an individualist narrative, it is established as a 
causally-coherent configuration of discrete, actualised experiences, a form of cultural 
rationalisation.  Furthermore, this observation mirrors Derrida’s aforementioned exploration 
of metaphysical history; in considering linear causality as a configuration of presence(s), the 
action-image mimics logocentric narratives of historical knowledge, reaffirming its 
applicability to individualist discourse. 
 
Individualism and Independent Film 
 
Drawing upon aforementioned developments in film theory and narratology, this 
chapter undertakes a comprehensive reading of Wendy and Lucy and Sure Fire as 
complementary deconstructive representations; whilst seeming to synthesise linear, causal 
structures centred on identifiable individualist protagonists, the films simultaneously lay 
bare textual contradictions and paradoxes that disturb the unity and closure of the narratives 
that they evoke. This reading departs radically from previous critical discussions of narrative 
in independent film, a gesture necessitated by my rejection of existing categorical 
definitions. As suggested in chapter one, studies of independent film frequently utilise 
Bordwellian categories, locating independent cinematic narratives in relation to prominent 
modes of classical Hollywood and art cinema narration. Geoff King typifies this trend, 
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analysing independent texts in reference to classical “norms”: “one of the key identifying 
features of many American Independent films is the extent to which they depart from the 
familiar conventions of the classical Hollywood variety.”42 In turn, King suggests that these 
narratological deviations often signify an explicit rejection of the individualist cultural 
narratives they purportedly embody:  
 
To portray characters as heroically lifting themselves out of their difficulties, 
triumphing through adversity, and so on – is to impose a typically American-
capitalist ideological framework, rooted in the notion that America is a society in 
which even those from the lowest reaches can achieve the dream of prosperity.43  
 
Here, King appears to suggest that independent texts utilise narrative innovations to 
challenge individualist ideologies. However, this process does not take the form of a 
reflexive narrative critique; rather, he postulates an oppositional rejection of goal-oriented 
structures, a logocentric gesture that tacitly canonises classical form as a normative standard. 
As a result, King ultimately reifies an inherent structural relationship between causal 
cinematic narratives and American cultural narratives; Bordwell’s mode of classical 
narration is unproblematically endorsed as the embodiment of American individualism, 
reinforcing the structural integrity and centrality of these forms of cinematic and cultural 
storytelling.     
Thus, whilst King highlights a range of potential narrative configurations within his 
construction of independent film, they are primarily classified within the structural (and 
ideological) terms established by Bordwell’s dichotomous model. For example, in noting a 
trend for “decentred,” “relaxed,” or static narratives, King associates such configurations 
with “international ‘art’ cinema,”44 another discrete mode theorised by Bordwell in 
opposition to a homogenised “classical” standard.45 E. Deidre Pribram also supports this 
reading of independent films as a dynamic blend of antagonistic narrative forms, suggesting 
that “a potentially rich means of conceptualizing independent film...is as an undertaking that 
modulates the oppositional framings of prevailing and alternative narrative practices.”46 
Thus, whether viewed as a reinforcement of Hollywood convention, an elaboration of an 
alternative art cinema, or a merging of the two, discussions of narrative in independent films 
are consistently framed within oppositional formalist models. 
                                                          
42
 Geoff King, American Independent Cinema (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 59. 
43
 Ibid., 67. 
44
 Bordwell, Narration in the Fiction Film, 205-273. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 E. Deidre Pribram, Cinema & Culture: Independent Film in the United States, 1980-2001 (New 
York: P. Lang, 2002), 140.  
123 
 
 Reading Wendy and Lucy and Sure Fire as deconstructive texts, my approach rejects 
this interpretative framework, discussing the texts in a manner that attempts to dismantle 
pervading binary structures. In doing so, these analyses provide useful textual observations 
that diverge sharply from those made by King and Pribram: that which has been previously 
assumed as a merging or negotiation of mainstream and marginal qualities will instead be 
treated as a reflexive interrogation of linear causality, and its relation to previous 
constructions of American cultural knowledge. Therefore, these analyses will not consider 
the films’ narrative structures as elaborations of their location within discrete cinematic 
modes, drawing arbitrary links between the films’ narrational, aesthetic, and contextual 
properties. Rather, they will be read simply as critiques of metaphysical knowledge-
structures, cultural narratives that both constitute and enact the concept of American 
individualism.   
 
“I’m Just Passing Through”: Constructing Wendy and Lucy’s Individualist Narrative 
 
Released in 2008, Wendy and Lucy provides a fruitful text within which 
individualism can be addressed in a contemporary American context. To begin, it is prudent 
to establish a general outline of the film’s key events. Importantly, in reading a film as a 
piece of narrative cinema one sustains several dominant structuring principles, assuming the 
primacy of narrative causality and spatio-temporal coherence.47 Nevertheless, this analysis 
offers a reflexive displacement of cultural narratives; only by establishing Wendy and Lucy 
as the product of inter-related cultural and cinematic discourses can one explore how the text 
destabilises and exceeds their structural unity. Yet, this methodological justification does not 
completely ameliorate the problematic endeavour of presenting a subjective interpretation of 
the film’s plot as an objective summary of events, as an a priori source material for close 
textual analysis. Therefore, in reading Wendy and Lucy as a (superficially) individualist 
scenario, it is vital to demonstrate the links and assumptions made in constructing the text as 
a linear, causal narrative.  
Bearing this in mind, the film begins with a series of static shots of a railway 
junction; freight trains slowly move on a variety of directional planes, the camera placed at 
various disparate angles to the tracks. In the following sequence, we are presented with a 
continuous tracking shot in which Wendy (Michelle Williams) plays “fetch” with her dog, 
Lucy. This sequence intersperses diegetic and non-diegetic sounds; whilst Wendy shouts 
instructions at her dog, she simultaneously hums a tune, a motif that repeats throughout the 
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film. Following the titles, Wendy comes across a gathering of young people, sat around a 
campfire. From her brief conversations, we become aware that they are travellers, resting for 
the night. It is also in this scene that the film establishes Wendy’s name and purpose; she is 
headed to Alaska, seeking temporary cannery work. The following morning Wendy is 
awoken by a security guard (Walter Dalton), having spent the night in her car. Instructed to 
move the vehicle from an empty parking lot, she realises that it has broken down. This is 
assumed, in this reading, as a key narrative turning point; as we are already aware of 
Wendy’s wider journey, we become conscious of an impending barrier to her mobility. 
Following this discovery, Wendy attempts to find food and a mechanic. A nearby garage 
appears closed, but Wendy locates a supermarket, tying Lucy to a bike rack outside. Wendy 
picks out a selection of foodstuffs and tins of dog food, placing these in her pockets in a 
seemingly surreptitious manner. Wendy leaves the store to talk to Lucy, but is apprehended 
by a young employee (John Robinson). She is then taken to the store’s manager (John 
Breen), and the police are informed, despite her protestations. Wendy is taken away in a 
police car; Lucy remains behind. At this point Wendy is separated from her dog, providing 
another perceived narrative goal: the reuniting of the pair. In jail, the protagonist is forced to 
undergo repeated procedural acts before being allowed to leave, paying a $50 fine. Here, 
Wendy’s forward-mobility is reinforced; she asserts that she is “not from round here,” and is 
“just passing through.” Returning to the store, Lucy is gone, and any immediate attempt to 
ascertain her whereabouts prove fruitless. Wendy’s quest to reclaim her dog comprises the 
bulk of the film’s remaining scenes. Wendy reaches the local dog pound the following day, 
but Lucy is not there. Filling in an administrative form, we are granted further snippets of 
Wendy’s back story; her surname is Carroll, and she comes from the state of Indiana. 
Additionally, we are encouraged to read substantial detail from absent information; her lack 
of a phone number and fixed abode appear to signify groundlessness and isolation.  
Following an unsuccessful trip to the pound, Wendy pursues further futile attempts 
to locate Lucy. In a series of repetitive sequences, Wendy calls for her dog, creates and then 
distributes “missing” posters, and checks back continually with the pound, using a mobile 
phone provided by the security guard. Wendy also acts upon one piece of the guard’s advice, 
as he informs her of a method his father once used to locate a lost hound. This leads Wendy 
to return to the woods, where she scatters her belongings in the hope that Lucy will return to 
their scent. Sleeping the night in a clearing, Wendy is awoken by a man who incoherently 
and threateningly rants; after an abrupt cut Wendy runs to the toilets by a local petrol station, 
where she washes and sobs loudly. Although there are no physical signs that suggest a 
violent act has occurred, the scene evokes the aftermath of a traumatic event. Calling the 
pound once more, Wendy is informed that her dog has been located, having been rehomed 
on the day of her arrest. Nevertheless, this revelation is offset by the news that her car is 
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severely damaged, requiring repairs that would cost $2,000, far in excess of the vehicle’s 
worth. Taking a taxi to an unknown location, we find that Wendy is visiting the address 
given to her by the pound. Lucy is in the back garden, and Wendy begins to play “fetch” 
across a mesh fence, an apparent re-inscription of the film’s opening sequence. Wendy soon 
breaks down, leaving without Lucy. Having spoken about her predicament, as well as 
complementing Lucy’s new home, one could read this decision as a benevolent sacrifice, 
made for the good of her canine companion. Promising to return, Wendy walks away, 
sobbing as she follows the railway line. Hopping aboard a freight train, the film ends with 
Wendy humming her recurring tune.  
 
Intertextual Realism 
 
Approaching Wendy and Lucy as a critique of American cultural life isn’t an original 
critical approach in and of itself. Indeed, film reviews and scholarly texts often treat the film 
as a subversive representation of economic and cultural decay, a realistic exposé of 
American social marginalisation and disempowerment.48 This reading of Wendy as a 
metonym for a “forgotten America”49 fundamentally re-evaluates ideals of individualist 
opportunity; discussed in relation to cycles of poverty, youthful apathy, and personal loss, 
prevailing critical texts place Wendy’s experiences in stark contrast to narratives of 
individual empowerment and social mobility. For example, King approaches the film as a 
direct challenge to individualist ideals; he notes that Wendy & Lucy’s underlying premise 
has been framed by the film’s director as “a fictional test of one of the most fundamental of 
American-capitalist ideologies: the notion that individuals, in whatever difficulty, can pull 
themselves up by their own bootstraps.”50 Thus, whilst King suggests that the film provides 
a potentially “radical” challenge to the widespread “myth” of the “American Dream,” he 
argues that this is achieved through an act of thematic displacement; rather than 
interrogating the contradictions embedded within individualist cultural narratives, he argues 
that Wendy and Lucy shifts focus from myths of individual agency to a more accurate 
portrayal of “systemic” social inequalities and impediments.51 
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Thus, King’s account notes Wendy and Lucy’s “realist credentials,”52 arguing that 
the film’s premise can be directly related to “real-world socio-economic events.”53 In doing 
so, he demonstrates a popular ontological assumption that pervades existing analyses of the 
film; King reifies a dominant reading of Wendy and Lucy that centres on the authentic 
representation of social experience, suggesting that it is possible to unproblematically depict 
contemporary American social reality. This trend is typified by Michael Atkinson: “this is 
the reality of 99 per cent of United States communities: decaying infrastructure, Wal-Mart 
sustenance, gone-to-weed neighbourhoods, lives ruled by petty commerce. There’s not a 
fake moment or image on the programme.”54 In turn, these suppositions also inform readings 
of Wendy and Lucy that highlight key intertextual links; several critics compare the film 
formally and stylistically with Italian neo-realism, a cinematic movement constituted around 
perceived aims of documenting life in a minimalist, naturalistic fashion.55 Indeed, A.O. Scott 
uses Wendy and Lucy to introduce his prominent notion of “neo-neo realism,” a cycle within 
contemporary independent film that self-consciously evokes neo-realist aesthetics and its 
thematic preoccupation with social verisimilitude; these films “offer…bracing, poetic views 
of real life” through a series of “local, intimate narratives.”56 Rather than using these 
intertextual markers to establish the text as a cinematic construction, reviews enlist such 
references in supporting claims for the film’s inherent social verisimilitude.  
Therefore, whilst many readings treat the film as the antinomy of narratives of 
individualist social mobility, they do so by constructing a series of alternative truth claims. 
In doing so, they reify metaphysical structures of meaning, disavowing a multiplicitous 
“play of difference”57 in favour of a concrete reading of narrative events. In this manner, 
attempts to view the film as a more realistic portrayal of cultural experience are highly 
problematic; the textual strategies that help sustain cultural narratives are not dismantled but 
re-affirmed, based as they are upon a stable, unified transcendental signification or structure. 
This methodological problem extends beyond the interpretation of this particular text, as 
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these assumptions pervade critical readings of independent cinema as a whole. For example, 
Emmanuel Levy considers the truthful rendering of social reality as a defining independent 
characteristic: “the portrait of America drawn in (independent film) is both more 
idiosyncratic and more realistic than that evident in mainstream Hollywood fare.”58 In turn, a 
preoccupation with cinematic and social realism is diagnosed (and largely reinforced) in 
various studies of independent film, including the work of Michael Z. Newman, Sherry B. 
Ortner and, as already demonstrated, King.59   
 
Wendy as the Goal-Oriented Protagonist 
 
Conversely, any attempt to read Wendy and Lucy as a deconstructive text must 
fundamentally reject any pretensions that the film holds a privileged relationship to 
representing an objective social reality. Instead, the film is approached here as a text that 
visualises the instability of logocentric narrative structures associated with individualism. 
Thus, this analysis begins by reading Wendy and Lucy as the incorporation of various signs, 
formal devices, and narrative configurations associated with this specific cultural discourse. 
In turn, it is then argued that the film challenges the very foundations of the individualist 
narrative it evokes, reflexively criticising the binary formulations and structural assumptions 
that ground this account of American identity. Whilst deconstructive methods vary in 
relation to the structures they are disrupting, Wendy and Lucy’s reflexive criticism will be 
achieved through a series of textual shifts, substitutions, repetitions and ellipses. 
   The most explicit way in which Wendy and Lucy (superficially) endows its 
protagonist with an individualist subjectivity is through the establishment of a series of goal-
oriented narrative threads. Firstly, the figure of Wendy’s journey appears to place the film’s 
events within a broader causal structure: she is headed to Ketchikan, Alaska in search of 
work. This can be read as the protagonist’s overarching (economically-motivated) goal; as 
J.J. Murphy suggests, this is cast as the character’s sole long-term aim, one she is “hell-bent” 
on achieving.60 Wendy reinforces this totalising narrative structure through her consistent 
assertions that she is not staying in Oregon, but is rather just “passing through.” 
Furthermore, Wendy’s journey appears to symbolise both a spatial and socio-economic 
ascent; with the events of the film located in Oregon, it can be inferred that she is travelling 
north, meeting up with the Pacific West coast before continuing upwards to her eventual 
                                                          
58
 Emanuel Levy, Cinema of Outsiders: The Rise of American Independent Film (London: New York 
University Press, 1999), 52.  
59
 See Michael Z. Newman, Indie: An American Film Culture (Chichester: Columbia University 
Press, 2011), 87-137; Sherry B. Ortner, Not Hollywood: Independent Film at the Twilight of the 
American Dream (London: Duke University Press, 2013), 3, 29; King, Indie 2.0, 169-215. 
60
 Murphy, “A Similar Sense of Time,” 166. 
128 
 
destination. Building upon these thematic and structural attributes, Paul Cooke and Rob 
Stone evoke the character of the travelling “hobo” to locate Wendy directly within 
discourses of individualist autonomy; she is cast as “a figure of exclusion and somewhat 
self-destructive defiance.”61 Finally, whilst composing just one aspect of a complex, liminal 
reading of Wendy as a fatigued, “wearied female bod(y),” Elena Gorfinkel argues that her 
subjectivity is partly constituted by her “desire to work, the drive to be employed from a 
position outside it.”62 As a result, she briefly suggests that the film’s premise superficially 
engenders an individualist scenario, although this observation does not precipitate a 
sustained discussion of American cultural narration: “the story – which at first appears to be 
couched as a road film, a genre of mythic, masculinist American mobility and individualist 
adventure – stalls, never leaving this unnamed town.”63     
In turn, this reading of Wendy’s journey as an individualist struggle is emphasised 
by the use of transport in the film’s opening and closing sequences. Firstly, the evocation of 
long-distance travel figuratively reinforces a regulation of contingency through the 
application of a pre-determined narrative causality. Thus, in travelling by road to Oregon, 
Wendy’s journey is controlled by a series of externally-imposed routes (the surrounding 
road network). As such, this provides a metaphorical representation of individualist motion; 
once a route has been chosen, it must be followed to its causal conclusion (a specific goal), 
at which time the next objective must be ascertained, mapped, and pursued. This spatial 
economy is reinforced by a series of prominent cultural associations; personal goals are 
frequently granted spatio-temporal representation through the appropriation of a lexicon 
derived in travel and movement (a person’s “route” through life). Additionally, the methods 
of transport used in these sections of the film reinforce principles of individualism and self-
determination. Firstly, Wendy arrives by automobile, which figures as the most prominent of 
her few personal possessions (with the exception of her pet). Wendy thus enters the film’s 
diegetic frame under her own volition and agency, having seemingly driven herself to the 
parking lot. In doing so, she embodies a figurative evocation of individualist agency; as 
Levinson argues, “in many quintessentially American stories, physical mobility is equated 
with individual autonomy.”64 Furthermore, following the breakdown and unsuccessful 
attempts to repair her vehicle, she is forced to leave by hitching a ride from a passing freight 
train. This once again locates her actions within a discourse of private enterprise; using her 
                                                          
61
 Paul Cooke and Rob Stone, “Transatlantic Drift: Hobos, Slackers, Flâneurs, Idiots and Edukators,” 
in Impure Cinema: Intermedial and Intercultural Approaches to Film, eds. Lúcia Nagib and Anne 
Jerslev (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 83. Murphy also relates Wendy to the “mythic figure of the 
hobo”; see Murphy, “A Similar Sense of Time,” 166.  
62
 Gorfinkel, “Weariness, Waiting,” 323. 
63
 Ibid., 334. 
64
 Levinson, The American Success Myth on Film, 32. 
129 
 
initiative to overcome her temporary stasis, Wendy’s actions are mirrored in her use of non-
public modes of transportation.  
 Finally, a reading that grants pre-eminence to goal-driven causal structures is 
solidified by Wendy’s experiences in the unnamed Oregon town. Early in the film two 
potential goals are established, each related to the successful continuation of the 
protagonist’s journey. Firstly, Wendy discovers that her car will not start, a barrier that must 
be overcome if she is to reach Ketchikan. Soon after, her arrest for shoplifting marks her 
impending separation from Lucy. These provide two clear aspirations for Wendy, which she 
pursues sporadically throughout the film. To further reinforce this link between cultural and 
cinematic narrative structures, these goals appear inextricably tied to the importance of 
Wendy’s socio-economic ascent. For example, the need to fix her car is vital to her future 
journey, as without a means of transport she appears physically trapped in her current 
location. Equally, the manner in which she loses Lucy attests to the importance of wider 
individualist goals; as her theft appears motivated by necessity, it is cast as a symptom of the 
socio-economic marginalisation she is actively attempting to escape. 
 
Linear Frames and Narrative Recurrence 
 
 As demonstrated above, it is possible to read Wendy and Lucy within a series of 
conceptual frames relating to individualist struggle, postulating a dualistic relationship 
between individualist narrative themes and cinematic narrative structure. However, rather 
than unproblematically endorsing (or rejecting) these rationalisations of cultural experience, 
this analysis argues for a complex reconfiguration and dismantling of these frames 
throughout the filmic text. The first of these spatio-temporal challenges occurs in the film’s 
reformulation of linear causality, specifically in relation to the protagonist’s pursuance of 
narrative goals. Aforementioned readings of causally-coherent cinematic forms place a 
strong emphasis on an irreversible forward motion: for example, in utilising this form to 
support his classification of “classical narration,” Bordwell argues that the succession of 
related sequences “advance the causal progression” and institute a pattern of “forward 
momentum.”65 
 In Wendy and Lucy, however, this sense of linear narrative propulsion is undermined 
by a variety of narrational, stylistic, and plot-based devices. This is not to say that Wendy is 
lacking in goals, or even fundamentally deficient in fulfilling them. Rather, in the act of 
pursuing these aims the temporal register of the film shifts from narrative progression to 
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stasis, or more accurately, recurrence.66 This is achieved through a tapestry of interwoven 
repetitions and ellipses, occurring on both formal and stylistic levels. As Wendy attempts to 
find her dog, it becomes clear that her search will not be comprised of the consistent 
unravelling of a series of causally-related clues. Having exhausted her only substantial lead 
(that Lucy may have been taken to the pound), Wendy is forced to wait for further news, 
robbing her of productive agency; as a result, she is forced to endure what Gorfinkel refers 
to as a “desolate stillness.”67 This experience of temporal stasis is reflected in the film’s 
formal properties, which have been described as overwhelmingly “episodic”;68 once the 
central premises of the film are established, scenes unfold alongside frequent ellipses, 
lacking any rigidly defined textual order. This is primarily achieved through the operation of 
a circular, rather than linear temporality. For example, Wendy continually returns to the 
parking lot, where the security guard provides her with sporadic advice and assistance. This 
narrative repetition is reinforced by a number of cinematographic recurrences. Firstly, as 
Wendy returns to this location several times, certain shots are continually recycled. A clear 
example of this concerns the security guard, who is framed in a similar manner at different 
occasions in the film, looking directly at the camera (Figs.1.1-1.3): 
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Figs.1.1-1.3 
 
Whilst this could be read as a reference to the monotonous, uneventful nature of the guard’s 
profession (protecting a disused parking lot), it also draws close attention to the repetitive 
nature of Wendy’s search; although she utilises numerous strategies in her pro-active search 
for Lucy, she is doomed to return to the same spot, checking on the progression of an 
investigation which is ultimately out of her hands. 
 Further sequence shots highlight a pervading sense of narrative repetition. 
Throughout the film, Wendy is commonly framed through a series of close-ups, the camera 
focusing clearly on particular aspects of her figure (usually her face).69 However, there are 
notable occasions in which Wendy is framed not in close-up, but rather through long 
tracking shots. These images often coincide with the protagonist exploring a new area for 
signs of her lost dog, and bear striking compositional similarities (Figs.1.4-1.5):   
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Figs.1.4-1.5 
 
Firstly, these shots can be read as a direct evocation of one of the film’s opening sequences, 
an extended tracking shot of Wendy playing “fetch” with Lucy (Fig.1.6): 
 
 
Fig.1.6 
 
As these appear to be the only occasions in which this stylistic device is utilised, one can 
draw clear parallels between their applications; the later shots are drawn into a discordant 
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syntagmatic relationship with representations of Wendy’s bond with her dog. Importantly, 
this reinforces the effect of their later application; the repetition of these shots attests to the 
stagnation of Wendy’s continued attempts to find Lucy. By juxtaposing these stylistic 
devices with the opening sequence, their position as commentaries on the wider search for 
Lucy is reaffirmed. 
 This construction of a predominant narrative circularity is further augmented by a 
series of repetitions of content. The first of these are Wendy’s calls, which punctuate large 
sections of the film; following her dog’s disappearance, Wendy continually resorts to calling 
her name, using declarative demands in the hope of attracting her attention. These aural 
devices reinforce the aforementioned deconstruction of causal relations in two ways. Firstly, 
they can be viewed as heavily redundant, involving a high degree of internal repetition; each 
instance is comprised of a string of related commands, shouted in various iterative 
reconfigurations (“come Lou,” “Lucy come,” “come out Lucy.”) Secondly, this strategy is 
repeated heavily throughout the film’s remaining scenes. Thus, they provide yet another 
meta-commentary on Wendy’s search: striving for Lucy without any concrete leads, her 
calls come to signify the despairing paradox of a denarrativised, episodic goal-oriented 
search. One further aural element elaborates Wendy & Lucy’s engagement with narrative 
repetition. In the film’s opening tracking shot, we are introduced to a simple tune, hummed 
by Wendy. This tune is repeated twice more; firstly, as a muzak-jingle in the supermarket, as 
well as being hummed over the movie’s final shot. These elements reinforce this reading of 
other aural elements within the text; embracing a repetitive internal structure as well as a 
recurring textual role, the tune provides a further destructuring device, drawing attention to a 
stasis based in repetition rather than a causally-driven momentum.  
 Taken together, these stylistic and textual devices problematize the constitution of 
an inherently goal-oriented, causal representation of cultural experience. Destabilising many 
of the elements within an overtly individualist premise, the structural unity of this cultural 
narrative is fundamentally breached. Through the use of elliptical cuts, episodic sequences, 
and formal and stylistic repetitions, the realisation of Wendy’s goals are rendered 
inconsequential: whether achieved or not, they are severed from their role as the pinnacle of 
causal structures that are initiated but are then broken down. This is particularly clear in 
reference to the conclusion of the film, when Wendy finally locates Lucy. Whilst Wendy 
actively attempts to locate her dog, it appears that this achievement in born more out of 
contingency than causality, as by this point the search is largely outside of her control. This 
represents a distinct rupture between the goal-oriented protagonist and the goal itself, as 
Wendy no longer plays the role of a chief causal agent. The final sequences of the film attest 
to this narrative reconfiguration. Upon discovering Lucy, Wendy decides to leave her with 
the new foster family, displacing her dog as a constituent part of her wider journey; it is a 
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“break with…the sense of the film’s own narrative drive.”70 Therefore, Lucy’s retrieval no 
longer centres the meaningful rationalisation of the film’s events. In doing so, this forms a 
direct attack on one of individualism’s underlying binary structures. The discrete, exclusive 
division of success and failure is violated as the successful realisation of Wendy’s goal fails 
to provide the reconciliation that is the assumed narrative telos embedded within the goal’s 
pursuance.  
 
The Journey: Erasing Wendy’s Origins  
  
The film’s elaboration of a circular narrative logic is further exemplified by the 
structure of Wendy’s wider trip. As suggested earlier, it is possible to read Wendy’s journey 
to Ketchikan, Alaska as a figurative representation of individualist upward mobility. 
However, if one considers the content of Wendy’s travel narrative, it can be argued that the 
basis of this structure is problematized in a similar manner to her short-term diegetic goals. 
For example, whilst the job in Alaska comprises the primary aim for Wendy’s travails, her 
prospective position working at a fishery appears inherently seasonal. This is reinforced in a 
scene early in the film, where Wendy meets a series of fellow travellers. In conversing with 
a number of these, the alignment of Wendy with impending socio-economic betterment 
starts to unravel. To begin, the camera pans to show a number of these travellers, each one 
represented in an extreme close up (Figs.1.7-1.8): 
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Figs.1.7-1.8 
 
In doing so, each figure is located as an atomised individual, an agent capable of embarking 
upon their own narrative journey. Their affinity with Wendy is reinforced through stylistic 
mirroring. In a shot directly preceding this sequence (split only by the film’s titles), Wendy 
is framed in much the same way, in extreme close-up, facing the camera (Fig.1.9): 
 
 
Fig.1.9 
 
However, it soon becomes apparent that her engagement with the group facilitates a 
dislocation of any individualist potential. Firstly, in speaking to another young woman, she 
finds that she is travelling in the opposite direction, “headed south,” undermining the 
geographical alignment of Wendy’s journey with economic elevation. Secondly, a 
conversation with a named traveller, Icky (Will Oldham), highlights the transitory nature of 
her plans. Icky has also worked in Alaska, and endorses Wendy’s decision; recommending 
employers and areas with favourable conditions and pay, he provides anecdotal evidence for 
potential financial rewards in her chosen destination. Yet, as they talk around an Oregon 
campfire, it is clear that the prospect of this work is only temporary; like Icky, Wendy will 
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return to this spot, undermining any chance of lasting personal progression. This sense of a 
circular, transitory journey is reinforced by another of the film’s recurring motifs, the image 
of birds in flight (Fig.1.10): 
 
 
 
Fig.1.10 
 
By consistently drawing attention to wildlife in migratory formations, a clear parallel can be 
constructed; as the birds undertake a temporary, seasonal journey, Wendy’s narrative can be 
read as a similar repetitive cycle.71 
Looking backwards through the architecture of Wendy’s journey provides another 
means of deconstructing the closed narrative it appears to embody. This is due to the 
importance of an originary point from which the specific goals of a causal agent can stem; 
for the appearance of a unified structure towards a certain goal, a fixed starting point is 
required for progressing aspirations. Whilst this observation is relevant to any narrative 
form, the role of the origin appears particularly explicit in individualist discourse. As 
Levinson notes, “success myth” stories rely upon a protagonist that desires to escape their 
humble (or even poverty-stricken) beginnings; describing the (gender-coded) individualist 
agent, she asserts that “as he advances to the top, he overcomes his origins.”72 It is argued 
here that Wendy and Lucy engages directly with this particular aspect of individualist form, 
explicating the paradoxical status of this cultural narrative’s structural opening. Indeed, one 
can read Wendy’s journey as an example of what Derrida refers to as a “decentering,” a 
moment “that in which, in the absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse.”73 
This is achieved through the ambiguous treatment of Wendy’s own origins. Throughout the 
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film there are allusions to the geography of her journey; maps, plans, number plates, and 
administrative forms all point to Wendy’s travels beginning in Fort Wayne, Indiana. This 
fact is highlighted by references to her starting point from other characters; when noticing 
the Indiana plates on Wendy’s car, the mechanic remarks that Wendy is “a long way from 
home.” Wendy’s itinerary and an annotated road atlas clearly mark her prospective route, 
establishing a fixed point of departure (Figs.1.11-1.12):  
 
 
 
Figs.1.11-1.12 
 
Nevertheless, the precision with which Wendy’s journey is traced back is seemingly 
contradicted by the deferral of the origin’s totalising role. As the origin (or centre) is 
prescribed to “orient, balance and organise” a fixed structure, it is tasked with drawing 
together myriad elements into a stable, unified meaning.74 In this case, the origin is vital in 
producing a coherent understanding of Wendy’s journey; the details, motives, and choices 
relating to her travels can only be understood in relation to her own personal context, a start-
point that defines the unfolding of her journey as a causal structure. Yet, any further details 
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of this contextual origin are elided; besides the geographical basis of her journey, we are 
provided with minimal details regarding Wendy’s social, cultural, or economic beginnings. 
Other than a quick, dismissive phone call to her sister, we are provided with no information 
regarding her educational, social, or family background. In short, Wendy and Lucy remains 
silent about the varied socio-cultural discourses that could constitute its protagonist’s 
subjectivity, rendering her attempts to “overcome” her origin a structural impossibility.75 
Thus, whilst the film clearly evokes Wendy’s origins as an organisational device, 
they are demonstrated as ultimately intangible and open to limitless substitution (or freeplay) 
with other potential centres of meaning. For example, Indiana clearly acts as a stable 
geographical referent, relating to a fixed locale. Yet, we are barred from any of the 
connotative values associated with this location, unable to locate the potential role it has 
played in Wendy’s life (home, community, family) or in precipitating her journey. Thus, 
Wendy and Lucy visualises the contradiction that governs structuration in “classical 
thought”; as Derrida suggests, it represents the paradoxical notion that “the concept of 
centred structure is in fact the concept of a play based on a fundamental ground.”76 
 
“Two Sides of the Coin: Win, or Lose” - Sure Fire 
 
Every morning I wake up – boom! – shot full of energy...I just can’t wait to get to 
work, I’ll tell you why, because – boom! – every job I do – boom! - wants to get me 
on to the next one. 
 
In this quote, Sure Fire’s Wes (Tom Blair) articulates a similar role as an 
individualist “American archetype,”77 driven by a desire to fulfil pre-planned economic 
aims. Through a direct engagement with individualism as a goal-orientated narrative, the 
film complements the deconstructive theoretical trends observed within Wendy and Lucy. 
Thus, rather than problematizing foundationalist notions of the protagonist’s origins (as in 
Wendy and Lucy), Sure Fire focuses more clearly on narrative closure. In doing so, a 
number of aforementioned individualist narrative principles are reconfigured, undermining 
their presumed structural purposes within the cinematic text: the film provides a seemingly 
unequivocal conclusion, the murder-suicide of Wes and his son, Phillip (Phillip R. Brown). 
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Therefore, the underlying individualist impulse to rigidly define cultural experience 
(expressed by success/failure dichotomies) contradicts its own structural principles, abruptly 
terminating the plot’s cause-effect chain; the film concludes with a necessary (but 
paradoxical) destruction of narrative goals, a fatal trajectory that ironically highlights the 
film’s structuring processes. Additionally, rather than focusing purely on the reconfiguration 
of the protagonist’s narrative arc, Sure Fire reflexively challenges a variety of formal 
attributes and procedures utilised in the rationalisation of smaller units of cinematic meaning 
(shots, scenes, sequences). Therefore, whilst Wendy and Lucy questions the process within 
which individualism narrativises disparate experiences, Sure Fire undermines the initial 
establishment of these experiences as discretely and internally self-coherent, present, or 
actualised.  
 
Wes as the Goal-Oriented Protagonist 
 
 As with Wendy and Lucy, limited critical readings of Sure Fire place the film 
closely within individualist socio-cultural discourses. For example, Philip Kemp reads Wes 
as an “ideal citizen – supportive husband, solicitous father, generous friend and keen 
entrepreneur.”78 Kemp then positions Wes as the product of a number of “national myths”: 
“Manifest Destiny, the frontier, go-getting, men and a man’s world, and so on.”79 Levy 
considers the film within writer-director Jon Jost’s wider forays into Westerns, a series of 
texts that openly explore American individualism through a series of iconic and generic 
reconfigurations: “Jost examines the inheritors of the mythic cowboys, left adrift after the 
closing of the frontier and the demise of the code of honor, living with false hopes of 
expansionism and individualism.”80 This judgement ties-in with other prominent 
constructions of individualism, observable within American studies scholarship. Bellah et al 
establish the cowboy as a “mythic individual hero” of American life, a heroic outsider 
working on behalf of a collective society within which he can never fully reside.81 In 
contrast, Levy’s reading of Sure Fire appears to locate Wes as a decadent inversion of these 
nostalgic frontier virtues. Expansionism and individualism remain, but are transformed into 
selfish impulses that occur to the detriment of the communal and relational structures that 
surround the central character.82 This attitude represents a key deviation from normative 
narratives of individualism, upward mobility, and the self-made man; rather than venerating 
                                                          
78
 Philip Kemp, Review of Sure Fire, dir. Jon Jost, Sight & Sound 3, no. 7 (1993): 51-52. 
79
 Ibid., 52. Here, Kemp teases out discursive links between individualism and wilderness. 
80
 Levy, Cinema of Outsiders, 60. 
81
 Bellah et al, Habits of the Heart, 145. 
82
 Levy, Cinema of Outsiders, 60. 
140 
 
a moderated economic individualism, it is placed within a discrete oppositional hierarchy, as 
a deviation from the selfless ideal of serving a social “greater good.” Therefore, whilst 
Levy’s reading notes Wes’ role as a negative exemplar of a rugged individualist, this cultural 
trope remains critically untouched.83 By considering Wes’ self-reliant individualism as an 
antithetical corruption of an idealised, selfless individualism, the former’s role in structuring 
American cultural experience is disavowed rather than dismantled.  
 Readings of Wes as a debased former ideal are problematized by the film’s formal 
and narrational properties. Rather than being viewed as an oppositional portrait of excessive 
egoism, one can place Sure Fire’s representation within wider critiques of individualism as a 
means of structuring and retelling cultural experience. Akin to Wendy, Wes is located within 
cultural discourses that relate concepts of wealth accumulation, upward mobility, and self-
determination with principles of narrative linearity, forward momentum, and causal 
coherence. Again, this radical proposition collapses arbitrary divisions between content and 
form, exploring the ways in which narrational properties shape (and subvert) our reception 
of the film’s individualist scenario.  
 To begin, it is important to clarify how the film can be read as an individualist text. 
Unlike Wendy and Lucy, Sure Fire does not appear to be solely structured around the 
immediate pursuance of a specific character’s narrative goals. Whilst Wes displays an 
essentially goal-oriented subjectivity, the film’s plot is not a single narrative thread that can 
be elucidated in the same manner as Wendy and Lucy’s. Instead, the narrative appears 
discordant and fragmentary, drawing together isolated scenes through modest plot and 
thematic connections. Thus, interspersed with Wes’ plans are disjointed depictions of 
domestic life; we are provided insights into his friend Larry’s (Robert Ernst) marital 
troubles, the loneliness of Larry and Wes’ wives (Kristi Hager and Kate Dezina), and 
overhear seemingly irrelevant conversations in a local coffee house. Therefore, whilst Sure 
Fire systematically explores Wes’ individualist subjectivity, this occurs within a wider 
exploration of other community relationships. 
Nevertheless, playing the part of a ruthless, self-interested real-estate agent, Wes’ 
goal-oriented actions clearly relate to a single, complex money-making plan, hinging on the 
sale of houses in his home state of Utah to rich Californians. The majority of Wes’ activities 
appear directly connected to this overarching ambition. The extent to which Wes focuses on 
the achievement of this goal dictates a number of his interpersonal relationships: he views 
his friends as potential investors or employees, bores his wife with his elaborate plans, and 
enlists his son in preparing a house for a viewing. Additionally, Wes is clearly aware that his 
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ultimate goal rests upon a successful causal chain; the scheme is meticulously constructed in 
advance, demonstrated by Wes’ assertion that he is “one year ahead of schedule.” 
 Wes’ characterisation as a self-made man is also established through his lexical 
choices in communicating with others. This is epitomised in one particular scene, a long-
take conversation between Wes and Larry during a night-time drive (Fig.1.13): 
 
 
Fig.1.13 
 
Utilising both interior monologue and external verbal communication, Wes systematically 
extols a personal philosophy that draws clear attention to the role of causal logic in his 
actions and conceptualisations of experience. Noting Larry’s financial troubles, Wes firmly 
places the blame upon his friend’s malaise, admonishing him for not replicating his own 
forward-thinking mind-set: “You’re talking about the past, and I’m talking about the present, 
and you have to start thinking about your future.” Conversely, in this section’s opening 
quote, Wes describes the swift process by which he completes a task and moves onto the 
next, stating that “every job I do wants to get me on to the next one.” This evocation of a 
forward momentum that links events or experiences is mirrored in the sentence structure that 
conveys and constitutes this message: Wes’ repeated use of the word “boom,” punctuating 
the description of his work ethic, comes to signify specific moments of causal progression, 
tying this description to an explosive motive force. Finally, a short soliloquy of Wes’ from 
the beginning of the same scene attests to his embracing of a success/failure binary 
opposition that underlies this form of individualist discourse. As Wes again articulates his 
entrepreneurial attitude, he establishes two potential outcomes for his travails, “two sides of 
the coin”: win, or lose. This discrete dualism elucidates the metaphysical tenor of Wes’ 
thinking: individualism is sustained upon an absolutist, foundational success/failure 
dichotomy, a structure Wes uses to make sense of his actions and experiences.  
 
142 
 
The Figure of the Path 
 
 Thus, Wes’ goal-orientated protagonist places Sure Fire within discourses of 
individualism as an American cultural narrative, collapsing distinctions between thematic 
and formal properties. This heightened reflexive self-awareness is built upon by a number of 
visual motifs, signifying (but then challenging) the principles that Wes directly espouses. 
The most prominent of these is the figure of “the path.” As highlighted in Wendy and Lucy, 
one can identify the use of spatial metaphors for personal advancement and character 
causality, drawing upon pop-culture conceptions of an individual’s “route” or “path” 
through life. Nevertheless, this motif is rendered within the two case studies in very different 
fashions. In Wendy and Lucy, the path eludes literal representation. Wendy’s route is only 
displayed through plans and maps, as signs stripped of any material significance: 
individualism has no inherent foundation, a route with no root.  
In comparison, literal representations of “the path” are utilised throughout Sure Fire. 
This is particularly clear in one extended sequence, an uninterrupted long-take of a highway 
journey (Fig.1.14):  
 
 
Fig.1.14 
 
Travelling through an arid landscape, the shot begins on a straight road, a linearity 
punctuated by continuous road markings that bisect the image. The road then begins to wind 
through a mountain pass, oscillating between areas of glaring sun and darkened shade. As 
the sequence continues to unfold, it is augmented by a horizontally scrolling line of 
superimposed biblical text (Fig.1.15): 
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Fig.1.15 
 
 This evocation of the road as “path” draws attention to a constructed linear causality 
in a number of ways. Firstly, whilst the road stretches out in front of the spectator (the 
possibilities the route represents), the camera is actually travelling in the opposite direction, 
away from the horizon. Thus, whilst the road can symbolically represent an individualist 
potential for mobility and forward momentum, the direction of this motion is reversed. This 
individualist image is further problematized by the layout of the route. Whilst the shot 
begins with a lengthy period of travel on a straight road, the way soon begins to wind and 
camber, shifting direction in a manner that emphasises smooth curves and turns. This creates 
a circular, rotational effect, a clear contrast to “the path” as a figure for linear causality.  
 Finally, this interplay of causal linearity and figurative circularity is articulated in 
religious subtitles that move across the screen. The quote, taken from the Book of Mormon, 
directly references goal-fulfilment and causal linearity: 
 
The works, and the designs, and the purposes of God, can not be frustrated, neither 
can they come to naught, for God doth not walk in crooked paths; neither doth he 
turn to the right hand nor to the left; neither doth he vary from that which he hath 
said; therefore, his paths are straight and his course is one eternal round.   
  
Superficially, this line of scripture reinforces a number of aforementioned structural 
principles. Nevertheless, the final line problematizes individualist linearity in a manner 
complementary to the visual metaphor that it accompanies. The quote “his paths are straight 
and his course is one eternal round” can be read as self-contradictory; although the clauses 
that precede this allude to narrow, pre-set goals, the notion of an “eternal round” evokes 
repetition and recurrence, an atemporal path that constantly returns the traveller to its 
starting point. As a result, this sequence augments the deconstructive repetitions utilised 
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throughout Wendy and Lucy: seemingly linear, individualist scenarios are subjected to 
diegetic recurrence, denying the progression of their supposed causal chains. In turn, this 
problematization of linear succession echoes Derrida’s reconceptualization of metaphysical 
history. In exploring the possibility of a “history” that eschews logocentric assumptions, 
Derrida calls for a “‘monumental, stratified, contradictory’ history, a history that also 
implies a new logic of repetition and of the trace.”84 In basic terms, this attitude appears to 
inform both Wendy and Lucy and Sure Fire’s deconstructions of causal narrative. The 
interplay of linear succession and circular motion constructs a paradoxical temporal logic, 
embracing principles of recurrence and repetition through the interplay of the “straight” and 
the “round.” 
 
Deconstructing the Event 
 
 Sure Fire’s deconstructive cultural critique can be extended to the very experiences 
individualism links and rationalises, demonstrated by formal and editing choices that 
punctuate the film’s representations of personal interaction and domestic space. In recent 
analyses of Sure Fire, formal properties have garnered extensive attention, overshadowing 
studies of the film’s thematic content. King dedicates a sizeable section of American 
Independent Cinema’s chapter on form to the film’s director, using sequences from Sure 
Fire as examples of Jost’s auteurist formal idiosyncrasies.85 In his analyses, King notes that 
the film consistently fragments on-screen and domestic space, arguing that “conventional 
framing and editing regimes are frequently abandoned or undermined.”86 However, in 
King’s adoption of Bordwellian categories, these devices are inevitably motivated by 
thematic or character-based factors, as a means of expressing “a pervading sense of 
disconnection and alienation.”87  
This scenic fragmentation is reinforced by the manner in which characters 
communicate throughout the film. In a sequence involving Wes and his wife, the former 
explains a plan he has devised to lure Californian customers to the area. Throughout the 
scene the camera stays rigidly fixed on Wes, only cutting to an image of his wife after he has 
finished his extensive soliloquy (Figs.1.16-1.17): 
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Figs.1.16-1.17 
 
This separation of onscreen space is reinforced by the lack of a clear establishing shot at the 
beginning of the interchange; during Wes’ speech, the fact that he is addressing his wife can 
only be discerned from the content of his instructions. 
 Importantly, King’s reading of the film’s formal innovations relies upon accepting 
an a priori set of conventional aesthetic values from which they can deviate. Thus, 
sequences like the one above can only be read as thematically-motivated if one accepts a 
specific construction of spatio-temporal coherence as denoting a normative representation of 
reality. Therefore, even as he suggests that Sure Fire radically departs from classical 
norms,88 their dominant structural role is reaffirmed, providing a fixed base from which any 
formal innovation derives its meaning. Conversely, the formal attributes of Sure Fire can 
also be read as a further elaboration on the film’s engagement with the narrativisation of 
cultural experience; specifically, they call into question the structural coherence of the 
scenes they convey, undermining the constitution of discrete and actualised events required 
to sustain an individualist causal chain. A striking example of this can be viewed in the 
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editing of a sequence set in Larry’s farmhouse. Returning home, he discusses financial 
matters with his wife, who is cooking dinner for the pair. When she reveals that Wes has 
been providing financial assistance with their mortgage payments, an argument ensues, and 
Larry is slapped around the face. Superficially, this can be read as a cogent scenario, in 
which Larry appears emasculated by his wife’s knowledge of Wes’ aid, loses his temper and 
is struck when he raises his voice.  
Nevertheless, this coherence is undermined by the manner in which the sequence is 
assembled, through a series of overtly foregrounded cuts. As the scene unfolds, the narrative 
described above is constructed from a range of shots that follow Larry around the house. 
However, each shot is accompanied by an abrupt cut to black, being followed eventually by 
proceeding action. In a typical neo-formalist textual analysis, such cuts would primarily be 
read as signifying narrative ellipses; in Bordwell’s model of classical narration, the cut to 
black would likely represent the occlusion of superfluous time, uneventful moments that 
detract from the construction and reception of a temporally cogent scene.89 Thus, in this 
model the application of such techniques would require consistency with an overarching 
principle of “continuity editing,”90 in which an intelligible sequence is formed from the 
ordering of spatio-temporal fragments.  
This role of editing and form in constructing discrete narrative events has been 
explored by a number of film theorists, a notable example being Mary Ann Doane. 
Theorising a direct relationship between early film and the rationalisation of contingency, 
Doane stresses cinema’s privileged (indexical) relationship with the unfolding of events as 
“aleatory, stochastic, contingent.”91 Therefore, as with Bordwell’s exploration of “continuity 
editing,” the occlusion of what Doane refers to as “dead time” 92 is vital in providing these 
experiences with a meaningful structure, as “the condition of a conceptualization of the 
‘event,’” where “time is condensed, and becomes eminently meaningful.”93 Nevertheless, for 
Doane the event is a structure that remains internally unstable, containing the seeds of its 
own destruction: the event is considered “the most condensed and semantically wealthy unit 
of time,” yet remains “the site of intense internal contradictions.”94  
Doane broadens this notion of regulated contingency and paradox to a wider study 
of editing procedures. Although noting that editing “generates its own anxieties about 
discontinuity and absence,” Doane reaffirms that “editing – as the possibility of departure 
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from temporal and spatial continuity – is consistently perceived as the sine qua non of 
cinematic signification.”95 Therefore, editing is portrayed as another form of metaphysical 
structuration. Yet, Doane also suggests that such procedures contain their own self-
contradictory critique, structuring on-screen actions whilst simultaneously fragmenting 
them.96 Despite Doane’s observations being rooted in the study of “early actualities,”97 her 
judgements provide useful insights for recent conceptualisations of cinematic structure; 
formal and editing procedures are placed on the cusp of narrative and contingency, shaping 
cinematic meaning whilst simultaneously alluding to its inherent structural instability.  
 In the textual sample presented above, editing procedures draw close attention to 
their structural role, demonstrating an inadequacy in constructing a fully coherent 
representation of contingent events. For example, throughout the sequence the cuts to black 
do not appear to occlude uneventful narrative information, rather bisecting moments of 
narrative importance; in one shot Larry is positioned by the fridge, and after a cut he is 
shown to have walked a small distance, where he kisses his wife at the cooker. Thus, Larry 
has moved during the interstice, an action that occurs in real time, despite the presence of a 
cut. Whilst an image of this movement has been removed, the action unfolds as if the editing 
technique had not been employed, with no re-ordering of diegetic time. The redundancy of 
this cut, in which no real-time information has been occluded, is reinforced by the audio 
track for the scene, as it continues uninterrupted over the aforementioned rupturing of the 
image. 
Therefore, Sure Fire ultimately adopts these structuring processes as a means of 
demonstrating the arbitrariness of their function: rather than producing a classically 
consistent representation of domestic life, the cuts to black produce a discordance that 
prevents the reception of the scene as unified or internally coherent. As the on-screen 
content appears to unfold in real-time, we are provided with an edited, fragmented image 
that nevertheless retains an unedited, continuous duration. This visualises the very purpose 
of event-construction posited by Doane, in which “the concept of the event provides a 
limit...and reinvests the contingent with significance. The contingent, in effect, is 
harnessed.”98 Thus, Sure Fire actively draws attention to the manner in which continuous, 
contingent experiences are granted significance by their assimilation into homogeneous, 
logocentric structures, be it a single event, or a narrative series of events. 
Derrida also interrogates the concept of the event in Archive Fever. Using the 
archive as an illustrative example, he draws attention to the manner in which events are 
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formally produced by the act of their representation, providing contingent experiences with 
an arbitrary presence: 
 
The technical structure of the archiving archive also determines the structure of the 
archivable content even in its very coming into existence and in its relationship to 
the future. The archivization produces as much as it records the event.99     
  
Thus, the quote above appears particularly relevant to studies of both cinema and 
individualism; Derrida’s discussion of a temporal structuring element (the “relationship to 
the future”) acknowledges the necessity of structured events in sustaining linear causal logic 
or anticipation. 
 Derrida’s subsequent critique of the metaphysical event appears to reinforce the 
deconstructive editing schema employed in Sure Fire. Whilst noting the structural value of 
the archive, Derrida consistently articulates a radical unfixity of the event it produces. 
Geoffrey Bennington notes that iterability (repetition and re-evaluation) ensures that the 
event remains fundamentally contingent, open to new and unexpected transformations upon 
every occasion of its retelling,  
 
dividing its uniqueness and giving rise to the possibility of different versions and 
accounts of the ‘same’ event...but iterability also entails alteration and difference, so 
that something new, a new event, also takes place in every account of an event.100       
 
This structural elusiveness ensures that the event can never be grasped as a static, self-
coherent whole, a vital precursor to its incorporation into causal (and by extension, 
individualist) narrative structures. It is this transformative potential that is articulated by 
Sure Fire; the aforementioned scene continually escapes the attempts at rationalisation 
implied by foregrounded editing procedures, bridging and subverting interstitial gaps in 
representation.  
This provides one final challenge to causal individualism: for Derrida, the event is 
constantly rewritten by that which follows it, always open to re-inscription.101 Derrida 
himself notes the implausibility of a complete archive (and hence, a totalised representation 
of an event): 
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By incorporating the knowledge deployed in reference to it, the archive augments 
itself, engrosses itself.... But in the same stroke it loses the absolute and meta-textual 
authority it might claim to have. One will never be able to objectivise it with no 
remainder. The archivist produces more archive, and that is why the archive is never 
closed. It opens out of the future.102 
 
By its assimilation into a causal chain, the event is inevitably altered and recontextualised by 
other events to which it is tied. Thus, whilst this manifestation of individualism appears 
predicated on the successive achievement of identifiable, fixed goals, the unity of these goals 
is erased the moment they are positioned as events (the act of their fulfilment) within a 
causal relationship with one another.  
 
The End of the Path 
 
 This contradictory dynamic of inextricably tying together amorphous, fluid events is 
reinforced by a wider narrative critique, undertaken in the film’s concluding scenes. This 
appears as the inverse of the narrative interrogations of Wendy and Lucy, in which the film 
problematizes the unity of Wendy’s origins. Conversely, Sure Fire utilises the film’s 
shocking conclusion as a means of highlighting a key contradiction within individualist 
narratives: the very causal structure of goal-fulfilment must be terminated as a means of 
articulating its successful completion. This is figured literally, as the film concludes with the 
suicide of Wes, after he murders his son. Therefore, although individualism is 
conceptualised as a forward-oriented progression of goals and events,103 the desire to rigidly 
demarcate narrative elements evokes an antithetical stasis, a temporal contradiction 
demonstrated through the concept of narrative closure. 
 Throughout Sure Fire, there are references to an upcoming event, which ultimately 
marks the end of the film’s narrative: “the big hunt.” During the film, references to hunting 
are common, both visually (Wes is shown practicing his aim on a target) and verbally, in 
which Wes uses related terminology in conversation with others. Indeed, Wes often employs 
these references to articulate his individualist aims, utilising violent hunting metaphors in 
explaining his plans to his peers. This is encapsulated in the film’s title: Sure Fire can refer 
to a bullet that flies straight and true (another reference to causal linearity). However, the 
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title also alludes to Wes’ entrepreneurial use of the phrase, as he suggests to potential 
investors that his plan is a “sure fire winner.” 
 This reading is reinforced by several sequences that construct a wider variety of 
visual and lexical connections, inextricably tying hunting to individualism. Firstly, the 
importance of targets draws parallels between Wes’ financial goals and his gun-sight, as 
both involve identifying and fulfilling specific aims. This is epitomised by the sequence in 
which Wes practices with his rifle. Several gunshots are presented in a similar pattern of 
camera shots; there is a close-up of Wes’ finger on the trigger, followed by another of the 
target. This basic model is repeated several times, varying the frequency of trigger and target 
shots. After a number of close-ups on Wes’ hand, there is finally a long shot depicting both 
Wes and the target (Figs.1.18-1.20): 
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Figs.1.18-1.20 
 
Firstly, it is important to note that the act of shooting is not framed as one continuous, 
totalised movement. Instead, it is constructed through a series of close-ups, emphasising 
specific moments in a causal chain: the act of pulling the trigger (the cause), and the shot of 
the target (the effect). These two moments are drawn into a relationship of temporal 
succession, producing a seemingly cogent, causal narrative of action. 
 This representation of constructed goal-fulfilment is amplified by the scene’s 
repetitive temporality. Although the action seems to precipitate an unequivocal cause-effect 
relationship, it is one that is repeated a number of times, continuing in a loop as Wes fires 
off shot after shot. This constructs a contradictory temporal logic akin to the aforementioned 
“eternal round”; straight, causal lines are juxtaposed with a repetitive circularity. 
Additionally, as the sequence continues to repeat, strict cause/effect delineations appear 
increasingly blurred; robbed of any structural self-coherence, each shot is rendered a 
constituent of a terminal loop, a cyclical event with no discernible beginning or end.  
 This complex representational critique is further elucidated during “the big hunt.” 
As the sequence begins, Wes presents his son, Phillip, with a new gun, following the gift 
with a hunting safety lecture. During this monologue, Wes draws yet another parallel 
between hunting and economic individualism: speaking of his responsibility to provide a 
clean kill, Wes discusses an “implied contract” between hunter and prey, adopting 
entrepreneurial jargon to make his point. However, soon after hunt begins, Phillip informs 
him that Wes’ wife is considering a move to California, and that he intends to go with her. 
Once Wes and Phillip are secluded from their hunting companions, Larry and Dennis 
(Dennis Brown), two gunshots ring out. From the reactions of Larry and Dennis, it is 
assumed that Wes has murdered Phillip, before turning the gun on himself. However, the 
actual shootings escape direct representation; the gunshots occur off-screen, and when their 
companions arrive, only Wes and his son’s legs are visible.    
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 To begin, the apparent cause of Wes’ actions (the revelation about his wife’s plans 
to leave) represents an inversion of Wes’ spatialised goals; whilst he is attempting to attract 
rich Californians to move to Utah, she threatens to move in the opposite direction. This 
appears as a direct challenge to the alignment of his plans with socio-economic reward and 
upward mobility, as the northward geographical movement associated with his scheme is 
counteracted by her plans to make this journey in reverse. Wes’ reaction to this challenge 
can also be read as a moment in which his individualist narrative lapses into internal 
contradiction. As suggested above, Wes and his son’s deaths effectively conclude the film’s 
plot. In marking the end of the film, it also provides the epitome of closure, as the causal 
chain centred on Wes as a narrative agent is abruptly and unequivocally finished. Indeed, the 
finality of this event is reinforced by the accompanying death of Wes’ son. Not only has 
Wes been rendered terminally static, but Phillip cannot inherit and carry on his father’s 
work, stunting any potential patriarchal succession.  
 Therefore, in providing a sudden conclusion to Wes’ narrative, the two deaths seem 
to stand in direct opposition to his individualist aims, robbing the protagonist of agency, 
abruptly rupturing the cause-effect chain that sustains his goals. However, it can be argued 
that this effect is itself a product of the metaphysical foundations of individualism, the desire 
to imbue experience with discrete, fixed meanings. Derrida appears to proscribe a similar 
structuring dynamic to death itself, which he describes as a marker of an “irreplaceable 
singularity.”104 Indeed, Nicholas Royle notes that in utilising Derrida’s notion of plenitude 
(given as “the ‘desire for absolutely actual and present intention”), the purest manifestation 
of “presence” would indeed be death.105 This “double bind” is clearly demonstrated by 
Derrida himself, punning on the word “end”: “plenitude is the end (the goal), but were it 
attained, it would be the end (death.)”106 Therefore, whilst death provides a fundamental 
rupture, a termination of narrative goals, it also provides the purest form of presence, a 
transcendental unity that underlies and sustains the operation of causal linearity. Sure Fire 
encapsulates this contradictory dynamic within its closing scenes, and their relation to the 
narrative as a whole. Death prevents the fulfilment of Wes’ aims, yet is written into the very 
structure of cultural rationalisation that constitutes a cogent individualist form. This device 
exemplifies Sure Fire’s potential as a deconstructive text: the structural foundations of 
individualism are used to communicate the arbitrary and self-contradictory status of its 
narrativisation. 
 
                                                          
104
 Jacques Derrida, Aporias: Dying---Awaiting (One Another at) the “Limits of Truth”, trans. Thomas 
Dutroit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 74. 
105
 Nicholas Royle, Jacques Derrida (London: Routledge, 2003), 67. 
106
 Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc., ed. Gerald Graff (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 
1988), 129. 
153 
 
Conclusions 
 
As demonstrated through close-textual readings, Wendy and Lucy and Sure Fire 
provide a variety of complementary deconstructive effects, primarily focused on structural 
properties associated with American individualism. Principles of causal linearity, forward 
momentum, and the goal-oriented protagonist are actively engaged, comprising the formal 
and thematic premises of the two texts. In doing so, the two films share a number of vital 
commonalities. Firstly, both texts utilise a variety of visual motifs that reinforce their 
engagements with linear narratives of cultural experience. Thus, the sequence of Wes’ 
shooting practice and the shots of Oregonian freight trains embody similar symbolic values: 
both provide clear figures of causal narrative logic, evoking complementary values of 
cause/effect and linear motion, integral to individualism as a cultural narrative. 
Furthermore, whilst instituting a set of clear narrative goals for the two main 
protagonists, these texts are primarily cast as static or episodic. This contradictory temporal 
dynamic, in which character goals are radically detached from the causal momentum they 
imply, is achieved primarily through a combination of narrative ellipsis and formal 
repetitions. This is typified by Wendy and Lucy, in which a number of shots and motifs are 
continually recycled throughout the course of the film, stymieing any sustained causal 
progress. Thus, linear progression is fundamentally undermined as it is juxtaposed with a 
pervasive evocation of narrative recurrence and stasis. The resultant sense of narrative 
circularity also appears to be figuratively replicated in both films, shown in Wendy’s “calls” 
and in Sure Fire’s evocation of “the path.” As a result, both texts fundamentally dismantle 
any absolute opposition between form and content; a subversive narrative recurrence is 
reflected not only in the ordering of the films’ scenes, but in their visual and figurative 
content. Thus, this appears to reinforce a theoretical proposition suggested in this chapter’s 
introduction: namely that individualism self-consciously elucidates its narrational function, 
internalising principles of causal rationalisation within its thematic and symbolic content.  
Finally, the two films provide complementary explorations of the limits and bounds 
of individualist narratives, problematizing the self-coherence of their protagonist’s story 
arcs. Importantly, both Wendy and Lucy and Sure Fire achieve this through a shared, 
paradoxical effect: the incorporation of a seemingly ceaseless narrative momentum within a 
clearly demarcated, rationalised structure. In Wendy and Lucy, the origins of the protagonist 
are problematized and effaced; portrayed only through secondary denotations (maps, forms), 
Wendy’s origins are simultaneously foregrounded and immaterialised, shorn of any wider 
significance in informing our reading of her journey. Conversely, Sure Fire focuses more 
clearly on the issue of narrative closure; mimicking Derrida’s reading of death as an 
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“irreplaceable singularity,”107 the film’s terminal conclusion destroys Wes’ goals whilst 
simultaneously replicating the metaphysical logic of self-presence that sustains his goal-
orientation.   
Therefore, through close-textual analysis, one can observe in Wendy and Lucy and 
Sure Fire complementary deconstructions of individualist cultural narratives. Undermining a 
range of structural principles and oppositions, the two films elaborate a contradictory 
narrative logic: both films provide goal-oriented, linear, causal structures that contain the 
seeds of their own destruction. Additionally, this reflexive emphasis allows for a more active 
form of cinematic reading, noting a clear dependency between theoretical methodology and 
textual content. Thus, this reading forms a dynamic engagement with the two texts, teasing 
out moments of contradiction that shape the film’s thematic explorations of individualism as 
deconstructive.  
Finally, in forwarding this reading of the two films, numerous concepts (linear 
causality, narrative momentum) are severed from their prominent association with the 
“classical mode”108 of Bordwellian film theory, providing a significant departure from 
previous readings of narrative in independent cinema. Indeed, this appears to vindicate the 
broader aims of this project in deconstructing the oppositions that constitute contemporary 
independent film as a coherent classification. Rather than positioning the films within a 
priori cinematic categories or modes, textual and structural qualities are considered in 
reference to wider conceptual and theoretical schema, allowing a re-reading of the films in 
relation to themes of cultural narration and national identity. Therefore, a fundamental 
critique of existing formalist definitions is displayed as a vital methodological precursor, 
opening up the possibility for diverse (and previously inhibited) textual engagements. 
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Chapter Three – Deconstructing the American Nuclear 
Family: Challenging Domestic Whole(some)ness 
 
The American Nuclear Family as Cultural Centre and Origin 
 
 In the previous chapter, critical and textual analyses focused upon dislodging an 
individualist subject from his purportedly indelible position as the heroic protagonist of 
American national narrative. Unencumbered by oppressive social ties, the atomised 
individualist figure is embedded within causal narratives of upward mobility. However, 
further theorisations of American identity have utilised similar structural tenets to locate the 
nation’s cultural centre on a different social scale. Rather than focusing specifically upon an 
individualised subject, such discourses have argued that a coherent national self is 
constituted within a self-contained cultural milieu: the nuclear family.1 Thus, in analysing 
familial scholarship alongside discussions of individualism, it is apparent that they utilise 
analogous terminology to root a homogeneous national character within specific 
autonomous structures. Described as a “mythical entity,”2 a “sacred place,”3 and a vital 
anchor to the American “way of life,”4 critical discourses continually position the nuclear 
family as an eminent socio-cultural nexus. 
 In intractably tying the family to broader constructions of national identity, scholarly 
accounts focus primarily on a specific nuclear ideal. Judith Stacey succinctly summarises 
homogenised pop-culture familial representations, suggesting that in an American context 
there exists a “family form that most Americans now consider to be traditional – an intact 
nuclear unit inhabited by a male breadwinner, his full-time homemaker wife, and their 
dependent children.”5 Joseph M. Hawes and Elizabeth I. Nybakken provide a similar outline 
of a national nuclear norm, constructing it as a pervasive model to which American families 
aspire: “the nuclear family consisting of father, mother, and children living together within a 
privatized household has often served as the model of the American family.”6 As a result, 
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academic studies reaffirm the predominance of a particular image of the family in American 
cultural discourse, a specific value-laden model described as “conjugal, patriarchal (and) 
heteronormal.”7   
 Broad readings of the family as a universal socio-biological origin provide a 
structural model for more focused theorisations of the family’s unique status within 
American culture;8 Ruth Cavan describes the family as “a deeply rooted institution in the 
United States.”9 Prominent early theorists of American national identity (such as Alexis de 
Tocqueville) have suggested that “democratic” aspects of the American character are 
microcosmically encapsulated within the structure of the nuclear family, ensuring a vital 
correspondence between domestic and national cultures: a “spirit of equality” can be 
discerned “around the domestic hearth.”10 In turn, value-judgements regarding the 
importance of the family in American life frequently appeal to abstract notions of cultural 
suitability: numerous scholars have reinforced a common-sense discourse that stress a 
“goodness of fit”11 of the nuclear family to American society, a structural relationship that 
“makes sense” and precipitates a coherent experience of national being.12 In doing so, such 
readings typify what Michael J. Shapiro refers to as a “universalizing political discourse that 
valorizes the traditional family as a foundational and moral condition of possibility for 
national political coherence.”13   
Readings of the family as a structural foundation for cultural order are reinforced by 
explicit references to its position as a cultural centre. Brigitte and Peter Berger’s War over 
the Family analyses this common structural motif, describing conventional readings of the 
American family as an unchanging “intimate core.” 14 Betty G. Farrell espouses a similar 
view, which she uses to account for the role of the family in a various societal discourses 
and issues: “the family in American history has always been at the center of social life and 
has served to refract many social concerns.”15 In summarising 1980s “family values” 
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discourse, Sarah Harwood appends this perceived social centrality with a moralistic 
dimension: “the family…became the moral centre for political and cultural rhetoric; a family 
which was held as metonymic, explicable and responsible for the social formation in toto.”16 
Finally, Jean Bethke Elshtain utilises a bodily metaphor to communicate the family’s 
position as a vital organ in the functioning of a healthy nation, describing the nuclear 
domestic unit simply as the “heart” of America.17   
Discourses of American family centrality do more than simply reinforce the pre-
eminence of the family in constituting a specific national identity. Rather, the centre also 
connotes distinct structural properties, allying popular discussions of the family 
wholesomeness with logocentric conceptions of wholeness, order, and presence. As a pre-
cursor to his fundamental displacement of the centre in metaphysical discourse, Jacques 
Derrida notes that it is commonly furnished with ontological attributes of absolute fixity and 
self-coherence: its role “was not only to orient, balance and organize the structure…but 
above all to make sure that the organizing principle of the structure would limit what we 
might call the play of the structure.”18 In making this claim, Derrida establishes the centre’s 
specifically logocentric function; in aligning all structures with a telos of absolute self-
identity, it regulates and arrests a dynamic play of spatio-temporal différance: “it is the point 
at which substitution of contents, elements or terms is no longer possible.”19 However, 
Derrida notes that this logocentric economy produces a structural paradox, a rupture that 
fatally compromises the centre’s metaphysical solidity: for the centre to be legible it must be 
ontologically unique, and if this is the case, it cannot be assimilated within the structure it 
orients: 
 
It has always been thought that the center, which is by definition unique, constituted 
that very thing within a structure which while governing the structure, escapes 
structurality. This is why classical thought concerning structure could say that the 
center is, paradoxically, within the structure and outside it.20 
   
Here, Derrida discerns within Western metaphysics a necessity to think of the centre as both 
inside and outside of the structure, a contradiction that contravenes logocentric principles of 
totalised presence and oppositional difference: “the concept of centered structure – although 
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it represents coherence itself…– is contradictorily coherent.”21 Thus, in positioning the 
family as a national centre-point, the domestic structure adopts a purportedly essential unity, 
fixity, and self-coherence. Yet, this theorisation simultaneously produces the possibility of 
the family’s critical displacement, a deconstructive gesture undertaken by this chapter’s 
close-textual analysis.   
The static coherence of nuclear family form is solidified through the figurative 
imagining of the family as an elemental structure from which a larger societal fabric is 
assembled. In propagating this assumption, popular and academic discourses continually 
describe the nuclear family as a social unit that carries a self-identical meaning within a 
rigidly bounded structure. John Demos and Arlene S. Skolnick both utilise architectural 
metaphors to demonstrate this relationship between the family “unit” and the nation, 
describing families as the “building blocks” from which American society is assembled.22 
Images of the nuclear family as an enduring cultural totality or “center of stability”23 are 
further evidenced in Vivian Sobchack’s study of domestic representations in Hollywood 
film; she approaches the nuclear unit as a self-contained signifying economy, describing the 
“American bourgeois family” as “an ideological as well as interpersonal structure 
characterized…by its cellular construction.”24 Finally, it is possible to discern an antonymic 
structural opposition within scholarly discourses that spatialises the family’s totalising 
semiotics. Located within oppositional discourses of the public and private, the American 
family is presented as a personal realm impervious to broader social changes, a hermetically-
sealed, static structure opposed to a tumultuous public world.25 Constructions of the nuclear 
family as a private entity thematize its formal and structural properties; described as a 
“haven in a heartless world”26 and a “nest of domesticity,”27 familial definitions reify 
connotations of privacy, isolation, reassuring stasis, and totality. Therefore, whilst recent 
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scholarship has attempted to challenge the distinctiveness of these dualistic categories,28 the 
metaphysical structural assumptions associated with privatised readings of the nuclear 
family still play a vital role in framing its socio-cultural representation.  
 Dual images of family wholeness and wholesomeness further engender familial self- 
presence by representing static, timeless domestic structures.29 Farrell treats these temporal 
properties as integral constituents of idealised family images, arguing that American culture 
is dominated by a “romanticized and static image of the family.”30 Stacey observes similar 
suppositions within recent (polemical) discussions of the family, suggesting that a “dubious 
assumption of the family-values campaign is that (family) truth is timeless as well as 
singular.”31 In accordance with this suggestion, Shapiro also notes that in recent “culture 
wars” discourses the family has been approached as “a historically stable, noncontingent 
result of natural inclinations and morally appropriate choices.”32 Finally, Harwood focuses 
closely upon temporal stasis in filmic families: discussing the usually totalised resolution of 
familial narratives, she contends that the family is “invoked in a bid to fix time and secure 
stasis in a period of great flux.”33 Thus, Harwood concludes that a central aspect of familial 
discourse is a purported “claim to timelessness” that naturalises and universalises specific 
models of cultural fixity: “the moment of representation – the imaging of the family – was 
thus a temporal elision which collapsed past, present and future into an always-already, has-
been and ever-shall-be, model for social organisation.”34 In treating the American family as a 
transcendental signified, these discourses tacitly construct it as a “natural” configuration; in 
turn, this evokes prominent discursive debates that centre on whether the nuclear family is 
“genetically determined”35 or a “primary social construct.”36 However, whilst perceptions of 
familial naturalness clearly reify its purported spatio-temporal fixity,37 antithetical 
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perspectives mobilise a similar logocentric rhetoric in their reading of the nuclear family as 
essentially cultural.38 Thus, antonymic familial readings grant the nuclear family with an 
inherent cultural meaning, regardless of which specific ontology is vehemently espoused.39  
 In positioning the American family directly within the closure of metaphysics, it is 
cast as a “normative entity”40 that disavows differences and regulates diverse cultural 
experiences and meanings. This process of cultural homogenisation is explicated in more 
complex, reflexive scholarly conceptualisations of the nuclear family. Returning to Shapiro, 
he directly attacks representations of the family as an eternal, hermetically-sealed textual 
body; “the ‘family’ is a contingent form of association with unstable boundaries and varying 
structures.”41 As a result, “conservative appropriations of historical and contemporary family 
values” are rendered an oppressive “regulative fiction,” a “weapon against a politics of 
multiplicity.”42 In similar terms, Stacey frames idealised family rhetoric as a coercive 
discursive force, a regulatory form that imposes a “deceptive unity” upon a “contested 
term.”43 In contrast to this restrictive representational norm, Stacey suggests that “like 
postmodern culture, contemporary Western family arrangements are diverse, fluid and 
unresolved.”44 In doing so, she theorises a “postmodern family condition”: stripped of its 
regulative narrative status, this family model exhibits “features of improvisation, ambiguity, 
diversity, contradiction, self-reflection and flux.”45 
 This chapter constructively builds upon these recent theoretical critiques, discerning 
similar representational challenges to the nuclear family within a specific cinematic case-
study. The rest of this introduction provides a critical survey of American familial 
discourses, hinging on a reflexive discussion of how domestic representations have been 
accommodated within rigid dichotomous categories; conflicting images of the American 
family frequently oscillate between idealisation and vilification, utopian and dystopian 
poles. Indeed, it is suggested that several recent studies have constructed a historically-
specific, oppositional familial discourse, commonly framed as a partisan “war over the 
family.”46 Finally, I conclude with an investigation of cinematic family scholarship, 
culminating with a specific examination of domestic settings in independent film. Thus, this 
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again provides a medium-specific context for the textual analysis that follows, allowing a 
case-study exploration of deconstructive aesthetics to be considered in relation to broader 
debates surrounding the family in popular media.  
 
Oppositional Families 
 
As explored above, prominent images of familial coherence are commonly founded 
upon a series of interrelated binary structures (private/public, natural/cultural); in turn, these 
dualities furnish the American nuclear family with an essential spatio-temporal solidity. 
However, recent studies of the family have observed this binary logic on both micro- and 
macro-structural levels; totalised familial representations have themselves been divided into 
antithetical, value-laden categories, judged as either positive or negative, idealised or 
debased, utopian or dystopian. In broad terms, studies of the family in American culture 
have focused on a traditionally dominant image of the nuclear household as an idyllic milieu 
positioned at the heart of a shared national character. Describing the pre-eminence of nuclear 
structures in American cultural discourses, Berger and Berger note that these representations 
carried near-universally positive connotations: “the taken for granted definition of the family 
in American culture, of course, was not merely descriptive but charged with positive 
value.”47 Similarly, Michèle Barrett and Mary McIntosh argue that normalised familial 
representations throughout Western culture are predominantly idyllic: “the imagery of 
idealized family life permeates the fabric of social existence and provides a highly 
significant, dominant and unifying, complex of social meaning.”48 Enlarging upon these 
abstract descriptions of familial exceptionalism, Harwood provides a detailed taxonomy of 
idealised nuclear icons, identifiable (positive) tropes observable in Hollywood texts: “These 
ideal family types are authentic inheritors and embodiment of the American Dream – white, 
middle-class, affluent, beautiful, mid-American, affectionate, permanently laughing/happy, 
untouched by external events and upwardly mobile.”49 Finally, although the idealised 
American family has often been treated as a timeless structural form, recent studies have 
located contemporary familial representations as self-conscious evocations of a specific 
socio-historical context, the 1950s. The pervasiveness of idyllic familial images is attributed 
to a collective “cultural nostalgia”50 for a lost origin or a priori plenitude against which all 
familial representations are negatively judged. 
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In turn, positive familial images can be directly contrasted with a similarly 
homogenised counter-view of the American family as a seat of unrealised ideals or inherent 
negative value. In many cases, such perspectives endorse aforementioned narratives of a lost 
“golden age,”51 as contemporary social trends are viewed as an index of familial “decline.” 
Arguing that such rhetoric has been a stable element of familial discourse throughout 
American history, Demos notes that “for at least a century now the American family in 
particular has been seen as beleaguered, endangered, and possibly on the verge of 
extinction.”52 Bryce J. Christensen, a conservative exponent of this sociological discourse, 
delineates a broad range of societal changes as causes and symptoms of a breakdown of the 
heterosexual, nuclear family ideal; Christensen condemns high divorce rates, falling 
marriage rates, single-parent families, and intergenerational conflicts, citing these as 
determinants and consequences of “grievous tears in our national social fabric.”53 Whilst 
such views approach the American family as a structure in material and moral disarray, they 
retain a glorified image of the nuclear family as a privileged cultural foundation. A 
dystopian reality is contrasted with a utopian ideal, and the source of this discrepancy is 
located within an external social context; such flaws are not considered innate deficiencies 
of the nuclear family itself.  
Lamentations of familial decline are frequently positioned as a response to 
oppositional discourses that approach the family itself as inherently oppressive. Stephanie 
Coontz typifies such attitudes, arguing that “beneath the polished facades of many ‘ideal’ 
families, suburban as well as urban, was violence, terror, or simply grinding misery that only 
occasionally came to light.”54 Skolnick suggests that images of a repressive, “dark side of 
the family” originated in the context of greater social openness in the 1970s: 
 
Formerly taboo topics – from homosexuality to abortion to incest – could now be 
openly discussed. Family violence was “discovered”: child abuse and wife battering 
became important topics for research as well as significant public issues.55 
 
Finally, Berger and Berger provide a detailed outline of shifting familial values in a similar 
historical context, charting how perceptions of the family transformed from being inherently 
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idyllic to innately destructive or “sick.”56 Accounts of family dystopia are particularly 
prevalent in feminist scholarship, in which domestic oppression is experienced primarily by 
women and is attributed to the nuclear family’s patriarchal structure. Barrett and McIntosh 
summarise this perspective, contending that “the women’s liberation movement has drawn 
attention to the violence and degradation hidden within the walls of the nuclear household, 
and to the broader social and economic inequalities connected with it.”57 Furthermore, whilst 
significant attention has been given to the family as a seat of misogynist violence, others 
have focused on a more mundane (but also repressive) image of the family as a stifling, 
conformist model. Skolnick elaborates upon this perspective, arguing that academics, artists 
and social critics constructed a “myth of suburbia” that played a prominent role in shaping 
and representing 1950s socio-cultural life; this “nightmare vision of family life…portrayed 
disintegrating families and rotting marriages,” set to the backdrop of ruthless capitalist 
competition, domestic loneliness, and social conformity.58  
 As demonstrated above, popular ideals of the American nuclear family have been 
confronted by pessimistic, dystopian representations; these relate a range of superficially 
antithetical meanings to the family’s inherent ontological properties. However, as has been 
implicitly suggested, these contestatory images reinforce the structural logic of the familial 
discourses that they purport to challenge. For example, aforementioned judgements of “the 
decline of the family” simplistically celebrate (rather than critique) the American family as a 
nuclear cultural model; although the domestic home is cast as a broken, ineffective social 
setting, this judgement is only achieved by juxtaposing it with a static, homogenised ideal. 
Furthermore, narratives of failing families assume a broader social reality as the origin for 
familial strife; the family itself retains a cogent structure and positive value, properties that 
are undermined and dismantled by external pressures rather than internal incoherences. 
 Conversely, inherently damning judgements of the American family provide (on 
face-value) a fundamental challenge to its enduring cultural worth and centrality. Yet, such 
views again solidify the nuclear family’s logocentric foundations, reinforcing positive 
representations as coherent presences against which alternative images are hierarchically 
defined. For example, negative family portrayals are frequently discussed as deviations from 
normative cultural images, a hidden “dark side” defined by the degree to which it differs 
from a homogeneous and idyllic cultural model; thus, idealised family images are retained as 
a norm against which other representative modes are constructed in standardised opposition. 
Furthermore, discrete challenges to familial ideals tacitly recreate their underlying 
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logocentric properties; value judgements are simply reversed, as representational alternatives 
retain pretensions of structural unity, ontological self-identity, and cultural truth. The 
metaphysical properties that abet the construction of the whole(some) nuclear family are not 
dismantled but restated. 
 These preliminary critical appraisals elucidate a discourse replete with simplified, 
dualistic oppositions; a plethora of potential representations are ghettoized into discrete 
positive and negative categories, sustained in an antagonistic opposition of self-identical 
presences. Demos explicitly observes the operational correspondences between seemingly 
divergent familial representations, arguing that positive ideals are joined by an inverse “anti-
image” of the American family, representations that are “opposite faces of the same coin.”59 
In attempting to theorise an effective feminist intervention into nuclear family debates, 
Stacey also notes the simplistic nature of such oppositional conflicts: “we cannot counter the 
flawed, reductionist logic of family-values ideology, however, unless we resist using knee-
jerk, symmetrical responses.”60 Thus, whilst the family may be perceived as a positive or 
negative structure, its integrity and centrality are rarely challenged.61 
Finally, the oppositional tenor of familial discourse has been granted significant 
cultural visibility in recent years due to aforementioned theorisations of a “war over the 
family.” Contextualised within supposedly divergent reactions to social changes in the 1960s 
and 1970s, popular responses to the family have purportedly crystallized into two specific 
camps, commonly cast as “critical” and “neo-traditionalist”; the former hail the breakdown 
of the nuclear family’s “nest of oppression and pathology,” the latter lament the “erosion” of 
the American family as cultural and moral ideal.62 Stacey argues that such formulations 
entrench partisan categories within family discourse, reflected in the antagonistic form of 
related popular debate: “outside the embattled groves of academe, a right-wing profamily 
movement rapidly polarized popular discourse on family change into feminist vs. 
antifeminist, left vs. right, and fundamentalist vs. secular humanist camps.”63 Similarly, 
Christensen accounts for recent familial discourses as a “new kind of civil war,” a cultural 
stand-off he claims is “fracturing America.”64 Thus, whilst numerous texts account for a 
multiplicity of potential familial perspectives, these are frequently accommodated within 
readings of the family as a bifurcated “battleground” between self-identical antagonists; in 
doing so, they reflect a broader “culture wars” rhetoric that dominates discussions of 
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American national identity itself.65 Reading this chapter’s case-study film as a 
deconstructive intervention into this conceptual economy, I demonstrate how textual 
representations of the American family interrogate and dismantle these simplistic, arbitrary 
structural principles. However, before doing so, it is prudent to briefly explore how these 
broad cultural trends have shaped studies and representations of the family in the mass-
media, and in particular, cinema.   
 
Publicising the Private Family 
 
 Sociological and cultural studies scholarship continually reaffirms the significance 
of popular media in framing perceptions of both personal domestic experiences and the 
American family’s socio-cultural centrality. For example, Barrett and McIntosh argue that 
“the media, advertising and popular entertainment” are saturated by “familial ideology,” 
rendering familism a trope that “pervades virtually every cultural genre.”66 Furthermore, 
such readings stress the pre-eminence of specifically positive images as a normative cultural 
baseline;67 historians Stephen Mintz and Susan Kellogg stress the role of cultural artefacts in 
shaping idyllic familial perceptions, with particular emphasis on the aforementioned 
association between nuclear ideals and the 1950s, “the golden age of the American family, a 
reference point against which recent changes in family life can be measured.”68 In turn, 
Farrell argues that the presence of utopian familial representations has endured over a broad 
range of historical and media contexts, providing a shifting but ever-present discourse of 
nuclear veneration.69 Finally, the role of myriad popular forms in mediating and structuring 
broader cultural experiences is reflected in Shapiro’s assertion that “people tend both to live 
in a family and to process information about families from diverse genres – novels, 
television dramas and sitcoms, and feature films, among others.”70 He concludes that media 
families operate as regulatory a priori models, used by Americans to render their own 
cultural experiences intelligible.71          
Whilst televisual representations form the central focus for studies of the family in 
American popular culture,72 significant recent scholarship has analysed cinematic images of 
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domestic structures. Indeed, several theorists have paralleled the development of cinema’s 
narrational, formal, and representational properties with dominant familial paradigms in 
Western culture; Nick Browne asserts that the “development of the cinematic language was, 
from the very start, linked to a particular subject matter. This subject was the family.”73 
Robin Wood expands upon this observation in a specifically American context, positioning 
Hollywood representations of the family “as the projection of a national psyche”: “the 
concept of family – a motif that cuts across all genres in Hollywood cinema, informing and 
structuring westerns, musicals, comedies, gangster films, melodramas alike is obviously 
basic to American ideology.”74 Murray Pomerance similarly argues that the family’s 
presence in all Hollywood genres indicates its cinematic and cultural vitality: “in virtually 
every film family makes some sort of appearance, marginal or central, stated or implied.”75 
Finally, Nina C. Leibman notes that the family offers an enduring theme that has pervaded 
American cinema from the coming of sound to the present day: “the family and its domestic 
anxieties had long been a dominant narrative focus for feature film.”76      
 In turn, studies of cinematic familial representations again stress the role of the 
medium in disseminating (and thus perpetuating) idealised domestic tropes. Returning to 
Pomerance, he notes a tendency for filmic families to be cast as “a glowing paragon to 
behold, an image to which we can in some way aspire.”77 In broad accordance with this 
observation, Harwood intractably links Hollywood cultural representations with the 
perpetuation of certain domestic structures: “reproducing the ideological form of the nuclear 
family always has been the underpinning goal of classical Hollywood cinema.”78 Finally, in 
introducing a study of how the horror genre has subverted idealised family models, Tony 
Williams juxtaposes these generic texts with more widespread utopian representations; in 
Hollywood cinema the family is “generally revered as a positive icon of ‘normal’ human 
society,” accounting for the presence of “normal idealised family images in mainstream 
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American film.”79 Nevertheless, Williams ultimately argues that horror opens up a 
representational space for subversive family portraits, an observation that elucidates 
countervailing representational trends; in such texts the family is not represented as a caring, 
supportive milieu, but rather as a “material cause of horrific events.”80 Similarly, Pomerance 
outlines a series of negative familial depictions that invert normative, nuclear 
representations; these range from 1950s images of the middle-class family as a “seat of 
disease and corruption” to more recent challenges to heteronormative familial structure in 
terms of gender and sexuality.81  
Aforementioned theorisations of the cinematic family as an entity that shifts over a 
range of socio-historical contexts forms the basis of Emanuel Levy’s broad historical study 
of the concept in “New American Cinema.” Embedding a series of distinct familial images 
within a dynamic socio-cultural context, Levy delineates six discrete cycles, each responding 
to “a decisive moment, an ideological shift, in Hollywood and by implication in American 
culture”: these range from “decline of the family in the late 1960s” to “a return to traditional 
family values in the late 1980s,” covering a range of critical (“troubled and tormented” 
families) and “alternative” representations in the interim.82 However, in suggesting that 
diverse images of the family can be mapped onto broader socio-historical trends, Levy 
groups a plethora of films into a reductive series of monolithic, totalising cycles. Rather than 
questioning the integrity of fixed familial representations, this approach constructs a 
chronological succession of equally homogeneous cultural truth claims; furthermore, the 
very discussion of “alternative” familial images defines them as ontological deviations 
within a logocentric opposition with foundational nuclear norms, reinforcing the hierarchical 
authority of the latter.  
 Usefully, several scholars have noted that the suburban nuclear family offers a 
particularly prominent thematic focus and setting within recent independent film. For 
example, Jeffrey Sconce, Peter Hanson, and Jesse Mayshark respectively locate the nuclear 
family as a central preoccupation of “smart,” “Generation X,” and “post-pop” cinema;83 as 
demonstrated in chapter one, each of these groupings incorporates texts that are more 
commonly located within independent film definitions. However, such texts appear 
(superficially, at least) to replicate aforementioned readings of the nuclear family as an 
                                                          
79
 Tony Williams, Hearths of Darkness: The Family in the American Horror Film (London: Fairleigh 
Dickinson University Press, 1996), 13. 
80
 Ibid. 
81
 Pomerance, “Introduction,” 3-4. 
82
 Levy, “The American Dream of Family in Film,” 190. These mirror a similar taxonomy of familial 
images in American popular culture; see Skolnick, Embattled Paradise, 187. 
83
 Jeffrey Sconce, “Irony, Nihilism, and the New American ‘Smart’ Film,” Screen 43, no. 4 (2002): 
358; Peter Hanson, The Cinema of Generation X: a Critical Study of Films and Directors (Jefferson, 
NC: McFarland, 2002), 43; Jesse Fox Mayshark, Post-Pop Cinema: The Search for Meaning in New 
American Film (London: Praeger Publishers, 2007), 9. 
168 
 
essentially fallen locale; case-study films purportedly communicate a “sense of domestic life 
as a nexus of abandonment, alienation, and frustration,”84 casting the family as “crucible of 
miscommunication and emotional dysfunction.”85 Thus, whilst arguing for heightened levels 
of ambiguity, nuance, and irony in their textual representations, prominent analyses of these 
themes in independent cinema largely focus upon unequivocally negative readings of the 
nuclear family as a conflicted, abusive realm.86 
 Despite the metaphysical tenor of these normative scholarly approaches, some 
recent critics have focused more sharply on complexities and contradictions embedded 
within seemingly cogent family formulations.87 Indeed, one recent scholarly work has laid 
the foundation for a more complex, deconstructive engagement with the nuclear family in 
independent film; Claire Perkins’ nuanced expansion of smart retains Sconce’s 
aforementioned focus on American familial representations, contextualised within a wider 
discussion of suburban life. However, Perkins explicitly argues that smart disrupts dualistic 
frameworks that characterise suburban and, by extension, familial discourse: she 
understands her case-study films’ aesthetics “as something that in fact overcomes the 
representation of suburbia as utopian or dystopian.”88 Mobilising a more reflexive notion of 
“anti-utopia” that self-consciously alludes to its utopian opposite, Perkins argues that smart 
textual critiques of the nuclear family exceed simplistic dualistic definition.89 In doing so, 
Perkins attempts a radical challenge to the metaphysical logic of suburban family discourse, 
a theoretical aim to which this thesis wholeheartedly assents. 
 Nevertheless, Perkins’ mobilisation of the anti-utopian genre still appears to 
ultimately portray the family in an essentially negative light; as she suggests, smart texts 
invert “ideal utopian solutions into nightmare possibilities.”90 Indeed, her taxonomic 
description of smart suburban representations bears a striking resemblance to 
aforementioned dystopian renderings: “the comfortable, educated life that suburban-
utopianism imagined is represented as stultifying and destructive, leading only to violence, 
unhappiness and abuse.”91 In doing so, Perkins inaugurates an ontological closure that denies 
her texts overtly deconstructive value, restraining a heterogeneous, generative play of 
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cultural identities; as she notes, these “broadly anti-utopian visions” are “negations that 
don’t reconstruct.” 92 Finally, although she argues that anti-utopian images refer indirectly to 
absent utopian possibilities, she largely ignores the deconstructive ramifications of this 
unsettling co-presence; rather, she appears to treat this phenomenon as a culturally complicit 
projection of a utopian image of the “traditional nuclear set-up.”93 Thus, whilst offering an 
invaluable critique of dualistic family discourses, potential moments of radical 
undecidability are neutralised within a self-coherent (and conventionally negative) reading 
of the nuclear family.94  
 In contrast, a more sustained deconstructive approach can be found in Sobchack’s 
study of the child in horror, science-fiction, and melodrama.95 Again, the family is 
established as an incoherent, divided milieu: “the visual site of horrific attraction and 
repulsion, of utopian wonder and dystopian anxiety, was redirected back toward that 
domestic structure of social relations – the nuclear family.”96 However, in considering 
familial representations in these genres since the 1960s, Sobchack demonstrates that 
bifurcated domestic oppositions have begun to unravel, embodied in the figure of the 
deconstructive child:    
 
Not only has the bourgeois distinction between family members and alien Others, 
between private home and public space, between personal microcosm and 
sociopolitical macrocosm been exposed as a myth, but also the family itself has been 
exposed as a cultural construction, as a set of signifying, as well as significant, 
practices. The family and its members are seen, therefore, as subject to the 
frightening, but potentially liberating, semiotic processes of selection and 
combination – and their order, meaning, and power are perceived as open to 
transformation, dissolution and redefinition.97   
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Sobchack’s generically-specific comments provide a useful jumping-off point for a 
sustained deconstruction of the cinematic nuclear family, an objective realised here through 
a case-study analysis of Happiness (1998). It is important to clarify that such a project 
extends beyond a simplistic overturning of an homogenised, whole(some) cultural image in 
favour of a dystopian alternative, an assumption perceptible in existing critical readings of 
the film. Furthermore, such an approach extends beyond simply defining the family as a 
self-contained milieu of contradiction, mixing a series of distinct, antagonistic elements 
within a bounded domestic space. Rather, representational oppositions are exposed as 
arbitrary forces of cultural regulation, metaphysical frameworks imposed upon a boundless 
freeplay of familial images and meanings. In turn, these categorical monoliths are toppled, 
as textual ruptures and paradoxes expose their foundations as intangible, amorphous, self-
effacing.  
 
Deconstructing the Happiness and Whole(some)ness of the Nuclear Family 
 
“I wish I had your life…Husband, kids, car pool…” These aspirational words, 
uttered by Helen Jordan (Lara Flynn Boyle) to her sister Trish (Cynthia Stevenson), embody 
a familiar familial cliché. However, by the conclusion of Happiness, the much-desired 
nuclear household has been upturned, displaced, and dismantled. Trish’s husband, Dr. Bill 
Maplewood (Dylan Baker), has been exposed as a paedophile, precipitating her (and their 
children’s) flight from the family “nest.” In Happiness’ final scene, Helen promises to find 
Trish a new man, a matchmaking role she assumes for all her family (her other sister, Joy 
[Jane Adams], is single, and her parents, Mona [Louise Lasser] and Lenny [Ben Gazzara], 
are separated). This “landscape of failure,”98 in which stable families appear either 
unobtainable or doomed to disaster, has frequently been cast in dystopian terms; inverting 
the middle-class family’s positive connotations, Happiness superficially represents suburbia 
as “a type of peripheral hell, a moral darkness on the edge of town.”99  
However, upon closer analysis, the film’s representations offer a more complex, 
fundamental critique of the American family as a cultural centre or presence. Rather than 
simply reversing the family’s conventional utopian ontology, Happiness deconstructs this 
polarising dynamic, subverting the tendency to cast familial representations as either wholly 
idyllic or debased. In doing so, Happiness’ domestic settings are inhabited by traces of 
seemingly contradictory elements, values, and meanings; this strategy is embodied within 
the head of the superficially idyllic nuclear household (Bill), who is simultaneously cast as a 
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loving father and violent paedophile. In this manner, the nuclear family is rendered as an 
undecidable milieu of conceptual co-presence, within which potentially paradoxical 
significances are indiscernibly weaved throughout its semiotic structure. In doing so, this 
Derridean gesture challenges the structural closure of any totalised, metaphysical reading of 
the nuclear family, be it positive or negative. 
 
Retelling Happiness and the Utopian/Dystopian American Family 
 
 Described in critical and academic texts as an “episodic”100 or “ensemble” work,101 
Happiness charts the experiences and relationships of seemingly disparate New Jersey 
residents, signifying a broad variety of interpersonal relationships and familial structures. 
Nevertheless, they are drawn together by an overarching familial commonality; they are all 
members, spouses, friends, neighbours, children, workmates, or pupils of a single family, the 
Jordans. Thus, this specific family (parents Mona and Lenny and their adult daughters Joy, 
Trish and Helen) provides a structural core to the film’s multiple narrative arcs, a centre that 
orients and relates each character with one another.102 Whilst relying upon a single family as 
an ordering nexus, the film unfolds through a series of seemingly discrete sequences, each 
focusing specifically on one or two of the film’s numerous figures. Importantly, each 
character’s narrative segments are scattered throughout the film’s broader structure. 
Happiness opens with Joy nervily breaking off a short-lived relationship with Andy (Jon 
Lovitz), who cruelly rescinds a personalised gift he had given her. Soon after, Joy herself is 
shown in tears of guilt, as she is told that Andy has committed suicide. This scene sets the 
tone for many of Joy’s later encounters. She quits her telemarketing job to teach English to 
immigrants, where she meets Vlad (Jared Harris), a self-confessed thief from Russia with 
whom she shares a brief sexual liaison. Just as Joy is failing to achieve a lasting, romantic 
relationship, her parents (Mona and Lenny) are newly separated, although neither will 
formalise this by filing for divorce. Whilst Mona expresses a desire to find someone new at 
the film’s conclusion, she lacks confidence in her chances, remarking that she will now 
require “another fucking facelift!” Although Lenny appears to have a ready-made partner in 
the more stereotypically glamorous Diane (Elizabeth Ashley), he is gripped with malaise and 
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just wants to be left “alone”; although they do have a brief sexual encounter, Lenny finishes 
unsatisfied as he “cannot feel anything.”   
Another of their daughters, Helen, is a critically-acclaimed writer who is bored with 
her work and the opulent lifestyle that goes with it; she fantasizes about being raped as a 
child to provide a real-life justification for her transgressive poetry, which she deems 
fraudulent. She lives down the hall from Allan (Philip Seymour Hoffman), a sexually-
frustrated IT technician who makes obscene phone calls to random women and fantasizes 
about subjecting Helen to violent sexual acts. When he finally locates her in the phone book, 
his sexualised threats appear to be the answer to her malady, but when he arrives at her door 
she is unimpressed with his physical appearance, and asks him to leave. Just as Allan lusts 
after Helen, he is in turn desired by another of his neighbours, Kristina (Camryn Manheim). 
After numerous awkward interactions, they eventually go on a clichéd date, slow-dancing in 
front of a jukebox and eating at a retro diner. However, any potential romance is denied 
when Kristina informs Allan of her repulsion to sexual intercourse. Kristina attributes this to 
a recent traumatic experience, in which she was raped in her own home by the doorman to 
their apartment building; she informs Allan that she broke his neck in self-defence, chopped 
up his body, and now has him stored in her freezer. 
 Whilst these varied narrative threads present seemingly atomised individuals 
incapable of forming coherent domestic groups, there is one further story arc that visualises 
a stable, nuclear family unit. Trish is married to Bill, a professional psychiatrist and father of 
three (Billy [Rufus Read], Timmy [Justin Elvin], and Chloe [Liza Glantzman-Leib]). 
Superficially, the nuclear family provides an idyllic contrast to the tales of social dislocation 
and alienation described above. The film utilises a variety of aesthetic and stylistic devices 
to imbue the Maplewood family home with connotations of positivity and exceptionality, 
portraying their suburban house as a vibrant locale; the Maplewoods reside in a well-lit, 
detached dwelling with a distinct décor of bright colours, replete with signs of familial 
activity and childhood play. Additionally, we are introduced to its constituent members as 
they undertake traditional domestic roles, replicating the gendered division of labour 
associated with American nuclear norms. Trish is introduced in the kitchen, completing 
household tasks; Bill arrives home after fulfilling his role as the family’s breadwinner, and is 
greeted with a kiss by his appreciative wife (Fig.2.1): 
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Fig.2.1 
 
Perceptions of the Maplewood family as a clichéd domestic ideal pervade academic and 
critical readings of Happiness. For example, Greg Tuck suggests that: 
 
On the face of it, the Jordans’ oldest daughter, Trish Maplewood…has the perfect 
upper-middle-class existence with her large house, uniformed maid, three children 
and a husband, Bill Maplewood…who is a successful therapist.103  
 
Thus, as Adam Wadenius summarises, “on the exterior, the Maplewood’s fit the ideal 
patriarchal mould.”104 The individual members of the family have been described in 
similarly positive terms; Chris Chang suggests that “Trish is seemingly the perfect 
homemaker,”105  a judgement that echoes Xan Brooks’ assertion that Bill is “an outwardly 
upstanding suburban dad.”106 Similarly, Mike King judges Trish as the only commendably 
positive character in the piece, describing her as the film’s “touchstone of ‘normalcy.’”107 
However, these idyllic representations are subsequently problematized by a series of 
thematic inversions. Bill, the father, is secretly racked with paedophilic desires; whilst these 
are initially channelled into masturbatory fantasies, he eventually acts upon them, raping two 
of his son’s classmates. Bill is arrested, but not before admitting his actions to his son; he 
tells him that the experiences were “great,” before Billy asks him “would you ever fuck 
me?” Bill’s response is in the negative: “no, I’d jerk off instead.” The final scenes of the 
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Maplewood family depict Trish and the children swiftly fleeing their suburban home; the 
house has been defaced with prurient graffiti, bluntly reading: “SERIAL RAPIST 
PERVERT.”   
In this context, initially utopian renderings of the Maplewood’s family life can be 
read as a “façade,”108 a pleasant surface that obscures a destructive, abusive interior reality. 
Jason Bainbridge reads Happiness as an exemplar of this dualistic cultural logic: 
“(Happiness) presents a veneer of suburban life which it then goes on to soil, particularly 
through the Maplewood family (whose story provides the climax for the film).”109 Similarly, 
Douglas Muzzio and Thomas Halper treat the film’s representation of nuclear family ideals 
as a superficial cover, a semiotic cloaking device observable in a range of 1990s American 
films: “a serene façade often conceals human relationships that fail at everything, except 
breeding shame, guilt, pain…and worse.”110 Thus, in the specific case of Happiness, the film 
follows “the intertwined blighted lives of the members of a contemporary suburban 
family…the film tells sinister stories of alienation, betrayal, humiliation, and perversion.”111 
Finally, Jason Lee firmly links Bill’s transgressive desires to both the local and national 
milieus within which he operates; his abusive tendencies are a product of “his position, his 
lifestyle, and his peculiarly American culture.”112 Thus, whilst such images contrast two 
potentially polarised interpretations of the family, they tend to settle upon a reading of the 
film’s family as ultimately dystopian; positive familial images merely conceal a debased, 
destructive essence.  
In reaching this conclusion, critical readings invert the polarities of familial 
discourse, presenting an unequivocal image of domestic deviance; negative portrayals are 
raised to a position of ontological superiority, a gesture that ensures the retention of 
bifurcated domestic discourses. Whilst Perkins’ aforementioned work on the “suburban 
smart film” ostensibly problematizes discrete representational dualities, she approaches 
Happiness’ cultural environs as a negative “anti-utopia.” Describing the film’s image of 
suburban life as “unflinching,” Perkins contends that Happiness remains “unambiguously 
within” its “nightmare scenario”; as a result, it “(satirises) the original values of suburbia, 
exposing the false assumptions of this specific brand of utopianism.”113 Robert Beuka self-
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consciously unpacks the metaphysical underpinnings of such readings, arguing that negative 
suburban representations merely overturn existing hierarchical binaries. In doing so, he cites 
Happiness as an exemplar of this reductive anti-image; postulating a “continued cultural 
reliance on a restrictive, binary system in defining the suburban milieu,” Beuka argues that 
suburbia tends to be rendered as a “harmonious model of community…or the inversion of 
that dream vision as it appears in any one of a number of recent films set in the suburbs 
(Todd Solondz’s Happiness…etc.)”114 Acts of simplified structural inversion are also 
perceptible in interpretations that focus on the juxtaposition of normal and abnormal family 
portrayals within the film. To provide one prominent example, Stella Bruzzi argues that 
Happiness’ depiction of the father relocates the abnormal as a cultural and textual centre, 
inverting the metaphysical role of the idealised family model: “Happiness offers little sense 
of a normative, safe image of fatherhood. In fact, what Happiness constructs is a mosaic of 
sexual perversity that renders perversity ‘normal’ – simply by virtue of its prevalence.”115 
 Just as aforementioned conceptualisations of a suburban façade engender structural 
antinomies and oppositions, certain readings attempt to subvert this metaphysical economy 
by focusing on the film’s perceived representational ambiguity;116 as Bruzzi suggests, in 
Happiness “there is…a diminished sense of the difference between good and evil.”117 
However, whilst numerous scholars observe countervailing tendencies within the filmic text 
(particularly Bill’s rendering as both “monstrous” and sympathetic),118 they commonly cast 
these as distinct, definable attributes; in such interpretations, Happiness oscillates between 
discrete representational poles, a priori presences that merge and overlap in a manner that 
necessitates their essential theoretical separation. In contrast, whilst Shapiro also describes 
Bill as a morally ambiguous character, he lays the foundations for a more radical “critical, 
semiotic displacement” of “family values.”119 Taking as a subject the seemingly paradoxical 
position of Bill as a supportive father and paedophile, Shapiro argues that “it’s hard to 
dismiss Maplewood as simply a moral monster, because his pedophilia does not exhaust his 
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personality. He also shows great caring and sensitivity as he speaks to his coming-of-age son 
about male sexuality.”120 This contradictory ontological dynamic is described by Shapiro in 
explicitly post-structuralist terms, as a shift in attention “from signified to signifier”: 
“because (Solondz) disrupts the inclination to apply unambiguous moral terms to Dr. 
Maplewood, he turns attention away from Maplewood as an object of scorn and towards the 
discourse of sexual morality.”121 Thus, whilst Shapiro arguably separates Bill’s behaviour 
into discrete caring and abusive modes, he does provide a useful theoretical elucidation of 
Bill’s undecidable subjectivity. However, I contend that this dynamic is not embodied solely 
within the figure of the father, but rather can be discerned as a broader textual principle, 
governing the film’s sustained, subversive engagement with domestic structures. 
Whilst American domesticity is a clear discussion point in critical readings of 
Happiness, very few explicitly focus on how the film reflexively interrogates the structural 
properties of the nuclear family. Furthermore, those few readings that have considered the 
Maplewood home in greater detail have tacitly reinforced the dualistic underpinnings of 
American familial narratives. Emma Wilson provides a rare systematic engagement with the 
film’s representational strategies and how they intervene within broader cultural discourses. 
Again, Happiness is approached as an ambiguous text; noting the viewer’s uncomfortable 
complicity and identification with morally dubious behaviour, Wilson argues that the film 
“(domesticates) the child molester and show(s) him within the range of familiar (and family) 
experience…Happiness takes as its subject the grotesque and pathetic imbrication of 
paedophilia and family dynamics.”122 However, Wilson shifts focus specifically towards 
cinematic ethics and the representation of child abuse; this is achieved through an analysis of 
Happiness’ human “inter-relations” that contextualise paedophilia within American socio-
cultural life. Furthermore, brief observations regarding the film’s “blurred boundaries” again 
signify the encroachment of two countervailing tendencies; whilst child abuse and 
parenthood may “queasily merge,” to do so they must carry within themselves a discernible 
a priori significance.123  This partial retention of reductive binary frames is further 
reinforced by the film’s perceived respect for “the excessive horror of its subject.”124 
Discerning a textual rejection of “equivocal values,” Wilson argues that Happiness 
“represents a more generic suburbia, a filmic cliché re-presented and a dystopic space of 
home, childhood and domesticity”;125 ultimately, challenges to fixed familial significances 
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are cast as coherently dystopian. The structural values of the nuclear family are not 
displaced, but rather simplistically reversed, a deconstructive precursor that is never 
followed through. 
Radicalising these existing readings, I argue that Happiness provides a sustained, 
destructive engagement with the American nuclear family and its perceived cultural 
centrality. To begin, this analysis demonstrates how Happiness superficially figures the 
family’s position as a conceptual core, providing a normative model against which other 
characters and social arrangements are initially compared. However, the family is 
subsequently displaced from this position of textual and cultural centrality; it is rendered 
simultaneously a kernel of presence and absence, a hauntological paradox abetted by the 
film’s simultaneous representation and occlusion of scenes of child rape. Finally, the film 
disrupts the simplistic utopian/dystopian binary opposition frequently associated with 
cinematic and cultural images of the American family. Rather than reading Bill as a figure 
who embodies conflicting abusive and caring tendencies, these are treated as potential 
significances that can be simultaneously attributed to a variety of his actions; this radical 
undecidability ruptures existing oppositional frames, constructing the Maplewood father as a 
textual fissure who exceeds and destabilises antonymic structural totalities. Finally, this 
deconstructive aesthetic is discerned in a wider variety of the film’s familial elements, 
demonstrating how the domestic milieu itself subverts the metaphysical certainties upon 
which the nuclear family is founded.  
 
Constructing the Maplewood Family as a Cultural Centre 
 
Happiness’ engagement with familial discourse can be initially discerned by the 
pervasive presence of domestic settings throughout the text. We are shown a wide variety of 
households, a multiplicity of homes for the film’s large ensemble of characters: Bill and 
Trish’s suburban nuclear household; Mona and Lenny’s retirement condo in Florida; Joy’s 
house (belonging to her parents); Christina, Helen, and Allan’s apartments; the flat Mona is 
shown around by an estate agent; the apartment belonging to Vlad and his significant other; 
the Grasso family home. Each of these settings appears intractably tied to its inhabitants, 
providing a plethora of potential biographical details; indeed, several of these figures (such 
as Lenny, Helen, and Trish) spend the vast majority of their on-screen time rooted in their 
specific household environments. Furthermore, as suggested earlier, the use of the Jordan 
family as an ordering structure embeds American family centrality within the film’s 
narrative premise; each character shown on screen interacts (either directly or indirectly) 
with at least one member of the Jordan clan. 
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Despite the variety of domestic settings listed above, Happiness reflexively 
privileges the nuclear family as an idyllic, aspirational cultural model against which all other 
social forms are defined. This textual hierarchy is highlighted by the manner with which 
Trish and Bill’s familial life is explicitly constructed as an exemplary social arrangement 
against which the other sisters compare their own lives unfavourably. After breaking down 
during a conversation about her upsetting personal circumstances, Joy suggests that she is at 
her most content when visiting Trish’s domestic milieu: “I’m so happy…yeah, I mean, being 
around you and the kids.” However, this comment belies a comparative discordance between 
Joy’s own arrangements and her sister’s; it is implied that she is really lamenting her own 
failure to emulate Trish’s model existence. This antagonistic juxtaposition is reinforced by 
the visual representation of the sisters’ kitchen conversation. The camera centres on the 
table, with the two sisters facing each other; an invisible dividing line places Trish, her dog 
and child on one side of the frame, all looking in the same direction, while Joy is isolated on 
the other (Fig.2.2):   
 
 
Fig.2.2 
 
Similarly, in the quote that opened this analysis, Helen tells Trish over dinner that 
she envies her suburban domestic lifestyle, despite Helen’s own artistic, financial, and 
sexual successes. Trish also narcissistically contrasts her own situation with her siblings’, 
lamenting their inability to form their own nuclear families; talking to Bill about Joy’s 
increasingly depressive state, Trish remarks “I’m concerned. She’s not like me, she doesn’t 
have it all.” Finally, when Mona decides to move out of her and Lenny’s apartment, an 
estate agent interrogates her regarding her personal circumstances, unwittingly reciting a 
checklist of nuclear family components that she no longer possesses; tellingly, these could 
accurately provide a taxonomic description of the Maplewood family as it is depicted at the 
film’s beginnings. Asking whether she will be living with her husband, her kids, or any pets, 
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Mona answers each query negatively; the estate agent concludes by insensitively stating 
“just you alone, all by yourself.” The effect of these interchanges extends beyond the simple 
signification of the family as an idealised cultural image. In the act of comparison, it is 
positioned as an exemplary social model, a static centre against which other domestic forms 
are unfavourably defined.  
Additionally, aforementioned discussions of the film’s episodic structure establish a 
narrative framework that alludes to prominent televisual representations of nuclear family 
life. For Niall Richardson, Happiness is a product of Todd Solondz’s “televisual cinema”; 
the film evokes medium-specific formal properties through, amongst other things, “a focus 
on domestic settings.”126 Furthermore, Chang notes the film’s focus on “suburban angst and 
familial pain,” suggesting these provide a thematic correspondence with negative family 
portrayals in TV sitcoms.127 Finally, Wilson suggests that Happiness adopts an unobtrusive 
cinematographic style, upbeat music, and suburban settings partly as a means of replicating 
the stylistic properties of “American sitcoms,” a televisual form she refers to as “an ironic 
point of reference.”128 Familial pre-eminence is thus reinforced through a web of intertextual 
references, replicating formal properties frequently associated with more widespread media 
representations of the American nuclear household.  
 Furthermore, Happiness solidifies images of the family-as-centre by replicating 
prominent forms of nuclear household representation, achieved through the recurrence of 
totalising textual tropes. For example, Happiness’ evocation of nuclear family 
whole(some)ness is figured by periodic representations of the familial group at the dining 
table. Such images symbolise familial fullness through their aesthetic composition; these 
scenes are initially framed from a medium or long shot, allowing the family to be established 
as both unified and symmetrical (Figs.2.3-2.4):   
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Figs.2.3-2.4 
 
These representational strategies cogently communicate a set of structural assumptions 
embedded within normative familial discourses; the Maplewoods are shown as an internally-
consistent social unit with static boundaries and, accordingly, a fixed, essential meaning. 
The dinner table is not the only representational structure used to foreground images of the 
Maplewoods as a totalised cultural entity. Additionally, Happiness includes a lingering shot 
of a family portrait, an image that is juxtaposed with an act of shocking child abuse; it fills 
the screen moments after Bill has drugged Johnny (Evan Silverberg), who he proceeds to 
rape (Fig.2.5):  
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Fig.2.5 
 
Wilson perceptively notes that the presence of the photograph is mirrored in some of the 
film’s formal properties. The predominant use of a static camera, “simple cuts” and a 
“straightforward” mise-en-scène can themselves be read as allusions to “the aesthetic of 
family photography”; in turn, the family portrait is established as “a space of renegotiation 
of family history and of ideals of the family as structure.”129 As a result, this formal and 
thematic correspondence also positions the American family as a self-contained centre of 
cultural orientation. As Wilson concludes: 
 
Solondz’s use and abuse of the structure and image, both literally and in his still 
mise-en-scène, work to signal the ways in which the family is central to his analysis 
of contemporary interrelations and the ways fractures in the structure of the family 
will be figured in the form as well as the content of his films.130 
 
This observation neatly reinforces earlier allusions to familial unity, plenitude, and presence. 
Happiness continually imbues the nuclear household with the properties of the metaphysical 
centre; this illusory self-coherence is then undermined through deconstructive textual 
strategies.  
 
Decentering Nuclear Family Narratives 
 
Just as Happiness introduces a seemingly self-coherent image of family 
whole(some)ness, the solidity of this idealised structural paradigm is fundamentally shaken. 
Principally, a deconstructive dynamic can be discerned in the film’s signification (but then 
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displacement) of the suburban family as a literal centre to Happiness’ narrative events. As 
suggested earlier, the film’s ensemble structure necessitates consistent cutting between 
different domestic milieus and subjects, constituting a formally episodic text that avoids 
focusing on a single protagonist or setting. Yet, numerous critics have reaffirmed the 
heightened centrality of the Maplewoods to the film’s unfolding story, arguing that the 
inhabitants of the nuclear family (and specifically, Bill) form Happiness’ clearest narrative 
emphasis; Brooks exemplifies this reading in his assertion that “at the heart of Solondz’s 
intersecting train-wreck of lifelines sits psychiatrist Bill…an outwardly upstanding suburban 
dad who masturbates to pre-teen magazines and romps off in dogged pursuit of his son’s 
classmates.”131 Similarly, King locates Bill as the film’s core obsession, an observation that 
simultaneously ties him to discourses of American identity and locates him as a monstrous 
figure: “the central character of Happiness (Bill) is perhaps the sickest product of the 
madness of the American mind.”132 Thus, specific members of the Maplewood clan are 
consistently forwarded as the film’s central protagonists, reinforcing the perceived pre-
eminence of the nuclear family unit to which they belong. 
Furthermore, one of the longest unbroken sequences featuring a spatio-temporally 
contiguous location and cast revolves around the planning, unfolding, and aftermath of 
Johnny’s assault in the Maplewood family home; we are shown Bill’s introduction to Johnny 
at a “little league” baseball game, Johnny’s sleepover with Billy, Bill’s implied assault on 
Johnny, Bill and Trish waking up the morning after, Johnny’s sickness at the breakfast table, 
his journey home, and finally a father-son discussion between Bill and Billy. This whole 
sequence lasts over 12 minutes, and concludes almost halfway through the film’s total pre-
credit runtime; in this regard, it can be approached as a functional narrative centre-point. 
Furthermore, the sequence appears to fulfil the centre’s role as a node of structural 
organisation; the events build upon character behaviour and trends instigated in the film’s 
opening scenes, and initiates a number of interrelated narrative threads that converge at the 
text’s conclusion. Firstly, Bill’s actions materialise his previously latent paedophilic desires; 
in earlier scenes he is shown masturbating to a boy’s magazine, and possible abusive 
intentions are foreshadowed when he offers to show Billy how to do the same. Similarly, 
Bill’s assault of Johnny directly precipitates his arrest and the eventual breakdown of the 
family unit; in the film’s final scene he is conspicuous by his absence at the table, as the 
Jordan family eat lunch.  
However, the sequence’s role as a fixed narrative centre fractures when put under 
close stylistic and aesthetic scrutiny. Whilst Bill’s assault is undoubtedly positioned as a 
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significant narrative event, it is already inhabited by an elliptical absence. Johnny’s rape acts 
as both an origin and culmination of plotlines weaved throughout the broader structure of the 
film, yet is signified primarily by textual occlusion. After Bill drugs Johnny (and his own 
family) there is a sharp fade to black, a transition that is held for a number of seconds. As a 
result, the sexual assault is only heavily implied, and is never directly shown. This erasure of 
Johnny’s (and later, Ronald’s) assault has been commented on by numerous academic 
critics; the viewer is “forced to imagine what happens next,”133 as the act is replaced by an 
“ominous fade to black.”134 Additionally, the film’s removal of the abusive moment 
becomes a central preoccupation for Wilson; discussing the two instances of paedophilic 
assault in Happiness, she suggests that “two fades, or elisions, mark the point of the film’s 
refusal to represent.”135 Thus, Wilson positions these aesthetic ruptures as a constituent of 
the film’s broader interrogation of child abuse’s representational ethics. In leaving the rape 
invisible, “the film avoids reproducing images which can themselves be mishandled”; 
paedophilic acts are established as “the unseeable and unsayable.”136 Yet, later narrative 
developments draw attention to that which escapes visual representation; “these two 
scenarios of abuse are missing from the film visually, yet they structure its affect and 
determine its outrage.”137 Johnny is sick the next morning, and after closer medical 
inspection is instructed to recount what happened. He is unable to fulfil this request, 
answering “no” when asked whether someone has hurt him; this response prompts his father 
(Dan Moran) to scream “what do you mean no? You’ve been fucking raped!” Furthermore, 
Bill eventually discusses his actions with his son; by this point he has raped another of his 
classmates, an act which is again rendered by an elliptical cut. After this, Bill is arrested, an 
event that again occurs off-screen; the police are shown arriving at the Maplewood home, 
before the film cuts to another, unrelated shot.   
Wilson reads this process as an occlusion of that which is repressed and cannot be 
“assimilated” into the “surface world of the Maplewoods’ family reality.”138 Conversely, it 
can be argued that the act itself constitutes a textual aporia that challenges not only the 
representability of sexual abuse, but also the centrality and coherence of the American 
family; as the act occurs within the domestic realm, it is not only the rape that is effaced, but 
also the nuclear household within which it is perpetrated. The act of child sex abuse 
positions the family as a significant narrative core, yet it also obliterates the metaphysical 
unity of the nuclear household; Trish, Billy, Timmy, and Chloe are figuratively erased, 
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rendered unconscious by spiked chocolate fudge sundaes. Thus, the assault of Johnny 
embodies an ontological paradox observed by Derrida in his critique of the metaphysical 
centre; it is simultaneously present and absent, inside and outside the structure: 
 
The center is at the center of the totality, and yet, since the center does not belong to 
the totality (is not part of the totality), the totality has its center elsewhere. The 
center is not the center.139 
 
This epistemological contradiction is replicated in the aforementioned representation of the 
Maplewood and Jordan families at the film’s conclusion, set six months later. Here, the 
families are shown, but Bill is conspicuous by his absence. Importantly, Bill’s occlusion 
from the family unit amounts to a further act of microcosmic dislocation. As has been 
mentioned earlier, critical readings have explicitly established Bill as an initial centre-point 
of the Maplewood family structure; Lee describes him as “the ultimate patriarchal authority, 
a pillar of the community, a PTA man, a father, and a psychotherapist.”140 Thus, just as the 
nuclear family is displaced as a narrative centre, Bill is displaced as a patriarchal centre to 
the family itself; his absence is signified by the presence of an empty chair. Whilst this gap 
has a narrative motivation (Billy is away from the table, voyeuristically watching a woman 
by the pool), it provides a figurative contrast to the film’s aforementioned use of the full 
table setting as a denotation of nuclear family wholeness (Fig.2.6):   
 
 
Fig.2.6 
 
The displacement of the nuclear family as a narratological centre is mirrored by the eventual 
occlusion of the family’s own structural centre-point, a missing father who is highlighted in 
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the very process of his own omission. Thus, the decentering of the Maplewood family 
precipitates a figurative critique that obliterates the solidity of the nuclear family as a static 
centre of American national identity.141    
 
Deconstructing Dualistic Family Images 
 
 As suggested in introducing this analysis, one can read Bill as a deconstructive 
figure, connoting seemingly contradictory values and meanings from his myriad behaviours. 
However, unlike existing readings of the film, I do not treat this tendency as a neat, discrete 
splitting of the subject into two conflicting halves, one monstrous, one fatherly. Rather, the 
character’s actions can be simultaneously read as caring and abusive, deviant and normal. 
This conceptual co-presence closely resembles Derrida’s aforementioned discussion of 
“undecidables,” which he refers to as “unities of simulacrum, ‘false’ verbal properties…that 
can no longer be included within philosophical (binary) opposition, but which, however, 
inhabit philosophical opposition, resisting and disorganizing it.”142 Thus, the undecidable 
inhabits metaphysical dichotomies, yet challenges their bifurcated economy by transgressing 
the strict delineation of the two terms that the dualism regulates; it exhibits a radical logic of 
“Neither/nor, that is simultaneously either or.”143 Exemplifying this deconstructive concept, 
Bill exceeds (and thus) escapes the oppositional categories of familial discourse as an 
undecidable textual fissure, a filmic element that elucidates the arbitrary, reductive nature of 
this specific binary model. In doing so, Bill typifies a broader strategy discernible within the 
text’s representations of the nuclear family as a whole; a variety of familial images, icons, 
and elements can be simultaneously read in seemingly paradoxical fashions, rejecting 
assimilation into utopian/dystopian familial frames.     
As alluded to by Shapiro, the most prominent example of this deconstructive textual 
strategy can be discerned in the numerous interactions between Bill and his eldest son. To 
begin, these sequences have frequently been treated as an ironic reference to earlier media 
portrayals of “father-son talks,” specifically evoking 1950s family sitcoms; Brooks casts 
them as “a paedophilic pastiche of the father-son chats in Leave it to Beaver.”144 Established 
in their first discussion, Billy’s narrative arc focuses on his growing concerns about sexual 
development, centred on his inability to ejaculate. On face value, Bill is reasonably 
successful in assuaging his son’s angst; he debunks Billy’s classmates’ fictitious boasts, and 
reassures him that “you’ll come, one day.” Furthermore, the overtly sexualised nature of the 
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exchanges does not itself render his behaviour deviant; as Wilson points out, they can also 
be read as elaborations of a traditional paternal role: “Another side of adult/child sexual 
negotiations is the parent’s responsibility to offer some reasonable sexual education to the 
child.”145 Furthermore, the manner in which Bill responds to Billy’s sexualised questions 
does not appear aggressively predatory; again, as Wilson notes:  
 
The film avoids any sexualisation of the visual presentation of the scenes…. Despite 
the film’s black humour manifested in the matter of fact tone of Bill’s patient 
questions and answers with Billy, the exchanges still belie his excess sexuality.146  
 
Thus, whilst the initial sequences display a pre-adolescent child in conversation with a sex 
offender, they can also be read as an expression of a caring, fatherly function normalised 
within the nuclear family. 
However, as these discussions cannot be separated from the paedophilic context 
within which Bill is introduced, they also signify paradoxical connotations of danger and 
abuse. For example, whilst Bill fulfils a paternal role in divulging sexual information, he 
extends his instruction to offers of demonstrative sexual touching. When Billy informs him 
that he does not know how to masturbate, Bill offers to show him how; similarly, when Billy 
reveals insecurities about the size of his genitalia, his father asks to measure his penis. As 
Wadenius argues, such gestures exceed an acceptable platonic intimacy, as Bill “violates the 
borders of responsible fathering”;147 these references to sexual abuse are reinforced by the 
pair’s final chat, in which Bill admits to his son that he raped his two classmates. Thus, the 
pair’s recurring conversations elude a simplistic definition as either caring or abusive, 
normal or abnormal; furthermore, they do not appear to contain discretely caring and 
abusive elements. Rather, these oppositional interpretations are cast as co-present 
possibilities, an undecidable textual logic that fatally compromises any discrete difference 
between antonymic familial images. 
Corresponding representations of other actions further elucidate conflicting 
connotations of care and abuse attached to Bill’s fatherly behaviour. For example, after 
drugging his family in preparation for Johnny’s rape, Bill carries the comatose Billy up to 
his room; here, he tucks his son in, checking that he is asleep (Fig.2.7): 
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Fig.2.7 
 
Evidently, this action is directly motivated by and precipitates a deplorable act of abuse. 
However, it also visually evokes an idealised image of fatherhood: “tucking in” his son so as 
to ensure his comfort as he sleeps, Bill’s behaviour also resembles one of the father’s most 
sentimentalised caring duties. Furthermore, after a later abusive act, Bill is again shown at 
Billy’s bedside, counselling his troubled son; Billy is awake, and shares with his father that 
he nearly achieved his central narrative goal, ejaculation (Fig.2.8): 
 
    
Fig.2.8 
 
Here, an oppositional difference of caring and abusive behaviour is rendered structurally 
insufficient; Bill’s fatherly actions cannot be neatly accommodated into this binary structure 
as it simultaneously connotes self-contradictory values. 
Happiness reinforces this co-presence of divergent connotations by signifying a 
series of textual repetitions, each presenting a specific mode of character behaviour or family 
icon in both positive and negative lights. To begin, the aforementioned representation of the 
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Maplewood family dining table can be read as a key elaboration of semiotic undecidability. 
As demonstrated earlier, the family’s dining room superficially operates as a metaphor for 
nuclear family wholeness, an assumed structural totality that underlies any essentialist 
representation. However, in figuring ontological solidity, it is also rendered a location of 
potentially conflicting meanings, as it is depicted in both positive and negative contexts. As 
knowledge of Bill’s guilt is slowly uncovered, the representation of the family changes from 
one of close, communicative intimacy to one of silent estrangement; each member is 
hunched over their meals, eating in silence. Whilst the characters’ body language conveys 
the differing moods of the two scenes (the children now sit further away from Bill), the 
setting is framed in a similar manner, established in long shot. Thus, whilst the mise-en-
scène reproduces this setting’s essential structural form, it is again granted seemingly 
opposed significances. Furthermore, the film’s strategy of showing the same signifier in 
positive and negative lights is figured literally by the shifting ambiences of the two images; 
the former scenes are evenly lit (Fig.2.3-2.4), whereas the latter has Bill’s figure casting a 
dark shadow over his domestic counterparts (Fig.2.9): 
 
 
Fig.2.9 
     
 Finally, a recurring textual undecidability is also embodied by an edition of “Kool,” 
a pre-teen magazine that is presented in two startlingly different contexts. We are first 
introduced to the magazine when it is purchased by Bill at a petrol station; he returns to his 
car and uses it as a masturbatory aid. However, later in the film we are shown the magazine 
again, this time in his son Billy’s bedroom (it is unclear whether this is the same artefact or 
another copy). Thus, the magazine connotes two seemingly opposed values; whilst it is a 
symbol of impending abuse when placed in Bill’s hands, it also functions as a signifier of 
Billy’s childhood innocence (Figs.2.10-2.12): 
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Figs.2.10-2.12 
 
Indeed, the fact that this magazine can be symbolically read in different fashions is 
reinforced by the conflicting ways in which it is literally read by these two characters. For 
Billy, it is an age-specific text providing suitable entertainment and information. Conversely, 
Bill approaches it as an object of desire, a stimulus for masturbation. Thus, the possibility of 
applying different reading strategies to a single text is embodied by “Kool’s” position as a 
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paradoxical cultural form. The conflicting familial values that can be projected onto the 
magazine are mirrored by the different meanings that characters inscribe onto its pages.  
  
Conclusions  
 
In the analysis above, Happiness offers a sustained textual challenge to the nuclear 
family’s assumed role as a self-identical origin and centre of American national culture. 
Thus, whilst the film initially signifies a clichéd representation of familial whole(some)ness, 
images of idyllic nuclear norms are confronted with a twofold deconstructive re-imaging. 
Firstly, the film provides a critique of the metaphysical centre that operates on numerous 
textual and thematic levels; the cultural centrality and coherence of the nuclear family is 
erased as it is cast as an absent centre for the film’s narrative structure, a process mirrored by 
Bill’s displacement as the patriarchal centre of the family itself. Secondly, this implicit 
challenge to familial integrity is expanded upon by an undecidable textual logic that calls 
into question the solidity of discrete domestic images. The common representational division 
of utopian or dystopian families is effaced, as readings of the Maplewood family as idealised 
and debased, caring and abusive become textually indiscernable.  
Therefore, a number of domestic actions, icons, and settings are imbued with 
contradictory significations, disrupting the logocentric status of fixed familial 
representations (positive or negative) as well as their positioning as discrete, oppositional 
antinomies. To cite a prominent deconstructive elucidation from Derrida’s own oeuvre, the 
radical co-presence of paradoxical connotations lays bare the status of any binary opposition 
as a metaphysical reduction, a process that is violent, arbitrary, and always incomplete; each 
one of Happiness’ undecidable familial elements “is something which escapes these 
concepts…” (the “concepts” here being discrete positive and negative familial 
representations) “…and certainly precedes them – probably as the condition of their 
possibility.”148 Representations of the nuclear family in Happiness exceed a strict dualistic 
economy of utopia and dystopia, motioning towards an originary différance that pre-exists 
(and makes possible) these bifurcated presences. Thus, one cannot theorise the Maplewood’s 
domestic realm as a site that accommodates and mediates conflicting (yet ontologically 
stable) elements and categories. Rather, the very act of framing the American family in 
discrete, oppositional terms is called into question; any attempt to furnish the nuclear unit (or 
any of its constituent elements) with a legible, essential significance is undermined by traces 
of potentially paradoxical connotations. 
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This Derridean logic is demonstrated in one final figurative image, returning us to 
the site of Johnny’s assault: the nuclear family home. In his frantic attempts to sedate the 
child, Bill laces a tuna sandwich with a date-rape drug. As the malevolent substance mixes 
with the sandwich’s viscous filling, it can no longer be discerned as separate from the 
foodstuff in which it is contained, visualising a contamination of paradoxical, co-present 
traces; it is rendered simultaneously as sustenance and threat, care and abuse, dismantling 
the oppositional difference between these categories. In doing so, this object embodies 
ontological properties that align it closely with Derrida’s deconstructive interpretation of the 
pharmakon, which he argues is roughly analogous to his theorisation of the trace.149 
Derrida’s subversive re-reading of Plato establishes the pharmakon as an entity that 
embodies seemingly paradoxical attributes; it as “at once medicine and poison…a ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ drug”;150 in Dissemination, he notes that:  
 
When a word inscribes itself as the citation of another sense of the same word, when 
the textual center-stage of the word pharmakon, even while it means remedy, cites, 
re-cites, and makes legible that which in the same word signifies, in another spot 
and on a different level of the stage, poison.151 
 
In the passage above, Derrida demonstrates the undecidable logic at work in Happiness’ 
rendering of the nuclear family. Opposed significances do not coexist discretely alongside 
one another but reside “in the same word” (or element); furthermore, to deny either of these 
paradoxical potentialities amounts to a gesture of metaphysical reduction. Ultimately, this 
radical form of conceptual co-presence is evidenced in the child’s response to the tuna 
sandwich; whilst it allows Bill to sexually violate him, Johnny also describes it as “really 
good”; similarly, whilst Trish’s drugging is a symptom of an abusive act that will tear her 
family to pieces, she (unwittingly) remarks “I haven’t slept so well in so long.” Precipitating 
the co-presence of a positive reaction and a catastrophic consequence, this single element 
exemplifies an undecidable Derridean economy; this conceptual logic underlies Happiness’ 
deconstructive engagement with the American nuclear family. 
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Chapter Four – Decentering the Heartland: Revisiting the 
American Small-Town 
 
The Small-Town as a Geographical and Cultural Centre 
 
“The history of a nation is only the history of its villages written large.” Ima 
Honaker Herron begins her influential study of The Small-Town in American Literature with 
this quote from former US president Woodrow Wilson, who constructs the American small-
town as a socio-cultural microcosm.1 Pronouncements like Wilson’s demonstrate key 
ontological links between national identity and everyday rationalisations of American 
existence; local communities (described as small cities, villages, or most commonly, small-
towns)2 appear intractably tied to broader constructions of a shared national character. As a 
result, images of the American small-town have been understood by scholars as enduring 
narrativisations of a shared national culture, cementing the small-town’s position as one of 
“the most powerful, persistent, and pervasive myths shaping many Americans’ sense of their 
past and national identity.”3 Thus, whilst representing a limited social scale, the small-town 
operates as an index or reflection of broader cultural values or experiences; it purportedly 
encapsulates either a core set of national norms, or else typifies a shared American socio-
cultural reality.  
These interrelated assumptions are often granted a specific figurative significance 
within academic discourse. Although numerous critics stress the heterogeneity of American 
towns and their popular representation, such readings still return to a foundational 
assumption regarding the small-town that vindicates their continued study. Herron notes in 
her account of the literary town that despite significant regional variations, “all of these 
towns are American, bound together by something strangely homogenous.”4 Thus, described 
as a “truly American place,” the small-town’s heterogeneous renderings are not considered a 
sign of cultural fragmentation, but rather a symptom of the town’s pervasive relationship 
with “so many cogent ideas fundamental in our culture.”5 Just as the small-town assumes a 
normalising role in shaping and articulating individual American experiences, it is 
                                                          
1
 Woodrow Wilson, quoted in Herron, The Small-town in American Literature, xiii. 
2
 Ima Honaker Herron, The Small Town in American Literature (New York: Haskell House 
Publishers, 1971), xiii, 3. 
3
 Jane Marie Pedersen, Between Memory and Reality: Family and Community in Rural Wisconsin, 
1870-1970 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992), 3; quoted in Lyn Christine MacGregor, 
Habits of the Heartland: Small-Town Life in Modern America (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
2010), 6. 
4
 Herron, The Small-town in American Literature, 3. 
5
 Ima Honaker Herron, “Changing Images of the American Small Town - Fair Verna to Peyton 
Place,” English Journal 47, no. 9 (1958): 538. 
193 
 
metaphorically positioned as the very locus of a shared, cohesive national culture. Whether 
described as a centre, heartland, or as the residence of Middle America,6 the small-town’s 
dual role as location and cultural narrative is reflected in its conceptual (and geographical) 
positioning.  
Constructions of the small-town as a cultural centre can be discerned in countless 
sociological, historical, and literary texts. Max Lerner suggests that the size of the small-
town ensures an inextricable relationship with core American values, a reading he bases 
upon histories of demographic development: “the American place started with small 
population units…traditionally, the small-town has been held to embody the American spirit 
better than the larger frame.”7 Don Martindale and Russell Galen Hanson identify this 
traditional view of small-town pre-eminence within early social science studies of American 
community, describing orthodox readings of the location “as the permanent and 
unchallengeable heart of American life.”8 Here, Martindale and Hanson make explicit the 
key constitutive role played by academic readings in solidifying images of the small-town as 
a cultural core. This trend is exemplified by Robert and Helen Lynd’s 1929 study of Muncie, 
Indiana; often lauded as the formative sociological illustration of small-town life, it is 
significant that the pseudonym they chose for the settlement was “Middletown.”9   
Despite suggestions that small-town centrality has waned over time, a more recent 
study by Rob Kroes notes persistent perspectives that locate it at the very core of an 
American “sense of self.” Punning on the phrase “dead center” (as an exact and deceased 
locus), Kroes demonstrates a general paradigmatic shift (or “decentering,”) drawing 
scholarly attention away from the town and towards the study of “borderlands” and “blurred 
identities.”10  Nevertheless, Kroes admits that the town’s wider socio-cultural centrality is 
harder to extinguish: “the center refuses to give, and so does the small-town. It is always 
there, as so many places on the map, as so many remembered Americas, as so many points 
linking Americans to an America as they feel it.”11 A similar understanding of the town as 
an ahistorical, transcendental presence is expressively elucidated in Richard R. Lingeman’s 
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history of the small-town in American culture. Discussing Thornton Wilder’s play Our Town 
(1938), Lingeman approaches the text’s “archetypal New England small town” setting as a 
concrete, static centre, embodying and condensing American ideals: 
  
Not only was this little town timeless, a synecdoche for the universal experiences of 
mankind; it was also located at the center of a stable cosmos, like the ancient 
astronomers had located the earth in the center of the solar system.12  
 
Thus, positioning the town as a locus of human experience, Lingeman reifies 
aforementioned constructions of American national identity as a metaphysical cultural 
nexus. Theorisations of the town as a socio-cultural foundation are reiterated by Walter 
Hölbling in his study of Mid-West settlements in American literature; despite regional 
variations, the small-town is still treated as “the true base of the great American society,” a 
foundation of core beliefs and values upon which a broader American character is 
constructed.13 Again, Lingeman argues that it is the small-town’s centrality that ensures its 
pop-culture persistence; whether it is accepted as a model for contemporary American 
experience, he argues that it still serves a “relevant cultural need,” as a durable figurative 
anchor that cannot be erased regardless of socio-economic context.14 Conversely, 
sociological studies that perceive a contemporary “marginalisation” of the small-town base 
their conclusions upon the assumption that it once constituted an effective cultural centre; 
Richard O. Davies’ assertion that the town has recently been “shunted to the margins of 
national life” alludes to its original, a priori ontology as America’s heartland.15 Thus, 
whether endorsing or challenging the pre-eminence of the small-town in contemporary 
cultural discourse, myriad approaches perpetuate its foundational function as a singular heart 
of American national culture.  
Readings of the small-town as a fixed cultural centre-point tacitly reinforce the 
assumed self-coherence and concreteness of the identities and meanings it connotes. As a 
result, it can be argued that the small-town fulfils structural functions commonly proscribed 
to the metaphysical “centre”; these logocentric attributes, and their critique within Derridean 
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thought, have already been discussed at length in the previous chapter’s analysis of the 
nuclear family. Indeed, the American family and small-town’s shared status as a nexus of 
national being is reinforced by a series of perceptive discursive correspondences. For 
example, in D.W Meinig’s exploration of “symbolic landscapes” he outlines a series of 
positive, wholesome small-town associations that closely mirror idyllic constructions of the 
family, which he subsequently erects as a centre of American community: “the image of the 
New England village is widely assumed to symbolize for many people the best we have 
known of an intimate, family-centered, Godfearing, morally conscious, industrious, thrifty, 
democratic community.”16 Furthermore, in Kenneth MacKinnon’s study of Hollywood’s 
Small Towns, he notes a tripartite figurative economy that intractably links the two cultural 
narratives to broader constructions of American national identity. Thus, the American 
family, small-town, and nation are shown to evoke similar collective identities on ever-
increasing conceptual scales: 
 
A similar appeal to an ideal Small Town is made at a higher or wider level in these 
melodramas, and, as we shall see, in many others, so that at first glance it could 
appear that there might be a case for seeing the small town itself as macrocosm 
(standing for a still greater macrocosm, the United States) to the microcosm of the 
small-town family.17   
 
Thus, in treating the nuclear family and small-town as harmonised figurations of national 
wholeness, their potential treatment as complementary cultural centres are reinforced; 
furthermore, in basing this equity around logocentric structural principles, their role in 
constituting a metaphysics of American identity is illustrated. 
In introducing this chapter I argue that treatments of the small-town as a fixed, rigid 
centre have been used to normalise specific, self-coherent constructions of the small-town in 
American culture. Most prominently, popular and scholarly accounts of the small-town have 
probed links between the location and certain socio-cultural concepts, hypothesising the 
universality of specific American virtues: community, local democracy, and “face to face 
relations.”18 For many, the town provides an eternal space within which core, enduring 
national values structure everyday existence, their essential, fixed position within American 
culture perfectly realised. Thus, whilst American sociologists have hypothesised a “decline 
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of the small-town” in post-war American life, this only reaffirms the location’s position as 
the site of an idyllic cultural uniformity.19 This tension between the ideal and actual, in 
which a perfect, homogenised small-town model is contrasted with a flawed, fallen social 
reality still unproblematically grants the town a coherent, idyllic significance; the town is 
established as a fixed archetype with which more authentic, debased representations can be 
compared. Thus, regardless of historical and economic shifts, many continue to locate the 
unambiguous essence of American identity (whether literal or metaphoric) within the small-
town’s tree-lined streets. 
 However, the second section of this introduction focuses more clearly on recent 
challenges to the national centrality of a bucolic small-town model. Numerous 
commentators (critical, popular, and artistic) have accounted for conflicting small-town 
representations, highlighting the potential for antonymic readings of the town as a setting 
that is “emotionally stifling, intellectually suffocating and sexually repressive.”20 The 
possibility of paradoxical small-town images is particularly important to recent studies of the 
geographical setting within American cinema. Both Emanuel Levy and MacKinnon structure 
their readings of the cinematic small-town within a series of binary frames, demonstrating 
how screen depictions have oscillated between opposed, value-laden representational poles. 
As a result, whilst demonstrating subtly different theoretical and conceptual emphases, the 
pair elucidate similar ontological judgements; rather than simplistically epitomising idyllic 
American socio-cultural experiences, the small-town provides a venue of “dialectical”21 
contestation, crystallising around a number of discretely delineated cultural dichotomies. 
 Nevertheless, these approaches still emphasise the unity and inherence of key 
cultural concepts associated with the small-town. Rather than accounting for a 
heterogeneous multiplicity of differing cultural representations and identities, such 
methodologies rationalise cultural difference within restrictive interpretative couplets, 
treating both positive and negative portrayals as discrete, logocentric presences. In turn, this 
process reinforces the hierarchical and conceptual dominance of prominent small-town 
ideals (community, local democracy, pastoralism and so on).22 Typified in Levy and 
MacKinnon’s structuralist readings, representational diversities can only be accounted for as 
deviations from a pre-existing dominant term. Thus, whilst arguing that cinematic small-
towns engender mythic contrasts, this very methodology perpetuates the self-same dominant 
meanings and fixed, differential economies they superficially seek to problematize.   
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Mapping the Small-Town Ideal  
 
In post-war sociological and cultural discourses, discussions of the American small-
town focused largely on the extent to which it fulfilled its presumed role as a positive 
epitome of core American values. Thus, whilst appraisals of small-town verisimilitude vary, 
its socio-cultural importance remains largely unquestioned. 23 This is succinctly 
demonstrated in Lerner’s reading of the “decline of the small town”; whilst noting key 
economic and demographic challenges to local communities, he suggests that “the fact that 
the small town is dwindling in importance makes Americans idealize it all the more.”24 
Therefore, despite the widespread desire to (unfavourably) compare small-town life with an 
idealized socio-cultural model, this very dynamic demonstrates the continuing importance of 
the town in constructing and narrating American national identity. The notable veneration of 
the small-town in American life is demonstrated by its pervasive presence in myriad 
academic and popular discourses. For example, literary critics Jean Bethke Elshtain and 
Herron describe broadly positive representations that recur within wide historical cycles; the 
small-town is approached by both as a “seedbed,” a point of origin for American 
“democracy”25 and “the republican spirit and the source of our cultural vigor.”26 Sociological 
readings of the town frequently cast it as the manifestation of an ideal community, a 
transcendent structure of ontological wholeness and cultural coherence; for example, 
Lingeman treats the small-town as a conceptual exemplar, arguing that “the small town myth 
exists and persists at a deeper stratum of American culture: the small town makes up our 
image of community.”27 The author then quotes James Oliver Robertson, who reaffirms this 
link between community and totality, arguing that popular images of the small-town are 
grounded in socio-cultural uniformity: “the imagery of homogeneity provides a sense of 
secure, unchallenging rootedness in a society of the uprooted.”28 Finally, a number of texts 
that provide taxonomic descriptions of small-town virtues focus on attributes commonly 
associated with community forms. Kroes describes the ideal town as a “safe haven of social 
integration,”29 a judgement echoed by Meinig’s study of the New England village’s 
“connotations of continuity...of stability, quiet prosperity, cohesion and intimacy.”30  
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In examining the small-town film as a cinematic genre, MacKinnon also establishes 
its central role within American “public sentiment”; characterised as a utopian community, 
the town encompasses ideals of democracy, “Christian love,” fairness and kindness.31 
Furthermore, MacKinnon notes a continuing conceptual importance for the small-town 
divorced from any root within his perception of American socio-cultural “reality,” 
suggesting that “it is the image of the ideal, rather than its realization, which ensures the 
place of the small town in the American imagination.”32 This prescription of the town as an 
archetypal (and idyllic) cinematic setting is further discussed by Levy, positioning “Small-
Town America” as both an “ideological construct” and a “distinctly American” mythology.33 
Akin to Elshtain’s treatment of literary representations, Levy observes changing small-town 
images in different periods of film history, linking these shifts to economic and socio-
cultural factors. Nevertheless, he concludes by demonstrating enduring continuities that 
form key conceptual links between protagonists of small-town films and what he coins 
“basic American values”: individualism, pragmatism, common sense, resourcefulness, self-
assurance, determination, “control over one’s fate” and optimism.34 Furthermore, in 
introducing his study, Levy demonstrates that notable tenets of small-town existence 
encapsulate an ideal American “way of life”; these are demonstrated through dualistic 
themes of “work and public life; love and marriage, family and friendship; sex and leisure; 
politics and community life.”35 Thus, commentators from disparate disciplines carefully note 
a potentially shifting correspondence of small-town principles with socio-historical reality; 
yet, an intractable structural relationship between the small-town and a coherent national 
identity underpins these seemingly more nuanced criticisms.   
 
The Ideal or Actual? Small-Town Binary Oppositions 
 
 As suggested above, increased sociological attention has been granted to perceived 
disparities between ideals of small-town life and contrary representations of everyday 
experience. This foundationalist, metaphysical opposition underpins both Levy and 
MacKinnon’s cinematic studies. The pair fundamentally differ in their characterisations of 
the small-town within filmic discourses; MacKinnon approaches the small-town film as a 
cogent generic tradition, whilst Levy characterises the small-town as a recurring setting 
perceptible in numerous generic and historical contexts, entailing myriad thematic and 
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iconographic references.36 Nevertheless, in attempting to read a wider variety of socio-
cultural representations within specific case-studies, the two approaches both stress the 
heterogeneity of potential cinematic small-town images. For example, whilst diagnosing a 
“generally favourable attitude of film (and dominant culture) towards small towns,” Levy 
argues that “there have been variability in concept and diversity in image. Culturally 
conditioned, in each of the six decades under consideration, small-town films have 
embodied different symbols and projected different meanings.”37 Thus, notwithstanding the 
problematic project of dividing representations into arbitrary historical periods, Levy notes a 
representational complexity largely absent in sociological readings. This impulse to explore 
a wider diversity of socio-cultural messages also underlies MacKinnon’s study. For 
example, in discussing the potential pitfalls of delineating a cogent small-town genre, 
MacKinnon warns against imposing homogenised readings within which thematic or 
structural similarities are stressed to the detriment of the peculiarities of specific texts.38 
Thus, superficially at least, both scholars self-consciously attempt to complexify readings of 
the small-town and its cinematic rendering.  
 However, when the methodological foundations of Levy and MacKinnon’s works 
are considered in detail, it is clear that their aim is not to study a heterogeneous economy of 
singular small-town images; rather, they focus on the ways in which representations of the 
small-town can be rationalised and restricted. This is particularly clear with recourse to the 
aforementioned tension between the ideal and the actual, a binary framework central to 
MacKinnon’s arguments; mirroring prominent sociological accounts, representations are 
discretely divided into two self-coherent categories, contrasting a consistent ideal of the 
small-town “as Utopia”39 with a more negative actuality or “reality.” MacKinnon utilises 
this dualistic dynamic to structure his overarching generic categorisations: “the principal 
antithesis which emerges, more or less overtly, in every small-town movie is that between 
ideal and actuality or, perhaps more accurately, between the image of the ideal and a 
perception of the actuality.”40 Thus, varied small-town representations are not considered on 
their own terms, but are rather defined by how closely they match up to a cogent cultural 
ideal. MacKinnon elaborates upon this method, cementing a specific model as the centre-
point of small-town discourse: “the small town in movies seems forever to be looking 
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upwards at some Platonic ideal of itself, congratulating itself on its close approximation to it 
in actuality or castigating itself for its failure to match practice with inspiration.” 41 
 
“The Bright and Dark Sides” 
 
Oppositional, hierarchical contrasts between diametrically divergent small-town 
representations are explored in greater detail and complexity in contemporary readings of 
American popular culture. Specifically, several recent historical and literary studies have 
self-consciously interrogated such binary formulations to uncover their discursive 
assumptions, challenging the structural coherence of either an intangible ideal or a flawed 
actuality. For example, Elshtain notes a dichotomous logic that orients explorations of the 
small-town in literary representations; the quintessential town “exists in narrative, whether 
‘history’ or ‘fiction’, always ‘in contrast to.’”42 Whilst noting the common interpretative 
couplet of real vs. imagined, Elshtain challenges the authenticity of either illustration; rather, 
both positive and negative images are treated as contrasting (but equally constructed) 
representative poles, performing similar roles in arbitrarily rationalising a heterogeneous 
matrix of cultural experiences. Conversely, James F. Barker utilises conflicting small-town 
representations to diagnose a potential co-presence of seemingly contradictory cultural 
values. Thus, rather than identifying a range of discrete representational alternatives, Barker 
suggests that  
 
a number of us possess a subtle schizophrenia concerning the small town image. We 
love it for its picturesque qualities and its sense of community, but we hate it for its 
narrowness of thought and its slowness to respond to change.43  
 
Thus, whilst Barker appears to treat such discursive elements as tangible, essential 
properties, he theorises a potential challenge to the structural coherence of discretely 
opposed representations; whilst positive and negative elements remain ontologically distinct, 
their “schizophrenic” coexistence implies a superficial questioning of the conceptual 
supremacy of either term. 
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Levy replicates these discursive interrogations in his conception of the “dark side of 
small-towns.”44 In his reading, a consistent structural feature of small-town discourse is the 
antagonistic contrast of wholesome images with debased (and purportedly more authentic) 
representations of the small-town as “hell,” a bigoted setting defined by the absence of 
idyllic values. However, Levy does not locate these antagonistic tendencies within discrete 
representational ontologies; rather, they are demonstrated as two complementary (and 
interrelated) sides of the town, treated as “the bright and dark sides.”45 Thus, as Levy 
demonstrates, the desire to juxtapose a darker, more realistic rendering with an idealised 
small-town model underlie complementary negative (yet, equally constructed) cultural 
representations. For example, in reading Fury (1936) as an exemplar of this textual strategy, 
Levy notes that the film’s “condemning” view of the small-town self-consciously explores 
elements disavowed by idyllic small-town representations: these include “ignorance, 
hypocrisy, bigotry, and provincialism.”46 Thus, dealing with the “delicate balance between 
the normal and abnormal, order and disorder,” Levy argues that several small-town movies 
utilise a dialectical approach that treats the “normal and familiar life…as the starting point 
for an understanding of the deviant and unfamiliar…. These narratives…use the strategy of 
defamiliarization, displacing the commonplace to reveal submerged patterns of meaning in 
life.”47 As with scholarly readings of the nuclear family, seemingly contradictory images are 
located within a single setting or text, with the idyll read as a superficial cover for a sordid 
social reality; elucidating differing layers of socio-cultural meaning, such representations 
unveil “dark anxieties operating beneath the surface register.”48  
Importantly for Levy, this strategy of stark thematic contrast is central not only to 
his reading of small-town America, but of popular film itself. Adopting a structuralist 
methodology influenced by the work of Claude Levi-Strauss and Roland Barthes, Levy 
analyses movies “as cultural myths, narratives arising from society’s underlying issues and 
basic structures...as transformations of basic dilemmas or contradictions that in reality 
cannot be resolved.”49 As a result, the retention of a binary logic is integral to Levy’s 
equation of popular film with discourses of myth. The presence of seemingly contradictory 
representations encapsulates his characterisation of small-town films as a stage for semiotic 
contestation: “the best small-town narratives have contained dialectical conflicts, through 
which ideological-mythic resolutions are explicitly provided. Such films have dealt with the 
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delicate balance between the normal and abnormal, order and disorder.”50 Thus, whilst 
allowing for the potential co-presence of divergent cultural meanings, Levy rationalises 
these representations within an oppositional either/or structural economy, tacitly retaining 
small-town ideals as a comparative centre. The potential erasure of structural boundaries 
between discrete representations is undermined by the replication of logocentric formal 
assumptions; for conflicting representations to be juxtaposed, their a priori coherence and 
plenitude is vital. Additionally, in suggesting varying representative layers of superficial 
order and hidden disorder, this visualisation relies upon treating this discursive veneer as 
illusory or intangible; as a result, the image of life “beneath the surface register” is granted a 
hierarchically superior status of greater (or even inherent) authenticity. Thus, whilst 
superficially overturning the value-laden dichotomies that favour idealised images of 
American small-town life, this line of argument fundamentally reifies the restrictive 
presences and dualities that constitute small-town discourse. 
MacKinnon and Levy’s application of a strict opposition between positive and 
negative small-town portrayals is replicated on a syntagmatic register; both writers observe 
clusters of conceptual comparison that both underlie and mirror the central opposition of 
conflicting small-town significances. As a result, a broad stratum of values, themes and 
concepts are accommodated within a further sub-set of interpretative oppositions, a trend 
observable more broadly in scholarly small-town discourses; Levy lists these as individual 
vs. community, community vs. society, nature vs. culture, stability vs. change, integration vs. 
isolation, the sacred and the profane, and finally, public vs. private.51 On one level, this 
approach is useful in highlighting pervasive forms of discursive regulation; for example, 
Levy and MacKinnon make explicit a number of the reductive methodological assumptions 
that have shaped popular and critical small-town discourses. However, in unproblematically 
utilising these oppositional categories to structure their readings, a number of these 
suppositions are replicated and perpetuated; foundational concepts such as community and 
stability are treated once again as self-contained totalities, inherent and self-identical small-
town concepts that assume a position of hierarchical supremacy within the “dialectical 
conflicts” they purportedly contest. Finally, scholars like Levy and MacKinnon ensure that 
the texts and themes that they encounter are forcefully homogenised within these restrictive, 
cogent classes; their discrete juxtaposition relies upon a fundamental definitional coherence, 
inhibiting a more radical displacement of their totalising boundaries and binary frames. The 
difference that MacKinnon attests to in his exploration of the small-town genre can only be 
understood within the arbitrary oppositional framework he erects and applies. Thus, critics 
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do not trouble the small-town’s fundamental ontological solidity; antonymic conceptual 
differences continue to regulate the dynamic, heterogeneous différance that operates within 
every small-town representation as a condition of its possibility. 
It is my contention that this theoretical critique of existing cultural discourses 
facilitates an illustrative cinematic deconstruction of the American small-town. In 
constructing a case-study reading of George Washington (2000), I argue that the text 
fundamentally destabilises structural metaphors and hierarchical oppositions that are 
diagnosed in (and reinforced by) critical readings of the small-town. However, this does not 
simply take the form of a heightened textual and representational undecidability, within 
which the discrete, artificial difference between polarised small-town images is reversed and 
then displaced. Indeed, such a process is outlined at length in the previous chapter of this 
thesis, in which a comparable deconstructive method is applied to similarly bifurcated 
nuclear family discourses. Rather, George Washington is approached as a text that carries 
complementary deconstructive potentials, which coalesce around the sustained decentering 
of the small-town as a conceptual and cultural core. Thus, this metaphorical challenge stems 
from a filmic fragmentation of small-town space, place, and architecture, problematizing the 
structural integrity of the town as a fixed cultural totality; this dynamic is reinforced by a 
narratological decentering, as key events are shifted from central locations to the town’s 
spatial (and conceptual) margins. Thus, George Washington undermines a figurative 
representation of geographical certitude that encapsulates the small-town’s similar reliance 
on rigidly defined, self-coherent cultural meaning. 
 
“It’s a Nice Town”: Decentering the Heartland in George Washington (2000) 
  
In one of George Washington’s concluding scenes, we are provided with a 
subjective taxonomy of heroic attributes, presented in the form of a television interview with 
one of the film’s central characters, a 12-year old boy named George (Donald Holden).  
Adopting a superhero persona, the child revels in the attention given to him following his 
successful rescue of a drowning boy. George believes he is a hero because he is “wise, 
strong and very talented”: as he summarises, “I’m a hero because I like to save people’s 
lives.” Yet, George’s self-aggrandizing public persona starkly contrasts with a tragic secret 
that forms a central plot-point for the film; another child, Buddy (Curtis Cotton III), lies 
dead, fished from a nearby river, a victim of a fatal head-wound inflicted (accidentally) by 
George. Buddy’s death occurs after an ill-advised game of “shove” in a disused toilet-block, 
one of many activities the film’s youths undertake as they drift from location to location, all 
but invisible to the town’s (limited) sources of community or parental authority.  
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Focusing upon the aimless lives of unsupervised children in a decaying Southern 
small-town, George Washington constitutes its setting as a venue of social fragmentation 
and structural différance. In arguing that the film offers a primarily figurative challenge to 
small-town discourses, this reading deviates sharply from its limited existing scholarly and 
critical discourse. For example, a number of critics have focused closely upon the film’s 
alleged “realism,” arguing that George Washington’s cultural representations embody 
heightened values of social authenticity. Indeed, in Justin Horton’s sophisticated scholarly 
reading of the film, he establishes a superficially realist interpretation, before ultimately 
problematizing this simplistic analysis: 
 
On some levels, (George Washington) surely fits the customary realist criteria: if so 
inclined, a viewer could easily apply the ‘naive’ writings of Bazin and, by focusing 
on the film’s depiction of poverty, location shooting, and nonprofessional players, 
mount a critique from the familiar and well-beaten path.52   
 
Exemplifying this normative discourse, Edward Lawrenson suggests that George 
Washington presents an archetypal social realist scenario; however, he then clarifies that 
these narrative and thematic attributes are not matched by a complementary aesthetic 
verisimilitude.53 Nevertheless, other critical commentators construct a more explicit link 
between the film’s subject matter and an identifiably realist aesthetic. For example, Armond 
White directly matches George Washington’s social verisimilitude with realist 
cinematography and style, noting both the film’s “authentic dailiness” and “poetic 
realism.”54 Finally, as noted by Horton, A.O. Scott treats the film as a pre-cursor to a cycle 
of American films influenced by the aesthetics of Italian neorealism; in doing so, Horton 
outlines a series of aesthetic properties that superficially complement the film’s subject 
matter: “Green’s film adheres to the customary checklist of the neorealist inheritance: long 
takes, deep-focus cinematography, episodic narrative, a cast of nonprofessionals, and so 
forth.”55      
Superficially, these pervasive aesthetic and thematic judgements appear to position 
George Washington within a normalised oppositional economy that characterises American 
small-town discourse. In establishing the film’s social realist ontology, critical readings 
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engender an ostensibly authentic critique of idealised cultural representations, achieved 
through a textual exposé of small-town decay, disorder, and deprivation. However, whilst 
some readings of the film reify this discursive link, many others do not construct an 
essentialist correspondence between George Washington’s thematic or aesthetic properties 
and negative small-town images. Indeed, several prominent reviews argue that George 
Washington’s apparently more authentic images of small-town life actually reflect or 
embody idealised cultural values, identities, and communities. Interestingly, such 
judgements are frequently framed in response to another recent independent text that has 
been treated as a more explicitly “nihilistic” attack on small-town cultural narratives: 
Gummo (1997). For example, Ben Thompson argues that George Washington’s engagement 
with small-town place provides a reassuring palliative to Gummo’s setting of Xenia, Ohio, 
described by another critic as a “stretch of hell”:56 “in its benign - not to say lyrical - 
depiction of the eccentricities of the American backwoods, George Washington seems to be 
working to heal the wounds Harmony Korine’s Gummo inflicted on American ideals of 
small-town life.”57 These critical comparisons attest to the difficulty of positioning George 
Washington exclusively within aforementioned dichotomous categories of ideal or adverse 
small-town representations. Whilst other recent texts have been read as an unequivocally 
chilling visions of small-town deprivation and perversion, George Washington draws out 
seemingly conflicting critical attitudes that escape rigid bifurcations of idyllic model vs. 
fallen reality. For some it constitutes an exposé of rural poverty and social disorder; for 
others, it demonstrates the triumph of small-town community over socio-economic 
depression. 
In contrast, Horton’s aforementioned analysis of George Washington teases out 
latent discursive contradictions to disrupt the ontological certitude of existing readings. 
Locating the film within Deleuze’s re-reading of Neorealism, he argues that George 
Washington utilises the complex narrational strategies of “free indirect discourse” to 
problematize metaphysical divisions of subject/object, real/imaginary, and actual/virtual; in 
doing so, the film exemplifies the Deleuzian notion of the “time image” and “the powers of 
the false” that it embodies.58 Thus, Horton’s “neo-Bazinian” approach repositions George 
Washington within a Neorealist paradigm precisely because of pervasive textual paradoxes 
and narrative ellipses.59 Specifically, properties of photographic and social verisimilitude 
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merge with an exploration of character interiority and subjective “realism,” in which the 
“filmmaker enters into a mimetic relationship with the character’s way of seeing.”60 Thus, 
noting the “dreamlike quality”61 of many sequences, Horton argues that George Washington 
offers a radical experience of “becoming” that subverts the colonialist division between self 
and other:62 “the free indirect mode puts the film’s maker and its subjects into an oscillation, 
one that serves to obliterate the distinction between subjective and objective, for though the 
two are distinct, they are indiscernible.”63 Horton concludes that this narrational dynamic 
inaugurates a “calling into existence” of the marginal identities of a “‘missing’ people,” a 
“collective enunciation” that constitutes the film’s characters beyond constructions of 
America as a “white- and male-dominated nation.”64  
Shifting focus from the film’s narrational complexities to its fragmentary mise-en-
scène, I exploit a similar reading of discursive ambiguity and socio-cultural rupture to 
dismantle the small-town as a logocentric structure of cultural presence. Specifically, this 
analysis elucidates the film’s interrogative challenge to the small-town’s spatial, 
architectural, and structural coherence, visual tropes which solidify the location as an 
ontological and sociological unity. Firstly, with reference to George Washington’s opening 
sequences, it is argued that the film’s North Carolinian setting is depicted as a fragmentary 
cultural topography, a range of contingent locations excised from any broader geographical 
order. This is understood as a figurative challenge to the small-town as a formalised cultural 
totality; a lack of geographical wholeness symbolises a related lack of conceptual plenitude. 
Thus, previous attempts to delineate essential small-town structures or meanings are 
challenged by the absence of a foundational visual unity. This deconstructive attack upon 
small-town self-coherence precipitates a fundamental decentering of the town’s perceived 
exceptional position in articulating American cultural experience; specifically, the text 
provides a microcosmic shift in representing the town as a conceptual centre to a setting of 
architectural ruin and marginality.65 In noting that the majority of the film’s integral scenes 
unfold in indiscernible, derelict spaces, one can observe a further figuration of conceptual 
and structural breakdown articulated through an increased focus on material detritus, 
disorder, and decay. Thus, the narrative ultimately draws attention away from town’s centre 
to its margins, a move that mirrors a more fundamental displacement of the small-town as a 
definitional centre of American national identity. The final section of this chapter considers 
the fleeting moments in which George Washington explicitly represents the central spaces of 
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small-town community, typified by Main Street and the local church. However, the manner 
in which these are presented (simultaneously vibrant and depressed, full and empty) 
provides a bridge to the previous chapter’s analyses; the undecidability of these socio-
cultural environs is reinforced by their depiction as locations of paradox, spaces lacking the 
distinct structural coherence that their assumed centrality necessitates. Finally, this holistic 
challenge to architectural and ontological certitude encourages expressions of a multifarious 
cultural heterogeneity that inaugurates and exceeds the small-town and national identities it 
solidifies. In doing so, this chapter recasts and relocates Horton’s Deleuzian notion of 
George Washington’s “‘missing’ people” as but one manifestation of a Derridean cultural 
différance, focusing more closely upon how a deconstructive reading of American (small-
town) identity makes a boundless range of “collective enunciation(s)”66 possible. 
 
Community and Conversation 
 
Before exploring these strategies of textual displacement, it is useful to consider 
how these fit within George Washington’s broader narrative structure, and how the film can 
be superficially located within small-town discourse. To begin, whilst the film contains a 
seemingly pivotal moment of violent narrative transformation (Buddy’s death), it is 
primarily characterised by meditative moments of conversation and personal exploration; 
this aspect is directly noted in Martha P. Nochimson’s assertion that George Washington 
“does not focus rigorously on its central story, but rather weaves among the lives of the 
people in the town.”67 As a result, the film’s brutal centrepiece is subsumed within broader 
formal strategies (described by Jonathan Rosenbaum as “episodic”68) that focus upon 
character subjectivity (typified by the personalised narration of Nasia [Candace Evanofski]), 
and conversational exchange (the myriad bilateral discussions that provide insights into the 
characters’ lives and personalities). 
Nasia’s voiceover consistently relates her observations to friendship or community 
groups, extolling the virtues of the town’s cohesive adolescent population: “when I look at 
my friends, I know there’s goodness.” Additionally, the film regularly returns to a range of 
different social groupings, represented as contrasting forums of mundane discussion; several 
teenage girls engage in clichéd discussions about their male counterparts, and the manual 
workers on the railway line converse about health and diets over their communal lunch 
breaks. Furthermore, previous critical readings have highlighted the film’s avoidance of 
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explicitly highlighting socio-cultural divisions amongst the town’s residents. For example, 
the children are predominantly black, apart from Sonya (Rachael Handy), who is white; in 
an inversion of this demographic makeup, the group of workmen is predominantly white, 
with the notable exception of Damascus (Eddie Rouse), George’s uncle. However, Philip 
Kemp notes a constant deferral of explicit racial tensions: “in general, racial concerns seem 
to float smokily around the periphery of the action, but never coalesce into anything 
tangible.”69 Perhaps more tellingly, Rosenbaum addresses the cast as a single whole, in spite 
of their potentially divergent cultural subjectivities: “George Washington boasts…a racially 
mixed cast of characters, working-class and southern.”70 Thus, such comments evoke 
homogenising discourses of Americanization and the melting pot, key concepts in the 
constitution of national togetherness. Although noting a diverse range of potential identity 
forms (race, region and class), these are rendered insignificant by the presence of a structure 
of shared national meaning, in this case, the small-town. 
Nevertheless, this seemingly clear endorsement of an organic communal cohesion is 
problematized by the complex manner in which the film depicts myriad social relations. 
Whilst Nasia’s opening narration highlights her affinity with the other local youths, she is 
continually seen in conversation with a number of “anti-male girlfriend(s),”71 harshly 
evaluating several of the friends she previously praised. Indeed, the role of gossip within the 
film, a recurring theme within sociological accounts of the small-town,72 reaffirms the 
perception that social and emotional attachments are limited and transient; for example, after 
George adopts his superhero persona, he is discussed mockingly by Sonya and Vernon 
(Damian Jewan Lee), two characters with whom he initially appeared to share a close social 
bond. Furthermore, on the few occasions that the friends are seen “hanging out” they appear 
isolated and bored. Sonya, Buddy, Vernon and George loiter in an “abandoned miniature 
golf range”;73 Buddy and George glumly discuss the former’s break-up with Nasia; Vernon 
admonishes Sonya for using a stick to write on a wall with animal faeces. It is in the next 
scene that Buddy meets his violent end, as the group move on to a similarly dilapidated toilet 
block; he slips on a puddle during a session of innocent play-fighting, and cracks his skull on 
the floor. The group take Buddy’s body and place it in a dilapidated house, his broken head 
obscured by a lizard mask. This is the last time the four of them are seen together as a group. 
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 The adolescents’ failure to realise idyllic, enduring communal relations is further 
reinforced by the film’s prominent depictions of personal conversation. Thus, rather than 
focusing on “an interracial group of 12- to 15-year olds living in rural, underclass North 
Carolina”74 (as Cynthia Fuchs suggests), the film charts fleeting bilateral relationships 
between members of that group and with other residents. Indeed, many of our major 
character insights stem from the conversations they have with others, providing a frank, 
personal discourse that is absent from shared discussions. For example, Buddy and Rico 
(Paul Schneider) speak about painful moments in past romantic relationships, prompted by 
the failure of the former’s relationship with Nasia; Buddy also talks to Euless (Jonathan 
Davidson), a health-conscious worker, about his mother’s insomnia; later on, Vernon and 
Sonya share a self-deprecating conversation about their perceived personality flaws. As a 
result, the film institutes a fundamental questioning of the presumed opposition between 
community and social isolation. On the one hand, the text relies almost entirely on social 
relations to convey its slow-burning story, as plot points and character information can be 
primarily discerned from one-on-one conversations, Nasia’s reflective voiceover, and 
character monologues. Simultaneously, these conversations undercut readings of a cohesive 
community within the film’s small-town setting; such dialogues are transitory and fleeting, 
as characters operate as temporary sounding boards for the discontents and negative self-
perceptions of others.  
This dynamic is clearly demonstrated in a particularly prominent conversation 
between Vernon and Sonya. Returning to the scene of Buddy’s death, Sonya finds Vernon 
sat on the floor of the toilet block, and after a cursory interchange, Vernon shows his 
frustration at their predicament. The scene is dominated by Vernon’s extended soliloquy, a 
device used throughout the film’s social interactions; sustained, mutual communication is 
eschewed in favour of detailed litanies of personal grievances. In this case, whilst a series of 
shot-reverse shots frame the pair within a back and forth conversational dynamic, Vernon 
monopolises the interaction. Sonya stands over him, listening silently as he rants about a 
series of incoherent, frustrated desires; for example, he proclaims “I just wish I had my own 
tropical island, I wish I was. I wish I could go to China, I wish I could go to Outer Space 
man.” The film’s use of conversational settings as unequal venues for personal expression is 
also reflected in the fluidity with which these dialogues shift. Individuals are seen 
conversing privately with a wide range of characters throughout the film, often discussing 
other members of the cast; for example, Rico is seen comforting Buddy early in the film 
after Nasia turns her romantic attentions to George, but later walks around Main Street, 
admiring George’s work directing traffic (he dons a fluorescent jacket and helps). In George 
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Washington, the characters do not appear socially isolated; however, their diverse and one-
sided interactions call into question the strength of the bonds that purport to tie the 
characters into coherent, identifiable communities. This reflexive dynamic, in which 
characters are both socially active and personally introspective, initiates a structural paradox 
that disturbs the self-coherence of small-town ontology. The remainder of the chapter 
explores this textual incongruity in reference to the town’s spatial representation. However, 
it must be noted that the fragmentation of George Washington’s small-town setting does not 
figure a simplistic division of a pre-existing communal presence. Rather, it initiates a 
deconstruction of the town itself, visualising a fundamental, originary difference that 
contests the unity of any a priori representation and its oppositional, metaphysical 
constitution. Ultimately, George Washington’s signifies an incoherent setting that is always 
already structurally dispersed, where fragments of existence escape reassembly into any 
representational whole. 
 
Small-Town Fragmentation 
 
In his discussion of the cinematic small-town, Levy stresses the importance of a 
film’s formative moments in establishing the cultural milieu as a coherent setting or theme. 
By providing an introductory overview of the town’s inhabitants, topography, and 
architecture, the small-town can be solidified as a holistic socio-cultural and textual entity. 
In such circumstances, the viewer is not only provided an image of the different elements 
that form the town’s internal structure, but also how these fit together: 
 
The typical beginning of a small-town film was an establishing (tracking) shot of the 
town, often from the point of view of an outsider…or a bird’s-eye view…. 
According to conventions, it became customary to begin a film with a pan across 
town (often an aerial shot) or of Main Street, which conveyed rapidly the town’s 
size, location, territorial boundaries, “nature” sights (lake, river, hill), train station, 
and stratification system.75    
 
Therefore, we are not provided with a series of discrete images, but rather a continuous 
elaboration of a self-coherent small-town space; whilst we are presented with the 
peculiarities of a particular setting, these are defined by their spatial (and ultimately, 
symbolic) ties. Meinig provides a strikingly similar description of the small-town’s symbolic 
landscape; his taxonomy also focuses on spatial and architectural relations, including:  
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A courthouse, set apart on its own block, may be visible, but it is not an essential 
element, for the great classical columns fronting the stone temple of business 
proclaim the bank as the real seat of authority. This is Main Street, and parallel with 
it lies Church Street, not of the church, but many churches.76  
 
Thus, in the small-town’s cinematic and cultural rendering, diverse architectural forms and 
land uses are introduced as constituents of a harmonious cultural unity.  
Elaborations of small-town wholeness are also perceptible in sociological readings. 
For example, Donlyn Lyndon notes that the unique character of the small-town is reflected 
in how the varied elements of the location are placed within close geographical proximity, 
creating a place that is “distinct,” totalized, complete: 
 
Small towns have the great advantage that their elements are few, their extent 
limited…. In a few minutes you can traverse a cross section of the place and its 
diversity is readily accessible to view. Being few, and readily grasped, its various 
elements make a recognisable pattern, a place often of distinction.77  
 
Lyndon’s perception of a “recognisable pattern” within the small-town suggests a coherent, 
rationalised setting, a conceptual entity that imposes order upon a diverse and heterogeneous 
topographical difference. In turn, physical or material cohesiveness purportedly reflects a 
related socio-cultural plenitude. Drawing direct links between physical and social structure, 
Barker suggests that the small-town offers an “abundance of order” in “American minds,” 
before clarifying that “physical order originates from the union of topography, architecture, 
social structure, land values, and political decision-making.”78 This observation is indicative 
of wider readings of small-town structure, in which physical, social, and conceptual unities 
are intractably intertwined. 
 In contrast to such images of small-town equilibrium, the opening sequences of 
George Washington signify a setting that exists as a series of irreconcilable fragments. In 
many ways, it is possible to read the scenes occurring before the opening titles as a 
subversive re-imagining of small-town film’s aforementioned geographical overview. 
Accompanied by Nasia’s voiceover, we are provided with snapshots of the film’s setting, yet 
these are presented with no coherent spatial or thematic connection. This disjointed visual 
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effect is heightened by a variety of aesthetic choices. Firstly, the images shown are tightly 
framed; whilst we can discern a number of characters and actions, the scenes’ 
cinematographic qualities effectively excise their content from any identifiable context. For 
example, the film begins with a shot of a child walking along an iron girder, demonstrated 
by an extreme close-up on the characters’ feet; no other details are shown (Fig.3.1): 
 
 
Fig.3.1 
 
The framing of the film’s opening image initiates an aesthetic that relies upon the 
representation of decontextualized, contingent, arbitrary details. As this shot fades to black, 
we are shown a brief scene in which two of the film’s central characters end a relationship; 
Nasia breaks up with Buddy, admonishing him for acting “like such a little kid.” Whilst the 
characters’ dialogue provides an intelligible narrative event, the location of this scene is 
impossible to distinguish; although it appears that this may be occurring within a shed or 
playhouse, the abrupt cut from the previous image grants no coherent geographical link 
(Fig.3.2): 
 
 
Fig.3.2 
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Furthermore, the tight framing of the scene (enclosed within the walls of the room) 
heightens the sense of a self-contained interior excised from a wider diegetic universe. 
 These stylistic strategies are replicated in later representations of the small-town, 
providing no clear link between the settlement’s various sights and sites. Superficially, the 
viewer is shown a series of features that closely resembles the taxonomic small-town 
descriptions provided by Levy and Meinig; fast-paced cuts provide a stream of typical small-
town landmarks. For example, a shot of a local factory is immediately followed by a similar 
image of a railroad crossing (Figs.3.3-3.4): 
 
 
 
Figs.3.3-3.4 
 
However, the cinematography and editing of this sequence again reaffirms an overriding 
logic of fragmentation and spatial ellipses. Both images are tightly framed, ensuring that 
neither feature is fully visible (the factory’s foundations are out of shot, as is the base of the 
crossing sign). Consequently, these landmarks are framed as standalone icons, impossible to 
place within an overarching topographical (or conceptual) map.  Furthermore, the use of 
sudden cuts between the two images introduces a violent textual rupture; in turn, this form of 
editing undermines any spatial continuity between the two features, as each image is clearly 
demarcated.  
214 
 
 Finally, a subtle fragmentation of small-town topography is even perceptible on the 
rare occasions where George Washington depicts spatially-contiguous diegetic locations. 
There are two notable examples of this; in the first Rico rides his motorbike through town, 
held in a medium-length shot as he travels towards a moving camera (Fig.3.5): 
 
 
Fig.3.5 
 
In the second, George runs along a sidewalk, escaping a news crew who have come to 
document a car crash involving Vernon and Sonya, who try to skip town at the film’s 
conclusion (Fig.3.6): 
 
 
Fig.3.6 
 
 In the first example, Rico’s bike is framed head-on, providing a detailed image of 
the road but with little focus on the surrounding streets and minimal contextual details. 
Furthermore, the editing of the sequence highlights a fragmentary spatio-temporal logic; a 
series of jump-cuts segment the on-screen action, ensuring that his journey does not unfold 
as a single, continuous movement. In George’s case, his movements are tightly framed, 
effectively isolating the figure within a wider geographical setting; the shot above provides 
even less background information than Rico’s sequence. The absence of any clear 
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geographical orientation delivers the illusion of the subject running on the spot; whilst he 
covers a lot of ground, it is impossible to determine where he is, where he is going, and what 
he has passed on the way.  
 
Which Side of the Tracks? 
 
As has been argued in the two preceding sections, George Washington can be read 
as an interrogative engagement with the small-town as both a unified cultural and spatial 
entity. The film’s problematization of communal cohesion is mirrored by its geographical 
fragmentation, constructing a discursive link that collapses clear distinctions between small-
town form and meaning. As a result, this multifaceted subversion of small-town certitude 
furnishes material disintegration with a figurative significance, in the form of an equivalent 
denial of socio-cultural uniformity. Thus, any sustained challenge to the town as a unified 
place evokes the possibility of a more layered engagement with small-town character; a 
fragmentary on-screen geography spatialises a shattering of the internal cohesiveness that 
engenders uniform socio-cultural identities. 
However, it is important to note that logocentric readings of small-town order do not 
necessitate a totalitarian perception of absolute social uniformity; indeed, in broader critical 
discourses on the small-town, it has been argued that limited social divisions are an integral 
element in representing this locale as an idealized community. As implicitly suggested 
earlier, constructions of the small-town as a cogent whole often rely upon a drawing together 
of disparate spaces or identities into a singular topography or community. Returning directly 
to Meinig, his account of Main Street as a symbolic centre epitomises this reading of the 
town, in which spatio-communal cohesiveness is only legible through a moderated 
awareness of socio-cultural difference: there are  
 
no great extremes of wealth or poverty, with social gradations but no rigid layers, a 
genuine community but not tightly cohesive; in size – not so small as to be 
stultifying nor so large as to forfeit friendship and familiarity.79  
 
Similarly, Levy argues that cinematic small-towns often draw attention to structures of 
cultural distinction, such as class, religion, and ethnicity. Listed amongst the many 
identifiable small-town tropes is the settlement’s “stratification system,” treated with a 
similar importance to other iconic images and locations; for Levy, this aspect of small-town 
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discourse pertains to its perceived position as the embodiment of “democratic” values.80 
Furthermore, whilst MacKinnon also notes the prevalence of “class divisions” within many 
cinematic small-towns, these differences are again reconciled; “the lower-middle- and 
working-class characters tend to be acquiescent, and to confirm the status quo.”81 Thus, the 
presence of discrete divisions often reinforces preconceived notions of communal plenitude; 
a heterogeneous cultural freeplay is fixed within binary oppositions that are then integrated 
and neutralised within a broader geographical and conceptual totality. Ultimately, this 
process of demarcating and fixing an amorphous différance exemplifies metaphysical 
aspirations towards a static telos of coherent cultural being. 
 Furthermore, discrete divisions are also used to characterise opposed (yet similarly 
homogeneous) representations of small-town decline or disunity. For example, such a view 
is reinforced by Meinig’s discussion of small-town socio-cultural exclusion; listing a variety 
of cultural groups that deviate from the supposed general population of “middle-class White 
Anglo-Saxon Protestants,” Meinig argues that “such people and their habitations and 
facilities show up marginally if at all in the symbolic landscape…they certainly are not part 
of the idealized community which was considered representative of basic American 
virtues.”82 Figurative representations of rigid social divisions are perceptible within 
cinematic portraits of the small-town as a divisive realm, defined by broad inequalities that 
stratify the experiences of the setting’s varied inhabitants. As MacKinnon notes, these 
detachments are often symbolised by physical partitions: “the communality of the small-
town…is split by the division between classes, particularly in the sense of rich and poor, a 
division often given physical expression by the railroad tracks.”83 In explicitly highlighting 
factors that inexorably divide small-town inhabitants, critics like MacKinnon cast these 
divisions as regulated differences between discrete alternatives, a prominent example being 
the aforementioned binary opposition of rich vs. poor. Thus, such portraits do not challenge 
the essential, logocentric structural unity of the small-town. Whether presenting a 
harmonious, idealized community or a divided locale rife with jingoism and inequality, such 
representations posit the small-town as a self-coherent cultural concept that carries an 
essential significance.   
Directly interrogating these bifurcated small-town divisions, George Washington 
separates socio-cultural boundaries from their presumed connotative values. Thus, rather 
than presenting the town as a legible (but divided) whole, such faultlines are shorn of their 
presumed figurative significance; instead, they demarcate meaningless fragments, operating 
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as empty borders that cannot be located within a geographical or conceptual totality. In turn, 
such divisions are recast as hollow markers of the oppositional logic with which the small-
town is constructed. Rather than drawing attention to figurative divisions, they highlight the 
act of division itself; the small-town’s dichotomous rationalisation of différance is explicitly 
foregrounded and defaced through the close visual interrogation of its conceptual 
borderlines. This strategy of semiotic displacement is exemplified in the film’s 
representation of an aforementioned small-town symbol, the railroad tracks. In George 
Washington, the railway forms a recurring location, as many of the film’s characters carry 
menial jobs on the line. However, the tracks are never given a definite spatial location; 
shown first in an overgrown field, they meander past factories and roads with no consistent 
direction or clear destination. We first see the tracks in the film’s opening sequence, as a 
handheld camera bumpily follows their route towards the top of the frame (Fig.3.7): 
 
 
Fig.3.7 
 
In the shot above, the camera examines the route of the tracks, closely inspecting this 
potential conceptual division. Running vertically through the centre of the shot, the tracks 
evenly bisect the surrounding area, separating both their diegetic setting and the cinematic 
frame. However, whilst this sequence may allude to the presence of a potential figurative 
border, it is impossible to ascertain that which it divides. Once again, tight framing excises 
the shot from any broader location or context, with only brief glimpses of what exists 
beyond the twin rails. Furthermore, whilst the camera eventually pans up to give a more 
privileged view of where the rails are headed, this is immediately undermined by an 
instantaneous dissolve into the next sequence, allowing inadequate time for spatial 
acclimatization (Fig.3.8): 
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Fig.3.8 
 
This disorientating effect is further demonstrated in the sequence’s editing. As the mobile 
camera follows the line of the track, shots of the railway are intercut with images of the tops 
of trees, a visual motif that recurs in a brief but regular pattern (Fig.3.9): 
 
 
Fig.3.9 
  
Again, such parallels are suggestive of a boundary, this time conceptual, reiterating 
prominent divisions of nature and culture that recur within (and orientate) American identity 
narratives. This shifting focus from cultural to natural elements is reinforced by the 
accompanying narration; Nasia eulogises the virtues of nature as the sequence cross-cuts 
between images of rails and trees, proclaiming that “I like to go to beautiful places, where 
there are waterfalls and empty fields...places that are nice and calm and quiet.” Finally, a 
shot from later in the film reinforces this perception of the railway as a potential 
nature/culture frontier. As the kids play aimlessly at a nearby train station, the line is shown 
in a medium-length shot, again at the frame’s centre (Fig.10): 
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Fig.3.10 
  
This shot of the line differs from those incorporated into the film’s opening sequence, as the 
frame’s composition allows for some level of spatial contextualisation; we can see the 
track’s limited surroundings. Furthermore, noticeable differences between the two sides of 
the track superficially reinforce its potential appraisal as an ontological faultline. To the left 
of the frame there are overgrown fields and woodlands; to the right, the image is dominated 
by the architecture of the station, casting a shadow over the lines. Thus, the shot 
superficially delineates natural and cultural space; the differences between the each side of 
the track allows their incorporation into apparently opposed categories. 
However, upon closer inspection this clear division begins to disintegrate. Staying 
with the image above, subtle elements of opposed values permeate purportedly self-
contained purities. For example, whilst the electricity pylons on the left of the image denote 
specific cultural functions, they rise above the area of greenery, a natural space. In turn, their 
appearance problematizes their own position within an exclusively cultural visual economy; 
the pylons also resemble the tall tree trunks they stand beside, connoting a specifically 
natural form. This undecidable textual economy is further reinforced by a close examination 
of the station building; within the shadows, one can see bushes and foliage, interrupting the 
uniformity of the architectural structure. This economy of conceptual co-presence 
reinscribes the “other” within ostensibly coherent spaces, challenging the homogeneity of 
each category. This visual device can be further demonstrated in the aforementioned opening 
shots of the railway line at the beginning of the film (Figs.3.7-3.10). Between the track’s 
wooden sleepers weeds are sprouting, growing over the rusted and disused girders. The 
dynamic merging of natural and cultural spaces into emergent, indiscernable formulations is 
neatly encapsulated by Lawrenson’s description of the sequence: “the rusting girders are 
wrapped by wiry weeds, as if in the process of being reclaimed by nature.”84 Finally, this 
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mutual conceptual contamination is noted by Horton, who suggests that the landscape’s 
“natural and man-made elements seem to have fought one another to a draw”; this 
observation is then considered within the context of the film’s “contamination of outside and 
inside,” a theoretical insight that calls into question the purity of any metaphysical 
presence.85 Thus, as the film directly interrogates conceptual boundaries and theoretical 
oppositions, it simultaneously problematizes the very divisions with which they are 
commonly aligned within small-town discourses. In this example, images of the film’s train 
tracks symbolise a wholesale deconstruction of a figurative borderline between nature and 
culture; these two values are reinscribed within their opposite, making it unclear which 
encroaches upon the other. Therefore, this illustrative case demonstrates how geographical 
space can be allied with the Derridean concept of the “undecidable,”86 transforming the 
text’s potential figurative function into a theoretically subversive tool. 
 
Dumps, Derelicts, and Marginal Spaces 
 
 Briefly reiterating this chapter’s introductory remarks, one can draw clear 
conceptual links between readings of the small-town as a distinct totality and as a cultural 
centre; treatments of the small-town as a heartland, an indicative apotheosis (or antithesis) of 
American identity encapsulates and engenders aforementioned structural assumptions that 
furnish it with a cogent, essential, fixed significance. Interpretations of the small-town as a 
centre of national being are in turn solidified by microcosmic readings of the town’s own 
ontological structure. Just as the small-town is located as an identifiable centre of American 
cultural life, the town itself is granted a similar nodal point, based on a prominent iconic 
location: Main Street. For example, Meinig’s description of popular Main Street images 
positions it directly as a centre of the small-town, drawing clear parallels with its proscribed 
role as a point of national orientation: 
 
(Main Street) is ‘middle’ in many connotations: in location – between the frontier to 
the west and the cosmopolitan seaports to the east; in economy – a commercial 
center surrounded by agriculture and augmented by local industry to form a 
balanced diversity.87 
 
Thus, in playing a number of seemingly vital socio-economic roles, Main Street assumes a 
figurative position as the small-town’s heart. This reading of Main Street is reinforced by 
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Richard V. Francaviglia, who argues that “as both a place and a concept, Main Street is 
ubiquitous and characteristically American”; he then locates this “cherished icon” as the 
“heart” of the small-town, incorporating numerous communal and commercial functions.88 
Similarly, Miles Orvell suggests that “Main Street is not only an actual physical place, but, 
more generally, a symbol of core values in American society: community, democracy, and 
family.”89 This conceptual centrality is then mirrored in a spatial description of Main Street; 
returning once more to discourses of Main Street as a figurative heart, Orvell asserts “every 
town or settlement has a central artery running through it, and in the United States that road 
or avenue is known as ‘Main Street’: it is the essence of the small town and synonymous 
with it.”90 However, several other readings of small-town coherence posit the Christian 
church as an alternative conceptual locus for American models of small community (and in 
turn, national identity). For example, Page Smith’s influential As a City upon a Hill draws 
attention to what he refers to as “the covenanted community”; arguing that popular images 
of the small-town found their “original and classic form in New England,” Smith suggests 
that “at the heart of the Puritan community was the church covenant, forming it, binding it, 
making explicit its hopes and its assumptions.”91 Thus, by positing the New England village 
as a foundational small-town archetype, Smith universalises the centralising role of religious 
doctrine, again adopting a lexicon that locates the church as a cultural centre or heart. Again 
taking the New England village as an iconic precursor to more generalised cultural 
representations, MacKinnon also stresses the integral role of religion in structuring 
cinematic images of the town, contending that “the community had at its center the church,” 
ensuring that any defiance towards this image was tantamount to blasphemy.92 Thus, in 
casting both Main Street and the church as (complementary) small-town cores, scholars 
replicate and reify the logocentric functions that Jacques Derrida attributes to the “center” of 
Western metaphysics, a fixed “point of presence” that works to “orient, balance, and 
organize” any totalised structure.93 
 As demonstrated above, numerous readings of the small-town construct a 
microcosmic interconnection, in which the town simultaneously comprises and contains a 
symbolic centre-point. Derrida notes that this meta-structural dynamic is a common attribute 
of metaphysical discourse; in discussing how the “center” forbids the “permutation or 
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transformation of elements,” he argues that such components “may of course be structures 
enclosed within a structure.”94 This observation is particularly pertinent to the 
conceptualisation of a fundamental decentering of the small-town in George Washington. 
Namely, the text displaces its narrative emphasis from normative small-town centres (such 
as Main Street), as these are depicted sporadically and fleetingly; instead, the film focuses 
on derelict, marginal spaces, as ruined houses, dumps, and boarded-up streets provide the 
backdrop for most of the film’s key events and interactions.95 In turn, this textual strategy 
actively exploits aforementioned discursive links, ultimately figuring a wider decentering of 
the town itself from its position as a national cultural heartland. 
 These interrelated tendencies are well illustrated by a sequence that immediately 
follows Buddy’s violent death. Here, we are shown a brief three-minute sequence, beginning 
with a series of repetitive shots of the town junkyard; bulldozers push pieces of garbage and 
architectural waste into amorphous piles. Set to first a dissonant, dirgeful soundtrack, the 
sequence returns frequently to similar shots of heaps and bulldozers, engendering a 
seemingly endless loop (Figs.3.11-3.14): 
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Figs.3.11-3.14 
 
Although these shots play no clear narrative purpose, they characterise representative 
strategies that extend throughout the film. The film obsesses over marginal spaces, places 
that often remain hidden or repressed in representing the small-town as a cogent, uniform 
totality. There are other clear examples of this; we see George wandering around empty car 
parks, we frequently return to the workers on the railway line, and Buddy’s death, a pivotal 
narrative moment, occurs in a disused toilet block. Thus, the film returns again and again to 
these marginal spaces, places where waste is disposed, where workers fulfil menial tasks on 
the periphery of the community. 
 The repositioning of narrative events to the margins of the town is reinforced by a 
complementary focus on structural dereliction. This device, in which small-town geography 
is characterised by architectural decay, internalises an aforementioned topographical 
fragmentation into the very material structure of the location. Rosenbaum notes this dynamic 
in his suggestion that George Washington is “fascinated by ruins and junkyards,”96 a reading 
that is reinforced by Kemp’s assertion that “the camera lingers on scenes of industrial 
dereliction, finding beauty in junkyards and rusting machinery.”97 George Washington’s 
continual meditation upon derelict spaces is exemplified by a scene that directly follows the 
aforementioned junkyard sequence. Having travelled back into town by taxi (with Buddy’s 
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lifeless body slumped on the backseat), Vernon and Sonya hide the corpse in a dilapidated 
house. The shot begins by tightly framing an expansive architectural hole, before zooming 
out to reveal a collapsed roof, cutting soon after to Buddy’s corpse (Figs.3.15-3.16):  
 
 
 
Figs.3.15-3.16 
 
Whilst the exact location of this makeshift burial ground is again obscured, the ruined house 
can be treated as a marginal space as it remains largely hidden from the town’s residents. 
Indeed, the peripheral status of this particular area is reinforced by Vernon’s parting words 
to his dead friend, “ain’t nobody gonna find you here, Buddy, don’t nobody come here”; this 
observation clearly rationalises the choice of the building as an acceptable place to dump a 
body. However, the use of this specific derelict location does not appear to be motivated 
solely by narrative necessity. Instead, it is presented as merely one amongst dozens of 
equitable sites, as the vast majority of the film’s scenes play out against similar backdrops of 
architectural disassemblage. Returning to the example of George Washington’s myriad one-
to-one interactions, these conversations do not appear intrinsically related to the spaces 
within which they unfold; nevertheless, they are linked by their frequently run-down 
settings. Thus, dereliction provides an omnipresent diegetic backdrop; the broken sleepers 
and rusting rails where the young men work (described by Lawrenson as a “sun-scorched 
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patch of wasteland”98); Damascus’ disordered front yard which George deems unsafe; the 
miniature golf range that Vernon himself comments upon, noting its untidiness (“look at this 
place…it looks like two tornadoes came through here.”)  
 Previous critical readings of the film have treated such aspects of the mise-en-scène 
as exemplars of the film’s engagement with themes of rural poverty and deprivation.99   
However, when considered within the context of George Washington’s broader stylistic and 
formal attributes, this strategy takes on a deeper figurative significance. As part of a general 
shifting of the film’s integral scenes from more identifiable small-town settings to marginal, 
indiscernible spaces, it reinforces the film’s decentering of the town’s presumed cultural 
significance. The constant evocation of ruins and material decay also strengthens 
observations made regarding the town’s representation in the film’s opening scenes: the 
fragmentation of the small-town as a unified construct is figured both externally (through 
elliptical editing) and internally within the very material fabric of the town’s buildings, roofs 
and so on. Furthermore, this deconstructive reading of George Washington as a 
complementary decentering and dismantling of the small-town is reinforced by theoretical 
links between these textual strategies and aforementioned post-structuralist critiques of the 
metaphysical centre. Noting its apparently “fundamental immobility and a reassuring 
certitude,” Derrida treats the centre as a logocentric structure par excellence: the term has 
“always designated an invariable presence – eidos, archē, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, 
existence, substance, subject) alētheia, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and so 
forth.”100 As such, clear parallels can again be drawn between this reading of metaphysical 
structure and the small-town’s common construction as a definite, anchored centre of 
American cultural life. 
However, in further exploring the relationship between centre and structure, Derrida 
demonstrates a number of conceptual paradoxes that call into question the essential 
coherence and fixity of the former term. For example, in noting the necessary uniqueness 
(and absolute presence) of the centre, Derrida demonstrates that whilst playing a distinct 
structural role, the centre itself “escapes structurality”;101 as a unique, self-coherent 
singularity, it exceeds the structure’s imposed organisational edicts. As already noted in the 
previous chapter, Derrida views the centre as simultaneously present and absent, “within the 
structure and outside it.”102 Thus, “the center is at the center of the totality, and yet, since the 
center does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totality), the totality has its center 
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elsewhere.”103 This aspect of deconstructive thought has been fittingly elucidated by Derrida 
through the application of architectural metaphor. In an allegorical statement that is equally 
applicable to the fragmented topography of the small-town and the microcosmic disarray of 
its buildings, Derrida summarises the enterprise of deconstruction as the uncovering of 
marginal, faulty blocks or pieces that undermine the solidity of any metaphysical structure: 
 
One first locates…in the art of the system, the ‘neglected corners’ and the ‘defective 
cornerstone,’ that which, from the outset, threatens the coherence and the internal 
order of the construction. But it is a cornerstone! It is required by the architecture 
which it nevertheless, in advance, deconstructs from within. It assures its cohesion 
while situating in advance, in a way that is both visible and invisible (that is, 
corner), the site that lends itself to a deconstruction to come.104  
 
I contend that these Derridean notions of “elsewhere” and “neglected corners” encapsulate 
George Washington’s decentering of the small-town. The film’s central scenes paradoxically 
unfold in peripheral, indiscernible spaces (“both visible and invisible” to the film’s 
characters) that nevertheless play key practical functions as “cornerstones” to an ordered 
small-town existence. Thus, as the film challenges the integrity of small-town structure, the 
centre is always already elsewhere; in marginal corners of the map that escape absolute 
structuration, in places that belong within the small-town yet simultaneously escape its 
homogeneous significances and structural impulses.  
 
Erasing the Centre 
 
 The film’s relative focus on derelict, marginal spaces is only legible insofar that it 
also provides fleeting images of traditional centres of small-town life. As has already been 
established, it is possible to approach both Main Street and the church as complementary 
community centres, core spaces that structure and orientate myriad small-town discourses. 
Importantly, it is these two locations that provide the rare moments in which George 
Washington shifts focus back to geographical or conceptual centre-grounds. To begin with 
Main Street, there are scenes in which it appears to superficially fulfil its idealised function 
as a bustling socio-cultural nexus. The most prominent of these depicts the 4th of July 
parade, a commonly cited symbol of small-town social cohesion: as discussed earlier, 
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Francaviglia notes the “community parade” 105 as one of Main Street’s most prominent 
associations, and Esther Romeyn and Jack Kugelmass place this event within the context of 
a broader tradition of “small-town pageantry.”106 In this sequence, Main Street is shown as a 
vibrant, communal space; the brightness of the mise-en-scène reinforces the pervasive sense 
of positive communality, as crowds of people watch as the parade passes by (Fig.3.17): 
 
 
Fig.3.17 
 
Thus, packed with national icons (Uncle Sam, Cowboys, Beauty Queens) and contented 
families, the street is represented as a venue of national (and local) togetherness.  
 Furthermore, in readings of the symbolic and Main Street, the linearity and direction 
of the central road is highlighted as an integral constitutive figure; Meinig argues that “the 
basic order is linear: Main Street running east to west, a business thoroughfare aligned with 
the axis of national development.”107 Thus, it can be argued that Main Street’s figurative role 
as the town’s “central artery” is reliant itself upon a consistent and contiguous linear 
direction, commonly associated with the expansionist national rhetoric of Manifest Destiny. 
The aforementioned scene superficially appears to embody this integral compositional 
consistency; varied camera angles still provide a largely homogeneous directional flow, as 
the general orientation of the parade unfolds from the right of the frame to the left. However, 
the cinematographic rendering of this sequence pulls against any attempts to establish 
absolute spatial continuity. Whilst it is clear that the procession is located on a central 
avenue, the scene’s editing again separates and isolates the subjects of the parade from this 
specific geographical context. Thus, shot primarily in medium-length, the sequence 
represents the parade not as a continuous movement, but as a series of stand-alone icons; 
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rather than using a long-take to demonstrate the passage of the parade’s attractions, the film 
employs a series of quick cuts, seemingly mimicking the changing focus of a single 
observer, George.  Therefore, Main Street is constructed as an internally paradoxical space; 
on the one hand the parade appears to embrace a figurative “east to west” movement, whilst 
simultaneously being reduced to a chain of discrete, fractured, disseminative images. 
 This reading of Main Street as a site of internal contradiction is reinforced by its 
aesthetic rendering throughout the film. Whilst the parade depicts Main Street as a lively, 
celebratory locale, other moments of the film represent this space very differently; fleeting 
glimpses of the street cast it as materially depressed and deserted (Fig.3.18): 
 
 
Fig.3.18 
 
Thus, in this shot from early in the film, George walks his dog down the street, passing a 
series of boarded-up shops and business premises. Importantly, this image of Main Street 
appears to contradict that which is shown later in the film. Here the street is robbed of its 
perceived communal or structural role, that of an economic or retail centre; the physical 
emptying of this central space figures a semiotic emptying of the small-town sign, draining 
Main Street of its cultural connotations. As a result, seemingly opposed representations of 
Main Street are accommodated into a single text; it is simultaneously a socio-cultural hub 
and a deserted wasteland. Furthermore, this extends beyond prescribed judgements of good 
and bad “sides” of the town that pervade small-town discourse and are referenced in the text 
by Rico: “It’s a nice town. I mean, it’s like any other place, I guess. It’s got its good parts, 
and then, on the other side of the corn, there are the bad parts too.” Yet, in George 
Washington these values are not separated but coexist within the very fabric of a single 
location, Main Street offering a clear example. Thus, as the centre “is by definition unique,” 
229 
 
“a point of presence, a fixed origin,”108 the coexistence of paradoxical images amounts to a 
deconstructive attack on Main Street, robbing it of an essential, totalised significance. 
Finally, this contradictory visual economy is replicated in the film’s representations 
of the church. Akin to Main Street, the church is one of the few settings in the film that 
appears superficially ordered; we are provided a glimpse of a tidy interior as George and 
Buddy chat through a hymn (Fig.3.19): 
 
 
Fig.3.19 
 
However, this image of a neat, tidy religious structure can be contrasted directly with a 
strikingly similar scene from earlier in the film. In this, Buddy, wearing a Dinosaur mask, 
stands on the stage of a similar (but dilapidated) church building, reciting a seemingly 
scriptural passage (Fig.3.20): 
 
 
 
Fig.3.20 
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As can be seen, the two shots share several compositional similarities; both frame the stage 
at a perpendicular angle, concentrating on the human figure(s) in the centre of the image. 
However, the mise-en-scène of the two buildings are extremely different; whilst the first 
(Fig.3.19) is bright and ordered, the second (Fig.3.20) is marked by signs of abandonment; 
graffiti adorns the stage, there are significant holes in the walls, and a tree emanates from the 
centre of the building. Thus, whilst stylistic and cinematographic traits draw the two images 
together, the spaces are represented in near oppositional terms; bright/dark, 
ordered/disordered.  Although this contrast can be explained in narrative terms (it is a 
different church), these contrasting images still produce a striking discordance; the provision 
of two seemingly oppositional representations within the same conceptual space calls into 
direct question the unity or coherence of either depiction. Once again, this observation 
evokes Derrida’s critique of the metaphysical concept of the centre: “the concept of centered 
structure – although it represents coherence itself...is contradictorily coherent.”109 Thus, such 
theoretical links draw George Washington’s representations of centres into broader 
strategies that stress the decentering and fragmentation of the small-town as a cogent cultural 
form. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 In this chapter, George Washington has been approached as a systematic dislocation, 
deconstruction, and decentering of the small-town as a privileged cultural site and narrative 
of American national identity. Feeding upon vital figurative links between architectural, 
topographical, and conceptual structures, the film evokes small-town space and community 
only to cast these as radically disjointed; subverting key discursive properties of 
geographical and cultural homogeneity, small-town wholeness is shattered into a series of 
irresolvable textual fragments. Furthermore, noting common constructions of the small-town 
as a cultural centre, this reading mobilises a specifically Derridean critique to postulate a 
multifaceted structural re-orientation. Thus, in shifting key narrative events to marginal, 
indiscernible, disordered locales, George Washington visualises a microcosmic decentering 
of small-town space that figures a broader dislocation of the town itself as a centre of 
American cultural life. Finally, whilst traditional epicentres of small-town experience are 
occasionally depicted, these are integrated within the film’s broader strategies of textual 
fragmentation and conceptual undecidability, challenging their ontological and structural 
self-coherence. 
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 However, George Washington’s use of architectural and topographical metaphors to 
posit a radical dismantling of small-town structure should not be approached solely as a 
destructive act of semiotic sabotage. Instead, this chapter’s decentering and deconstruction 
of the small-town is presented as a precursor for an affirmative economy of cultural 
différance; from the town’s conceptual rubble and figurative fragments, a more fluid, 
dynamic and diverse reading of American identity can be assembled. Importantly, such an 
act of theoretical production is alluded to by Derrida in further discussions of deconstruction 
through architectural metaphor. Indeed, he argues that deconstruction operates as a 
necessary pre-cursor to any inventive act of construction, typified by this thesis’ call for a 
radical re-inscription of cultural undecidabilty: 
 
Deconstruction does not consist simply of dissociating or disarticulating or 
destroying, but of affirming a certain ‘being together’…construction is possible only 
to the extent that the foundations themselves have been deconstructed…. If the 
foundations are assured, there is no construction; neither is there any invention. 
Invention assumes an undecidability; it assumes that at a given moment there is 
nothing…. Thus deconstruction is the condition of construction, of true invention, of 
a real affirmation that holds something together, that constructs.110  
 
Hence, only by deconstructing and dislocating reductive conceptualisations of the small-
town as a fixed national centre can a more heterogeneous, non-proscriptive model of 
American cultural experience be erected in its place. Utilising George Washington as a 
textual launching-pad for a radical gesture of structural disassemblage, this chapter initiates 
a call for new (non-metaphysical) acts of cultural construction that embody this thesis’ more 
general theoretical objectives and principles.   
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Chapter Five - Denaturalising Nature: Reconsidering the 
American Wilderness 
 
Wilderness and American National Identity 
  
 Environmental historian Roderick Nash positions wilderness at the very centre of a 
developing American character, dating back to the earliest sustained settlement of the New 
World in the late 17th century. Introducing the 2001 edition of Wilderness and the American 
Mind, Nash contends that “Wilderness was the basic ingredient of American culture…with 
the idea of wilderness they sought to give their civilization identity and meaning.”1 Whilst 
following this statement with an exploration of the idea’s contestation and transformation 
throughout American cultural history, Nash notes its enduring significance to myriad 
national identity constructions. Suggesting that “the American attitude toward wilderness is 
much older and more complex than we customarily assume,”2 Nash implies that changing 
perspectives on wilderness have actually reaffirmed its cultural importance. Simplistically 
summarising a perceived shift from treating wilderness as an “adversary” to an “asset,” its 
recent appreciation is itself attributed to a heightened perception that “uncontrolled 
nature…had a lot to do with American character and tradition.”3 
 Nash’s influential study of wilderness discourse demonstrates a series of intellectual 
assumptions that have cemented the concept as figuratively and culturally significant. 
Described as a “the nation’s most sacred myth of origin,”4 the “breeding grounds of a 
particular type of American national character,”5 and “an article of cultural nationalism,”6 
untamed nature pervades diverse academic engagements with American identity. Whether 
summarising, reaffirming, or critiquing previous constructions of nationhood, wilderness 
(and its relation to civilisation) is consistently treated as a vital conceptual locus. This 
discursive pre-eminence is supported by more general critical trends that theorise American 
culture as uniquely and closely related to nature. Drawing upon readings of the continent as 
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an untouched “virgin land,”7 “arcadia,”8 or potential “garden,”9 perceptions of the New 
World landscape reinforce the socio-cultural importance of wilderness terrains. Applying a 
rhetorical device referred to by Lawrence Buell as “the America-as-nature reduction,”10 
numerous popular and theoretical texts reinforce Emersonian ideals of America as “nature’s 
nation.”11 Furthermore, Catrin Gersdorf argues that these conceptual links retain their 
originary national importance: “the idea of wilderness as conceptually definitive in the 
formation of an American national identity survived well into the 20th century”; wilderness 
provides “a semiotic frame of reference for defining America as a nation.”12  
Accordingly, the presence of diverse natural discourses attests to the function of 
wilderness as a cultural narrative, as disparate attitudes are rationalised within a series of 
totalised conceptual constructs. This narrational function is reflected in Leo Braudy’s 
assertion that “the implicit but official American view of nature is…a fundamental, even 
fundamentalist search for master myths through which nature can be both revealed and 
conquered by story.”13 Furthermore, readings of wilderness as a cultural narrative draw upon 
recent scholarship that locates “wild nature” as a primarily socio-cultural construct. William 
Cronon provides a radical example of this approach in his assertion that “far from being the 
one place on earth that stands apart from humanity, (wilderness) is quite profoundly a human 
creation – indeed, the creation of very particular human cultures at very particular moments 
in human history.”14 In turn, he notes that perceptions of wilderness as a natural entity 
disguise its status as a cultural product: “Wilderness hides its unnaturalness behind a mask 
that is all the more beguiling because it seems so natural.”15 This view is reinforced by Neil 
Evernden, who notes that connotations of “the real” or “essence” are frequently attached to 
the concept of nature.16 Thus, such observations reinforce the wilderness’ metaphysical 
function in an American context; it is rendered a structure of semiotic regulation, effacing its 
rootedness within specific thought systems and cultural contexts.   
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 Aforementioned scholarly studies chart a rich historical and intellectual tradition of 
exploring the significance of wilderness to American national self-coherence. Indeed, 
wilderness and the related conception of the frontier underpin notable formative accounts of 
the United States’ cultural development; the most prominent exponent of this intellectual 
trend is Frederick Jackson Turner, who directly correlates perceived American values to the 
material “wilderness condition” of frontier life and a shared national project of civilising an 
alien wild nature.17 Furthermore, esteemed 19th and 20th century American writers and 
activists (such as Henry Thoreau and John Muir) have been credited with both transforming 
and cementing the prominence of wilderness in American popular discourses.18 In doing so, 
conventional historical narratives suggest “transcendentalist” or “romantic” figures shifted 
the perceived relationship between man and nature. Rather than providing an adversarial 
geographical “other” against which to forge national meaning, wilderness has also been 
theorised as a realm of psychic enrichment and even a signifier of human (and national) 
consciousness.19     
 This simplified, foundational summary of American wilderness thought is expanded 
upon further in this introductory section. However, it is important to note the manner in 
which these categories structure existing readings of wilderness and national identity; in 
turn, such observations underlie this chapter’s resultant displacement of these self-same 
classifications. This economy of two dominant, relational paradigms between wilderness and 
American identity is neatly summarised by Nash. Whilst suggesting that “from the raw 
materials of the physical wilderness Americans built a civilization,” he paradoxically notes 
that “the roots of the story lie in the fact that civilization created wilderness.”20 Although 
Nash suggests that it is impossible to separate America’s physical and mental relationship 
with wilderness, a shift in emphasis between the two forms of association encapsulates the 
differences between existing constructions of American wilderness identity. This 
dichotomous logic can be explicated by first returning to the work of Turner. Whilst the 
experience of frontier wilderness is often viewed as a key constituent of a (dynamic) 
American character, for Turner it engendered a distinct national ontology by locating 
                                                          
17
 Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” in Rereading 
Frederick Jackson Turner: “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” and Other Essays, 
ed. John Mack Faragher (New York: Henry Holt, 1994), 31-60. For discussions of the “frontier 
myth,” see Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 24; Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation: The 
Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1998), 1-26.   
18
 See Max Oelschlaeger, The Idea of Wilderness: From Prehistory to the Age of Ecology (London: 
Yale University Press, 1991), 97-204. 
19
 David Melbye, Landscape Allegory in Cinema: From Wilderness to Wasteland (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 35; John R. Short, Imagined Country: Environment, Culture and Society 
(London: Routledge, 1991), 10. 
20
 Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, xi. 
235 
 
American subjects at “the meeting point between savagery and civilisation”: “This perennial 
rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion westward with its new opportunities, its 
continuous touch with the simplicity of primitive society, furnish the forces dominating 
American character.”21 Thus, while frontier settlers forged civilisation from wilderness, the 
very project of westward expansion provided the necessary material conditions to engender 
a uniquely American identity.  
Conversely, romantic readings of wilderness place greater emphasis on the 
conceptual worth of nature and its relation to human subjectivity. For example, Max 
Oelschlaeger characterises romantic wilderness engagements as sharing a “poetic view of 
nature,” gravitating “towards its wild and mysterious aspects, the felt qualitative rather than 
measured quantitative dimensions of experience.”22 Whilst this is attributed to wider 
European theological and intellectual trends, changing attitudes to wild nature are also 
discussed in relation to shifting conceptions of American identity.23 Thus, in postulating the 
influence of the romantic “sublime” on American wilderness attitudes, numerous theorists 
note that these ideas infiltrated cultural and artistic representations of a perceptible national 
character. For example, although Cronon postulates a convergence of frontier and sublime 
images of the American wilderness, he suggests that this synergy has encouraged the 
“freighting” of wilderness with “cultural symbols,” loading wilderness “with some of the 
deepest core values of the culture that created and idealized it.”24 Furthermore, this shift in 
emphasis from a denotative to connotative wilderness is further expressed in his assertion 
that “the romantic legacy means that wilderness is more a state of mind than a fact of 
nature.”25 
Thus, wilderness does not merely provide a physical basis for forging American 
civilisation; it is simultaneously rendered an intellectual construct and a psychic mirror, an 
existential basis for reformulating theistic human-nature relations and American social 
ideals. Whilst addressing these aforementioned themes with varying degrees of reflexivity, 
numerous readings mobilise dualistic formulations to reconcile differing conceptions of 
nature and wilderness in an American context; antinomies of “classical” vs. “romantic,”26 
“modernist” vs. “romantic,”27 and “classical humanist” vs. “progressive”28 characterise this 
binary logic. Oppositional framings of discordant wilderness views are further grounded in 
normative historical accounts of their development. As suggested by Oelschlaeger, 
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“romantic” attitudes to the wilderness are frequently considered as a direct critique of 
existing views that constructed the American environment as an “other” to be overcome and 
subjugated.29 Nevertheless, certain critical accounts demonstrate a co-presence of seemingly 
antithetical values. For example, Michael L. Johnson posits a foundational “double attitude” 
held by settlers first entering the American west, simultaneously conceptualising the new 
territory as Eden and hell.30 Discussing contemporary cultural perspectives, Buell explores a 
similar conceptual concurrence: “for more than a century the United States has been at once 
a nature-loving and resource-consuming nation.”31 Thus, whilst American natural discourse 
has oscillated between purportedly paradoxical trends of wilderness exploitation and 
veneration, contemporary critics frequently position such views as structurally interrelated 
aspects of a shared national narrative.  
Evidently, any deconstructive engagement with the wilderness necessitates a 
fundamental questioning of these reductive, bifurcated theoretical frameworks, in which 
myriad cultural attitudes are homogenised within antonymic terms. However, in this critical 
overview of American wilderness discourse these conceptual frames are strategically utilised 
to structure the following discussion. This does not constitute an acceptance of the integrity 
of pre-existing representational categories; rather, only by mobilising normative 
classifications can their underlying binary logic be shaken. In the following analyses I 
demonstrate not only the dichotomous relationship between differing American conceptions 
of wilderness, but also the dualistic foundations of the very representations themselves. 
Namely, such attitudes tacitly mobilise an ordering logic based upon metaphysical 
oppositions of nature/culture and wilderness/civilisation, perceptible even in readings that 
ostensibly question such dichotomies. Therefore, similar theoretical assumptions can be 
observed within seemingly disparate popular and academic responses to the American 
environment, accounting for their supposed coexistence in contemporary cultural debates. 
Finally, drawing upon recent “ecocritical” scholarship, I use these discursive analyses as a 
basis for textual readings that dismantle pervasive conceptual bifurcations.32  
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From the “Howling Wilderness” to the “Garden of the World” 
 
 Normative accounts of New World settlement theorise a primarily adversarial 
relationship between the human subject and natural landscape. Nash suggests that the 
pioneers faced a continent of material and figurative danger; confronted with the “vast 
blankness” of a “boundless wilderness,” Euro-Americans viewed the landscape as a “dark 
and sinister symbol,” an acultural realm signifying “a moral vacuum, a cursed and chaotic 
wasteland.”33 Subsequent theorists have noted the enduring importance of such attitudes to 
prevailing American images of wild nature, arguing that Americans construct wilderness as 
a “negative”34  or “generic, blank space.”35 Such readings endorse a simplistic, totalising 
semiotics of American landscape, as it is deemed to signify a lack of cultural meaning itself; 
wilderness represents the unrepresentable, an empty inhuman void. In turn, by characterising 
the wilderness as essentially acultural, absolutist distinctions are drawn between wilderness 
and civilisation. This dualistic gesture is coherently elucidated by Michael Richardson in his 
observation that “‘America’, both as a place and an idea, was founded in an encounter with 
what was other to itself,” an “alien” wilderness;36 as Gersdorf cogently summarises, 
“wilderness is the metaphoric domain of the other.”37  
 Whilst Puritan images of a “howling” nature have been linked to pre-existing 
cultural and theological discourses,38 wilderness has frequently been considered as a vital 
marker of American difference. The sheer scale of seemingly uncultivated land purportedly 
demarcated formative American experiences from European socio-cultural conditions, 
confronting settlers with a wilderness that had no identifiable “old world” equivalent.39 
Thus, the clear delineation of wild and civilised spaces is commonly perceived as a 
structural foundation for a uniquely expansionist American identity. This interplay of 
cultural and physical forms is again summarised by Gersdorf, who argues that: “the 
transformation of nature into civilization, land into landscape, landscape into text, and text 
into a social and political tool for producing and reproducing a nation’s cultural identity is a 
process foundational for our understanding of America.”40 Readings of American cultural 
development do not posit a static relationship between equitable but opposed values of 
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civilisation and wilderness; rather, their separation facilitates a logocentric, hierarchical 
dynamic of subjugation, “a call for expansionism.”41 
 Narratives of an American identity forged from the civilising of wilderness provide 
the central thesis for a variety of influential historical and American studies texts. As 
suggested previously, Turner’s prominent notion of a “frontier thesis” intractably ties the 
development of a national character to a continual process of westward expansion.42 As 
Henry Nash Smith comments, this conceptualisation of a moveable frontier materialises 
ontological divisions; for Turner, “the outer limit of agricultural settlement is the boundary 
of civilization,” whilst “the wilderness beyond the frontier” is “the realm of savagery.”43 
Richard Slotkin observes a similar bifurcated economy in broader constructions of the 
frontier as a “national myth,” positioning wild nature (and its inhabitants) as the opposite 
(and enemy) of American culture: “the moral landscape of the frontier myth is divided by 
significant borders, of which the wilderness/civilization, Indian/White border is the most 
basic.”44 Thus, expansionist theses of American development also reinforce the hierarchical 
implications of a foundational nature/culture distinction. In characterising the frontiersman 
as “the agent of civilization,” Nash notes that “civilizing the New World meant enlightening 
darkness, ordering chaos, and changing evil into good.”45 This argument is replicated in John 
R. Short’s generalised analysis of New World states: “nation-building has been intimately 
related to conquering the wilderness…the transformation of the wilderness has a special 
place in their national identity.”46 In turn, Buell claims that nature has been “otherized” in 
modern thought,47 paradoxically symbolising both empty wilderness and an untapped and 
exploitable region of material wealth.48 
 As alluded to previously, historical accounts of the civilising of wilderness 
frequently stress theological antecedents. For example, the expansionist conception of 
Manifest Destiny furnished an overtly nationalist project with religious justification. In such 
arguments, holy scripture provides an overarching aim for settlers, a call to continue God’s 
work in fashioning Eden from an “unredeemed wasteland”; as Short notes, “transforming the 
wilderness was a sacred act of redemption as well as a secular act of survival.”49 In drawing 
together the theological and national, wilderness discourse has also been linked with 
constructions of American “pastoral ideology” and “the Myth of the Garden.”50 Whilst 
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certain theorists argue that American wild nature itself has been perceived as an earthly 
paradise, prominent American discourses venerate a “middle landscape” of cultivated 
wilderness, “a rural nation exhibiting a happy balance of art and nature.”51 In turn, American 
idealisations of pastoral life are frequently tied to the cultivation of a singular cultural 
identity; Thomas Jefferson attributed America’s formative democratic ideals of freedom and 
individualism to experiences with agrarian land, typified in his veneration of the “yeoman 
farmer.”52 Importantly, such an idyll, whilst frequently treated as an implicit critique of 
urban civilisation,53 is predicated upon the technological advances of western culture.54 
Thus, American agrarianism superficially challenges strict delineations of cultural 
and natural space, positing a civilised wilderness as a national “master symbol.”55 Indeed, 
Leo Marx suggests that the “pastoral ideal” engages with (yet escapes) dualistic 
theorisations of nature and culture: “it is located in a middle ground somewhere ‘between’, 
yet in transcendent relation to, the opposing forces of civilisation and nature.”56 However, 
the agrarian middle landscape is fundamentally sustained by the self-same binary structures 
that it mediates and (purportedly) eludes. As Richard Lehan demonstrates, “Adamic books” 
(such as Marx’s Machine in the Garden) “upheld a dialectic or binary system of meaning” 
that set out a series of dualistic structures before endorsing one side of the opposition.57 
Furthermore, noting the difficulties of defining wilderness and civilisation, Nash argues that 
differing subjective images of wilderness should be approached as a “spectrum of conditions 
or environments ranging from the purely wild on the one end to the purely civilized on the 
other – from the primeval to the paved.”58 In suggesting that this model accounts for a 
“shading or blending” of natural and cultural landscapes, Nash locates the agrarian middle 
landscape as a centre-point: “in the middle portions of the spectrum is the rural or pastoral 
environment…that represents a balance of the forces of nature and man.”59 However, as 
suggested in chapter one, continuum models can only operate if their conceptual endpoints 
maintain essential, a priori ontologies that can be subsequently merged or balanced. Thus, 
American wilderness thought can be approached as fundamentally logocentric, even in those 
cases that it reflexively challenges its dualistic foundations.60 
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The “Romantic” Wilderness 
 
 Whilst the subjugation of wilderness is treated as a foundational national pursuit, 
scholarly accounts of American identity often posit a “romantic” counter-attitude that arose 
as its historical antonym. As suggested earlier, views that superficially venerate wilderness 
landscapes are usually formulated as an antithesis to those that treat American nature as a 
conquerable acultural other; as Nash argues, the spread of “romantic” aesthetic ideas led to 
“a striking change in the concept of wild nature,” which “by the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century” had ensured “wilderness was recognized as a cultural and moral 
resource and a basis for national self-esteem.”61 This statement implies a radical, ongoing 
change in American wilderness thought, in which the logocentric subjugation of nature 
comes under fundamental critique; indeed, as Nash writes in 2001, “American wilderness 
appreciation and preservation must be understood as recent, revolutionary and still 
incomplete.”62  
Superficially, a number of prominent ideas associated with cultural “romanticism” 
destabilize the classical delineation of civilisation and wilderness. For example, romanticism 
ostensibly stresses the theological interconnectedness of cultural and natural worlds, a moral 
imperative calling for direct human experience of the wilderness. Whilst Nash claims that 
defining romanticism is fraught with difficulty, he notes that the movement engendered a 
general “appreciation” of wilderness by intractably associating nature with a heavenly 
creator.63 If wilderness now signified God’s work, the deity provided a unifying structure 
that granted humanity and nature the same ontological essence; “the romantics had a 
pantheistic vision, a belief that god was everywhere.”64 Thus, as Oelschlaeger summarises, 
“nature was not alien but rather kindred to human spirit,” a product of God’s unifying 
presence as “first cause of all”; “God was the identity of mind and nature.”65 By extension, 
any absolute separation of humanity from nature disavows their fundamental spiritual 
relatedness; the connection between “humans and nature” is established as vital “to the 
Romantics in their critical reaction to Modernism.”66   
The romantic association of God with nature is closely linked to contemporaneous 
theorisations of the sublime. Explored by 18th century philosophers such as Immanuel Kant 
and Edmund Burke, experience of the sublime ensured that “nature and wilderness began to 
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take on meanings of reverence and awe,”67 precipitating an aesthetic response of “exultation, 
awe and delight” at the spectacle of wild nature.68 Furthermore, the sublime is posited as the 
product of an unmediated experience of the divine residing in the wilderness; Oelschlaeger 
notes that “the feelings of the sublime were, in the tradition of physico-theology, 
contemporary evocations of the same feelings humankind experienced in the prelapsarian 
condition when God manifested himself directly.”69 In this sense, the sublime encapsulates 
the perceived transformation of wilderness from a negative to “a sacred space.”70 In doing 
so, the sublime also appears inextricably tied to romantic theorisations of Man’s spiritual 
connection with wilderness. The sublime experience actualises attempts “to correlate the 
processes of the human mind to the surrounding natural universe.”71 
American manifestations of romantic wilderness appreciation exemplify this 
idealised integration of natural and cultural forces. Stressing the experiential connectedness 
of nature and the sublime, romantics established a wilderness experience that “brought about 
not a bewilderment but a renewed contact with deeper psychological truths and a more 
pronounced spiritual awareness.”72 Typified by Thoreau’s assertion that “in wildness is the 
preservation of the world,” romantic ideals provide the apparent source of a prominent 
American ecological trope, the “beneficial retreat to the wilderness.”73 Here, the human 
subject utilises the seclusion of nature to learn fundamental existential truths, a greater 
understanding of the human soul or psyche; wild nature provides “contemplative encounters, 
occasions for human beings to reflect on life and cosmos, on meaning and significance.”74 In 
positing the potentially enriching power of wilderness, such narratives draw upon 
“primitivist” discourses typified by the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau; “wild nature was 
idealized as an oasis free of the ills of civilization,” allowing a potential return to a “natural 
existence” that placed humanity in a unmediated relationship with the environment.75 In this 
sense, wilderness “became a symbol of an earthly paradise, the place of before the fall where 
people lived in close harmony and deep sympathy with nature.”76  
Finally, romantic ideas of an “intense personal involvement with and aesthetic 
response to nature” have been read as a reaffirmation of wilderness as central component of 
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American national identity.77 As Nash notes, the supposedly virgin continent of “pathless 
forests and savages” appeared to closely encapsulate ideals of mysterious nature engrained 
in the “romantic imagination.”78 Furthermore, the romantic re-inscription of holy wilderness 
is established as an important source of social cohesion and national pride: “if, as many 
suspected, wilderness was the medium through which God spoke most clearly, then America 
had a distinct moral advantage over Europe, where centuries of civilization had deposited a 
layer of artificiality over His works.”79 This construction of wilderness as a “cultural and 
moral resource and a basis for national self-esteem” dominates discourses on 
contemporaneous representations of nature.80 Typified by the work of artists like Thomas 
Cole, pictorial representations of the American landscape cemented idealisations of 
wilderness as a “source of nationalism”;81 this marked a historical “shift from a primarily 
religious to a national, psychological, and literary significance of wilderness.”82 Thus, the 
multifaceted romantic discourse of wilderness as a theological realm, an environment of 
human and natural synergy, and a site of national exceptionalism are drawn together in the 
positioning of wild nature as a centre-point for a developing American character. 
Whilst romantic views are historicised as an overt critique of existing wilderness 
formulations, recent ecocritical work has demonstrated their shared foundation in 
metaphysical binary logic. For example, J. Baird Callicott diagnoses a structural affinity 
between seemingly distinct wilderness attitudes, which he groups under the term “the 
received wilderness idea.”83 Stressing the links between perceptions of wild nature and 
puritan theology, Callicott argues: 
  
To the first generations of Puritans in America, man was created in the image of god 
and, if not good, at least the Elect among men were put in the service of a good God 
to enlighten a benighted, dismal and howling wilderness continent. To later 
generations of Puritans, the positive and negative poles of the dualism were 
reversed…. Nature became a foil for man’s sins and depravity. It was transformed 
into the embodiment of goodness.84  
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Rather than fundamentally dismantling classical wilderness narratives, romantic views are 
treated as outgrowths of the same philosophical and theological systems. Both attitudes rely 
upon a strict, hierarchical opposition between nature and culture; as Evernden notes, 
conflicting views of nature as “pure” and “bestial” are “flip sides of a semantic coin that was 
minted in our distant past.” 85 Thus, the frequent positioning of romanticism as a critique of 
cultural modernity structurally reifies a strict binary opposition between natural and cultural 
environments initiated in more adversarial conceptualisations of wilderness.86 For example, 
although Thoreau theorised “an organic connection between Homo sapiens and nature,” 
such a correspondence can only be experienced through an absolutist rejection of human 
civilisation; as Oelschlaeger argues, “Thoreau believes that the essence of freedom resides 
not in culture but in nature.”87 In this manner, wilderness/civilisation oppositions are 
retained in a simplistically inverted form; as Sean Cubitt notes, “the Romantics sang up the 
resistance of wilderness to ‘improvement’, reinforcing the sense that the forests and 
mountains were the other of the factories and tenements.”88 
 Finally, the logocentric tenor of these critiques is further cemented by addressing 
perceived currents of “resourcism” and “preservationism” in contemporary wilderness 
thought. Oelschlaeger intractably ties “resource conservation” with “the intense 
homocentrism of Judeo-Christianity and the alchemy of Modernism,” echoing foundational 
American ideals of nature as an entity that “exist(s) solely as means in terms of which 
human ends might be fulfilled.”89 Thus, foundational definitions of nature as a human 
resource reaffirm an outlook in which “Human life takes place outside of nature, and the 
boundaries between wilderness and civilisation are definite.”90 Conversely, preservationism 
is perceived as a direct challenge to resourcist aims, arguing for the protection of certain 
natural areas as dynamic, singular ecosystems, an acultural world under threat from human 
intervention. Although environmental preservation appears diametrically opposed to 
conservationist aims, they are both predicated upon the clear, modernist delineation of 
civilisation and wilderness.91 Noting a dominant premise that “nature, to be natural, must 
also be pristine – remote from humanity and untouched by our common past,” Cronon 
argues that environmentalist discourse appeals “to wilderness as the standard against which 
to measure the failings of our human world.”92 Thus, in directly opposing debased 
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civilisation with pure nature, “wilderness embodies a dualistic vision in which the human is 
entirely outside the natural.”93 For Cronon, preservationism reinforces the same essentialist 
economy that underlies nature/culture antagonism and “environmentally irresponsible 
behaviour”: “to the extent that we celebrate wilderness as the measure with which we judge 
civilization, we reproduce the dualism that sets humanity and nature at opposite poles.”94 As 
a result, romantic currents in American wilderness operate within closed systems of 
logocentric antinomy, tying them closely to metaphysical meaning-structures and the 
specific national identity discourses they sustain. 
 
Cinematic Nature 
 
In relating this chapter’s case-study texts with a deconstructive reading of American 
wilderness, this project can be contextualised within recent scholarly attempts to reconsider 
the relationship between nature and cinema. Numerous theoretical texts have approached the 
cinematic representation of wild landscapes as a visual iteration of an antagonistic (and 
destructively anthropocentric) relationship between demarcated cultural and natural spheres. 
For example, whilst eventually challenging such totalising assertions, Derek Bousé 
ironically inflates common arguments that liken cinematic representations of the 
environment to the material exploitation and subjugation of wilderness; he bemoans that 
wildlife films are often viewed as “attempts to exert a sort of god-like control over nature.”95 
Such attitudes are critically interrogated in David Ingram’s more detailed work on 
wilderness cinematography. In arguing that a variety of stylistic, aesthetic, and formal 
processes have been used to construct natural settings as free of human artifice, Ingram notes 
that this trend reinforces a hierarchical human subject/natural object division; “the cinematic 
construction of natural landscape as pristine is based on an aesthetics of exclusion.”96 Citing 
ecocritics like Karla Armbruster and Andrew Ross, Ingram then unpacks recent academic 
discourses that have intractably related the cinematic apparatus to a multifaceted domination 
of wilderness, enacting a figurative despoiling, exploitation, and occupation of natural space 
and resources.97 Finally, Ingram notes a medium-specific argument that cinematic 
landscapes are often relegated to an auxiliary narrative role, operating as (in Jhan 
Hochman’s words) “a two-dimensional backdrop to the human drama.”98 
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  However, this seemingly inherent representational subjugation of landscape has 
been questioned in several recent works of film theory. Indeed, Ingram ultimately questions 
the validity of such readings by noting an “implicit formalism” that is “problematic.”99 Thus, 
basing his counter-argument on the premise that “the meaning of a shot is context-
dependent,” Ingram observes that “there is…nothing in a shot of an empty landscape that 
inherently signifies the separation of human beings from nature, or the desire to master and 
exploit nature.”100 Linking this issue to a specifically American national context, he then 
notes that “images of sublime landscapes in American popular culture have served the 
interests of both preservationism and development, depending on the context of their 
reception.”101 Similarly, Braudy suggests that “nature films” turn popular cinema into a 
prominent discursive arena within which aforementioned wilderness dualisms can be 
critically interrogated: “the nature-culture continuum has a major thematic and structural 
force in the films, especially in terms of tensions between civilization…and primitivism.”102 
These observations underlie new trends in film scholarship that account for a greater 
variety of cinematic landscape representations. Most prominently, recent texts theorise a 
shift in the significance of environment in relation to the film’s narrative protagonists. For 
example, several critics have constructed “ecocentric” textual analyses that treat nature as 
the primary repository of cinematic meaning, extending beyond its assumed role as a 
denotative backdrop. For example, Pat Brereton has hypothesised a growing emphasis on 
wilderness in recent Hollywood film, in which sublime spectacle elevates the natural world 
from a role as setting to one which figures a plethora of complex ecological ideas. 
Ultimately, Brereton postulates the possibility of a direct address between landscape and 
audience; “raw nature” speaks “unmediated” through spectacular visual excess, 
“foregrounded” in its own terms.103 As a result, rather than being defined in relation to 
human or cultural activity, images of sublime nature carry their own appeal and significance, 
allowing them to act as potential conduits for utopian ecological themes; indeed, Brereton 
argues that in many popular films the environment itself determines the actions of the human 
protagonists.104  
Conversely, David Melbye approaches the natural environment in cinema neither as 
background object or foreground subject, but rather as a reflection of “inner subjective states 
of the principle character or protagonist.”105 Thus, Melbye’s reading problematizes previous 
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considerations of environment as pristine and acultural; instead, such an approach alludes to 
the interrelations between nature and culture in constructing a “landscape of the mind,” a 
process frequently related  to broader cultural tendencies of constructing meaningful “place” 
from natural “space.”106 P. Adams Sitney also argues that “the landscapes of narrative 
cinema” should not merely be approached as blank backdrops; rather, they “are latent 
expressionistic theatres, confronting or echoing the minds of the human figures within 
them.”107 Finally, engaging with similar issues in a narrower (but relevant) corpus, Scott 
MacDonald specifically explores the role of cultural landscapes in recent American 
independent cinema. Whilst MacDonald’s text focuses almost exclusively upon existing 
categories of experimental or avant-garde film, it once again demonstrates the pervasiveness 
of natural space in recent film criticism. Specifically, MacDonald’s study links cinematic 
images of nature to prominent constructions of American place, a focus that both informs 
and augments the aims of this thesis.108 
Yet, whether theoretically privileging the spectacle of nature above narrative action, 
or locating it as a reflection of personal or national subjectivity, this growing emphasis on 
cinematic landscape does not challenge anthropocentric delineations. Whilst rejecting the 
strict exclusion and subjugation of the environment as pristine, the integrity of nature and 
culture as coherent categories is ensured; as with romantic challenges to the classical 
wilderness, the conscious foregrounding of natural over cultural content constitutes a 
simplistic inversion of bifurcated theoretical frames. Similarly, whilst the attribution of 
cultural meaning to the natural landscape may suggest an interrelation of natural and cultural 
realms, they remain practicably separate. For nature to reflect culture both concepts must 
remain distinctly definable and self-coherent; a static conception of nature signifies 
particular, unified cultural meanings (“allegoriz(ing) the mindset of a particular nation.”)109 
Nevertheless, such approaches provide a rich critical discourse within which the following 
analyses can actively intervene. Rather than reading this chapter’s case-study films as further 
reformulations of a static relationship between nature and culture, they will be approached as 
overdue deconstructive engagements with the metaphysics of American wilderness.  
The first case-study, Dead Man (1995), provides a sustained disruption of the 
nature/culture dualism that underlies diverse wilderness constructions. Primarily read as an 
idiosyncratic western, the film’s relationship with American cultural narration has been 
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contextualised within broader interrogations of this genre’s attributes, icons, and 
oppositions. However, whilst readings of the text as a deconstructive Western are common, 
any sustained analysis of the film’s representation of wilderness has been largely sidelined. 
Thus, refocusing existing generic interpretations of the film, this reading suggests that Dead 
Man elucidates a number of broader theoretical tensions that precipitate intense debate in 
ecocritical discourses. Conceptual couplets of nature/culture and wilderness/civilisation are 
radically effaced by a consistent logic of undecidability, a Derridean gesture already 
established in this thesis’ earlier analyses. Finally, I conclude with a close-reading of the 
film’s re-mapping of linearity and horizontality in logocentric cinematic and cultural 
landscape depictions.  
As explored earlier, popular and literary discourses treat the wilderness as a 
theoretical and material foundation of American culture; however, wild nature is 
simultaneously read as a socio-cultural construct of an American national imagination. In 
recent critical readings of Gerry (2002), a similar paradoxical economy is legible, as the 
text’s wilderness setting is interpreted as either an acultural “other” to the protagonists or as 
the product of their shifting and chaotic subjectivities. In contrast, I argue that the film 
reflexively questions the very project of establishing any fixed meaning from Gerry’s 
landscape setting. By focusing specifically on the formal and stylistic rendering of 
wilderness terrains, this chapter locates within Gerry’s landscape(s) a reflexive critique of 
normative wilderness cinematography; the film’s setting is rendered as a terrain of 
ontological undecidability, evidenced by the fraught attempts of Gerry’s protagonists to 
interpret and escape the wilderness. Thus, Gerry’s wilderness environs evoke a variety of 
semiotic and structural processes that motion towards (but ultimately defer) any intelligible 
cultural significance, rendering it a heterogeneous landscape of différance.  
 
Dead Man and the Western Wilderness  
 
“Look out the window. Doesn’t this remind you of when you were in the boat, and then later 
that night you were lying looking up at the ceiling, and the water in your head was not 
dissimilar from the landscape. And you think to yourself, ‘Why is it that the landscape is 
moving, but the boat is still?’” 
 
 The above quote, uttered by a train’s fireman (Crispin Glover) to William Blake 
(Johnny Depp), institutes Dead Man’s central narrative arc and its consistent engagement 
with wilderness/civilisation antinomies. Leaving behind his Cleveland home for 
accountancy work in the frontier town of Machine, Blake travels across a transformative 
western landscape. On the journey, he is confronted by disparate characters and natural 
248 
 
vistas, punctuated by foreboding, violent scenes; he observes locals shooting Buffalo 
through the windows of the carriage, and is warned by the fireman that he is as likely to 
“find his own grave” as he is prosperity.110 Arriving at the end of the line, Blake steps with 
trepidation through the town’s central thoroughfare, surrounded by steer skulls and other 
signifiers of death.111 Reaching his prospective employer, Blake is told that he is too late, 
and that his job has already been filled. He demands to see the plant’s owner, but upon 
entering Mr. Dickinson’s (John Hurt) office he is threatened with a shotgun and retreats to a 
nearby saloon. Outside the tavern Blake meets a woman named Thel (Mili Avital). Blake 
spends the night with her, before their entente is interrupted by Charlie, her ex-boyfriend 
(Gabriel Byrne). Aiming a pistol at his rival, Charlie accidently shoots Thel dead, the bullet 
passing through her and into Blake; Blake retaliates by killing Charlie, before escaping on a 
stolen horse.   
 Awaking in the wild garden beyond Machine, Blake finds he is being treated by a 
Native American who goes by the moniker “Nobody” (Gary Farmer); he unsuccessfully 
attempts to cut the bullet out of Blake’s mortal wound. When told that he is talking to 
William Blake, Nobody is aghast, confusing the wounded Easterner with the famous British 
poet; he is aware of the writer’s work from his English education, following his capture, 
deportation, and exploitation as a circus act. From this point, Nobody assumes an 
overarching narrative goal, to guide Blake to the western shore; Blake’s expiring form will 
be set out onto the Pacific Ocean, a spiritual ceremony designed to send his soul to “the next 
level of the world.” The film’s remaining scenes are structured around the pair’s travels 
across the wilderness, as they are stalked by marshals and bounty hunters (Lance Henriksen, 
Michael Wincott and Eugene Byrd) eager to cash in a reward for Blake’s capture or death 
(offered by Mr. Dickinson, Charlie’s father). Encountering (and extinguishing) these threats, 
Blake gradually transforms into a “proficient killer.”112 Blake and Nobody’s journey finally 
ends when they reach a Makah settlement on the Northwest coast; by this point Blake is near 
death. In the film’s final scene, Blake floats out to sea on a canoe; as he looks back at the 
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shore for a final time, he sees a gunfight between Nobody and one of the bounty hunters, a 
shootout that ends fatally for both participants.     
 Unsurprisingly, existing readings of Dead Man contextualise the film within generic 
discourses of the western. Importantly, the establishment of landscape as prominent focus in 
recent film scholarship appears partially indebted to prominent studies of this genre; as 
Cubitt summarises, “the old Western, as myth of origin of the nation-state in the USA, was 
characteristically interested in westward expansion, in the civilising of the wilderness, and 
the preservation of wilderness values into the newly civilised.”113 Addressed explicitly in 
structuralist genre studies, a series of binary oppositions have been used to elucidate the 
western’s semantic composition;114 these antinomies are cast as mythic contradictions, 
mirroring the conceptual tensions embedded within broader discourses on wilderness and 
American national identity.115 Nevertheless, structuralist approaches reify the metaphysical 
arrangements they interrogate: as demonstrated in the previous chapter on small-town films, 
such approaches solidify the antonymic terms they study, rationalising a potential 
multiplicity of representations into restrictive conceptual monoliths.  
Bearing in mind this discursive context, readings of Dead Man ostensibly redress 
the conceptual paradoxes present in foundational genre studies; in doing so, they forward a 
purportedly deconstructive assault upon the western. Whilst an exhaustive survey of these 
readings is impossible, it is interesting to note that the film has been universally located 
within a series of western sub-categories, each suggesting that the text reconfigures the 
foundational attributes of a recognisable cinematic form; it has been referred to as an “anti-
western,”116 a “revisionist western,”117 and a “post-western,”118 amongst other tags. These 
varied interpretative structures tacitly cement the film’s reception within specific generic 
frames, despite ostensibly challenging its tropes; as Gregg Rickman notes: “even as Dead 
Man erases its genre it confirms its ongoing vitality, dependent as this very interesting film 
is in so many ways on the genre’s form and conventions for its very existence.”119  
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 Rickman’s observation demonstrates a reflexive self-awareness indicative of his 
reading of the film as a “western under erasure,”120 an approach informed by his assertion 
that the film’s textual properties can be fruitfully elucidated by Derridean theory. Indeed, 
Rickman’s analysis sustains an explicitly deconstructive emphasis upon Dead Man’s 
“evident hostility to fixed meanings,” rendering the film a “nihilist statement of protest.”121 
Thus, utilising a reading of deconstruction as a “double gesture” of “reversal followed by 
displacement,” Rickman argues that the film disrupts western narratives, tropes, and icons; 
generic conventions are “inverted,” whilst the film’s narrative “forms a series of cancelling 
operations.”122 Justus Nieland also utilises an explicitly Derridean methodology to analyse 
how the film reflexively interrogates processes of inclusion and exclusion implicated in the 
construction of popular western narratives. His account concludes that the film 
simultaneously defamiliarizes the genre and reintegrates marginal perspectives into the 
“western archive,” leaving such forms open to future transformative iterations.123 Themes of 
wilderness and national identity are frequently implicit within these post-structuralist 
readings; such subjects are discernible in Dead Man’s perceived subversion of westward 
expansionist narratives and ethnocentric constructions of a natural or savage Native 
American “other.”124 Furthermore, in engaging frontier discourses, the genre again evokes 
an image of a pristine wilderness that is implicated in theorisations of American national 
identity; arguing that “it is widely believed that the Myth of the Frontier constitutes the 
single most important frame of reference for America’s self-understanding,” Melinda 
Szaloky suggests that this cultural narrative “depicts the territory lying beyond the frontier as 
an abundant and unappropriated land that is simply there for the taking.”125 
However, aforementioned deconstructive scholarly approaches have avoided a 
sustained consideration of the film’s wilderness representations; only Nieland and Szaloky 
offer brief discussions of the formal and cinematographic strategies used in representing the 
film’s landscapes, analyses accommodated into a broader re-inscription of western 
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history.126 Thus, direct interrogations of the film’s natural environment have been frequently 
occluded in favour of Blake’s shifting subjectivity, the representation of Native Americans, 
and other generic themes (such as violence, masculinity, and capitalism). Crucially, the 
critical foci of these readings reflects another trend in western scholarship outlined by 
Deborah A. Carmichael, who asserts that “in studies of the Western, the importance of the 
landscape itself, the idyllic or treacherous environment negotiated in these films, often 
receives supporting-role status, yet without the land, American national mythmaking 
wouldn’t exist.”127  
Whilst sidelined in academic readings, antonymic themes of wilderness and 
civilisation have received greater prominence in Dead Man’s popular and critical reception. 
Accordingly, they provide a useful jumping-off point from which to construct a sustained 
theoretical challenge to American wilderness narratives. For example, Kent Jones’ review 
makes general observations regarding the diversity of the film’s landscapes, suggesting that 
“the film moves through many types of terrain, far more than in most Westerns…. In Dead 
Man, the disjunction between people and place…bloom(s) into full flower.”128 Here, Jones 
implicitly engages a number of interesting tensions embedded within wilderness discourse; 
whilst he implies that Dead Man constructs the landscape as vast and acultural, it is then 
qualified by the observation that such “wide-open spaces” connote “lonely unease,” ensuring 
that there is “no mastery here among the white men.”129 However, such comments do not 
trigger a more detailed deconstruction of the text’s wilderness representations; whilst the 
connotations attached to civilising conquest are inverted, the adversarial relationship 
between nature and culture is retained in representations of humanity’s “violently aggressive 
dominance” of nature.130 
Dead Man’s thematic interest in wilderness/civilisation oppositions becomes a more 
explicit focus of Jacob Levich’s semi-academic review, as he argues that the film’s setting 
“acknowledges no bright line between Civilization and Wilderness, but only a continuous 
material reality, one in which the substance of nature and the works of man are inextricably 
intertwined.”131 Thus, Levich prefigures his discussion with a potentially radical 
observation: “Jarmusch flatly rejects the bipolar symbolism of traditional Westerns, most 
obviously where Civilization and Wilderness are concerned.”132 However, Levich again 
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sustains an antagonistic, expansionist division between nature and culture. Specifically, his 
assertions reinforce American ideals of Manifest Destiny at the same time he purports to 
challenge the purity of its underlying concepts: “far from wallowing in the romantic concept 
of ‘virgin territory,’ the film depicts a mid-19th century America in which capitalism has 
already embraced and transformed the farthest reaches of the continent.”133 As a result, 
whilst Levich argues for a merging of the civilised and wild, this mixture resembles a 
simplistic reversal of the engineered middle landscape that stands as the idealised telos of 
expansionist narratives. Furthermore, in reading the film’s natural setting as polluted with 
“the detritus of westward expansion,” the integration of the two concepts evokes a discrete, 
hierachical imposition of “the works of man” upon a previously pristine wilderness 
landscape.134  The pollutive artefacts of civilisation are merely scattered on the surface of the 
wilderness scene, rendering Dead Man’s landscapes as the juxtaposition of discrete 
substances that carry static, unchanging ontological properties.  
 In summary, several critics have superficially observed in Dead Man a reflexive 
challenge to wilderness/civilisation dualisms. However, these accounts demonstrate 
problematic methodological limitations that my analysis attempts to redress. Firstly, Jones 
and Rickman only offer limited analysis of the stylistic and formal strategies utilised in 
representing wilderness landscape in the text; furthermore, whilst Levich does analyse of the 
film’s natural representations, these are supportive of a totalised interpretation in which 
discrete notions of wilderness and civilisation are “intertwined” rather than deconstructed. 
Conversely, this reading of Dead Man is inaugurated by an explicitly Derridean desire to 
fundamentally rupture this pervasive logocentric economy.  
 
Destabilising Nature and Culture in Dead Man 
 
 Returning to this analysis’ open soliloquy, Dead Man institutes a problematic 
nature/culture economy from its very beginnings. As the train’s fireman reminds Blake of a 
time when “the water in your head was not dissimilar from the landscape,” a clear semiotic 
link is constructed between two seemingly antonymic substances: the human subject and 
natural object. Jonathan Rosenbaum touches upon this in his monograph on Dead Man; for 
him, the fireman’s words imply an “inability to distinguish between inner consciousness and 
external reality,” a theme he discerns throughout the film.135 Rosenbaum diagnoses this 
discursive preoccupation throughout director Jim Jarmusch’s wider oeuvre: “he returns 
repeatedly to the notion of looking at the same thing in different ways – or looking at 
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different things the same way.”136 Yet, this sequence is equally readable as a direct 
interrogation of a specific structural antinomy, challenging the crystallization of nature and 
culture as discrete, hierarchical alternatives. In the fireman’s monologue this strategy of 
collapsing interiority and exteriority is provided a specifically biological figuration; his 
words introduce a natural textual motif (“the water in your head”) that figures their semiotic 
fluidity. Rather than postulating a simplistic correspondence between two discrete 
conceptual elements, this brief remark inaugurates a reflexive, undecidable dynamic in 
which the cultural subject is presented in terms of the natural object, and vice-versa.  
The encounter between Blake and the fireman is often read as a future echo, 
prefiguring Blake’s death at the film’s conclusion. Rickman exemplifies this reading of the 
film’s “circular” structure, arguing that a series of narrative allusions and repetitions 
imprison the protagonist in an “endlessly repeating cycle.”137 However, the scene does not 
simplistically actualise the words uttered in the film’s opening sequence. Rather, it also re-
signifies the ontological fluidity and indiscernibility those same words connote. In the film’s 
final moments Blake is laid out in a canoe, looking towards the heavens in a point-of-view 
shot (Figs.4.1-4.2): 
 
 
                                                          
136
 Ibid., 13. 
137
 Rickman, “The Western Under Erasure,” 401. 
254 
 
 
Figs.4.1-4.2 
 
This particular sequence bears striking similarities with a particular line of the 
aforementioned monologue: “Doesn’t this remind you of when you were in the boat, and 
then later that night you were lying looking up at the ceiling?” Yet, when visualised in the 
film’s final moments, “the ceiling” is the sky itself, a counterpart to the “mirror of water” 
upon which the boat now floats. In figuring two natural realms (the sea and the sky) through 
cultural metaphor (the mirror and the ceiling), Dead Man provides a further representational 
challenge to the self-identity of natural and cultural spaces.  
 This strategy of contaminating textual elements with traces of paradoxical meanings 
is replicated in the film’s final shot. Drifting in the Pacific Ocean, Blake’s canoe is gradually 
assimilated into the surrounding waves; it is subsumed by the natural environment it 
navigates (Fig.4.3):  
 
 
Fig.4.3 
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Here, the scene is represented through an extreme-long shot, a cinematographic choice that 
conventionally contextualises the human figure within a vast, empty landscape. Indeed, 
Rosenbaum endorses this normative reading, suggesting that “the film ends with a wide 
expanse of cavernous sky and ocean conceived as an empty stage.”138 However, this 
interpretation reinforces aforementioned constructions of natural purity, ensuring its 
continuing perception as profoundly acultural. Alternatively, the apparent integration of the 
boat into the landscape suggests a more complex deconstructive gesture; as the canoe is no 
longer visible upon the sea, the oppositional concepts these two elements signify are no 
longer divisible. The canoe is simultaneously present and absent, drifting in a choppy, 
dynamic milieu of fluid conceptual relations.  
Another recurring image that collapses a dualistic nature/culture economy can be 
found throughout the film’s central journey, as Blake discovers “Wanted” posters 
advertising a reward for his death or capture. Blake first encounters the posters within the 
natural landscape itself; he tears down multiple sheets when he finds them nailed to tree-
trunks (Fig.4.4):  
 
 
Fig.4.4 
 
Superficially, the presence of these posters can be read as a signifier of nature/culture 
antagonism; infiltrating the landscape of Blake’s escape, the posters demonstrate the 
potential reach and power of an omnipresent human culture, free to enter and inscribe the 
wilderness at will.139 Indeed, the presence of the printed word is itself often represented as 
the apotheosis of civilisation. As a technology foregrounded within the diegesis, it embodies 
the destructive being of western civilisation; like metal (typified by knifes, trains, and guns) 
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it “leads to alienation and death.”140 However, the manner in which the posters are 
incorporated into the text suggests a more complex structural relationship between 
wilderness and civilisation. Specifically, the placement of these posters on trees encourages 
us to ruminate on the natural constituents that form a base for this supposed cultural 
signifier; just as paper contains traces of wood in its genetic composition, the cultural status 
that the paper connotes is also re-inhabited by traces of its natural “other.” Furthermore, this 
formulation invests seemingly natural objects with cultural functions; used as a frontier 
noticeboard, the trees themselves are granted an ancillary purpose as a civilised medium, a 
humanised form that disseminates a universal linguistic code. Thus, trees and posters are 
presented as undecidable signifiers of both culture and nature; traces of antithetical terms are 
perceptible within the very substance of specific textual elements.  
 Finally, the dual status of these substances within the film is further demonstrated in 
the “paper flowers” manufactured by Thel. Observing her harassment outside the town’s 
saloon, Blake approaches her, ostensibly to help pick her up (and her belongings, a basket 
filled with flowers). Upon reaching her, Blake realises that the flowers are artificial, made of 
paper. After walking Thel home Blake enters her bedroom, and they discuss the flowers 
further; she eventually hopes to replicate the flowers’ natural scent by adding perfume to her 
creations, which she also intends to make out of silk once she can afford the endeavour. The 
artificiality of the flowers has often been interpreted as an example of the frontier town’s 
unequivocal status as civilisation’s destructive apotheosis: as Szaloky remarks, “the only 
flowers that grow in the slush and mud of Machine are made of paper.”141 Conversely, for 
Rickman this is a sign of Blake’s deficient imagination, a theme used to construct 
intertextual links between Dead Man and William Blake’s poetry; unable to suspend 
disbelief, the protagonist cannot look beyond the surface appearance of the synthetic 
organism, a fatal character flaw that ensures his westward journey will end in “puzzled 
defeat.”142 Building upon this observation, it can be extrapolated that his discordant response 
to the flowers is itself a sign of the impossibility of accommodating them within existing 
logical paradigms. As discussed earlier, the status of paper as an artificial, cultural artefact is 
undermined by its clear juxtaposition with a natural source. This dynamic is replicated in the 
sequence where Blake helps Thel outside the saloon, and is further displayed as Blake 
escapes her room following the shootings; both sequences include static shots that fixate on 
the flowers lying on the surface of mud, as if plants protruding from the soil (Figs.4.5-4.6):  
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Figs.4.5-4.6 
 
Yet, this image is immediately shattered: as Blake attempts to pass them back to Thel, she 
comments that those that have communed with nature are “ruined.” Furthermore, Thel’s 
attempts to augment the flowers’ natural verisimilitude appeals to the further addition of 
synthetic processes; silk and perfume are suggested as improvements to her creations, yet 
these reinforce the flowers’ status as products of human artifice. Therefore, the flowers 
comprise a further destabilising motif, embodying a state of semiotic flux and alterity. 
Whilst accompanying images and dialogue furnish the flowers with either a natural or 
cultural status, they are almost instantaneously re-written by further textual elements that 
stress a diametrically opposed ontology. Thus, the flowers are always already inhabited by 
traces of meanings that are necessarily disavowed by a metaphysical structural violence.  
 
Dead Man, Circularity, and Wilderness Geometry 
 
 As suggested previously, studies of landscape in Dead Man have been limited in 
comparison to anthropocentric foci; landscape is usually addressed as a brief addendum to 
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broader discussions of the film’s engagement with the western. In turn, when issues of 
environmental representation have been discussed, they have drawn myriad antithetical 
responses. For example, Gino Moliterno draws direct comparisons between the film’s 
landscape and earlier forms of magisterial landscape depiction, suggesting that the film’s 
black and white cinematography is “reminiscent of the nature photographs of Ansel 
Adams.”143 Conversely, purportedly revisionist readings suggest that Dead Man actively 
avoids presenting wilderness as a spectacle, focusing on landscapes that diverge from the 
western’s normalised expansive vistas. This interpretation is typified by Nieland, providing a 
rare close-reading of the film’s setting: 
 
Jarmusch radically reframes the natural landscape, offering neither the limitless 
panoramic shots of natural sublimity that offer the land up for colonization and 
conquest, penetration and possession, nor the “tabula rasa” shots of the desert, in 
which, as Jane Tompkins has observed, the West becomes “a white sheet on which 
to trace a figure…on which a man can write, as if for the first time, the story he 
wants to live.” Instead, Jarmusch places his central characters always already within 
natural scenes, surrounded by fauna that obscure and confound mastery rather than 
confer it.144  
 
Szaloky forwards a similar (but less complex) reading of the film’s denial of sublime 
spectacle, specifically in relation to Dead Man’s opening train journey: 
 
Instead of grand vistas of vast and overpoweringly beautiful landscapes in 
Technicolor, the film opens with claustrophobic images in monochrome…. High-
contrast black-and-white cinematography bleaches out any inherent spectacle.145 
 
Such observations are useful in locating the film directly within ecocritical discourses, 
demonstrating how the text fruitfully challenges constructions of natural purity and the 
hierarchical oppositions that underlie such representations. However, these brief 
observations stop short of an extensive, detailed exploration of the film’s formal and stylistic 
rendering of wild nature. Conversely, this analysis demonstrates that a close-reading of 
myriad textual elements can inaugurate a thorough critique of wilderness and its underlying 
topographical precepts. Specifically, certain stylistic choices construct motifs of circularity 
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and multiplicity within the film, challenging the pervasive horizontality and linearity 
frequently associated with metaphysical landscape depiction.  
In Yi-Fu Tuan’s Topophilia, he argues that “modern” perspectives of nature are 
intractably tied to concepts of scenery and landscape, leading to the conflation of the natural 
with certain “axial” modes of representation.146 As a result, rationalist, metaphysical 
constructions of landscape are figuratively associated with geometric values of horizontality 
and linearity. Utilising as a foundation the Newtonian precept of “the straight line as the 
natural path of all moving matter,” Tuan contends that linear conceptions of time contributed 
to the replacement of earlier cyclical models of spatio-temporal relation.147 Importantly, 
wilderness discourses internalise these directional trends within dominant representational 
modes; Tuan notes that American landscape painting (a vital disseminator of American 
cultural narratives) reified horizontal conceptions of nature and landscape, embodying a 
perspective that showcases wilderness as a vast, pristine realm of “open space.”148 As 
established earlier, this aesthetic preference is discernible in Turnerian engagements with 
wilderness and the frontier: American development is explained by “the existence of an area 
of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward.”149  
Thus, Turner mobilises a rigid ontological framework that antagonistically separates 
wilderness from civilisation, a dualistic relationship that is mirrored in the landscape’s rigid 
geometrical properties.  
  Engaging directly with the spatial foundations of wilderness constructions, Dead 
Man provides a reflexive critique that extends beyond the simple occlusion of sublime 
natural vistas. Rather, in the act of constructing the film’s wilderness setting, the landscape 
is framed in a way that downplays linear horizontality, instead stressing verticality and 
circularity. Thus, rather than absenting the natural landscape altogether, it is represented as a 
deconstructive topography; whilst thematically locatable within wilderness debates, it 
signifies seemingly antithetical spatial principles. To begin, the protagonists are shown 
entering new terrains and areas in a manner which immediately orients those settings on a 
vertical plane. This denial of geographical horizontality is augmented by the use of camera 
angles that frame the human figure from either slightly below or slightly above the 
perpendicular; this device is discernible in the vast majority of establishing shots (Figs.4.7-
4.8):  
 
                                                          
146
 Yi-Fu Tuan, Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes and Values (Chichester: 
Columbia University Press, 1990), 133-148. 
147
 Ibid., 148. 
148
 Ibid. 
149
 Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” 31. 
260 
 
 
 
Figs.4.7-4.8 
  
As shown in the examples above, the camera shoots the human characters from variable 
positions, engendering a spatial relationship between figure and frame that stresses vertical 
(rather than horizontal) relations.  
The geometrical planes upon which the film’s characters travel through the 
landscape further problematize perceived associations between wilderness, horizontality and 
linearity. As Jones implies, the movement of Blake and Nobody is infrequently presented as 
a horizontal journey, from one side of a static (or tracking) shot to the other; rather, “the film 
is punctuated by twisting journeys on horseback through rocky terrain.”150 This focus upon 
non-linear, rounded movements is produced by both the film’s cinematography and mise-en-
scène. Firstly, several settings depict winding paths, preventing horizontal motion; examples 
of this can be discerned in sequences following Blake and Nobody, as well as their myriad 
pursuers (Fig.4.9): 
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Fig.4.9 
 
Furthermore, the employment of disparate camera angles and shot lengths undermine the 
construction of a static, linear, self-coherent environment. As Nieland notes, the film 
frequently uses point-of-view shots stemming from the stricken Blake, as he is dragged 
through the wilderness atop a horse;151 these are often signified by unsteady, moving 
cameras, continually shifting our perspective of the surroundings as Blake moves in his 
saddle. A prominent example occurs early in the film, immediately after Blake’s first 
encounter with Nobody (Fig.4.10)  
 
 
Fig.4.10 
 
Furthermore, even those fleeting sequences in which the landscape is horizontally 
traversed simultaneously signify a conflicting sense of compositional verticality. For 
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example, as Blake and Nobody ride through a forested area, the direction of their movement 
(perpendicular to a tracking camera) is contrasted with the irregular vertical lines of tall trees 
(Fig.4.11): 
 
 
Fig.4.11 
 
Whilst this sequence ostensibly conforms to metaphysical landscape geometries, elements of 
the mise-en-scène problematize the topographical regimes they institute. Here, the role of 
perspectival horizontality in constructing wilderness as a wide-open space is not simply 
undermined by the cluttered frame; rather, the shapes and dimensions of the trees establish a 
pervasive verticality that discourages the perception of landscape as a simplistically 
horizontal composition.  
 Finally, one can also read Blake and Nobody’s journey as a broader juxtaposition of 
the linear and circular. As suggested by various critics, the pair’s quest appears superficially 
horizontal in its spatial and geographical orientation; they are headed directly to the western 
seaboard, to allow for the mortally-wounded Blake’s ceremonial return to his spiritual 
origins. This reading is legible in Roger Bromley’s account of the film, as he argues that 
Blake is (initially) “rehearsing the archetypal white American experience of the Westward 
journey.”152 Thus, the film’s central trek ostensibly enacts narratives of expansionism and 
colonization, figuring a linear motion that mirrors an ever-expanding civilisation headed by 
the frontier’s westward movement. However, whilst Nobody and Blake’s journey can be 
interpreted as a typical East to West voyage, it is problematized by the simultaneous 
circularity embedded of Dead Man’s narrative form. For example, whilst the journey is 
oriented towards a clear location, it is presented as a sporadic trek punctuated by repetition 
and ellipses; as Rosenbaum observes, “throughout Blake and Nobody’s trek through the 
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wilderness…we see practically every location twice, first with them, then with the bounty 
hunters or marshals following behind them.”153 In many cases, this narrative doubling is 
reinforced by stylistic doubling; in one sequence Blake and Nobody are framed in an 
extreme high-angle shot, a camera positioning that is identically replicated moments later as 
two bounty hunters follow their trail (Figs.4.12-4.13): 
 
 
 
Figs.4.12-4.13 
 
As alluded to earlier, a more general structural circularity has also been observed in 
a series of narrative foreshadowings. The aforementioned conversation between Blake and 
the fireman evokes Blake’s demise; his final moments are accurately described, rendering 
his life journey an “endlessly repeating cycle.”154 Furthermore, narrative mirrorings are 
observable in Blake’s experiences of Mobile, and his later arrival in the Makah village. As 
Szaloky notes, Blake’s introduction to the two settlements are framed in similar ways; the 
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use of furtive subjective shots in the Indian village signify a “point of view…comparable in 
its bleakness to the Main Street in Machine.”155 Such correspondences underlie a 
deconstructive reading of the western genre’s “search for origins”: “clearly, the white and 
Native-American settlements mirror each other. Their near-isomorphic duplication brings 
together the beginning and end of the narrative converting the seemingly linear, forward-
directed trajectory of the journey to a circularity or even stasis.”156 Szaloky’s insightful 
analysis provides an exhaustive challenge to the perceived conventions of western 
narratives, locating Dead Man’s juxtaposition of linearity and circularity within a specific 
generic context. Ultimately, her observations can be extrapolated further to initiate a 
wholesale critique of nature, landscape, and wilderness as metaphysical constructs. The 
film’s signification of contradictory geometries does not merely disrupt American western 
and frontier narratives; it also challenges images of wilderness as pure, vast, and acultural, 
displacing the prominent topographical principles upon which they are founded. 
 
Gerry and the Frontier Wilderness 
 
Like Dead Man, Gerry begins with a travel sequence; we are presented with an 
extended long-take of a car driving down a desert highway. The camera position shifts from 
behind the moving vehicle to directly in front of it, before cutting to a medium-shot of two 
young men through a dirty, reflective windshield. The camera enters a disorientating spin as 
the car pulls into a roadside car park. Exiting the vehicle, the two eponymous protagonists 
(Matt Damon and Casey Affleck) embark on a “Wilderness Trail”; the aim of their jaunt is 
an indiscernible geographical landmark referred to simply as “the thing.” After an energetic 
sprint across the flatland terrain the pair decides to abort their hike, but cannot relocate their 
path. The Gerrys quickly become lost as they trudge through a series of arid, inhospitable 
landscapes; their attempts to retrace their steps prove ultimately fruitless as they unwittingly 
travel deeper into the remote desert environment. Spending several nights in the wilderness, 
they become exhausted and dehydrated; after a seemingly endless trek across salt-flats they 
hallucinate and collapse. Lying on the crystalline ground, Damon’s character throttles 
Affleck’s, an apparent mercy killing. The surviving Gerry is finally rescued as the film 
concludes, picked up by a passing car as he serendipitously stumbles across a desert road.  
 Aside from its consistent critical positioning within wilderness discourse (a trend 
addressed momentarily), Gerry is frequently cited as a film that abets a multiplicity of 
potentially divergent textual engagements. Thus, prominent critical readings of Gerry focus 
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not only on its prospective meanings, but also the difficulty encountered in attributing a 
single, fixed significance to the cinematic text; to provide one example, Geoff King argues 
that “it is possible to read a variety of implications or ‘meanings’ into the film, but this is not 
something it appears overtly designed to encourage.”157 However, unlike Dead Man, the 
film’s perceived textual openness has not manifested an explicitly post-structuralist critical 
discourse. As a result, such observations have not spawned significant readings of Gerry’s 
thematic and aesthetic qualities as overtly deconstructive.  
Indeed, statements regarding the film’s textual opacity usually precede attempts to 
accommodate the film’s scenic and narrative qualities within a single, totalised interpretative 
framework. Specifically, readings of Gerry’s wild setting oscillate between its positioning as 
an acultural “other” to the human protagonists, and its construction as a psychic reflection of 
the character’s fraught subjectivities. Importantly, these seemingly oppositional 
interpretations of the film’s setting mirror contrasting classical and romantic theorisations of 
wild nature and its specific relationship to American cultural identity. Whilst these 
aforementioned accounts of the film may appear superficially antithetical, they share a 
structural foundation in rigidly discrete nature/culture dichotomies; whether positioned as 
humanity’s absence or a reflection of it, the wilderness landscape is necessarily approached 
as a discrete entity, a realm that requires a fundamental separation from culture to remain 
legible. In this manner, existing readings of Gerry retain an ontological tension that persists 
within broader metaphysical constructions of wilderness; the film’s natural setting is 
positioned as both outside of culture and a product of American cultural discourse.  
 
Locating Gerry within American Wilderness Discourse 
 
 Before exploring how existing readings have interrogated Gerry’s natural setting, it 
is vital to clarify how the film superficially evokes American wilderness discourses. To 
begin, the film’s location within such debates is ensured by explicit references to unspoiled 
nature. This textual strategy is exemplified by an information sign shown at the very 
beginning of the film, naming the protagonists’ path as a “WILDERNESS TRAIL” 
(Fig.4.14):  
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Fig.4.14 
 
In turn, the film’s varying geological vistas are frequently rationalised as a blanket 
“wilderness” in critical accounts of the film. Thus, whilst existing readings frame the film 
primarily as a hike across a desert setting, its environment is referred to as “the wild(s),”158 
and “an American desert and mountain wilderness landscape.”159 Additionally, the common 
constitution of wilderness as the conceptual opposite of civilisation is signified by the film’s 
incorporation of extended images of roads. Providing an overtly civilising space, the asphalt 
track provides a bookended juxtaposition to the natural milieu that sustains the majority of 
the diegetic action. The role of the film’s opening and closing sequences (both long-takes of 
moving vehicles on a highway) in defining the protagonist’s objectives is remarked upon by 
several commentators; for example, Amy Taubin notes that a return to this seemingly 
“uninhabited and undifferentiated” setting has become the narrative goal of both Gerrys: the 
pair search “with increasing desperation and failing strength, for the highway, their car, a 
way out.”160 Thus, the film’s narrative arc is not characterised as a mere escape from 
wilderness, but also as a return to civilisation; by evoking a contrasting signifier of 
humanity, the film ostensibly defines its natural setting as specifically “wild.” If treated as 
material opposites within the film, the two sites can equally be located as divergent 
conceptual poles, constituting one another within a pre-existing socio-cultural economy of 
wilderness vs. civilisation. 
 The presence of the highway also provides a semiotic link to American frontier 
discourses. As noted throughout this chapter, the frontier provides a prominent historical 
narrative that ties the development of a uniquely American identity to the subject’s 
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experience of wilderness conditions. Like the highway, the frontier embodies a figurative 
borderline; expansionist discourses replicate metaphysical delineations that pervade existing 
readings of the film’s landscape setting. Tellingly, the frontier itself forms a key focus in 
several academic engagements with Gerry; for example, Lee Knuttila argues that the 
characters’ responses to the “contingent” wilderness re-enacts constructions of “hegemonic 
masculinity” embedded within “mythic imagined narratives” of western expansion.161 Thus, 
identifying explicit references to the American frontier, critical readings of Gerry mobilise a 
series of foundational conceptual oppositions integral to popular wilderness discourses.  
Furthermore, these interpretative frameworks reify an antagonistic relationship between 
nature and culture based upon the film’s perceived premise, the struggle for human survival 
in an inhospitable wilderness environment.162 Indeed, Luis Rocha Antunes bases her 
phenomenological reading of the film on this reductive, antonymic foundation: “Gerry is the 
overwhelming experience of man vs. nature.”163  
 
Gerry’s Oppositional Critical Landscapes  
 
 As demonstrated above, Gerry’s basic narrative scenario initiates a superficially 
oppositional relationship between the human characters and natural setting, establishing the 
former as a cultural protagonist and the latter as an acultural antagonist. More detailed 
analyses of Gerry’s setting appear to figure a more complex (yet equally metaphysical) 
evocation of American wilderness discourse. Myriad readings of Gerry’s wilderness setting 
explicitly approach it as an acultural realm devoid of human signs and meanings. For 
example, Martin Drenthen positions Gerry’s wilderness as a critique of socio-cultural and 
moral orders: “(Gerry) shows the grandeur of wild nature is deeper and more profound than 
merely human, although it also stresses that this wildness is utterly indifferent towards the 
fate of humanity and as such ultimately amoral.”164 The trials of the film’s dual protagonists 
can thus be accounted for by their “failure to appreciate the radical otherness and 
indifference of wild nature.”165 Drenthen’s reading does demonstrate a heightened level of 
ontological self-interrogation, complexifying adversarial “man vs. nature” readings of the 
film’s central narrative arc; he explores the semiotic paradoxes of a “wild ethic” that is 
fundamentally cultural at the same time that it constructs wild nature as a transcendent, 
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chaotic absence of cultural values.166 However, whilst Drenthen self-consciously notes this 
structural contradiction, it is sustained in his close reading of Gerry. On one level, his 
reading of the film’s landscape subverts nature/culture dualisms; as he concludes, wildness 
“conveys an utterly reflexive moral meaning that questions morality itself.”167 Yet, in the 
film’s rendering of wildness as a “silent protest against the arbitrariness of the modern 
human-centered world,” a fundamentally oppositional separation of nature from culture is 
tacitly reaffirmed; as wildness is “ultimately amoral,” Drenthen argues that its cinematic 
depiction critiques its common association with “clear narrative structures and human 
perspectives and values.”168 As a result, his reading tacitly reinforces the traditional 
positioning of wilderness as “the outside or the other of culture.”169 Finally, Tiago de Luca’s 
reading of Gerry explicitly constructs the film’s landscape as ultimately “meaningless”; 
noting a “disdain for anthropomorphic dimensions,” de Luca argues that Gerry’s “vast 
landscapes assume a central importance, calling attention to their own physicality and asking 
to be contemplated for their own sake.”170  
Conversely, other scholarly readings argue that the subjectivities of the protagonists 
and the material conditions of the external wilderness are inextricably linked, casting the 
latter as a psychic product of the former. For example, Devin McKinney understands Gerry 
as a film that sets about “finding human psychology signaled in the semiotics of physical 
landscape”; he perceives “surfaces and terrain which, viewed from a certain skeejawed 
angle, seem magically molded after the human body, or stoically representative of the 
oblique mental states being delineated by our actors.”171 In such a reading, the wild 
environment provides a figurative representation of the protagonists’ troubled, changeable 
subjectivities, a psychological landscape fashioned and shaped not by natural processes but 
cultural forces.172 Melbye also reads Gerry as an attempt to construct a “landscape allegory,” 
although he concludes that the film fails in this regard; it still “demonstrates an ineffective 
juxtaposition of psychological struggle with a scenic but inhospitable wasteland.”173  
Whilst the two interpretative frameworks outlined above may appear to constitute 
ontological opposites, they share a fundamentally metaphysical basis, a mutual reliance on 
rigid definitions of nature and culture. To begin, allegorical readings replicate the absolutist 
conception of presence observed in readings of the film’s wilderness as pristine: whilst a 
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broad range of cultural connotations can be drawn from the natural environment, such 
approaches are predicated upon the assumption that such meanings remain coherent and 
legible. Furthermore, although scholarly readings propose an interdependence of natural and 
cultural realms, the fixity of these oppositional terms remains unchallenged. As the 
landscape simplistically reflects the protagonists’ mental states, it is rendered a static 
representational canvas; for nature to reflect culture, both must retain stable discursive 
boundaries and an essential conceptual plenitude. Finally, in ostensibly locating Gerry’s 
setting as a psychic construct, McKinney perpetuates metaphysical, anthropocentric 
privilege; the landscape is only granted value in its potential elucidation of character 
subjectivity, rendering it the inferior term of a rigid structural dualism.  
Finally, in interpreting the film’s wild setting as either an exterior acultural “other” 
or an interior human construct, prominent readings of Gerry can be mapped onto similarly 
paradoxical discussions of wilderness and American national identity. As demonstrated 
earlier, Nash introduces his study of wilderness with a pair of seemingly antithetical 
statements, in which wilderness is treated as both an oppositional source of national self-
definition and an American cultural construct;174 in this regard, divergent treatments of 
Gerry’s landscape directly mirror Nash’s dichotomous discussion of the American landscape 
as both a “howling wilderness” and “a state of mind.”175 Whilst the presence of these 
conflicting accounts superficially problematizes discrete American wilderness ontologies, 
their constitution within the film’s critical discourses cements their position as a pair of 
equally logocentric alternatives. Conversely, the next section of this essay argues that Gerry 
can be read as a radical dismantling of the underlying metaphysics of wilderness, 
establishing the film’s setting as a terrain of ontological undecidability.  
 
Excising the Human from the Natural Environment 
  
 As mentioned above, several prominent readings of Gerry position the film’s 
wilderness as an acultural “other” against which the eponymous protagonists must struggle 
to survive and retain their humanity. Whilst the film does meditate for prolonged periods on 
landscapes devoid of human habitation, Gerry does so in a way that reflexively highlights 
the process of occluding human figures from the natural environment. Thus, rather than 
reading the film’s wilderness setting as a pristine realm distanced from civilisation, Gerry 
visualises the logocentric logic that allows this dichotomous formulation to be constructed in 
the first place. An indicative example of this reflexive aesthetic occurs early in the film’s 
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narrative frame. Having discovered that they are unable to retrace their steps, the 
protagonists begin their doomed trudge into the wilderness. The sequence frames the 
characters in an extreme-long dolly shot, before the camera zooms out and pans to the left, 
revealing more of the landscape whilst removing the characters from view (Figs.4.15-4.16): 
 
 
 
Figs.4.15-4.16 
 
In existing readings, such shots are frequently read as simplified expressions of a spectacular 
natural sublime. In his exploration of Gus Van Sant’s “minimalist” films and their appeal to 
niche audiences, King argues that Gerry’s landscape setting offers a site of visual pleasure 
that precedes any figurative or narrative significance; indeed, he suggests that the film’s 
landscapes act as a palliative for “difficult” formal strategies: “the potentially alienating 
qualities of abstraction might be contained by the fact that it can be enjoyed to some extent 
at the level of pictorial landscape beauty.”176 This reading, in which the wilderness forms a 
pleasurable object of cinematic spectacle, is superficially reinforced by the film’s stylistic 
regimen, which arguably showcases the desert setting to the detriment of character-based 
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narrative; the use of extreme long shots, long takes, static cameras, and slow pans encourage 
prolonged attention and meditation upon the film’s environmental backdrop.177 The 
positioning of the wilderness landscape as an object of ocular pleasure in turn evokes the 
“magisterial gaze” commonly associated with American landscape painting.178 The equation 
of certain cinematographic devices with anthropocentric modes of landscape depiction is 
explored by Ingram, who notes that: “the aerial tracking shot in a film…may be considered 
the cinematic equivalent of the elevated viewpoint in many nineteenth-century landscape 
paintings.”179 The conceptual ramifications of this observation are unpacked by Melbye, who 
notes that “landscape depiction without human presence refers more directly to a realm of 
imagination and mythmaking, which in the case of American culture was manifest 
destiny.”180 Therefore, Melbye concludes that sublime images of nature exclude the human 
figure to construct the wilderness as a “realm of uncharted space” to be subsequently 
possessed and tamed.181 De Luca also draws explicit parallels between Gerry’s desert images 
and American landscape painting; arguing that “Gerry resonates with a landscape painting 
tradition,” he contextualises the film within Van Sant’s broader “landscape sensibility,” 
which attempts a “foregrounding of the United State’s (sic) infinite expanses.”182 Again, this 
American representational mode clearly replicates the aforementioned cinematic “aesthetics 
of exclusion” explored by theorists like Ingram,183 reinforcing the construction and 
objectification of nature as a vast, separate realm to be either subjugated or venerated.  
Nevertheless, the dynamic camera movement that characterises the aforementioned 
long-take undermines simplistic readings of the sequence as a showcasing of pristine nature. 
Rather than presenting a completely empty terrain, the shot begins with a (diminished) locus 
of human activity; the pair are visible at the bottom of the frame, providing a cultural 
presence that questions the landscape’s essential purity. Scenes like this are often 
approached as establishing shots, formal devices used to locate the protagonists within a 
seemingly endless wilderness, orienting the viewer and communicating the scale and nature 
of their surroundings. For example, Sitney’s elucidation of cinematic long shots positions 
them as a tool to both locate and dwarf characters in natural landscape settings: 
 
The long shot is long, or distant, in regard to the center of human activity. Thus a 
long shot often has an “establishing” function, locating an individual, a group, or 
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even a municipality in a wider landscape. While it can emphasize human 
dominance…more frequently it serves to diminish the human scale.184 
 
In the case of Gerry, Knuttila similarly argues that “by juxtaposing the plethora of long shots 
of the Gerrys’ actions with long takes of the empty surrounding vistas, fauna and clouds, the 
film centers on displaying them in a larger social context.”185 Finally, de Luca notes that 
Gerry’s wilderness actively diminishes the importance of the human protagonists, as 
“landscapes dwarf human presence to the point where Damon and Affleck occasionally 
appear as insignificant dots within the frame…calling attention, by contrast, to the enormity 
of the deserts they traverse.”186  
In noting how this sequence grounds the protagonists in a material environment, 
existing readings evoke Ingram’s broader discussions of wilderness cinematography. For 
Ingram, establishing shots can be distinguished from pristine landscape images, yet are 
produced by the same metaphysical, hierarchical dualisms. In doing so, he notes a common 
argument pertaining to texts that locate human protagonists within a wild environment, 
despite their contrasting geographical scales: “films tend to subordinate nature to the 
centrality of their human dramas, thereby promoting an ideology of anthropocentric mastery 
and possession of the land.”187 Here, Ingram utilises an almost identical phrasing to the one 
used earlier in his description of the “magisterial gaze,” a representational device usually 
associated with landscapes devoid of human presence.188 In a similar exploration of the work 
of Thomas Cole, Nash notes that he “broke with landscape painting tradition by either 
omitting any sign of man and his works or reducing the human figures to ant-like 
proportions,” communicating the “grandeur” of wild nature as it “dominated the canvas.”189 
In doing so, the diminished presence or total absence of the human form communicates the 
massive size of the American continent, a factor used to underpin “American nationalism” 
as both an expression of a theological sublime and a call for civilising expansion.190 Thus, 
representations that highlight the diminished (yet continuing) presence of human figures in 
the realm of wild nature reinforce the same antagonistic and anthropocentric dichotomies 
proposed by those that establish the landscape as a pristine vista or a background setting.   
In contrast, the dynamic manner in which the sequence shifts from inhabited to 
uninhabited space can be read as a fluid visualisation of conceptual processes that sustain 
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distinct nature/culture oppositions. Here, the panning movement away from the human 
subjects is positioned not as an unproblematic signifier of their separation from an empty 
wilderness; rather, it visualises how wilderness is constructed as pristine, through the active 
occlusion of cultural signs (in this case, the protagonists). This interpretation is sustained by 
the cinematographic and formal procedures that compose this long-take; having shown the 
human characters in its opening seconds, the shot highlights their later absence as it pans 
away from them as a constituent of the frame’s content. Furthermore, the process by which 
they are removed from the frame is attributed to the camera movement itself, a product of 
the cinematographic and formal choices enacted in this sequence shot; the protagonists are 
not physically removed from the environment they are traversing, but rather the film’s 
perspective on the landscape is shifted so to exclude visual signs of their presence. In this 
sense, cultural images of pristine wilderness are exposed as heavily mediated, products of 
American socio-cultural discourse and (in this case) the cinematic apparatus. 
 
Assimilating the Human into the Natural Environment  
 
Just as Gerry visualises the construction of natural landscapes as necessarily 
uninhabited, the environment is simultaneously tied to the narrative protagonists through a 
series of formal and stylistic devices. In this manner, the film’s setting is not fundamentally 
separated from the characters in a way implied by writers such as Drenthen; neither is it 
simplistically rendered a psychic landscape, as McKinney argues. Instead, the film instigates 
co-present strategies of reflexive estrangement and ontological assimilation, undermining 
the rigid conceptual delineations required to attribute any holistic significance to its 
wilderness setting. The aesthetic assimilation of human subject and natural object is 
exemplified by striking pictorial parallels. In several scenes human figures appear to merge 
into the landscape they traverse, becoming increasingly indiscernible from the wilderness 
whilst remaining diegetically present. In one of the film’s many long-takes, the camera 
smoothly tracks from left to right (and then, right to left), scanning the terrain as the two 
Gerrys come into view sequentially. As the pair descend a shallow slope in fading light, their 
figures are engulfed by the silhouette of the hillside, their shoulders almost perfectly aligned 
with the ridge that provides the scene’s distant backdrop. The protagonists’ heads are framed 
directly beside the rocky protrusions of mountainous peaks, providing clear visual 
correspondences between the human figure and natural relief (Figs.4.17-4.18): 
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Figs.4.17-4.18 
 
Importantly, the human figures are not formally removed from the scene; rather, they are 
collapsed into it. Whilst this could signify their dwindling humanity as they are slowly 
devoured by a mountainous landscape, it also provides a theoretical complication to earlier 
images of wilderness as acultural and empty. Here, the protagonists become an indiscernable 
constituent of the landscape itself, suggesting a deconstructive re-inscription of the human 
within (rather than exclusion from) the purportedly alien natural environment. The 
characters are thus rendered as undecidable textual fissures, a formulation that erases 
antonymic divisions of nature/culture that sustain national (and cinematic) wilderness 
narratives.  
 
Gerry’s Transformative Landscape(s)  
 
 As suggested throughout the preceding analysis, reading Gerry as a deconstructive 
text challenges the frequent critical definition of the film’s landscape as a static, knowable 
entity. Whether replete with subjective meaning or figuring an absolute semiotic lack, the 
landscape itself is established as a fundamental presence; the very act of attributing meaning 
to the onscreen wilderness implies that its varied representational qualities can be 
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accommodated into a coherent cultural narrative. However, it can equally be argued that the 
landscape in Gerry foregrounds a transformative discordance, undermining a metaphysics of 
the film’s wilderness setting. This radical geographical disunity is again exemplified by a 
particular sequence, in which successive shots of disparate geological landscapes construct a 
disjointed environment of difference and flux. As the two Gerrys trek across the wilderness 
landscape, a series of medium and long shots locate them within several natural scenes. 
Unobtrusive editing and geometric commonalities within the mise-en-scène tie these shots 
together into a thematically contiguous sequence: they are shown walking from left to right 
in the first shot (Fig.4.19), with this direction of movement continued into perpendicular 
long shots of their continuing journey (Fig.4.20 and Fig.4.21):  
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Figs.4.19-4.21 
 
However, whilst these shots are sutured together through continuous character movement, 
the landscapes they cross differ vastly and change suddenly, undermining diegetic 
geographical coherence. In the first image, the pair are framed in a medium shot, walking 
across a rocky plateau. In the next shot they emerge in a desert environment, negotiating a 
tall sand dune. In the final shot of the sequence, they traverse a prairie, the presence of 
vegetation starkly contrasting with the previous two scenes’ aridity. Accordingly, any 
attempt to establish a fixed landscape meaning is undermined by close analysis of the 
geographical variations used within the film; the environment cannot be approached as a 
single landscape, as it is constructed from a series of discordant frames or vistas. Thus, 
whilst the wilderness provides a narratalogically consistent setting, the film’s representation 
of natural landscapes itself connotes an economy of difference, alterity, and incoherence. 
   In Martin Lefebvre’s reading of Gerry, one can find a rare theoretical discussion of 
the film’s dynamic and disparate scenery. His approach, which argues that the film 
challenges the subjugation of nature as human setting, is demonstrated in relation to Gerry’s 
diverse vistas, intractably tying the representation of geographical difference with 
ecocentrism: 
 
The landscape formations that succeed one another in diegetic continuity form an 
impossible geography. Once noticed, such implausible variations in terrain 
morphology create a space that defies, resists or exceeds strict diegetic motivation or 
subordination as well as real world referentiality. As a result, the narrative function 
of setting may momentarily fade and the depiction of space acquires, in the 
spectator’s gaze, the kind of autonomy traditionally required by pictorial landscape 
imagery.191 
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Whilst Lefebvre’s reading suggests that Gerry challenges the anthropocentric subordination 
of place to character, it does so by reinforcing the objectification of nature as pristine and 
acultural. Critically building upon Lefebvre’s observation of the film’s “impossible 
geography,” it can be argued that geographical fragmentation actually figures the very 
arbitrariness of granting the film’s landscape an identifiable essence or presence. The 
unbounded visual heterogeneity of Gerry’s world signifies a natural space composed of 
disparate vistas that undergo a constant process of redefinition and re-presentation, a 
dynamic, Derridean landscape of différance itself. Thus, not only does the natural 
environment embody spatial differences that exceed restrictive nature/culture binaries, but it 
also alludes to a (ceaseless) temporal delay of meaning, a key constituent of Jacques 
Derrida’s remodelling of textual signification: différance contends that “spacing is 
temporization, the detour and postponement by means of which intuition, perception, 
consummation – in a word, the relationship to the present, the reference to a present reality, 
to a being – are always deferred.”192 This continual suspension of meaning as it passes along 
a ceaseless chain of signifiers is figured by a wilderness in endless flux; a cogent meaning 
for the film’s setting can never be stabilised as it is constantly re-determined and revised by 
the landscape’s ever-changing properties. 
 This temporalized process of establishing textual meaning is demonstrated further in 
properties relating to the film’s form and mise-en-scène. It has been noted that the film 
ostensibly downplays the use of static camera positions in framing the natural landscape, a 
device commonly associated with wilderness cinematography due to links with antecedent 
photographic and painterly landscape depictions.193 In contrast, the film relies heavily upon 
tracking shots and pans, erecting a stylistic regime within which landscape is continually 
framed through motion: Antunes cogently demonstrates this point, remarking that the 
camera in Gerry “is not merely recording the action, nor is it following a formal or 
established visual practice in cinema. It has its own life and is in permanent interaction with 
the characters.”194 Ingram has previously commented on the role of movement in cinematic 
depictions of nature, describing such examples as “kinetic landscapes”: “the widespread use 
of tracking shots in Hollywood landscape cinematography contributes to an aesthetic 
appreciation of nature as movement.”195 However, whilst Ingram associates this loosely with 
devices that evoke “consumerist thrills of speed and immediacy, enacting a vicarious sense 
of mastery over the natural environment,”196 the use of a moving camera in Gerry subverts 
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this oppositional economy. Rather than providing a kineticised, dominating perspective of 
static landscapes, the camera-in-movement represents natural scenes in a continual state of 
transformative redefinition. As a result, landscape itself is not received as a fixed, 
immovable, material object, but rather is represented as a vista in motion; it frames the 
movement of the film’s characters whilst it is simultaneously reframed by the dynamic 
camera.  
 This landscape temporalization is further elucidated by Gerry’s representation of 
weather. Whilst this analysis has focused primarily upon physical landscapes, images of the 
wilderness environment are frequently juxtaposed with low-angle shots of the sky, 
showcasing weather patterns associated with Gerry’s desert environs (Fig.4.22):197  
 
 
Fig.4.22 
 
The film’s formal procedures further impart these shots with a sense of dynamic 
changeability; as Ryan Gilbey notes, many of these shots are achieved through the use of 
time-lapse photography, accelerating the movement of the clouds beyond their natural 
speeds and patterns.198 For Stephen Holden, these shots exemplify the film’s pervasive 
landscape “discontinuity,” ensuring that “the weather in Gerry is in continual flux.”199 Thus, 
meteorological depictions can be accommodated within broader strategies that ally the film’s 
natural landscape with spatio-temporal difference and transformation. The dynamic elusivity 
of meaning is foregrounded by the film’s self-conscious negotiation of temporal alteration, 
typified by the shifting qualities of landscape and climate.     
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The Indiscernibility of Wilderness Landscape 
 
 Drawing upon this discussion of Gerry’s desert environs as a figuration of 
geographical différance, the final section of this analysis explicates how this reading is 
reinforced by the protagonists’ engagement with the film’s setting. Specifically, the 
construction of a landscape replete with elusive, deferred significances is clearly 
demonstrated in the Gerrys’ inability to interpret and escape their wilderness prison. 
Importantly, this ontological undecidability is not attributed to a landscape that is pristine, 
inhuman, and culturally empty. Indeed, the film self-consciously evokes a range of potential 
signifiers with which the protagonists can rationalise their fraught situation. However, no 
coherent meaning is signified by these semiotic prompts; the protagonists’ attempts to read 
the landscape are rendered a fatal failure. Thus, Gerry visualises the process of attributing 
fixed meaning to the natural landscape, a project that is rendered ultimately useless as it 
points towards a signified that remains forever absent and deferred. 
 The indiscernibility of Gerry’s wilderness is encapsulated in the characters’ 
overarching aims. For example, the initial object of their hike is never explicitly defined; 
whilst they are clearly searching for a specific geographical location, it is simply referred to 
as “the thing,” a label that lacks definitional clarity and stresses indeterminacy. Thus, the 
hike itself appears to be directed at a point of paradoxical presence and absence; their 
geographical goal is emptied of any discernible significance, as the precise nature of this 
destination is never explained. Indeed, it is even unclear whether the protagonists understand 
“the thing”; when they decide to stop searching for it, Damon’s Gerry proclaims: “fuck the 
thing. It’s just going to be a fucking thing at the end of the trail.” The film’s narrative shift 
from leisure hike to survival mission also reflexively underlines the environment’s unsteady 
ontological status. The characters’ desire to read the landscape around them is internalised 
within their newly-developed narrative goals; they must interpret their environment as a 
means of plotting their escape. This change in narrative circumstances draws attention to the 
potential meaning of the surrounding natural landscape, and the processes of reading upon 
which the two characters now rely. Furthermore, as the protagonists are striving for a return 
to civilisation, their attempts can be positioned as a search for culture within the wilderness. 
Thus, the aims of their quest render the significances they seek as overtly cultural, even as 
they inhabit an environment that (superficially) appears essentially acultural; the very act of 
seeking a fixed meaning within the landscape is utilised to demonstrate the paradoxical 
foundations of wilderness discourse. 
Ultimately, as two figures lost in the wilderness, the protagonists’ plight comes to 
represent the very unknowability of the world surrounding them. The notion of being lost 
(that is, an absence of needed information) encapsulates this subtle distinction between 
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deferred knowledge and absolute meaninglessness; it is assumed that there is a potential path 
out of the wilderness, yet it is one that neither character can clearly discern from a seemingly 
infinite range of alternative routes. The status of being “lost” forms a key thematic focus of 
Knuttila’s reading of Gerry. Whilst his article concentrates on culturally-constituted (and 
mythic) modes of gendered response, the alliance of the film’s central premise with the 
experience of frontier contingency cements a sense of environmental indiscernibility within 
the text’s narrative setup: “the process of getting lost is dependent on encountering the 
contingent.”200 Importantly, this premise is used to stress a potential multiplicity of paths and 
modes of interaction with the film’s setting, undermining constructions of wilderness as 
fixed or fundamentally knowable: “each moment opens to a multiplicity of possibilities,” as 
“the film stresses the Gerrys facing the unforeseen…and highlights – through long-takes and 
character movement – the rising number of possible courses contingency opens.”201  
 The film’s construction of a multifarious landscape is demonstrable from the very 
beginning of Gerry’s narrative arc. As the Gerrys leave their car and begin their journey, it is 
provided a clear narrative status through the presence of a way-marker, establishing their 
chosen path as a “Wilderness Trail.” However, this tautological term exposes the paradoxes 
that inhabit both Gerry’s environs and broader constructions of wilderness; whilst the word 
“wilderness” implies an empty, acultural space, the word “trail” suggests a man-made route 
fashioned within the surrounding landscape. Thus, the path the characters intend to follow 
appears simultaneously cultural and acultural, a product of wilderness and a sign of 
civilisation. Superficially, this may reinforce American narratives of western conquest; a 
wild environment is converted into a useful, navigable cultural form.  However, the manner 
in which their journey later unfolds demonstrates the protagonists’ inability to read this 
specific path, questioning its positioning as a legible cultural signifier. Whilst they soon 
become immersed in the wilderness landscape, they jokingly depart from the safety of a 
man-made route (a clear juxtaposition with the figure of the road, present in the preceding 
sequence). Upon searching for the original trail, the pair discover that it is no longer visible; 
as Gilbey summarises, “they find the path has disappeared beneath their feet.” 202 Thus, 
whilst the route to “the thing” appears to be mapped out for them in advance, the characters 
are unable to follow it, and are soon stranded in an indeterminate scene.  
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Searching for a Sign 
  
 Gerry’s landscape of semiotic indiscernibility is further demonstrated in the overt 
figuration of “signs” at key narrative moments; these are granted a paradoxical materiality in 
the presence of way markers, road signs, and information boards.  However, drawing upon 
post-structuralist critiques of the metaphysical sign, the film elucidates a discursive 
disruption within which a legible signifier and a static signified do not inherently 
correspond. Thus, the aforementioned presence of actualised signs further constructs the 
wilderness as a setting replete with potential meanings that nevertheless remain 
unintelligible. This semiotic emptying of physical signs is demonstrated explicitly in a vital 
sequence taken from the protagonist’s narrative quest. Now severely dehydrated and 
exhausted, the Gerrys make yet another attempt to mentally retrace their steps. In doing so, 
their frantic deductions are accompanied by a figurative representation of a traveller finding 
a route, a spatial metaphor for their current predicament; whilst the sequence includes 
several extreme close-ups of the two protagonists’ faces, these are interspersed with inserts 
of fast-motion point-of-view shots of a vehicle on a winding road (Figs.4.23-4.24): 
 
 
 
Figs.4.23-4.24 
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Firstly, the frantic movement of the camera evokes a sense of panic and disorientation, 
reflecting the characters’ near-delirious states. This is also demonstrated in sudden panning 
movements of the camera, as it quickly shifts from side to side, as if uncertain of which 
route to take. The scene also makes significant use of road signs to further demonstrate the 
characters’ thought processes; in the cutaways to the highway that accompany the pair’s 
deductions, these guides literally signpost their discussions. In utilising these pictorial 
signifiers, this sequence also mirrors the film’s opening long-take, in which the pair arrives 
by car, passing many road signs that flank the monotonous motorway (Fig.4.25):  
 
 
Fig.4.25 
 
In the film’s opening shot, the signs are narratologically motivated, operating as cultural 
signifiers with a seemingly static, legally-determined meaning. Returning to the later 
sequence (Figs.4.23-4.24), the signs are used in a superficially similar fashion, denoting a 
fixed, intelligible significance; at moments of supposed clarity, we are shown a sign (such as 
the right-turn [Fig.4.24]) which we assume the pair will follow. However, the sporadic, 
changing, arbitrary nature of their deductions already implies that their interpretations of 
these signs are open to contestation. This is later confirmed as this scene does not mark a 
successful narrative reorientation; rather, they walk further into a wilderness from which 
only one of them will emerge. 
Signposts and way markers are not the only denotative elements used within the film 
to challenge perceptible connections between reference and referent. The film also makes 
extensive use of natural symbols and signs, markers that the characters interpret in their 
quest to escape the wilderness landscape. For example, in one sequence the two Gerrys 
focus their attention on the potential significance of a set of “animal tracks.” In the first 
instance, they infer that they lead to water; this is particularly important to the pair as they 
are significantly dehydrated. However, in working through a plan to exploit this discovery, 
they employ an elaborate logic that depends upon intensive, specialist knowledge of both 
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their surroundings and the species that reside within it; they discuss migratory and drinking 
patterns, mating behaviour, and animal sociability. Nevertheless, the protagonists’ 
assumptions do not appear to be rooted in relevant experience, skills, or understanding; King 
refers to this conversation as “nonsense.”203 Their inability to exploit the imprints is played-
out in the film’s unfolding narrative; these clues never lead to the successful location of a 
water source. This interpretative failure on the part of the protagonists exemplifies the film’s 
deconstructive intervention into American wilderness discourses. Any meaning attached to 
the landscape is arbitrary and fleeting, a product of binary oppositions that are consistently 
destabilised; any discrete or fixed significance for the wilderness is unobtainable as it is 
continuously transformed and deferred. 
  
Conclusions 
 
 In the textual analyses presented above, I have constructed complementary readings 
of cinematic wilderness that systematically unveil, overturn, and efface its logocentric 
constitution within American cultural discourse. In Dead Man, evocations of the Western 
genre allow the film’s wilderness landscape to be explicitly tied to prominent narratives of 
American national identity. However, this act of generic framing simultaneously draws 
critical attention away from specific landscape images to more anthropocentric foci. As a 
result, my reading relocates Dead Man’s natural landscapes as an analytical centre, at the 
same time that it disturbs the position of wilderness as an American national centre. As 
numerous textual elements operate as Derridean undecidables, the film fundamentally 
challenges any discrete, essentialist division between nature and culture; in doing so, it 
problematizes a metaphysical dichotomy that orients the American wilderness (and more 
broadly, national identity). Finally, by analysing the geometric properties of the film’s 
natural vistas, I conclude that Dead Man reflexively subverts principles of linearity and 
horizontality that underlie logocentric constructions of wilderness as a pristine, wide-open 
space.  
 Conversely, this chapter’s reading of Gerry constructs the film’s landscape as a 
complementary terrain of différance. This approach begins with a systematic exploration of 
existing analyses of the film’s natural environs, a critical endeavour that demonstrates 
discursive similarities between specific textual readings and superficially opposed classical 
and romantic wilderness images. In contrast to this interpretative orthodoxy, I argue that 
Gerry superficially evokes both forms of landscape depiction before laying bare their shared 
metaphysical assumptions, a gesture that denies their essential ontological fixity. Thus, 
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whilst the film often depicts its landscape as vast and empty, it does so through a reflexive 
stylistic economy that actually draws attention to the process of expunging the cultural from 
the natural. In turn, the film also foregrounds the wilderness’ potential role as the signifier of 
diverse cultural meanings; however, these signs remain forever unintelligible, demonstrated 
by the Gerrys’ inability to interpret and escape their surroundings. Thus, the film’s landscape 
is established as a transformative realm of différance, an environment within which any 
potential significatory endpoint is constantly deferred. 
 However, it is important to note that the textual readings of this chapter also stand as 
broader observations and conclusions pertaining to this thesis as a whole. In deconstructing 
logocentric antinomies of wilderness/civilisation and nature/culture, these analyses 
simultaneously connote a broader opposition between character and place that has ordered 
this project. In exploring cultural narratives of individualism, the nuclear family, the small-
town, and wilderness, this thesis’ structure superficially enacts a metaphysical continuum of 
American national identity; each chapter provides a structural opening onto the next as the 
thesis addresses oppositions of character and place on increasing conceptual (and 
geographical) scales. However, as established in this project’s introduction, this structure is 
strategically evoked as a means of deconstructing the specific narratives in question and 
their reliance upon discrete definitions of American character and place. Just as the totalised 
ontologies of each cultural narrative are radically effaced, their position within a regulatory, 
logocentric economy of character and place is equally shaken. Thus, this thesis’ overtly 
deconstructive structure is rounded-off with a specific thematic focus (wilderness) that 
stands as its conceptual and cultural apotheosis. The Derridean disruption of wilderness and 
civilisation operates as a microcosmic exemplar of this thesis’ wider disturbance of a 
metaphysics of American national identity.  
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Conclusion: Culture Wars and Cultural Différance 
 
 As detailed in this project’s introduction, my thesis hypothesises and enacts a 
fruitful practice of Derridean film analysis. Drawing upon a deconstructive re-inscription of 
independent film (itself a radical destabilization of existing definitional models), I 
demonstrate how cinematic case-studies can be approached as meta-textual critiques of 
specific thematic structures; in this case, a corpus of independent films are approached as 
deconstructive renderings of American national identity. However, these textual readings 
should not merely be treated as exemplars of a methodological intervention. Rather, their 
challenge to totalised national identity discourses offers a timely, subversive dialogue with 
relevant scholarly and popular debates. Thus, each chapter provides a detailed commentary 
upon specific national identity structures and their constitution within previous academic 
studies, a gesture that facilitates their subsequent deconstruction. Furthermore, by 
challenging the self-presence of American identity, one confronts it with an ungrounded 
freeplay of subjectivities and experiences; this radical economy of différance initiates a non-
proscriptive discourse that encourages diverse, fluid forms of cultural identification. Finally, 
the unfolding of these discursive and textual readings destabilises one final logocentric 
ordering structure, the discrete delineation of character and place. These reductive 
bifurcations are problematized by both the form and content of my arguments, as their 
undecidable co-presence is discerned in numerous scholarly and cinematic texts; this process 
reaches its apotheosis in my final chapter’s exploration of the American wilderness. 
The elucidations outlined above are primarily scholarly, as they provide 
deconstructive engagements with a variety of academic discourses. Yet, the insights offered 
by this project’s case-study analyses also provide a means of intervening directly within 
popular socio-political debates. As is increasingly noticeable in this project’s discursive 
analyses, numerous critics have detected dualistic divisions within narratives of American 
subjectivity and social experience; exceptionalism’s external, regulated difference is re-
inscribed within American culture itself, a move that superficially questions the nation’s 
totalized ontology. Yet, these internal divisions are frequently cast as discrete, oppositional 
struggles over shared structures of cultural meaning. Indeed, one can observe a metaphysical 
contestation of distinct presences in many of the cultural discourses that I address and 
dismantle; for example, antonymic structures are perceptible in contrasting idyllic and dark 
small-town images, divergent representations of a wholesome and debased nuclear family, 
and in adversarial and romantic wilderness attitudes. Thus, ruptures in national discourse are 
rationalised within a dichotomous “culture war,” a fixed economy that pervades both 
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academic and popular debates over American socio-political life.1 Furthermore, such 
approaches often entail the hierarchical juxtaposition of a collective subjectivity with equally 
discrete, self-coherent identity sub-categories, drawing heavily upon discourses of 
“multiculturalism.”2  
This conclusion outlines how the theoretical and textual insights of my thesis 
provide a challenge to these metaphysical paradigms, demonstrating the potential impact of 
my arguments outside of a specifically scholarly context. Having utilised this project’s 
earlier textual readings to confront American national identity with a boundless freeplay of 
différance, this heterogeneous economy is used to challenge the arbitrary regulations that 
allow culture wars and multiculturalist discourses to operate.3 In doing so, the theoretical 
innovations of this project are put to work on a series of discursive constructs that orient 
popular socio-cultural debates; self-contained partisan or sub-national subjectivities are 
displaced in favour of the freeplay of identities that this project has systematically 
unshackled. Finally, this conclusion demonstrates the worth of this thesis in abetting and 
provoking future cultural engagements. In dismantling American identity’s regulatory 
structures, I encourage a less restrictive range of singular cultural gestures. In this regard, my 
Derridean approach does not aim towards the total annihilation of logocentric presence. 
Rather, it focuses upon the emergent cultural heterogeneity that deconstruction brings to the 
surface, a dynamic process that encapsulates the generative politics of Derridean theory.4     
 
Culture Wars and American Difference(s) 
 
As alluded to above, critiques of a self-coherent national character are often 
accommodated within readings of American cultural fragmentation, commonly attributed to 
the growing prominence of other (sub-national) identities.5 Samuel P. Huntingdon’s 
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prominent work in this area is predicated upon the assumption that the United States is 
currently undergoing a “Crisis of National Identity”; he outlines numerous cultural forces 
that have cumulatively “erod(ed)” American cultural homogeneity: “Globalization, 
multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism, immigration, subnationalism, and anti-nationalism.”6 He 
continues by arguing that specific cultural interest groups have succeeded in shifting the 
ideal telos of cultural discourse, from an “emphasis on what Americans had in common” to 
“the celebration of diversity.”7 Thus, Huntingdon tacitly positions multiculturalism as the 
antithesis of a unified American subjectivity: “the notions of nation, national identity, and 
national interest may be losing relevance and usefulness.”8 In more theoretically nuanced 
terms, S.E. Wilmer understands American multiculturalism as a self-conscious critique of 
totalised national meaning: “In the late 1980s and 1990s, multiculturalism provided an 
answer to the accusations of essentialism embedded within identity politics.”9 Thus, whether 
treating such developments as lamentable or liberatory, scholars have identified a thriving 
state of American cultural diversity. However, in arguing that American cultural life has 
recently been fractured, they tacitly reinforce an idealised state of national plenitude that 
(until recently) governed American experience. 
In turn, studies of American cultural fragmentation have engendered antagonistic, 
binary theorisations of identity discourses; the United States is recast as the venue for a 
dualistic socio-political culture war, a bifurcated economy that forcefully regulates cultural 
difference. In such models, American identity is positioned as the object of hostile semiotic 
contestation; different cultural attitudes, values, and experiences are homogenised into two 
self-coherent camps, each espousing a distinct reading of American national meaning. James 
Davison Hunter’s analysis of this cultural conflict emphasises its metaphysical structure; his 
study is predicated upon the simple premise that a value-laden, discursive battle pervades all 
areas of cultural life: “America is in the midst of a culture war that has had and will continue 
to have reverberations not only within public policy but within the lives of ordinary 
Americans everywhere.”10 However, Hunter clarifies that it is the desire for a cohesive 
national identity that animates this debate. Analysing a specific interchange over a particular 
topic (the issue of abortion), Hunter concludes that such cultural clashes are indicative of a 
deep-rooted antinomy: “we come to see that the contemporary culture war is ultimately a 
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struggle over national identity – over the meaning of America.”11 Thus, whilst Hunter 
delineates a number of specific socio-cultural battlegrounds, he ultimately treats the culture 
war as an ontological struggle over American collective identity. Similar readings of 
contemporary American cultural discourse are perceptible in a range of other studies. 
Stanley A. Renshon describes America as a “land of paradox,”12 before suggesting that a 
contemporary culture war is submerging diverse identity groups and areas of national 
discourse: “this conflict’s primary focus is not being waged between one section of the 
country and another, but rather in every section of the country.”13 In turn, Renshon assents to 
Hunter’s perception of “a conflict over the viability of American culture and identity 
itself.”14 Thus, culture wars discourses explicitly mediate divergent values and perspectives 
that crystallize around American national identity; a heterogeneous body of differences are 
subsumed into a polemical debate concerning the validity of specific models of American 
cultural togetherness. 
 On face value, aforementioned commentators diagnose a multifaceted conflict 
involving myriad cultural antagonists. Much like Renshon, Hunter discerns a heterogeneous 
range of cultural attitudes within national debates: “though competing moral visions are at 
the heart of today’s culture war, these do not always take form in coherent, clearly 
articulated, sharply differentiated world views.”15 However, Hunter clarifies that the culture 
war amounts to a stand-off of two entrenched “polarities,” between which stretches a 
continuum of values where individual Americans can be located: 
 
These moral visions take expression as polarizing impulses or tendencies in 
American culture. It is important, in this light, to make a distinction between how 
these moral visions are institutionalized in different organizations and in public 
rhetoric, and how ordinary Americans relate to them. In truth, most Americans 
occupy a vast middle ground between the polarizing impulses of American culture.16 
 
Here, Hunter argues that specific individuals do not identify solely with one attitude or the 
other, instead expressing more complex blends of differing views; however, as has been 
demonstrated, continuum models still reify binary divisions between self-coherent, 
antagonistic extremes that can subsequently be mixed. Furthermore, naming these 
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“polarizing impulses” as the “Orthodox” and the “Progressive,” they are described as 
“formal properties of a belief system or world view.”17 Hunter’s detailed taxonomy of the 
“Orthodox” perspective, for example, closely mirrors the metaphysical yearning for static, 
totalized meaning; orthodoxy entails a theological “commitment on the part of adherents to 
an external, definable, and transcendent authority.”18 Furthermore, Hunter then argues that 
the progressive tendency carries its own transcendental signified, granting the two elements 
a shared ontological grounding; a religious deity is replaced by an equally metaphysical 
source of “moral truth”, such as “natural law.”19 Thus, Hunter outlines the shared logocentric 
foundations of both “camps,” and how they engender socio-political antinomies: 
 
 The orthodox and progressivist impulses in American culture, as I have 
described them, contrast sources of moral truth…. They also express, somewhat 
imperfectly, the opposing social and political dispositions to which Americans on 
opposing sides of the cultural divide are drawn.20  
 
In such arguments, the amorphous play of différance that inhabits American identity is 
externalised, fixed, and regulated through the construction of a culture war, a closed, static 
binary economy. As a result, the purported self-coherence of national belonging is protected 
and a heterogeneous field of potential cultural identities and experiences is disavowed; this 
superficial challenge to national unity actually reifies its underlying metaphysical logic.  
This form of conceptual complicity, in which critiques of cultural homogeneity 
reinforce its ontological closure, can be observed more broadly in an underlying discursive 
assumption; this is the contention that a previously totalised national identity has become 
increasingly fragmented due to the rise of multiculturalism. Whilst pluralist models of 
demographic diversity superficially problematize a monolithic American identity, they do so 
by confronting a cohesive national culture with a range of totalized identity categories, self-
present contestatory “others.” For example, Michael G. Kammen argues that the assimilative 
process of Americanization has left legible and distinct sub-national identity groupings 
intact: “as immigrant groups were transformed by diverse influences in American society, 
they lost many of their original attributes, were re-created as something new, but still 
remained discrete, identifiable groups.”21  In similar terms, recent studies of American 
culture on film have endorsed multiculturalism as the basis for analysing cinematic 
subversions of a coercively normative national identity; this issue has been addressed at 
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length in chapter one, as identity politics discourses provide a near-universal means of 
framing independent cinema’s socio-political representations.22 Finally, aforementioned 
culture wars approaches directly cite multiculturalism as a prominent source of varied 
antonymic ruptures within American cultural life. For example, Renshon argues that 
antagonistic debates regarding national togetherness thrive upon multicultural difference: 
 
The new danger lies in conflicts between people of different racial, cultural, and 
ethnic heritages, and between those who view themselves as socially, culturally, 
politically, and economically disadvantaged and those who are viewed as 
privileged.23 
 
In this reading, the war over American identity are fought on discrete and definable cultural 
faultlines; whilst stressing an overarching dualistic cultural logic, it is played out in a series 
of antonymic tussles that reinforce the integrity of specific socio-cultural groupings.24  
 Homi K. Bhabha provides a detailed interrogation of the metaphysical logic that 
structures multiculturalist rhetoric, a set of logocentric foundations that prevent the 
realisation of radical, liberationist claims. Lamenting the tendency to “polarize in order to 
polemicize,” 25 Bhabha refers to a pervasive cultural binarism that constructs discrete socio-
political minorities in (a hierarchically-inferior) opposition to an equally homogenised 
national norm. This process, by which a fixed cultural centre is challenged by equally 
totalised “minority discourse(s),”26 is eloquently described by Peter Brunette: “currently, too 
many leftists seem to combat the absolute presences of oppressive systems with other 
absolute presences which are seen merely as their opposites, and therefore involved in the 
same constricting economy.”27 Thus, ostensibly liberatory structures are often theorised in 
the image of their subjugators; this tendency renders such categories complicit with the 
metaphysical systems they aim to undermine.28 In turn, any attempt to subvert the 
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hierarchical dominance of metaphysical national identities by elevating its minority “others” 
leaves this underlying dualistic logic in place; as Bhabha notes, all this achieves is “the 
simple inversion of the relation of oppressor and oppressed, margin and periphery, negative 
image and positive image.”29 In contrast, he calls for a fundamental displacing of a binary 
cultural logic; this gesture frees cultural difference from its regulated, metaphysical form, 
relocating it within the national subject as a heterogeneous agent of structural subversion. If 
this reorientation of cultural resistance is accepted, one must endorse an identity model that 
is “more hybrid in the articulation of cultural differences and identifications – gender, race 
or class – than can be represented in any hierarchical or binary structuring of social 
antagonism.”30 In questioning the bifurcated solidity of logocentric identity discourses, 
Bhabha challenges any attempt to reconceptualise the nation as an assemblage of discrete, 
self-contained groups; this deconstructive re-inscription of cultural difference exceeds and 
overflows the multicultural model of the nation “as the admixture of pre-given identities or 
essences.”31 In doing so, Bhabha unpacks a hybrid “third space” that inaugurates an 
originary “discourse of emergent cultural identities, within a non-pluralistic politics of 
difference”: 32 
  
For a willingness to descend into that alien territory…may reveal that the theoretical 
recognition of the split-space of enunciation may open the way to conceptualising an 
international culture, based not on the exoticism or multi-culturalism of the diversity 
of cultures, but on the inscription and articulation of culture’s hybridity.33 
  
Thus, Bhabha demonstrates that many challenges to national homogeneity replicate its 
“totalising Utopian vision of Being and History”;34 as with national identities, they are 
oriented towards an idealised state of metaphysical self-presence and structural closure. In 
turn, these logocentric assumptions can only be displaced by a deconstructive re-orientation 
of cultural différance, a heterogeneous model that ultimately undermines the self-coherence 
of national identity and its varied multicultural “others.”  
Importantly, American pluralist and culture wars discourses provide exemplary 
case-studies with which to elucidate this Derridean intervention into identity politics. In 
these interrelated discursive examples, ruptures within the national body are regulated in 
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antagonistic, binary forms; a heterogeneous field of identities and experiences are 
assimilated into a series of self-coherent definitional categories. Thus, whilst the subject 
positions implied by multiculturalism superficially fracture the national whole, they instead 
function as a range of distinct, denigrated cultural “others,” defined against a national mass 
culture whose solidity they structurally reinforce. Furthermore, attempts to subvert this 
hierarchical, dualistic economy are shown to be problematic in theory and doomed in 
practice; such liberatory political gestures still rely upon logocentric models of presence and 
ontological discreteness, perpetuating the immovable binary architecture that originally 
engendered their subservient position. As with the externalised difference of American 
exceptionalism, multicultural models coercively regulate a freeplay of references and 
substitutions. Their illusory coherence can only be shaken by a radical cultural différance, 
explored in this thesis through detailed discursive analyses and put to work in the reading of 
cinematic case-studies.  
 
The Politics of Deconstruction 
 
As stated at the beginning of this conclusion, I have discussed at length how this 
thesis intervenes within and reshapes varied scholarly fields. However, the enduring value of 
the project also hinges on its potential to precipitate a practical intervention into American 
cultural life. Thus, whilst I have systematically outlined this thesis’ endorsement of a 
Derridean cultural différance, it is as important to consider how it can challenge popular 
discursive orthodoxies. A tentative example of this theoretical model’s potential impact 
outside of the academy stems from its aforementioned ability to disrupt the restrictive 
conceptual frameworks that shape prominent social debates. Importantly, this discussion 
brings into clearer focus a key critical charge that is persistently levelled at Derridean 
scholars: that deconstruction is an abstract exercise that avoids distinct political position-
taking and, at worst, precludes any practical application. Jacques Derrida debates this 
common criticism in his discussion of différance, noting that the concept “has often been 
accused of privileging delay, neutralization, suspension and, consequently, of straying too 
far from the urgency of the present, particularly its ethical and political urgency”;35 this 
charge is succinctly summarised in Peter Brunette and David Wills’ suggestion that 
deconstruction is frequently attacked for being “apolitical and ahistorical.”36 Thus, as 
Brunette summarises, critiques of deconstructive politics stem from its necessary 
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questioning of all social, cultural, philosophical and political discourses: “some on the left 
have denounced deconstruction because it tends to call all thinking into question, even that 
which presents itself as progressive and liberatory.”37 Finally, at its most extreme, anti-
deconstructionist rhetoric entails accusations of “moral relativism”38 and nihilism; this is 
perceptible in the common assertion (particularly outside of academia) that deconstruction 
denies any meaning whatsoever.39 Whilst the precise terms (and vehemence) of these 
critiques vary, one can perceive a common scholarly and popular assumption; Derridean 
thought is derided as an anathema of political, moral, or ethical engagement.  
 Conversely, my thesis is predicated upon the contention that deconstruction offers a 
useful basis for decisive interventions into cultural politics. Many Derridean theorists have 
convincingly challenged charges of apoliticism, arguing that deconstruction’s raison d’etre 
is to question the hierarchical inequalities that coercively regulate all Western structures. To 
begin, Derrida continually opposed purported misreadings of his work as essentially 
nihilistic; he notes that many activists struggle to understand that deconstruction is primarily 
political: “on one side and the other, people get impatient when they see that deconstructive 
practices are also and first of all political and institutional practices.”40 Thus, Derrida 
positions the radical worth of deconstructive thought in its ability to exceed and challenge 
repressive socio-cultural orthodoxies; it amounts to “an act of cultural resistance” that 
cannot be normalised or neutralised.41 Similarly, Brunette argues that deconstruction’s 
political function hinges on its disruption of a metaphysical discursive system that closes 
down debates that arise amongst a plethora of ideological positions: “Derrida’s writings can 
be seen as thoroughly political in nature when they are properly understood as a critique of 
the outmoded ‘logocentric’ thinking that has led to numerous political impasses in the 
past.”42 Extrapolating this view to its potential apotheosis, the political value of 
deconstruction could reside in its rejection of any fixed ideological position; Dana Polan 
eloquently argues this reading, suggesting that a “progressive” politics is abetted by 
deconstruction’s refusal to privilege a single, coherent reading of socio-historical reality: 
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Is progressive politics then engagement in and commitment to a position, based on 
the analysis of an ultimately interpretable historical situation? Or is progressive 
politics the refusal to be positioned at all, the realization that a new political 
situation demands a new language no longer tied to old representations and old 
modes of representation?43  
 
In such a reading, the radical potential of deconstructive politics comes from its rejection of 
any essential stance, revolutionary or conservative; as Derrida puts it, deconstruction is 
“inherently ‘nothing at all.’”44 
In turn, other critics have located Derridean theory’s political function in the 
deconstruction of logocentric dualisms. As has already been established, Derrida’s reading 
of metaphysical binarism perceives a “violent hierarchy” at work in all oppositional 
structures.45 Bearing this in mind, the overturning and displacing of discrepancies in 
discursive authority embeds a radical political potential within deconstruction’s underlying 
methodological principles. Brunette and Wills endorse this perspective, drawing upon 
Derrida’s own assertion that deconstruction seeks “to comprehend…what strategies, 
interests, and investments are at work in play.”46 In turn, Brunette and Wills elucidate how 
deconstruction probes the political hegemonies sustained by Western discourse, 
interrogating 
 
the ways in which authority and power constitute themselves through logocentric, 
oppositional hierarchies that a deconstructive strategy may then seek to reverse and 
displace. As long as politics has anything to do with structures of power and the 
workings of economies, Derrida’s work has been addressing political questions.47 
 
Thus, Brunette and Wills argue that the explicitly political themes of Derrida’s later work 
(such as South African apartheid) merely foregrounded a latent radical function that has 
always inhabited the act of deconstructive reading.48  
 Finally, accusations of nihilism can be countered by focusing on the productive 
possibilities of Derridean theory. Whilst critics argue that deconstruction aims towards a 
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total obliteration of knowledge or sense, others have noted that this critical gesture actually 
facilitates a greater diversity of significances and meanings. Derrida openly espouses this 
view, asserting that “deconstruction is never concluded because it was never nihilistic, 
contrary to what they say in Newsweek, but rather affirmative and generative.”49 Thus, the 
invention of meaning relies upon the deconstruction of restrictive metaphysical forms; while 
logocentric structures continue to regulate the play of différance from which all significance 
stems, any attempt to construct an original political intervention is impossible.50 Barbara 
Johnson cogently demonstrates this point, arguing that deconstruction does not posit the 
impossibility of meaning; rather it challenges the hierarchical pre-eminence of specific 
meanings to the detriment of a multiplicity of others: 
 
Deconstruction is not a form of textual vandalism designed to prove that meaning is 
impossible…. If anything is destroyed in a deconstructive reading, it is not meaning 
but the claim to unequivocal domination of one mode of signifying over another.51 
 
Wills uses similar insights to argue that deconstruction calls for constant critical reflection, 
an active process that consistently analyses and refines the ways in which we conduct social, 
cultural, and political affairs: 
 
In shaking up our way of thinking, Derrida is, in a very real sense trying to save it; 
not to save it in any immutable form, but to keep it going, to keep us thinking…in a 
culture that…is rapidly forgetting or repressing its relation to language and to the 
word, forgetting how to read, no longer taking the time to read, perhaps preferring 
the passivity of looking…. Derrida forces us to stop, look, and read more closely.52      
 
Wills demonstrates that Derridean theory does not posit a series of abstract strategies that 
absolve the critic of political responsibility; rather it is cast as the potential saviour of critical 
thought and, by extension, political action. Importantly, this understanding of deconstruction 
as the facilitator of diverse meanings, readings, or interventions exemplifies this thesis’ 
endorsement of Derridean theory’s political importance; it also underlies the positive, 
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practical impact of my research upon popular national identity debates. Uncovering and 
destabilizing forces of cultural homogenisation, this deconstructive intervention opens up an 
unbounded and non-totalizing freeplay of différance within American cultural politics. This 
Derridean model abets a fundamental reconceptualization of identity discourses; it 
dismantles restrictive metaphysical orthodoxies, displaces antagonistic structural 
oppositions, and liberates a plethora of singular cultural gestures. It is this form of dynamic, 
continuous political intervention that this thesis has attempted to facilitate. 
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